2008-11-21

Picture maps: Ireland, France and Italy, and Corea







Koreans made this map, allegedly in response to some Japanese derision that they are rabbits.


This is a propaganda map by a Japanese around the time prior to the 1905 Russo-Japanese War (but the language used was Chinese and English), In the English text on the top left corner Ohara depicted Russia as the "Black Octopus"
Note the antenna of the Octopus going through Manchuria into Lushun (near Dalian today).



小朋友!你能把各省的名稱指出來麼
Being Humourous Outlines of Various Countries
Satirical Maps of the First World War

2008-11-19

ZT: 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考 Wei - the Prussia of China 2500 years ago

One of the biggest puzzles in reading the Chinese history before the Qin dynasty is the geographic locations. In early Spring-Autumn period, the maps are relatively easy to construct, as most states are single-city states, surrounded by the farm land in the neighborhood. As the "merger and acquisition" game played out, territories are formed. still there was no clear boundary and at times exclaves and enclaves are formed.

By the time of the Warring States, the states are relatively consolidated. But one big confusion remains, i.e. the map for the state of Wei.

Wei started as 2 geographically disjoint "-claves": The West portion (today's SW Shanxi, From Yuncheng to Fenglingdu where the Yellow River makes a sharp 90 degreee turn from southward to eastward, and where the brick kilns a couple years ago was), and the East portion (today's Kaifeng and surrounding). For a few years at its pinnacles it even got another exclave by "borrowing road" via Zhao, to qonquer and annex Zhongshan (today's Shijiazhuang area).

Historians (and historic geographers) are still not quite sure how Wei (esp its army, as the cities are mostly self-sustainable and messengers are easy to get through in the wild) moved between its two disjoint territories. You can see the overall Warring State maps below. Some has postulated that there is a corridor (see the second map) connecting them but this theory has been disputed. Though it was possible that while Han was friendly to Wei (for most of the time it was, except the brief period when they were at war) they share the paths between their cities.

The origin of Wei's weird territory needs to be traced back to how the 3 states were formed upon the division of Jin. There were actually much more than 3 families towards the end of Jin, at least 8 (赵 魏 韩 知 范 中行(=荀) 栾 郤 in reverse order of when they were annihilated), most of them were descendents of the families who followed Zhong Er's (Jin Wen Gong) exiles a couple hundred years earlier in the Spring Autumn Period. In short, near the end there were 5 families left and each of these 3 got 2 big chunks, one of which was there traditional holding plus whatever they got up to that point, the second chunk was what they got by killing the other 3 families.
  • Zhao was the most lucky one, who had Jinyang (Taiyuan today)  area to start with, and acquired south Hebei (around Handan) from Fan/Zhonghang, Zhao was twice lucky because they were furthest away fromt he formidable Qin state, who later unified China. Wei and Han were weakened throughout the Period because of its promixity (and hence war) with Qin
  • Han's 2 chunks are one in South (mid-Henan) and one in North (the area which separates the 2 Wei territories)
  • Wei got where it started (Anyi, the capital before it was driven to Daliang (today's Kaifeng)) plus Zhi (the home of the Zhi family) which is SW of Anyi. Looking at this map one could understand why Zhao Xiangzi had been able to convince Wei into switching side and fought Zhi -- Zhi located in the SW corner of Jin and if anyone Zhi wanted to wipe out next it must be Wei who is just outside its front door. The graphically location of the West portion of Wei meant that Wei would have to be in war with Qin for the next 150 years until it more or less lost all its western territory, by that time the nightmare for Han really began as it was exposed to Qin fully then.

The Warring States Period had some striking similarity with Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. Wei, geographically disjoint as East and West Prussia, was surrounded in the middle facing enemies from all directions, which also made them great warriors and actually the first to reform (before Qin did). Chu was in a position similar to that of Russia, with wide open territories without advanced population on the other sides. Qin was similar to that of Britain, geographically well defended and eventually became the strongest of all.

---
Map of early Warring States Period, circa 400-300BC


The cities of Han and Wei (you can see Zhi is located to the west of Anyi, just north of Yongji, on the east side of Yellow River around where it is about to turn east)





战国时期魏国疆域变迁考  

作者:李晓杰 出处:历史地理

一、 问题的提出及已有的相关研究成果

政治地理学的研究在西方至今已有一百余年的发展,并取得了不少成绩。然而在我国,政治地理学长期以来未得到充分的发展,尤其是作为其分支的历史政治地理的研究,几乎是鲜有人涉猎。近年来,情况有所改观。在理论方面,周振鹤先生率先著文,对历史政治地理学的理论与学科建设提出了自己的设想 。不过对具体的中国历史政治地理的断代研究,则尚未出现。

战国时期,诸侯国之间征战频仍,其各自之间疆域变动之剧烈,在中国历史的其它时期,很少有能与其匹敌者。这段历史时期所发生的政治、军事、外交等诸多方面的变化,无疑给我们探讨历史政治地理提供了一个极好的案例。而欲进行战国时期政治地理的研究,理清其时各诸侯国的疆域变动的轨迹,应是首要进行的基础性工作。

关于战国时期诸侯国的疆域,迄今为止仅有钟凤年 、顾颉刚与史念海 、杨宽 、雁侠 、陈伟 、徐少华 等不多的几位学者做了一定的研究。在上述这些研究中,除去陈伟、徐少华先生对战国时期楚国北疆的变迁考证较为详实之外,其余的研究都是比较初步的,因此有必要对此进行重新审视。本文拟在此即对战国时期三晋之一的魏国疆域变迁做一全面的考证 ,以期对这一方面的研究有所推动。

现存先秦时期的文献中可作为疆域研究的资料极其有限,且已被以往的学者几乎利用殆尽,因此想要对前人的研究有所突破,其中一个很重要的条件就是依靠地下新的出土资料。前些年出土的一些先秦时期文字资料,其中主要有秦简《编年记》、曾侯乙墓中的简册、《包山楚简》及大量的秦封泥等,恰好都为考订这一时期的诸侯国疆域变化提供了宝贵的材料。

在进行战国诸侯国疆域变动的考证中,首先遇到的最大问题即是战国史料的编年的问题,它直接影响到整个考证的结论,因为依据不同的年代,就会复原出不同的历史面貌。以往从事这段历史研究的学者,在运用这些材料时都会感到一个很大的不便,即很多事件发生的年代,由于文献记载的矛盾,很难判断确切的时间。仅有的可作为年代参考依据的《史记·六国年表》,又包含有大量无法理顺的问题。现在这一问题终于有了一个较为圆满的解答。日本学者平势隆郎经过潜心的研究考证,在前人研究的基础之上,编纂了一部《新编史记东周年表--中国古代纪年の硏究序章》 ,该书将纷繁矛盾的先秦史料做了梳理,可谓目前最为完善的一部先秦历史纪年表。这一年表不仅将战国时期的事件做了统一的排序,而且也相应地澄清了一些史实 。不过,在此需要指出的是,该书的编纂是将《史记》所载之事完全做为信史而进行的,而对《史记》所记之事的真伪并未做进一步的考订,这是此书略显不足之处。
在此书出版之后,又有一位日本学者藤田胜久刊布了其研究成果--《史记戦国史料の研究》 。此书主要对《史记》的《本纪》及主要《世家》中所涉及的战国史料的编年问题做了深入的研究,其大部分结论与《新编史记东周年表》相同。因此本文在下面所从事的具体疆域考证的系年,基本上即以《新编史记东周年表》(后文简称平势《表》)为准。
另外,缪文远又有《战国史系年辑证》 问世,但因此书仍主要是以《史记·六国年表》及《资治通鉴》的《周纪》与《秦纪》为线索,并未跳出传统的战国纪年的窠臼,故本文不采缪氏之说。
魏,本为西周封国,公元前661年为晋国所灭,封大夫毕万于此地。《左传·闵公元年》载:"晋侯作二军,公将上军,大子申生将下军。赵夙御戎,毕万为右,以灭耿、灭霍、灭魏。还,为大子城曲沃,赐赵夙耿,赐毕万魏,以为大夫。"《魏世家》所载略同:"献公之十六年(前661),赵夙为御,毕万为右,以伐霍、耿、魏,灭之。以耿封赵夙,以魏封毕万,为大夫。"魏城在今山西芮城县北。后来毕万的势力越来越大,于是从其国名而称为魏氏。战国时期的魏国即是在此基础之上发展而来的。


晋文公即位,令毕万子魏武子袭魏氏之后封,列为大夫,治于魏。据《魏世家》,魏武子之子悼子时,又徙治霍(今山西霍州西南)。晋悼公之十二年(前562),魏绛又由霍徙治安邑(今山西夏县西北)。
公元前451年,魏桓子与韩康子、赵襄子伐灭知伯,分其地。随后,魏又与韩、赵两国三分晋国 ,正式确定了魏国的领土范围。由于战国前中期韩国北疆与赵国南境接壤,这种形势便将魏国河东与河内地区隔断,使魏国疆域分为东、西两个地理区域,因此本文拟分别考证这两个区域四至的变动情况。


二、魏国西部区域边界的变化

战国时期,魏国西部区域主要指魏河西、河东地区。在这一区域魏主要与秦国、赵、韩三国接壤。下面我们就具体来讨论一下魏这一部分疆域的变化情况。

(一) 西境

魏西境的变化是魏、秦两国相互争夺土地的结果。魏、秦之间的领土争夺先从西河地区展开。
魏文侯执政后,任用李悝,实行了一系列的变法改革措施,使魏国的实力大为增强。二十一年(前422),魏为防范秦国的侵袭,在少梁(今陕西韩城市西南)筑城 。少梁在西河以西,加之《秦本纪》说在魏筑少梁后,"秦击之",所以可推知该地其时与秦地相接,为魏西境上地。魏国此时西境已有西河的部分土地。
二十二年,魏国再次向位于自己领土西境外的秦国发动进攻,一直打到渭水南岸的郑(今陕西华县)地才收兵,并在雒(洛)阴(今陕西大荔县西南洛河南岸)、合阳(今陕西合阳县东南)筑城 。
二十三年,魏复城少梁 。此年复城少梁,当是此地邻秦,地理位置极其重要之故。
二十八年,魏派太子击围攻秦之庞(今陕西韩城市东南),"出其民",将庞地占为己有 。
三十一年,魏将吴起率军伐秦,夺取了秦临晋(今陕西大荔县东)与元里(今陕西澄城南)等地,并在该二地筑城 。临晋、元里亦在西河地区,加上前此魏所据有的少梁、洛阴、合阳、庞等地,魏将河西地区大部分土地控制在自己手中。春秋时期,河西之地本为晋地,公元前645年,晋将河西地献给了秦国 。现在魏又占领了该地。于是魏置西河郡,以吴起为郡守,以抵御秦、韩等国的进攻 。
四十六年,秦又侵位于渭水之南的魏之阴晋(今陕西华阴市东) 。魏、秦两国在渭南地区展开了激烈的争夺。
四十八年,秦伐魏,再败魏于渭南的武下(今陕西华县东),并俘虏了守将识 。魏国渭水以南领土缩减了不少。
惠成王五年(前366),魏为了巩固其在渭南的疆土,于是在武堵(都)(今陕西华县东) 筑城,但仍被秦国所败。因此时秦为献公执政,通过一些改革,秦国力已由弱转强。同年,秦又败韩、魏联军于洛阴,该地也当为秦所得 。自此,秦开始了逐步重新夺取魏河西之地的行动。
八年,秦又向北攻打魏河西的少梁,赵再次出兵相救 ,才得以抵挡秦军的攻势。
九年,魏继续与秦在少梁作战,结果被秦庶长国所率的军队击败,魏将公孙痤等被俘,位于少梁东北的庞为秦所取。庞原本属秦,故此次秦当是收回之 。
十七年,魏与秦战于元里,秦攻占了魏的少梁 。
十九年,魏在河西筑长城,南起于渭水南岸的阴晋,向北越过渭水、洛水,经大荔、澄城、合阳诸县,最后止于少梁 。
三十年,魏在西境与卫鞅所率的秦军交战,结果魏军败北 。
至迟三十三年,合阳属秦 。三十三年,秦攻魏,败魏于岸门(今山西河津县南),俘虏了守将魏错 。
惠成王更元三年(前332),魏将阴晋(今陕西华阴市东)献给了秦国,以求和好。秦得该地后,更名为宁秦 。
更元五年,秦在雕阴(今陕西甘泉南)大败魏将龙贾所率之军,斩首四万五千。与此同时,迫于秦的压力,魏将河西之地献给了秦国 。这样,魏与秦当以黄河为界。
更元六年,秦攻取了魏的汾阴(今山西万荣西南)、皮氏(今山西河津东)、焦 。
至迟于哀王十二年(前307),皮氏复由秦归魏 。
十三年,魏又在皮氏筑城 。
昭王六年(前290),魏又将河东四百里之地送给了秦国 。同年,皮氏又为秦攻取 。


3 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考

(二) 北境
武侯九年(前387),翟败魏于浍水 。
二十五年,魏败赵于蔺(今山西离石县西) 。
惠成王十年(前361),赵与魏又易地。魏将榆次(今山西榆次)、阳邑(今山西太谷东北)二地给了赵国 。
惠成王更元七年(前328),秦夺得魏蒲阳(今山西隰县),同时魏将上郡全境十五县之地献给了秦国 。魏至迟在魏文侯卒位的公元前395年已置有上郡。上郡之领域,杨宽以为有今陕西省洛河以东,黄梁河以北,东北到子长、延安一带 。在魏上郡属秦之时,原为魏十五县的肤施、漆垣、广衍等地亦当同时属秦 。
更元十三年,秦攻取了魏的平周(今山西介休县西) 。

(三)东境
武侯十四年(前382),魏城王垣(今山西省垣曲县东南) 。
惠成王九年(前362),魏与韩、赵发生利害冲突,魏相公孙痤大败韩、赵联军于浍水。擒赵将乐祚,伐取了赵的皮牢(今山西翼城东北) 。
惠成王更元十三年(前322),秦攻取了魏的曲沃(山西闻喜县东北) 。
昭王四年(前292),秦大良造白起率军攻魏,夺取了魏之垣邑,旋秦又将该地归还给魏国 。
六年,垣又为秦攻取 。
至迟九年,魏绛(今山西省侯马市西)地属秦。绛本春秋晋国之都,战国时期,绛入于魏 。

(四)南境
文侯三十九年时,秦对魏发动攻击,一直打到魏国的阳狐(今山西垣曲县东南古城),此时两国当以此地为界 。
武侯十四年(前382),魏城安邑(今山西省夏县西北) 。
惠成王二年(前369),魏与韩、赵联军战于浊泽。结果,魏军大败 。其地应在今山西运城市解州西。
七年,秦向东进军,越过黄河,攻打魏的河东之地。在石门(今山西运城西南),秦军大败魏军,斩首六万。赵派兵急救魏,方解秦之围 。
十九年,秦大良造卫鞅率军围攻魏旧都安邑,迫使安邑降秦 。后安邑又还属魏(见下文)。
更元五年(前330),围魏在黄河南岸的焦(今河南三门峡以西)、曲沃(今河南三门峡西南)二地 。
更元八年,秦复将焦、曲沃归还魏国 。
哀王五年(前314),秦将樗里子攻取魏的曲沃、岸门(今山西河津县南)、焦 。
十六年,秦攻取魏蒲阪(反)(今山西永济西)、阳晋(山西永济县虞乡西)、封陵(今山西芮城县西南)三地 。此三地都位于魏河东地区。
十七年,魏秦又将蒲阪(反)归还魏国 。
二十三年,魏、韩、齐三国联合攻秦,攻入函谷关,迫使秦求和。秦复将河外之地与封陵还给魏国,以示和好 。
昭王六年(前290),蒲阪又为秦攻取 。
九年,秦将司马错攻打魏之河内,魏将安邑献给属秦 。
安釐王二十三年(前254),秦取魏之吴城(今山西平陆县北) 。至此,魏在河东之地尽失于秦。


三、魏国东部区域疆界的变动

魏国疆域的东部区域是指魏河内及黄河以南的地区。

(一) 西境
魏国河内及中原地区西侧为韩国疆土,魏这一段疆界的变化,涉及到战国前期的魏与韩和后期的魏与秦之间的领土变化与争夺。
魏文侯四十二年(前401),魏在酸枣(今河南省延津县西南)筑城 。
惠成王十三年(前358),魏将龙贾率军在魏大梁西侧修筑了一条长城 。这条长城北起黄河南岸的卷(今河南原阳西),东南经阳武(今河南原阳东南),再折向西南,最后至密(今河南密县东北) 。魏筑此长城主要为了防备秦国越过崤关向东的侵袭 。
十四年,魏又从韩国手中取得了穿越太行山的要道轵道,并将鹿(今河南浚县东南)给了韩国 。
昭王七年,秦攻取魏河内六十一城 。
九年(前287),秦取得魏新垣、曲阳(河南济源市西)二城 。
十三年(前283),秦得魏安城(今河南原阳县西南,一说在今河南汝南县东南) 。
安釐王元年(前276),秦将白起伐魏,又攻取魏二城 。依据当时的形势推断,此二城应在魏大梁附近。
二年,秦再攻取魏二城,并兵临魏都大梁城下,韩派暴鸢率兵前来救魏,结果被秦击败,暴鸢退走启封(今河南开封西南),秦军追至该地 。魏最终将温(今河南温县西南)割给了秦国,才求得议和局面 。


4 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考
三年,秦客卿胡阳攻魏,又得魏卷、蔡(阳)(今河南上蔡西南)、长社(今河南长葛东北)及中阳(今河南郑州东)四城 。
四年,秦将白起攻华阳(今河南新郑县北),败三晋军,斩首十五万,魏将芒卯被迫逃走,魏献南阳以求和 。
九年,秦夺取了魏的怀地(今河南武陟县西南) 。
至迟十一年,韩邢丘(今河南温县东平皋东北隅)属魏,十一年该地又属秦 。
二十九年,秦拔魏高都(今山西晋城市)及汲(今河南汲县西南)。《秦本纪》:"(庄襄王)二年(据平势《表》,当三年 (前248)),蒙骜攻魏高都、汲,拔之。"
三十二年,秦麃公将军攻卷,斩首三万,复取魏卷 。卷本在安釐王三年已属秦,此年秦又攻之,当是得而复失,故再次攻取之。
景湣王十二年(前231),魏献地于秦 。从当时的形势来推测,魏所献之地当在魏都大梁附近。
王假三年(前225),秦将王贲率军攻魏,将魏都大梁包围,引河水及大沟水灌大梁,结果大梁城坏,魏王假被俘,于是魏亡于秦 。

(二)北境
魏文侯三十五年(前408),魏越赵界伐中山,至三十七年(前406)而拔中山 。因魏与中山之间有赵国相隔,所以魏对中山当是遥领之。魏文侯为守中山,将太子击封于中山,乐羊封于灵寿(《乐毅列传》),并任命李克为中山相 。
四十年(前403),魏文侯令西门豹守邺(今河北省临漳县西南),至迟此时魏已有邺地 。以该地所处位置来看,当在魏、赵两国交界处。
武侯六年 (前390),赵进攻魏的河北地区,攻取魏的棘蒲(今河北魏县南) 。
二年之后(八年),赵复取魏黄城(河南内黄县西北) 。
至迟十年,因魏不能越过赵国而对中山实行强有力的管辖,因此中山趁机复国,魏不再控有中山 。
惠成王元年(前370),魏在怀(今河南武陟县西南)大败赵军,怀当属魏 。
九年,魏伐赵,攻取了赵列人(今河北肥乡县东北)与肥(今河北肥乡西)二地 。列人、肥两邑地近赵都邯郸,魏占据之后,对赵十分不利。
十年,魏攻取了赵的泫氏(今山西省高平市) 。亦在此年,赵与魏又易地。赵将其旧都中牟县送给了魏国。而此时魏亦将繁阳(今河南内黄西北)、浮水一带给了赵国 。两国易地,使魏北界与赵南界发生了变化,因此《水经·渠水注》曰:"自魏徙大梁,赵以中牟易魏,故赵之南界,极于浮水,匪直专漳也。"
十八年,魏伐赵,攻占了赵国都城邯郸 。赵于是向齐求救,齐便派田忌、孙膑率兵求赵。齐军大败魏军于桂陵(今河南长垣西北)(《赵世家》、《魏世家》、《田敬仲完世家》、《孙膑列传》)。《孙膑兵法》中所记载的智擒庞涓的"围魏救赵"著名战例,即指的此次战役。


5 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考
二年之后(二十年),魏又将邯郸归还赵国 。
三十年,魏与赵在魏之北境交战 。
至迟惠王更元元年(前334年),黄城复由赵属魏 。
昭王八年(前288),魏河阳之地为赵所得 。此河阳,即河雍,在今河南孟县西 。
十四年,乐毅率领赵国的军队攻取魏伯阳(今河南安阳县西北) 。
十六年,赵与魏伯阳 。
安釐王元年(前276),赵国大将廉颇又领兵攻取了魏国东北境的几(今河北大名东南) 。
二年,赵攻取魏的防陵、安阳 。防陵与安阳都在今河南安阳西南。
二十年,魏宁新中(今河南安阳市西)属秦 。
景湣王元年(前242),秦拔魏酸枣(今河南延津西南)、燕(今河南延津东北)、虚(今河南延津东)、长平(今河南西华东北)、雍丘(今河南杞县)、山阳(今河南焦作东南)等二十城,随后即建立了东郡 。
景湣王二年(前241),魏朝歌(今河南淇县)为秦所取 。
三年,魏汲被秦国所攻取 。安釐王二十九年(前248),秦已从魏国手中夺取了汲,此时又复取,当是汲在公元前248年后又复属魏之故。
四年,魏将邺给了赵国 。
五年,秦将杨端和攻魏,夺取了魏的三城:垣(今河南省长垣县东北)、蒲阳(今河南长垣西)、衍(今河南郑州北)。随后,秦军又先后攻占据了魏的仁(当近平丘)、平丘(今河南长垣西南)、小黄(今河南开封东北)、济阳(今河南兰考东北)、甄城(今山东甄城北)等地 。

(三)东境
魏文侯四十五年(前398),襄陵(今河南睢县)为齐所攻取 。襄陵地处魏东南境上,其时当与齐为邻。而由《汉志》陈留郡襄邑下颜师古注引圈称所云"襄邑,宋地,本承匡襄陵乡也。宋襄公所葬,故曰襄陵。秦始皇以承匡卑湿,故徙县于襄陵,谓之襄邑,县西三十里有承匡城"之文又知襄陵为承匡之襄陵乡,是至迟此时魏已有宋之承匡地。承匡,亦作承筐,本春秋宋邑,其地在今河南省睢县西南匡城。战国初期承匡属魏,《齐策二》载"犀首以梁为齐战于承匡而不胜"可证。
武侯九年(前387),魏又使吴起伐齐,至灵丘(今山东高唐县南,一说在今山东滕州市东) 。
十四年,魏再次伐齐,至齐桑丘(今山东平原县西) 。
惠成王三年(前367),齐败魏于观(今河南清丰县南) ,观当属齐。观位于河水东岸,于此说明其时魏与齐在此处以河水为界。
十四年,韩派使者许息至魏,将韩伸入到魏国境内的平丘(今河南封丘东)、户牖(今河南兰考北)、首垣(今河南长垣东北)等地送给魏国 。
至迟十九年,襄陵由齐还属魏国,该年诸侯围魏襄陵 。
二十九年,魏攻韩,韩求救于齐。齐派田忌、田朌为将,孙膑为军师,出兵救韩。结果在马陵(今山东范县西南),齐军设下埋伏,大败魏军。魏太子申被俘,魏将庞涓自杀。
三十年,齐国大将田朌与宋人一起联合攻魏东境,围魏平阳(今河南滑县南) 。
三十一年,魏在济阳(今河南省兰考县东北)筑城 。
更元十二年(前323),楚伐魏,魏襄陵属楚 。
哀王二年(前316),魏与齐战,齐败魏于观津(今河北武邑县东南) 。
八年,魏攻卫,得卫二城 。
安釐王十二年(前265),魏据单父(今山东省单县) 。
至迟三十四年,秦陶郡之地为魏所取 。陶春秋时期为宋国属地,战国时期齐灭宋后,为齐所据。后来燕等五国联合破齐,秦又占有该地,秦昭襄王三十三年(前274),又益封穰侯魏冄于此。魏冄死后,方又设郡。陶郡乃因陶邑而得名,陶邑即定陶,该郡当有今山东省宁阳至定陶县一带 。三十四年,秦将蒙骜率兵夺取魏畼、有诡二地 。

(四)南境
魏文侯四十二年(前401),魏向南进攻郑国 。
武侯二十年(前376),魏伐楚,得楚之鲁阳(今河南省鲁山县) 。魏得鲁阳后,使魏在黄河以南有了较为广阔的领土。
惠成王元年(前370),魏在马陵(今河南新郑东南)大败韩军,马陵当属魏 。
六年,魏伐宋,取仪台(今河南虞城县西南) 。
十年,魏为了使地处河东的国都安邑免遭秦国的侵扰,决定将都城由安邑徙都中原地带的大梁(今河南省开封市) 。魏国的政治中心也因此由西部转到了东部。


6 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考


十六年,魏侵宋黄池(今河南封丘县西南),不久,宋复取之 。
至迟在惠成王更元六年(前329),楚上蔡属魏 。
哀王二十三年(前296),魏趁楚怀王新立,政权不稳,出兵伐楚,攻取了楚陉山 。
昭王元年(前295),秦取魏南部的襄城(今河南省襄城县) 。


四、小结

以上我们对战国时期魏国的疆域变动情况,按地理方位分别进行了考察。为了使魏国疆域的整体变化更易了解,下面再按时间顺序选取一些主要时段做一综述。

在安釐王二十三年(前254)之前,魏国的疆域主要分为以安邑为中心的西部区域及以大梁为中心的东部区域。前一区域主要包括魏河西与河东地区。后一区域主要是魏河内及黄河南岸的中原地区。在这两大区域之间是韩国的疆土。

文侯三十七年(前406)时,魏国疆域的大致范围是:1)西部区域:西境在渭水以南有武都、武下、阴晋,渭水北岸洛水及黄河以西有洛阴、临晋、元里、合阳、少梁、庞、皮氏、雕阴、肤施、漆垣、广衍等地与秦为界,北境有榆次、阳邑、平周、蒲阳与赵相接。东境有绛、曲沃、垣等地与韩接壤。南境大体以黄河为界,有黄河北岸的阳晋、封陵、焦、阳狐等地。2)东部区域:西境有曲阳、温、怀、卷、酸枣、衍、密、华阳等地与韩为界。北境有棘浦、黄城、宁新中、朝歌、汲、山阳等地与赵为邻。另外,魏向越过赵界还控制有中山国领土。东境有观津、观、平阳、济阳等地。东南境有襄城等地。

武侯二十年(前376):1)西部区域:西境无武下。2)东部区域:北境无棘浦、黄城,但增加了邺,且中山国地亦不再控制。东境又增灵丘、桑丘二地,但东南已有襄陵。南境拓展至鲁阳。

warring state period evolution map (source)


惠成王十四年(前357):1)西部区域:西境无武都、洛阴、庞。北境无榆次、阳邑。东境增皮牢、安邑。2)东部区域:西境增轵道,无鹿。北境无繁阳,增列人、肥、泫氏、中牟。东境无观、增平丘、户牖、首垣。南境增马陵、仪台。且此时魏都已由河东的安邑迁到黄河以南的大梁。




哀王二十三年(前296):1)西部区域:西境无少梁、合阳、阴晋、雕阴、肤施、漆垣、广衍等河西及上郡之地,亦无汾阴。魏、秦接壤处已从河西东移至河东。北境无蒲阳、平周。东境无曲沃(山西闻喜县东北),南境无曲沃(今河南三门峡西南)、岸门、焦。2)东部区域:东境无观津,得卫二城。南境增陉山,北境增黄城,无河阳。

昭王十三年(前283):1)西部区域:无垣、蒲阪、皮氏、绛、安邑。2)东部区域:西境失河内六十一城、新垣、曲阳、安城。南境无襄城,北境无几、防陵、安阳。



安釐王二十三年(前254),魏西部区域尽为秦所得,魏疆与其时的东部区域重合。西境无温、怀、高都、汲、卷、蔡阳、长社、中阳、华阳,北境无宁新中,东境增单父。

景湣王五年(前238),北境无酸枣、燕、虚、长平、雍丘、山阳、朝歌、邺、垣、蒲阳、衍、仁、平丘、小黄、济阳、甄,东境增陶。

王假三年(前225),秦破魏都大梁,魏亡。


战国时期魏国疆域的沿革主要情况,已如上述。不过,需要指出的是战国时期的疆域还不具备后世那样的封闭性,在没有修筑长城的地方,往往会有城邑交错。在有象太行山险的地方,韩、魏二国城邑的错综复杂更是可以想见。本文在此所勾画的魏国疆域只是一个理想的疆界,与当时的实际情况可能会有一定的出入。
另外,在此尚有一个问题需要提出,即魏国东、西两大区域是通过哪条路线保持彼此之间的联系的?对此问题已有学者做过一定的探讨。钟凤年推测其时魏可能是通过借道于韩来保持两区域间的往来的 。史念海先生则指出:"在魏国更为重要的却是新旧两都间的道路,也就是由河东经过河内通向河外的道路。尤其是河东和河内间的道路在较早的时期就更为重要。梁惠王就曾经说过:'河内凶,则移其民于河东,移其粟于河内;河东凶亦然'。这条河东河内间的道路当是由安邑,经过晋国旧都绛,再东南行达到河内。由河内东南行,前往大梁,是要渡过黄河的。渡河之处当在卷。" 其论可备一说。另外,在《淮南子·说林篇》所载"秦通崤塞而魏筑城也"及高诱所注"魏徙都大梁,闻秦通治崤关,知欲来东兼之,故筑城设守备也"之文中,似亦可窥出一些消息。这段文字虽然是讲述魏所筑的中原长城之事,然从中可推知,秦从崤关攻魏当是沿黄河进兵的。如此,则不知是否魏还可通过黄河沿岸的道路来沟通魏河内与河东地区?

This map postulated that there is a corridor up north between Han and Zhao connecting the 2 parts of Wei.

至于《中国历史地图集》及杨宽先生所认为的魏通过上党山区一线来联系河东与河内的结论 ,则是不可靠的。这不仅因为魏当时绕行赵、韩上党地区于理不合,更因为这一区域在战国时期始终为赵、韩的领地,魏从未有过据有赵、韩上党之地的记载 。总之,在魏国的东西两大区域之间一定存有沟通的道路,只是由于史料的不足,目前尚很难做出明确的判断。要准确复原这种情形,还有赖于新的相关文献的发现及对太行通道以及南阳诸邑归属的详尽检讨。

2008-11-14

China - "non"-helpful?

Dr. Brad Sester claimed China had been "unhelpful" (in the effort of easing the world from this current mess), because China has just increased its tax rebates on exports and all that.

This actually gave me comfort about China's situation, and as it follows, the world's. Alright, China did not help the world directly. But at least it does not try to drag the world further down by drowning itself, which would by itself be a pretty darn impressive performance. And as I would argue later, not helping the world directly while helping itself is ACTUALLY helping the world indirectly. So I tend to replace the word "unhelpful" with "non-helpful", which carries a very different meaning.

What we have been most concerned (myself, I think Prof Stephen Ng-sheung Cheung as well, etc) is that China may blow its own hot head by thinking it could save the world. Fortunately, if Dr Sester is right, it is not. It is just 'selfishly' laying down and tries to get itself out of this mess with the best it can do.

That is a consolation, a pretty major consolation.

Because, if some third world country starts using its central planning mentality and starts to solve the problem of the world, the world should be scared. The people of that country, more so.

I cannot say the PRC government has done the right thing, at least not yet. But so far, it hasn't done some major wrong stuff, especially regarding the things that Dr Sester talked about it seems to be getting it right.

There is some debate in the comment section of Dr Sester's post, mainly with contributor twofish -- who argues China should mind its own business and should not mind what is not part of its business. I am with twofish, that China should mind itself first, and itself only. But I come from a perspective that twofish hasn't mentioned yet (perhaps it is so obvious in his mind that he didn't bother to mention),
  • That China should first of all try to get itself out of the mess (which seems to have already been taking toll, check the latest Q3 GDP number and other stats). And do whatever it could to achieve this.
  • If this means currency depreciation, let it fall. If this means VAT rebate, do it. If this means lowering profit tax, do it. Dr Sester may argue that it is too minute to matter, but at this era every tiny cent matters.
  • Do only what is meaningful to the long term, and do what would help with the capacity utilization of its labour, equipment, whatever. But do NOT spend just for the sake of spend, because that is wasting resources. Since resource is scarce, you do not want to put them in to the wrong place. You especially do not want to pay $85bn for 80% of AIG and then add another $65bn for what? another 61% of AIG? how do you buy 141% of a company when there is only 100% in total?
This is what free economy is all about. Mind your own business, not others. Getting yourself out of the mess is doing everyone else a big big favour, by not dragging others down to hell with your mess. In the macro (global) context the units are countries, China, Japan, EU, US, Mexico, Brazil. If you find this hard to understand then think about this in a micro-level, China is your factory a few blocks away, US the walmart down street, HK a little 7-11 downstairs, free economy means every manager (CEO or Prime Minister) tries to make the best out of his own business. Socialism means some big brass dictates who is doing what and the factory should reduce production and raise price and that. That had been proven to be not working, by Mr Deng Xiaoping and Mr Gorbachev. Those in Beijing, I know you may not notice this little blogger here, and I know you are smarter than those who would need my little reminder, but just in case, please do not change the world into another People's Commune.

p.s. This may look like a counter for Dr Sester's post. But it really isn't. In a way, Dr Sester is doing what the Walmart manager is doing, trying his best to lift Walmart out of its mess. But I tried to look at this from a broader perspective, i.e. from the principle of capitalism and decentralized decision making, (and a non-zero sum persective) to argue that what he said is not exactly correct, in that China minding its own business is indeed an indrect help to the world.

p.s.2. About "non-zero sum". RMB depreciation, VAT rebate, wouldn't that means a gain in China is a loss in the rest of the world? (be it US the consumer or Vietnam the competing producer). Not really, not if the sum of consumption is not a fixed number. Looking at the world as a whole, the apparent gain in market share by China, is first of all, based on untilization of some idle capacity so there is really little incremental cost. Then the Vietnam's and Bangladesh's could also lower their currency, so could the US(!). Overall the world gains in (1) better capacity utilization (2) more importantly, net addition of a few people (those who had been able to keep the job and the capacity utilizaed) who can afford to consume!

2008-11-11

翻译:婴孩战论

盖日-不热车是原莫斯科外侨报刊“放逐者”的一个专栏作家的笔名。他的专栏叫做战争呆子(War Nerd)。我是最近才偶尔看到他的文章。虽然表面上是嬉笑怒骂,骨子里他其实早已读透了孙子兵法。

可惜的是放逐者几个月前被普金政府查封了(真不明白这些control freak们,盖日先生一向都是亲俄的,他对苏联在二战的贡献推崇备至),很多以前的好文章也随着网站被封而消佚了。现在的网址是exileonline.com),部分以前的文章在此,用google cache搜也能找到一些。

我在这里尝试翻译他以前的一篇文章,可见他的功力不同凡响。我的翻译水平一般,而且有些难翻的我就简单“掠”过了。这么好的文章不会英语的读者看不到真是可惜,不知道有谁愿意一起进行一些翻译工作。

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婴孩战论
盖日-不热车

二十世纪晚期最重要的战争是那一场?你可以争辩那是1975年11月6日在摩洛哥南境发生的那场战争。诚然,这不是另一场斯大林格勒。实际上,那天发生的事情通常人们根本不称之为战争。它的正式名称叫做‘绿色行进’。在(战争)的一边是35万没有武装手持绿色(伊斯兰)旗帜的摩洛哥平民,另一边呢 --- 离边界好多英里之内,因为他们希望能避免和那班行进者发生冲突 --- 乃一支意志摇晃、失去士气的象征性的西班牙军队在假装着要保卫一个前西班牙殖民地,西属撒哈拉。

(地图上的)西属撒哈拉挂在摩洛哥下面,在撒哈拉沙漠和大西洋汇合的地方,就如一面堵快倒的墙的样子。那大概是那附近的非洲海岸最没人想要的一块地,说不上有水只有微量的人口,那就是为什么西班牙当初得到它的原因。等到19世纪晚期欧洲列强准备好瓜分非洲的时候,西班牙早就远别了她昔日的光辉,所以只好守候着这点残羹剩饭。

不过我们在过去的世纪里学到的一件事情就是,在这个拥挤、饥饿的星球上没有什么所谓的不值钱的地方。西属撒哈拉已证明了这一点:在它往后属于摩洛哥的30年里,有人在其沿海的捕鱼权、以及那内陆100英里里的一个巨大的叫饱克拉BOU CRAA的硫酸盐矿赚了大钱。

这就是为什么摩洛哥国王哈珊二世,一个在CIA(中情局)不乏朋友的刁钻老苏丹,决定了把那班忠诚的东西往下运到摩洛哥南部边境,然后每人递上一支可以上镜头的小绿旗,然后送他们越过边境往那些西班牙军队处去。

摩洛哥人必须越过传统军事征服的臼巢框框去想,理由非常简单,摩洛哥的武装力量惨不忍睹。他们是如此的不堪,他们对世界军事史的仅有贡献就是在闹剧喜剧章里露露脸。比如说,国防部长有一次想要让摩洛哥空军的战斗机去击落哈珊二世某次外访回来乘坐的波音727。结果失败了。真的不骗你,喷气战斗机拦截不了一架巨大、肥胖、迟笨的民用飞机,而且还事先知道了目标的这个行程路线图呢。这样的一支军队必须要有不战而胜的征服方法,因为要它打赢一个公平的战争的概率是零。

当然摩洛哥人有着面对积弱而士气低落的西班牙殖民政府的优势,那是西班牙独裁者佛朗哥将军终于可以死去的时候。假如你的年纪允许你记得那些早期的周六直播节目(Saturday Night Live),你可能记得那车里翠丝(Cherry Chase)不断重复的笑话,“这是刚刚收到的消息:佛朗哥将军仍然是死的!”这笑话的之所以成功是因为那老将军花了很长时间才终于死掉,那意味着像摩洛哥那样的贪婪的新兴列强有着非常充足的时间去计划如何向西班牙的前殖民地伸出他们的手。

对于对战斗着迷的战争迷们这可能没啥了不起,不过这可是极端高效率的侵略。西班牙军队一枪没发。行进者们跨过了边界,让沙子入了鞋肚,高喊了这神圣的一块缺水的平坦沙漠现在已成为了摩洛哥不可分割的一部分,随后就回家了。自从那以后,西属撒哈拉就由摩洛哥控制了。虽然当地的游击队POLISARIO玻璃萨里奥曾经在某段时间里给他们制造过一点麻烦。

使得我提名这怪诞的一幕作为“当代最重要的战争”的候选者是因为它展现了一种获得有争议领地的崭新方法。如果过去的100年里我们学会了一件事,那就是传统的军事征服变得越来越没效率了。这是在所有军事史里最最令人诧异的一个变奏。19世纪的由始至终,那些由英法领头的欧洲列强,获得他们想要的土地的方法是基于他们有更好的军事技术、运输和组织。不同意这种观念的本地人通常会成为历史前进的巨轮的牺牲品而消失无踪。而这只是一个在这世界所有角落发生了数千年的故事的新版本:更大、更强的部落在所有他们能达到的地方取代并抹去相对弱的部落。那是那时代的规范,甚至在与白人接触前的北美,那瓦左人(navajo)便在白人出现前很久就在美国西南部把乌特人(Ute)给取代了。

回到现代,甚至在当传统战争的天平是除了更进一步往第一世界倾斜别无他向的时候,那些科技先进和组织完善的国家们却都在后撤之途,同时以前的受害国已开始反攻,不但要求他们之前的失地而且正在渗入前殖民主的领域。现在最重要的是士气,和国家的意志。这是西班牙人没有的,摩洛哥人有的。所以,即使西班牙军队完全可以抹去那些行进者,他们却无法开枪。武器只当你愿意去使用它的时候才是武器。一个技术先进的军队,假如没有开火的意志,就根本不是什么军队。

只有我们这些专注的战争呆子才似乎能感到这是何等的荒诞,在军事史上这是何等的史无前例。直到20世纪,我们的难题不是如何让军事上相对卓越的一方去开火 --- 而是如何使得他们在把相对弱势的部落、军队或国家消灭前停火。在20世纪前,我从来没听过有一个军事强势的部落或国家失去开战保卫疆土的意愿的例子,或是为了占领较弱的邻居领土而开战的例子。

20世纪是一个重大的转折点。德日等新兴列强尝试去模仿19世纪的老牌殖民列强却遭到了完全的、灾难性的失败,即使他们通常在战场上打了胜仗。那是两次世界大战带给我们的荒诞的教训:狭义的军事超级优势已经不足够了。即使有可以控制战场全局的德军(在某种程度上日军也不赖),德日两国在战争结束时不但没有增加一寸土地,还把自己家园变成废墟,自己的文化受到阉割,他们的出生率跟着也有好几代在世界排居后列。

即使是老牌殖民帝国,包括英法,也是在挺大的麻烦中结束这个世纪的。他们失去了抵抗他们曾经统治过的殖民地涌来的移民潮的意志。在军事理论的意义上我们正处于一个非常奇怪的时刻,我们的武器无损可是我们战斗的意志已荡然无存。

那些最早成立的殖民地是最成功的。例如,北美洲的北部,现在的美国和加拿大,变成了欧洲殖民者的永久财产(至少看起来是这样,直到最近之前吧)。有两件事情决定了这结果:首先,他们17-18世纪就来了,在他们良心开始行动之前,其次就是,大多数的土著人口都是微小的打猎和收捡食物者(这在澳大利亚亦然,虽然时代晚了很多)。所有其他地方 -- 拉丁美洲、非洲、亚洲 --- 当地人都在离在旧式军事理论家眼中的所谓军事优势很远的情况下大举反攻推进。这就是我们今天在南非看到的,和(虽然进程相对缓慢一点)在欧洲和美国南部看到的。在其他地方,特别是被法国人殖民过的地方(他们在这方面从来都比不上英国人),大批的殖民人口被完全消灭了,就像在阿尔及利亚的几百万法国人一样。

这样我们看到了一个军迷们需要很长时间才能面对的令人震惊的教训:军事上超级优势的影响力在现代已经远远不及出生率和简单无情的意志的影响力了。

啊,出生率 --- 真奇怪它是怎么在左右两派阵营都变成了不能谈的敏感题目的。左派做梦也不敢想像去告诉第三世界的人们去减低他们制造婴儿的速度,而右派们,虽然控制(人家)生育的决定可以延迟毁灭他们自己的国家,他们又不能达成一致的意见去实施。

所以出生率是一个没有对手的武器,没有“反武器”之“武器”。所以他一般都会赢。摩洛哥人很清楚地表明了他们的“绿色行进”完全就是来自于他们的出生率。那些他们送往边界的“志愿者”的数目是35万,刚刚好就是摩洛哥每年新生婴儿的数目。所以这基本上就是生存空间(lebensraum)的理由,就如那世纪前些时候德国人用过的理由。你可能听过那吧,一个叫“东方战线”的小东西。你可能现在会说假如有什么政策是曾经决定性的一败涂地的,那就是纳粹想要往斯大林哪里挤出一点生存空间的那个尝试。这完全就是事实啊。那是因为纳粹用了旧式的方法,就是武装征服的方法。

在后1918的世界里想要成功,在那威尔逊(woodrow wilson)的梦中“小国”即使没有自卫能力也有存在权的世界里要成功,你需要用相对慢的、看起来不明显的军事方法,比如,出生率和移民。这种缓慢征服的经典案例就是科索沃。在战场上塞尔维亚人总能打败阿尔巴尼亚人,即使是人数不如对方的时候也是。不过阿尔巴尼亚人在所有军事产业里的一个中有庞大的优势 --- 婴儿制造业。根据BBC,科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人50年前的出生率是令人惊奇的平均每个妇女生了8.5个婴儿。

科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人证明了军事技术其实无关重要,因为尝试以旧式方法 --- 科索沃解放军(KLA)的武装反抗 --- 去征服科索沃而失败了。那是全军覆没啊。当地的塞尔维亚民兵,一帮疲乏的中年业余者和警察,一举打扁了KLA。跟着发生的是现在这些日子里失败者获得胜果的漂亮演示。阿尔巴尼亚人把战争里阵亡的KLA士兵的衣服武器弹药扒掉,然后把尸体向那些易蒙的西方记者展示,告诉他们这是塞尔维亚人的“大屠杀”。是大屠杀没错,就算是吧,不过那时因为KLA连个屁仗都不会打(在战场上被杀了)。他们活着手持武器的时候,他们只能给人当笑话;死后没有武器了呢,他们却能使得己方变成受害者而赢得支持,并直接导致了美军的介入。

要以阿尔巴尼亚人在科索沃胜利的方法赢得战争,你需要制造很多的婴儿。就是这么简单。要理解那是怎么运作的,你需要摒弃那些说婴儿是因为‘爱’才来到这世界的无聊的自由派思想。在这世界的很多地方,婴儿制造是武器生产的一种形式。

在有些地方,这是公开的政策。例如,在巴勒斯坦的巴勒斯坦人和以色列人中就有一场全面的出生率战争在进行中。而这种斗争中最令人垂丧的其中一点,从以色列人的角度来说,就是当你让人家在占领区里生活越难过的时候,人家竟然就越能生出更多的小孩来。比如说,在加萨地带,就有非洲之外最高的生殖率之一,每位妇女5.6个孩子。

以色列的总体出生率是大概每个妇女2.8个孩子,对于一个富裕国家这算高了。不过在所有地方里最让人惊奇的出生率,甚至比加萨巴勒斯坦人还高的,是在一些最极端的犹太复国团体中,就是那个叫做哈热地(haredi)的“超正宗”犹太人。直到最近他们每位妇女能生8到9个孩子。当以色列移民新闻报道他们的出生率降到每位妇女只有7.7个孩子的时候这曾引起了很大的恐慌呢。

7.7,那是比马里(7.38)还高啊。马里是(以国家为单位的)世界纪录保持者。

那些(以色列)殖民者从不隐瞒他们用多生孩子来改变“大以色列”人口版图以使其偏向他们一方的企图 --- 这里凌驾一切的主要目的是要保证巴勒斯坦人永远不能成为多数。

有趣的是在这些超正宗社区里却有很多想要用以色列军事优势以传统方法来解决问题的声音,他们要驱除或消灭巴勒斯坦人。这些人失败了。他们的领导人,梅尔卡哈尼(meir kahane)在纽约被一个来自埃及的的士司机暗杀了。不过在他死前好久他就已经输掉这场辩论比赛了。当前的这些日子里你用这些方法无法就此不了了之的,即使你得到每一个在得克萨斯的获得重生的受洗犹太复国支持者(注:这里似乎指的是小布什)的毫无保留的支持也是。

假如你想要一个离你家近点的例子,去北爱尔兰吧,在那里以新教多数人口定出边界的地方里新教人口已经越来越少了,这乃得益于天主教的高出生率(注:天主教反对避孕)。到了2001年的时侯,天主教徒占北爱人口46%,1961年时只有35%。

可是当那令人生畏的天主教占多数的日子逼近的时候,在俄斯特镇(ulster)一件好玩的事情正在酝酿。天主教出生率比新教减得还要快。这种事情在一个部落突破进入中产阶级的时候总是会发生的。这说明了一个当代人口斗争中的一个真正的脑力难题:假如你真地恨你的敌人部落,你能做的最好的事情就是使得他们富裕。富人不会有那么多孩子。当然也有像超正宗以色列人那种例外,他们相当富有却全心全意的尽可能尽力制造最多的孩子。不过一般而言,金钱可以让人从建立大家庭里的想法分心出去想别的。所以,那压迫敌人部落的老方法通常是起反作用的。假如像ian paisley那种俄斯特狂人得逞的话,天主教将会被压到贫民区里,他们过去30年的出生率就会高好多,他们就可开始一场科索沃式的大多数人主政的政变,就像阿尔巴尼亚人对塞尔维亚人做的一样,甚至还有美国空军如对付贝尔格莱德一样去炸掉贝尔法斯特的每一座电视塔,他们是这样教训塞尔维亚人的,“在你们没把科索沃让给你们的阿尔巴尼亚小兄弟之前,不许看电视!”

使他们富有是你能对付这种在我们欧洲和北美见到的通过移民来征服土地的策略的唯一办法。没有人可以真诚的告诉你现在在美国有多少非法移民,不过就以我上班的途中看到的,我倾向于这些估计中偏高的点,大约2000万人从墨西哥潜入了美国南方找工作了。

以我所知,没有人在说拉丁裔移民决定了以生一大堆孩子作为征服得克萨斯和加利福尼亚的方法,那是那些以色列移民正在实施的方法。拉丁意义的“重新征服”,假如它真的发生,将会是如墨西哥这种国家通过提高出生率并降低死亡率的方法从第三世界升级到第二点五世界的一个史无前例的结果。

到了1970年的时候,墨西哥正处于一个仅有足够医疗服务以维持人民生命的危险阶段,所以死亡率没错是大幅下降了,可是人民还是维持在穷到还想要一大堆孩子的地步。在1970和2000年间,墨西哥人口翻倍了,从4800万到9800万。所以在格兰德河(rio grande 注:墨美的分界河)的一边你看到一大群年轻的穷人,在河的另一边呢,一大堆渴望着廉价劳工的资金和公司。就这样,一条如格兰德河般充满泥巴的小溪已没有足够的宽度来把这两个群体隔开了。

随着墨西哥人口的增加及其生活水平的提升,其生育率实际上却开始了让人惊叹的下潜,直到平均每个墨西哥妇女只有2.39个孩子的比例,仅仅比以色列的2.38排行高两个座次。

那使得拉丁人出生率下降的唯一因素 --- 指的是在他们的祖国,不是那些移民到美国的人们 --- 是因为那些农民有了点钱,使得他们开始把自己想象为消费者,并开始对于购买新的卡车和平屏电视比起对于生小崽子更有动力了。

以上的这些进展是非常缓慢的,起码比起传统的军事征服来说是这样。出生率要等数十年才能看到效果,阿尔巴尼亚人在科索沃的胜利是20世纪中叶出生率的结果。而且,在世界的一些其他角落,比如美国和欧洲,历史上新移民会融合入本地人中而不是像巴尔干和中东那里保存着古老的部族仇恨。说到头,那是一个文化的问题,不是种族的问题。对美国拉丁裔人口的研究告诉我们,在两代之内,大部分的美籍拉丁裔人都在为了要巡查边境以把那些天谴的移民拒诸境外而咆哮了。真的怪诞的事情是 --- 我可以以自身成长经验看到的来作证 --- 本地文化渗入了移民的事情,比如在美国的墨西哥人扬弃了天主教而变成重生的新教徒的事例。你只要去任何年轻的,热切的美国新教教堂,比如拿撒勒教堂(nazarene),你会看到好多的墨西哥家庭,他们都有好多的孩子,在以得克萨斯-墨西哥口音的英语唱着古老的苏格兰圣诗。事实上,我曾经看到一篇真的可以笑死你的文章,那是一个美国浸信会作家写的,他在担心浸信教徒的出生率正在下降 -- 其实拿撒勒人力每个妇女都在生3个以上的孩子。因此,那些反移民博客一直在预测的美国变成墨西哥的噩梦一幕,可能演变成真,不过只是你会称为“种族”意义上的墨西哥 --- 我的意思是,你的二年级全班合照里可能有三分之二是拉丁裔的面孔 --- 不过这些拉丁裔脸孔后面已完全吸收了整套的受洗重生美国的世界观图像,那图像其实来自于几百年前在美国南部定居的苏格兰裔和爱尔兰裔人。

人们对于这些缓慢的人口征服的焦虑有一点是有分歧的。这分歧是以他们最真实的恐惧来归类的:你是不想在外出时见到那些脸孔?抑或你是不想进口那些移民的祖国文化?这整个争论目前是如此的受到检查压制,使得辩论双方都绝对的不诚实,没有人愿意掏开心来说出自己的心里话。我怀疑对于有些人来说他们不能接受的是那些新脸孔,他们希望走在他们的大街上的都是跟他们长大的过程中见到的肤色形状是一样的。假如这就是你想要的,那么无论你在什么地方,我可保证假如你有足够的财富来为这种事情忧心(而不是为了你的下一顿饭的着落忧心),那好,你的确有忧心的理由。因为,人类迁移的原因不碍乎食物、金钱、牧场和工作之类的东西。那数千年前移入欧洲的日耳曼部落有一个比较合理的看法:他们把战争称为“人类的移动”。匈奴人把哥特人赶离了北亚大草原,然后嘣的一声,等你回过神来,哥特人已经在亚德里安诺普把罗马军队消灭了。

那些脸孔是要变的。我们正处于一个新的军事历史时代,在这时代里拥有全然的意志去抵抗移民性“征服”的国家唯有那些斯大林主义的国家。当然他们不曾碰到许多类似的难题啦 -- 没有太多移民会尝试去偷渡进入北朝鲜或者前苏联 --- 不过即使这些国家真的面对着真正意义的人口挑战,他们还有着开火的意志。柏林围墙是一个很恶劣的案例,他们开枪不是为了把人赶走而是要阻止人离开。

不过这些日子里这些斯大林主义国家并不是完全属于朝阳工业哪一类,而又没有一个自由民主国家还有把手无寸铁却又想闯关的人们射杀的意志(闯入,闯出都一样)。即使是那些以色列人,他们可能是在人口问题上最最狠的第一世界人民,也不会把越过比室吧(beersheba)找咖啡店工作的非洲人射杀。他们顶多就把他们送回苏丹让他们在那里被射杀而已。

所以这些人群的迁移,那缓慢的人口战争,会一直延续下去。大概除了用钱去砸他们使得他们留在家里之外,我们完全没有可以抗衡的行动。基本上,无论你在何处,你在大街上看到的肤色和特征总会改变的。对于这些脸孔法西斯们假如有什么事情是值得安慰的,那就是,这样说吧,是欧洲人首先走这一步棋的。因为啊,这里没几个非裔美国人是纯非洲血统的,也没几个墨西哥印第安人身体内没有流着几滴西班牙人的血。只是现在这些脸孔们的血统要朝反方向混了。

对于大多数人的真正的担忧,如果可以让他们大声讲出来的话,就是文化。假如你是法国人,你不希望巴黎变成金沙萨吧,因为让我们诚实点说,金沙萨是一个地狱坑啊。假如你是英国人,你不希望伦敦变成卡拉奇吧,因为卡拉奇是一个噩梦。假如你是美国人,你也不想要休斯顿 --- 呃,糟了,你去过休斯顿吗?假如你还有半边脑袋,你根本就不要去想要休斯顿,那个糟糕的蒸笼。

事实是,大部分从这些地方入侵的人们都倾向同意你的观点。这是他们一开始离开那些地方的原因。没有人比刚果人更清楚刚果是怎样的一个地狱坑。我曾经读过关于刚果内河渡轮的这样一个报道,他们对于不同舱等有这样的俗称。头等舱是“欧洲”,二等舱是“中国”,意思是不那么伟大,不过还凑合。三等舱是“刚果”,没有人愿意去那里,特别是刚果人最不愿意去。

所以,要针对这些新征服来评价你的处境,你需要决定你是在一个科索沃 --- 两个永远彼此仇视的部落,整出婴孩作为武器 --- 或是那艘刚果渡轮,在那里若有可能的话没人愿意太来真格。当然,在这两种模式间有一大片的模糊或重叠的地带。以北爱尔兰为例,到处是部落仇恨的喧闹,可我就不相信他们有把自己变成科索沃的能耐。他们太喜欢电视机和汽车了。

那就是这场争论的可笑之处:欧美的死硬派希望我们以古老的凉血意志去封锁边界,可是这些先进国家里的“弱者”却常常能很成功的把这些移民的下一两代同化为仇视移民的本地人。那旧模式,刺刀守边境的模式,甚至都没影了。这是面对事实的时候了。让我们去面对改变吧。

如果你能应付这些新脸孔,您将可能看到你那“弱弱”的欧美文化的胜出,慢慢地,没有光荣地却无可置疑地胜出。然后你将可能活到可以看到一片全新的脸庞的时候,乍一看他们好像刚从卡拉奇或金沙萨过来的,直到你把音量打开听到他们在咆哮着我们需要怎么去驱赶那些该死的新移民。



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原文

War of the Babies
by Gary Brecher

What was the most important battle of the late 20th century? You could argue it was the one that took place on the southern border of Morocco on November 6, 1975. Of course, we’re not talking about another Stalingrad here. In fact, what happened that day isn’t usually called a battle at all. Its official name is "The Green March." On one side were 350,000 unarmed Moroccan civilians carrying green (Islamic) flags, and on the other -- miles inside the border, because they were hoping not to have to confront any of the marchers -- was a shaky, demoralized token force of Spanish troops pretending to defend a former Spanish colony, the Spanish Sahara.

The Spanish Sahara hangs below Morocco where the Sahara meets the Atlantic like a crumbling brick wall. It was about the least desirable chunk of coastal Africa around, with no water to speak of and a tiny population, which is why the Spanish got it. By the time the European powers were ready to divide up Africa in the late nineteenth century, Spain had long since lost its glory and tended to get the scraps and leftovers.

But one thing we’ve learned over the last century is that on this crowded, hungry planet, there’s no such thing as worthless land. Spanish Sahara has proven that: in the 30 years it’s belonged to Morocco, big money has been made from the fishing off the coast and the huge phosphate mine at Bou Craa, a hundred miles inland.

That’s why the Moroccan King Hassan II, a wily old sultan with friends in the CIA, decided it was worth his while to ship all those loyal subjects down to Morocco’s southern border, hand out little green flags for the cameras, and send them across the border toward those Spanish troops.

The Moroccans had to think outside the traditional military-conquest box, for the simple reason that Morocco’s armed forces are pathetic. They’re so bad their only contributions to military history have been in the "slapstick comedy" department. For instance, the Minister of Defense once tried to have fighters from the Moroccan Air Force kill Hassan II by shooting down his Boeing 727 as it came home from a foreign trip. They failed. Seriously: jet fighters failed to intercept and destroy a big, fat, slow civilian airliner even when they knew its exact flight path. A military like that pretty much has to resort to unarmed conquest, because its chances in a fair fight are zero.

Of course the Moroccans had the advantage of facing a weak, dispirited colonial Spain just at the moment the Spanish dictator, General Franco, finally got around to dying. If you’re old enough to recall those early SNL seasons, you probably remember Chevy Chase’s running joke, "This just in: General Franco still dead!" The reason that joke worked is that it took the old General a long time to die, and that meant that greedy up-and-coming regional powers like Morocco had plenty of time to plan ways of getting their hands on former Spanish colonies.

It may not have been very exciting for combat fans, but it was an extremely effective invasion. The Spanish troops didn’t fire a shot. The marchers walked over the border, got sand in their shoes, shouted about how this sacred patch of waterless, flat desert was now an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco, and went back home. And since then, the Spanish Sahara has been dominated by Morocco, although the local guerrilla army, POLISARIO, gave them some serious problems for a while.

What makes this weird episode my nominee for "Most Significant Battle of the Era" is that it showed the new way of winning disputed territory. If there’s one thing that we should have learned over the past hundred years, it’s that traditional armed conquests are getting less and less effective. This is one of the most surprising twists in all military history. All through the nineteenth century, the European powers, led by the British and French, took the land they wanted on the grounds that they had better military technology, transport and organization. Locals who disputed that notion tended to disappear as casualties of inevitable progress. And that was just an updated version of what had been happening all over the world for thousands of years: bigger, stronger tribes displace and wiped out weaker tribes whenever they could. That was the norm, even in pre-contact North America, where the Navajo were displacing the Ute in the American Southwest long before the white guys showed up.

Now, even though the balance in conventional warfare is if anything tilting further toward the first world, the technologically advanced and organized countries are in retreat, and the former victims are pushing back, not just claiming their old territories but infiltrating the former colonizers’ countries. What matters now is morale, national will. The Spanish didn’t have it, and the Moroccans did. So even though the Spanish troops could have wiped out those unarmed marchers, they failed to open fire. Weapons are only weapons if you’re willing to use them. A technologically advanced army without the will to fire is no army at all.

Only us dedicated war nerds seem to realize how weird this is, how totally unprecedented in military history. Until the 20th century, the problem wasn’t usually getting militarily superior forces to open fire -- it was getting them to stop before the weaker tribe, army or country was totally wiped out. I don’t know of a single case, before the 20th century, of a militarily superior tribe or nation lacking the will to defend its territory, or for that matter, take the territory of weaker neighbors.

The 20th century was the big turning point. New powers like Germany and Japan tried to imitate the older colonial powers of the 19th century and suffered total, disastrous defeat, even though they usually prevailed on the battlefield. That’s the weird lesson of the two world wars: military superiority in the narrow sense just doesn’t cut it any more. Despite the total battlefield dominance of the Wehrmacht (and to a lesser extent the Imperial Japanese forces), Germany and Japan ended the war not just without additional territory but with their home territories in ruins, their cultures gelded, their birthrates for generations to come among the lowest in the world.

Even the older colonial powers, Britain and France, finished the century in big trouble, without the will to resist the immigrants from the colonies they’d once ruled. We’re at a very strange moment militarily: our weapons still work but our will is gone.

The colonies that were established earliest are the most successful. For example, northern North America, now the U.S. and Canada, passed into permanent possession of the European settlers (or so it seemed, until recently). Two things determined this: first, they were settled in the 17th and 18th century, before conscience set in, and because most of the native population had been relatively tiny groups of hunter-gatherers (which also holds true for Australia, though it was settled much later). Everywhere else -- in Latin America, Africa, Asia -- the locals have been pushing back the colonizers without coming close to what old-style military theorists would call military superiority. That’s what we’re seeing now in South Africa, and more slowly in Europe and the southern United States. In other places, especially those colonized by the French (who were never as good at it as the Brits), huge colonial populations were totally eliminated, like the million-plus French residents of Algeria.

So there’s a shocking lesson that military buffs have been slow to face: military superiority doesn’t matter nearly as much right now as birthrate and sheer ruthless will.

Ah, birth rate -- funny how it’s become such a taboo subject for both Left and Right. The Lefties wouldn’t dream of telling third-world people to limit their baby-making, and most right wingers can’t bring themselves to endorse birth control even if it could slow the destruction of their own countries.

So birth rate is a weapon without a counter-weapon right now. So it tends to win. The Moroccans made it clear that the Green March was all about birth rate. The number of "volunteers" they sent to the border was 350,000, exactly the number of births per year in Morocco. So this was basically a "Lebensraum" argument like the one the Germans tried earlier in the century. You might have heard about that one, a little dust-up called the Eastern Front. And you might be saying right now that if any policy ever failed decisively, it was the Nazis’ attempt to elbow themselves a little living space from Stalin. Which is totally true. But the Nazis tried it the old-fashioned way, with armed conquest.

To succeed in the post-1918 world, the world Woodrow Wilson dreamed up where "small nations" have rights even if they can’t defend them, you need to use slower, less obviously military methods, like birthrate and immigration. The classic example of this kind of slow conquest is Kosovo. The Serbs could always defeat the Albanians on the battlefield, even when outnumbered, but the Albanians had a huge advantage in the most important military production of all -- babies. According to the BBC, the birthrate of Kosovo Albanians 50 years ago was an amazing 8.5 children per woman.

The Serb/Albanian conflict offers damn near perfect lab conditions to prove my case that birth rate trumps military prowess these days, because the Serbs always beat the Albanians in battle, yet they’ve lost their homeland, Kosovo. Here again, we can blame Woodrow Wilson and his talk about "rights." In places where tribes hate each other, a tribe that outbreeds its rival will become the majority, even if it can’t fight. So, after generations of skulking at home making babies, letting the Serbs do the fighting, the Albanians finally became the majority in Kosovo and therefore the official "good guys," being oppressed by the official "bad guys," the Serbs. At least that’s the way the nave American Wilsonian types like Clinton saw it. So when the Serbs fought back against an Albanian rebellion in Kosovo, and dared to beat the Albanians, Clinton decided to bomb the Serbs into letting go of Kosovo, the ancient heartland of a Christian nation that had spent its blood holding off the Turks for hundreds of years.

The Kosovo Albanians proved that military skill doesn’t matter, because they tried and failed to conquer Kosovo the old-fashioned way: armed rebellion by the Kosovo Liberation Army. It was a wipeout: local Serb militias, a bunch of tired middle-aged part-timers and cops, crushed the KLA. What happened next is a beautiful illustration of the way losers win these days: the Albanians took the bodies of KLA men who’d been killed in battle, stripped all weapons and ammo from them, and showed them to gullible Western reporters as victims of a Serb "massacre." It was a massacre, all right, but only because the KLA couldn’t fight worth a damn. Alive and armed, they were a joke; dead and disarmed, they helped win Kosovo by making their side the "victims," which led directly to U.S. military intervention.

To win the way the Albanians won in Kosovo, you need to make a lot of babies. It’s that simple. And to see how it works, you have to drop the namby-pamby liberal idea that people only have babies out of "love." In lots of places on this planet, baby-making is a form of weapons production.

In some places, it’s open policy. For example, in Palestine there’s an all-out birthrate war going on between the Palestinians and the Israelis. And one of the most frustrating things about this kind of struggle, from the Israeli perspective, is that the worse you make life for the people in the occupied zones, the more kids they have. The Gaza Strip, for instance, has one of the highest fertility rates in the world outside Africa, at 5.6 kids per woman.

The rate for Israeli overall is about 2.8 children per woman, high for a rich country. But the most amazing rates anywhere, even higher than for the Gaza Palestinians, are in the most extreme Zionist groups, the Haredi "ultra-orthodox" Jews. Until recently they averaged eight or nine children per woman. There was actually a big panic in the Israeli settler press when news hit that their rate had dropped to a mere 7.7 kids per woman.

That’s actually higher than the rate for Mali (7.38 per woman), which has the highest birthrate in the world.

The settlers don’t hide the fact that they’re producing as many kids as they can in order to change the demographics of "Greater Israel" in their favor -- above all to make sure the Palestinians never become the majority.

What’s interesting is that there were plenty of voices in the ultra-Orthodox community in favor of using Israel’s military superiority to settle the problem the old-fashioned way, by expelling or wiping out the Palestinians. Those people lost out; their leader, Meir Kahane, was assassinated by an Egyptian cabbie in New York, but he’d lost the debate long before he died. You just can’t get away with those methods these days, not even with every born-again Baptist Zionist in Texas backing you to the hilt.

If you want an example closer to home, just go to Northern Ireland where the Protestant majority the border was designed to maintain has been getting smaller and smaller, thanks to the higher birthrate among Catholics. As of 2001, the Catholics were about 46% of the population, up from 35% in 1961.

But as the dreaded "Catholic Majority" date approaches, a funny thing is happening up in Ulster: the Catholic birth rate is slowing down even faster than the Protestant rate. This always happens when a tribe breaks out of its slums into the middle class. This illustrates one of the real brain-twisters of contemporary demographic struggle: if you really hate the enemy tribe, the best thing you could do would be to make them rich. Rich people don’t have nearly as many kids. Of course there are exceptions like the Ultra-Orthodox Israelis, who are fairly well-off and just dedicated to making as many kids as possible, but generally, money distracts people from starting big families. So the old methods of keeping down the enemy tribe are usually counterproductive. If the Ulster hotheads like Ian Paisley had had their way and kept the Catholics down in the slums, their birthrate over the past 30 years would have been much higher and they’d be ready to stage a Kosovo-style "majority rule" coup like the Albanians did against the Serbs, complete with the USAF blowing up every television tower in Belfast like we did to the ones in Belgrade, just to teach those Serbs a lesson: "No TV till you let your little Albanian brother have Kosovo!"

Makin'em rich is the only way you’re going to settle the kind of conquest-by-immigration we’re seeing now in Europe and North America. Nobody will even say honestly how many illegal immigrants there are in the U.S. right now, but just from what I see driving to work, I’m inclined to go with the higher estimates, something up to 20 million people who snuck in from Mexico and points south looking for work.

As far as I know, nobody’s claiming the Latino immigrants decided to have a lot of kids as a way of reconquering Texas and California, the way the Israeli settlers are doing. La reconquista, if it happens, will be an unforeseen result of rising birth rates and falling death rates for countries like Mexico that are just moving up from the third world to, say, the second-and-a-halfth.

By 1970, Mexico was at that dangerous stage where there’s just enough basic medical care to keep people alive, so death rates are falling sharply, but people are still poor enough to want a lot of kids. Between 1970 and 2000, the Mexican population doubled, from 48 million to 98 million. So on one side of the Rio Grande you had a lot of young poor people, and on the other, a lot of money and companies eager for cheap labor. And a muddy little creek like the Rio Grande wasn’t nearly wide enough to keep those two groups apart.

As the population of Mexico increased and the living standard rose, the fertility rate actually went into an amazing dive, to the point that the rate for Mexican women now is only 2.39 kids per woman, just two places up from Israel’s 2.38.

And the only thing that’s brought the Latino birthrate down -- in their home countries, not among the ones who immigrated to the U.S. -- is getting enough money that peasant families start thinking of themselves as consumers, and get more excited about buying a new truck or a flat-screen TV than having little Jos.

This is all pretty slow to unfold, compared to traditional military conquest. Birth rate takes decades to have an effect; the Albanian victory in Kosovo is the result of birth rates from the mid-20th century. And in some parts of the world, like the US and Europe, immigrants have a history of being absorbed by the locals rather than sticking to the old tribal hatreds in the style of the Balkans and the Middle East. It’s a cultural deal, after all, not racial. Studies of the U.S. Hispanic population show that within a generation or two, most American Hispanics are ranting about policing the borders and keeping those damn immigrants out of the country. What’s really weird -- and I can testify to this from my own experiences growing up -- is when the local culture infiltrates the immigrants, like the fact that Mexicans in the U.S. are deserting the Catholics and becoming born-again Protestants. Go to any of the younger, feistier churchers in the U.S. like the Church of the Nazarene and you’ll see lots of Mexican families with plenty of kids, singing old Scottish hymns in Tex-Mex English. In fact, I ran into a really hilarious article by a U.S. Baptist writer who worried that the Baptist birthrate is going down while the Nazarenes are having babies at a rate of three-plus per woman. So the nightmare scenario that anti-immigrant bloggers are always predicting, where the U.S. turns into one giant Mexico, might end up being true in what you might call "racial" terms -- I mean, your second-grade class photo might be two-thirds Hispanic -- but those Hispanic faces would have absorbed a whole born-again American world picture that actually comes from the Scots-Irish who settled the American south hundreds of years ago.

This is one point where people’s anxiety over these slow, demographic conquests splits according to their real fears: do you just not want to see that kind of face when you go outside, or do you not want to import the culture of the immigrants' home country? The whole debate right now is so censored, so totally dishonest on both sides, that nobody will come clean about which it is. I suspect for some people it's the faces: they want the faces on their street to be the same shape and color they were when they were growing up. If that’s what you want, then no matter where you are, I can guarantee that if you’re rich enough to worry about things like this (as opposed to where your next meal’s coming from), then yup, you definitely have grounds for worry. People move around to where the food is, the money, the good grazing, the jobs. The Germanic tribes who moved in on Europe a couple millennia back took a more reasonable view; they called wars "the movements of the peoples." The Huns push the Goths off the steppe, and boom! Next thing you know, the Goths are wiping out a Roman army at Adrianople.

The faces are going to change. We are in a new military-historical era, in which the only states with the sheer will to resist slow "conquest" by immigration were the Stalinist states. Of course they didn’t have much of a problem there anyway -- not too many immigrants trying to sneak into North Korea or the old USSR -- but even if they had faced real demographic challenge, they had the will to open fire. The Berlin Wall is a nasty case in point, where the will was used to stop people leaving.

But those Stalinist states are not exactly a growth industry these days, and no liberal democratic state has the will to shoot down unarmed people trying to get in (or out, for that matter). Even the Israelis, who are maybe the fiercest first-worlders on demographic issues, don’t shoot the poor Africans who cross to Beersheba for jobs in the cafes. They just send them back to Sudan to be shot there.

So the movement of the peoples, the slow demographic wars, are going to go on. We just don’t have a counter-move, except maybe bombarding poor people with money to stay home. Basically, no matter where you are, the complexions and the features you see on the streets are going to change. If it’s any consolation to face-fascists, Europeans got their licks in first, so to speak. Not many African-Americans around with pure African blood; not many Mexican Indians without some Spanish in them. So now the faces blend the other way.

For most people the real worry, if they were allowed to even say it out loud, is culture: if you’re French, you really don’t want Paris turning into Kinshasa, because let’s be honest, Kinshasa is a Hellhole. If you’re English, you don’t want London turning into Karachi, because Karachi is a nightmare. If you’re American, you don’t want Houston -- oh Hell, ever been to Houston? If you have half a brain, you don’t want Houston at all, the lousy sweatbox.

The thing is, most of the people who invaded from those places tend to agree with you. That’s why they moved in the first place. Nobody knows what a Hellhole the Congo is like a Congolese. I read somewhere that on the Congo riverboats, they have these slang terms for the different decks. The first-class deck they call "Europe." The second-class deck is "China," meaning not that great, but livable. The third-class deck is "Congo," and nobody wants to be there, least of all the Congolese.

So to assess your situation in terms of the new conquests, you have to decide whether you’re in a Kosovo -- two tribes hating each other forever, turning out babies as weapons -- or that Congolese riverboat, where nobody wants it too "authentic" if they can help it. There’s a lot of blurring and overlap between those two models, sure. Take Northern Ireland: a lot of yelling, a lot of noisy tribal hate, but I just don’t think they have it in them to be another Kosovo. Too interested in TV and cars.

That’s what’s funny about the debate right now: the diehards in the U.S. and Europe wish we had the old ruthless will to seal the borders, but the "weakness" of the advanced countries generally works pretty well to turn the immigrants into immigrant-hating locals in a generation or two. The old model, bayonets on the border, isn’t even in the running. Time to face that fact. So the faces will change.

If you can handle these new faces, you’re likely to be surprised to see your "weak" American or European culture win out, slowly, un-gloriously but surely, and you may live long enough to see a whole new crop of pols who look like they just came from Karachi or Kinshasa until you turn the sound on and hear them ranting about how we need to get rid of all these damn immigrants.

2008-11-07

张五常 - 不值得花就不要花

张五常的想法很直观,很简单。该花的钱就花,不该花的钱千万不要因为要刺激经济就轻易花掉。我是非常同意的。面对金融危机,中国最需要的是学吴宇森那个诸葛孔明,冷静冷静再冷静。楼市要调整由他调整,不该花的钱不要为了所谓扩大内需而花。

举个例。假如有些基建(比如铁路、核电站)可以提前两三年建,反正迟早需要的。不过没必要的大白象,比如再来一个鸟巢,就可省了。有钱倒不如给官僚系统加薪,让他们不要觉得不贪污就显得寒酸,让那些为数不多的清官能堂堂正正的花钱,这些钱才会真正回到社会里。

所谓花钱扩大内需刺激经济就是把钱投入一个相对封闭的一个经济系统(在这里就是中国吧)。怎么投入其实区别不大,因为最终目的是整个系统增加了资金在流通。就如把一瓶水倒到一个缸里,不管你从哪里到,缸的水平线提高了。假如这是修一条铁路,资金会流到民工的工资,和制造路轨(还有车卡)的钢铁厂的产能使用上,使之失业民工的时间和工厂设备不至于空转。而这些民工和工程老板(还有承包商)把钱花在餐馆、住宅、食物衣服上。

问题是,我们需要以最有效率的方法来促进使用这笔资金。比如
  • 可以使得设备、工时免得空转的
  • 最终产品能产生长远经济效益的。公路、铁路海港是。为了消费而消费的,比如嘉年华,修长城,就不是。 (除非长城可以增加国家的总体旅游收入)
  • 尽可能把资金投到穷人身上。因为穷人比富人会更小心花钱,是的资金回流到社会的路途更有效。比如,承包商会话3万元吃一顿鲍鱼晚饭,或3万元买个包包送小三。资金最终流向LVHM等。民工则会缁珠计较,钱最终可能花在买廉价衣服和食物上。(当然,不能否定承包商的经济贡献。neccessary evil, 包括贪污,还是存在的。问题是,在刺激经济是要考虑到如何把低效率的资金分流途径最低化)


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北京不要拜凯恩斯学派为师

。。。但克鲁明建议的处理目前金融风暴的主要方案,我认为行不通。他认为美国政府要大手花钱,由政府推出消费,因为消费者有钱也不一定会花。这是纯度一百的凯恩斯学派了。

我认为这政策行不通,因为美国政府今天的财赤庞大得惊人,再大花一笔后患无穷也。事实上,目前的金融灾难,虽然不是起于美国政府花钱太多,但庞大的财赤肯定是加重了他们目前面对的困境。佛利民生时认为伊拉克之战是大错,但又认为财政上美国负担得起。真的吗?

我的观点简单得多。不管宏观或微观,我信奉的原则是花钱要有所值,不值得花就不要花。多花不值得花的钱,早晚会闯祸,那些政府究竟可以花多少、把财赤推向后代可以推多少的分析,我知道,但不同意。花钱的原则简单,不值得花就不要花。政府大手花钱可以挽救目前的灾难吗?如果有钱大花特花,当然有助,但值不值得是另一个远为重要的问题。国债这回事,不是推到后代那么简单。这次灾难过后,国债太高可能惹来债券下跌,利率上升,通胀急起,美元大跌──会是另一场灾难。这些不容易加起来的现象组合,地球出现过。

最近的观察,是北京当局知道问题严重:不一定是恐惧金融风暴,而是知道经济数字很不对头,工业兵败如山倒。迹象显示北京开始花钱了。值得吗?

我不担心像美国三十年代那样,中国会因为不景而搞出大政府,因为中国的政府已经够大了。问题是中国比美国幸运得多,可以修改现有的为祸不浅的政策而过关。我担心的是如果北京轻视这个选择,学美国的别无选择的花钱途径,为祸不浅的政策会永远地驱之不去! 。。。

Wars in Tibet - "War Nerd" from "the Exile"

I was led to this site (that domain name seems to be unstable, try also exileonline.com) following some comments on the economist article "Britain's suzerain remedy". Since honest (i.e. without intentional biase) discussion on Tib-et is a rarity, i will post it here. Even though I might disagree with some of the comments there, I will let you do your own research and decide.

After you finished this I would also recommend many of the other essays by this Gary Brecher, not just enjoyably cynical, but also generally insightful. e.g.
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By Gary Brecher

FRESNO, CA -- Writing a column on the military history of Tibet seemed like a good idea in the good old days, a week ago, before I started actually trying to research it. I’ve never, ever had a harder time finding decent info on a topic. One reason is sheer shame; the Brits, for instance, don’t want anybody to know they invaded Tibet in 1904 and slaughtered a whole bunch of Tibetans for no reason except they were bored.

But some of the stuff on Tibetan military history is just so damn weird it made me feel like that scene in Ghostbusters where Rick Moranis gets possessed by some ancient demon and starts ranting: “During the rectification of the Vuldronaii the Traveller came as a very large and moving Torb. Then of course in the third reconciliation of the last of the Meketrex supplicants they chose a new form for him, that of a Sloar. Many Shubs and Zuuls knew what it was to be roasted in the depths of the Sloar that day I can tell you.”

I always liked that last bit, “…I can tell you.” Gives that human touch, especially from a five-foot-nothing little dweeb like Moranis. But let me tell you, that story about the Torb and the Shubs was light reading compared to what I’ve been digging through to research medieval Tibetan military history. Here’s an example from Karl-Heinz Everding’s lively little article, “The Mongol States and their Struggle for Dominance over Tibet in the 13th century”:

“…The troops of approximately ten myriarchies of Central Tibet (Tib. dbus gtsang) marched toward the [Stod Hor—the Mongol army, I think—GB]. They met on the dpal mo dpal thang. [Oh, that thang!—GB Sorry, couldn’t resist.] The ten myriarchies of Tibetan troops defeated the many hundreds of thousands of Stod Hor troops. As proof of having killed many thousand Hor, they cut off only the right ears [of the dead] and put them into many donkey loads (Tib. ‘drel khal). Having made Gad du Rin chen and the Dgon pa dbon prisoner and having taking [sic] them along, the ears started stinking. After they had exposed them to the sun on a cool plain, the stone enclosure where the [smell] disappeared, is today known as ‘stone enclosure of the ears’ (Tib. Rna ba’i lhas).”


And that’s one of the lighter bits. If life has been too easy and fun for you lately, you’re welcome to read the whole article in a volume with the catchy, original title of “Tibet: Past and Present.”

It’s a funny thing about writing columns on war: some pretty insignificant conflicts have tons of stuff written about them, and others, big and important wars, get no press at all. Like when I had to write about the Algerian civil wars, there was nothing any good about them anywhere.

Sometimes it’s a language problem, like with Algeria, where anything that might be any use was in French or Arabic. That was part of the problem reading up on Tibet, because I don’t read Chinese and there’s no translation program for Chinese that seems to work. (If anybody knows of one, let me know.) But there’s a much bigger problem: Tibetans are steppe people, inland Asian people, which makes them alien to us Western sea-oriented cultures, just like Mongols are alien to us. I found that out back when I was a huge fan of the Mongols—well, I still am, but I’m content to worship the Khans from afar now; back then I wanted to learn everything about them. So I checked out a book called “The Secret History of the Mongols,” supposedly written by a tame scribe taking dictation from the Khans’ family genealogist himself.

That book defeated me as one-sidedly as the British defeated the Tibetans in their 1904. That’s right, by the way, the Brits invaded Tibet just a hundred-odd years ago, though nobody seems to remember. I’ll get to that later. My point here is that after I read the “Secret History of the Mongols” I knew less than I did before. Or maybe I just knew once and for all that much as I admire the Mongol warriors, I’ll never really understand how they thought.

The Tibetans are even harder to figure out, because on top of that Central Asian weirdness is all this Richard-Gere do-gooder nonsense about the peace-loving Tibetans assaulted by the ruthless Red Chinese. Both parts of that story are wrong, wrong, wrong. The Tibetans were never peaceful people at all. They were one of the most warlike peoples in Central Asia and even conquered the Chinese capital, Chang’An, in their heyday. And the Red Chinese—who could be brutal when the situation called for it, sure—were actually very decent when they took over Tibet in 1950. They felt bad about it at the time, a weird mixture of professional military embarrassment and sheer pity, taking the PLA, battle-hardened from twenty years of fighting the Kuomintang and the Imperial Japanese, into battle against the “Tibetan Army,” such as it was.

The military history of Tibet divides pretty clearly into two parts: the glory days of the 7th-9th century, when Tibet actually challenged China for dominance in south-central Asia, and the sad, slow decline ever since, where the slogan would be: “Tibet, where old meets new and loses.” The Chinese takeover in 1950 was just the latest in a series of one-sided defeats for Tibet.

The invasion was organized by one of Mao’s best generals, a short little dude with a knack for one-liners and a can-do attitude. You may have heard of him: Deng Hsiao-Peng. The guy who brought down the Gang of Four, coined the anti-Cultural Revolution line, “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice”? Yeah, him. He had one of his classic lines about how organizing the attack on poor ol’ Tibet made him feel: “….like a tiger trying to catch a fly.” They love those animal sayings, the Chinese. Don’t like actual animals much, but they love to make them into proverbs—or soup, depending on whether it’s quip-time or lunchtime.

Deng only requested 80,000 troops for the invasion—not much for the PLA and its alleged addiction to human-wave tactics. The plan was always to do an Invasion Lite, with lots of talk about the ancient friendship of Tibet and China—which was also a lie, of course.

Against the Chinese the Tibetans had not so much an army as a mobile family campground—the Tibetan soldiers took their whole families with them on maneuvers. The governor of Tibet’s eastern province called the Lamas back in Lhasa to say, “Umm, I’ve got Chinese massing on the border, Your Holiness Sir!” He was told that it was very impertinent of him to bother the Holy Administrators because they were on their annual picnic. I’m sorry but it’s hard to feel much sympathy with a country like that.

When the Chinese crossed the border, the Tibetans fought as well as they could, which was pretty damn badly. Their army was mostly cavalry, a lot of it still armed with swords. There were about 200 artillery pieces and about that many machine guns to defend the whole country. The Chinese veteran soldiers, who’d marched thousands of miles and fought every kind of enemy, couldn’t believe it when they saw Tibetans charging them with swords raised. They didn’t so much defeat the Tibetans as restrain them, the way you would an escaped lunatic. “Whoa, take it easy there fella, c’mon, put down the sword before somebody gets hurt….” They could have wiped out the entire Tibetan force like the British did in similar circumstances in 1904, but whatever else you can say about the ChiComs, they were a lot harder on their own people than on foreigners, and they just flat-out pitied the Tibetans. They got the captured Tibetan soldiers together and lectured them on socialism—they were big believers in motivational seminars, those Maoists, talk your ear off—then gave the Tibetans money and noodles and a pat on the back and told them to go home and not play with swords any more.

If there were any Tibetan war nerds around in 1950, which is kind of hard to imagine, then it must have been a hard day for them. But they should have seen it coming, because the Brits had invaded Tibet just a half-century before—and they weren’t nearly as nice to the Tibetans. I keep telling you guys, you’ve got the completely wrong idea about the Brits. You’ve been watching too many of those BBC comedies where everybody’s cute and harmless. The Brits, up to the mid-20th-century, were stone killers, the most ruthless conquerors of the past thousand years.

They invaded Tibet in 1904 basically because they were bored. I’m serious. They owned everything on the planet worth having, so they were always having to invent new “menaces” to get funding for more invasions, grabbing the places they hadn’t considered worth taking in their earlier waves of conquest. So in the late 1800s they started talking up the Russian “threat” to swarm over the Himalayas and take away India. That was such utter crap that even the Brits talking up the threat must have had a laugh about it over their port, back at the officers’ club. Russia was weak, so weak that the Japanese crushed it on land and sea in 1905. The British knew Russia was in no position to threaten India. What they wanted was an easy conquest that would produce lots of medals, honors, stuff to wear on their chests in the London social season so they could snag an heiress and never have to work. So they invaded Tibet.

The guy who ran that invasion, Francis Younghusband, was quite a piece of work himself. One of those India-born Brits, who were generally fiercer and crazier even than the homegrown English. And he had that other feature that makes for a really ruthless conqueror: he was, like his biographers say, “deeply religious.” If you hear that about a guy who’s about to invade your country, go down to the basement, hoard lots of water and canned goods, and try to make yourself invisible for the next few years, because it’s not going to be pretty.

Younghusband marched into Tibet in December 1903 with a force of Sikhs and Gurkhas—pretty scary mix, like rottweiler plus pit bull. And the Gurkhas were definitely the pit bulls in that pair. Sikhs are very tough but not blood-crazy. The Gurkhas were not only devoted lovers of knife-work, especially on POWs, but ancient enemies of the Tibetans. It didn’t take much to push them to a massacre. The Tibetans knew the British were dangerous and tried not to resist at all. But as the British force pushed farther and farther into Tibet, the local commanders decided to resist. That was a mistake. This wasn’t Tony Blair’s cool Britannia they were dealing with. On March 31, 1904, Younghusband encountered a Tibetan militia force of about 2000 guarding a pass near Gyantse. He must have had a hard time keeping a straight face or wiping the drool from his lips, thinking about the medals he’d get for this one, because the Tibetans were armed either with spears and swords or at best with matchlock muskets. That’s right: the kind of 17th-century firearm that won’t fire unless you apply the smouldering wick to the firing pan. Younghusband decided to play with the poor fuckers he was facing. He said, “My friends, my friends, what’s all this hostility? Why dees paranoia? Here, I’ll tell MY soldiers to take the bullets out of their rifles, and you tell YOUR soldiers to put out the flame of their matchlocks.” The Tibetans, who had no idea that Younghusband’s troops had modern repeating rifles, put out their matchlocks. Younghusband then ordered his troops to open fire. 1300 Tibetans were killed, with almost no British casualties.


Younghusband thought it was a great triumph. But this was already late in the Imperial era and the people back home had had enough of this kind of triumph; in fact, it sort of made them sick. The whole thing was hushed up, and remains hushed up to this day—ask any Brit you know if they ever heard of their invasion of Tibet and I guarantee they’ll plead ignorance. It’s probably better that way, makes it easy to put one of those “Free Tibet” rising-sun stickers on your Land Rover without feeling like a hypocrite.

It’s much easier to be a do-gooder about Tibet if you’re totally ignorant of Central Asian history, like the days when Tibetan conquerors filled up whole carts with the ears of guys they’d killed. Even this idea that Tibet is the homeland of Buddhism, the most Buddhist place on the planet, is crap; Tibet got Buddhism very late, trying it on a couple of times before it took.

The glory days of Tibet were before Buddhism, which is probably not a coincidence. If I had to respect any religion it’d be the Buddhists because they’re quiet and they seem pretty well-behaved, but it’s not the kind of creed you’d want to conquer with. Before you got your army out the door, some annoying Zen type would be saying in that quiet serious voice they put on, “Is not the greatest conquest that of peace?” To which you’d have to say, “No, it’s a tossup between Alexander and the Mongols and would you please put your neck a little farther out the door? It’s at a bad angle for me from there.” And that wouldn’t set the tone for a happy war of conquest, the local monk getting his head blown off at the start.

The Tibetans in their conquering days—which means roughly in Charlemagne’s time—were followers of something called Bon, or Bun, which sounds either like the department store in Seattle or part of a hamburger, but apparently was some sort of mix of Taoist magic and Mongol shamanism. Sounds pretty fun. And it worked as a military religion, almost as good as Mithras or Anglicanism. The Tibetans had a fearsome reputation as warriors who were honored to die in battle, thought they were headed for their version of Valhalla, which would probably involve big vats of tea with yak-butter and maybe central heating if they were especially worthy.

The little I’ve been able to find out about medieval Tibetan armies came mostly from a great site I found where Chinese military buffs get together and talk about really cool stuff, like why the Tibetans had a reputation for particularly tough, impenetrable body armor.

According to these Chinese war nerds, who really seem to know their stuff, the Tibetans’ main weapon was something like the Persian/Byzantine cataphract or heavily armored cavalryman, and they used mail to cover the horse as well as the rider. According to their enemies, the Tang-dynasty Chinese warriors, the Tibetans were excellent with the sword and spear but weak on missile weapons, i.e. archery. One of the cool details I read on this China History Forum site and can’t help mentioning even though it’s kind of off-topic is how the Tang armies dealt with barbarian enemies who wore lacquered armor: they fired burning arrows into the breastplates! Whoa! “One clay-pot barbarian roasted in shellac, coming up! Rice or noodles with that?”


The Tibetan Empire these warriors protected stretched from the Silk Road to the Bay of Bengal. Tibetans ruling Bangladeshis—wish I could’ve seen that. Sitting there in the felt boots they never took off from one year to the next, pouring sweat like the Abominable Snowman in Bugs Bunny: “Gosh it’s hot!”

Seriously though, heat was a real danger to steppe armies. The Mongols actually abandoned part of what’s now Pakistan because they just said fuck it, it’s too hot. Not that they couldn’t handle heat, but they expected the occasional nice refreshing blizzard out of Siberia to cool themselves and their beloved ponies off. Uninterrupted heat, year-round, they considered disgusting and unnatural. And speaking as a fat man, I have to say I agree. (There were fat Mongols, by the way. Subotai was so fat no pony would carry him. You skinny people think you own everything.)

Climate seems crucial to the whole idea of a Tibetan empire. I mean, have you seen a map of Asia? Tibet is one big flat mountaintop. Only place in the world as high and dry as Tibet is the Andean highlands in South America. Now there they grew potatoes; what did the Tibetans grow to feed their armies? I haven’t been able to find out yet, but one thing that occurred to me is that the era when the Tibetan empire was going strong was the same time the Vikings pushed into the far north and even set up a colony in Greenland. It was one of those warm phases you get every few centuries, when some Dark-Ages Al Gore starts shrieking, “Global warming! ‘Tis Satan’s work! We’re doomed!” But more enterprising conquerors see opportunity, like the sales seminars say, where doomsayers see only crisis. Warm weather meant the Norsemen could pop out enough kids to send the long ships into every creek in Eurasia. And I’m thinking maybe it meant the Tibetans could have their day in the sun too—before those ears started to stink.

So if the planet really does warm up again, who knows? Watch out, all you tropical products: the Norse might ride again! The Tibetans might grow enough barley or whatever to march on Beijing!

Yeah. Those are about equally likely. Makes a nice fantasy though.


By Gary Brecher

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2008-11-02

Reading list Oct 2008

  • What do the average mainlanders think about the Taiwan issue: The douban discussion on the issue of "Unification with Taiwan" -- douban's readers are mostly well educated and those who love movies and books. The commenters are mainly from the mainland, plus a few from Taiwan (but mostly blue-biased).
  • e.g. "2008-10-31 11:31:51 xelodia
    至於海角七號引出的台灣日本情節問題
      這中間的五十年殖民史就不提了,網路上找都有
      我只講講自己身邊的例子
      
      我的外公外婆那一輩的就是接受日本殖民
      的確就像影片裏的茂伯會信手拈來就講的一口流利日文
      不過從以前到現在,我是完全不會感受到他們認為自己是日本人
      當然,他們也不認為是中國人,我們就是台灣人罷了
      日本,中國,這都是過去發生在台灣這塊土地上無法抹滅的歷史
      但是,是會常常聽到他們說日本人殖民台灣跟國民黨接管台灣的差別
      最常講的就是說他們那時候都夜不閉戶,治安良好的不得了
      日本人跟台灣人之間,雖然說殖民與被殖民,到後期其實也相安無事
      那之後光復就真的像歷史故事講的,當你發現你終於回歸祖國懷抱,同胞來台灣接管時
      結果居然現實-國民政府軍當初來台的各種狀況及歧視以及228事件-是如此的不堪
      那種身份認同的錯覺,你無法接受這樣的人是你的同胞,而這樣的同胞的所作所為甚至還不如把台灣當殖民地的日本人
      可能這樣的狀況下,有少部份人就因此更認為自己應該是日本人,另一部份人認同自己回歸到台灣人的身份,當然還有不少部份人也還是認為我是中國人
      因為那時隨著蔣介石從中國來台的人數也佔了當時全台人數中不小的比例
      
      到了我爸媽的年代,也可以說現在在檯面上左右台灣去向的那一輩
      日本殖民這段歷史對他們來說也不過是聽長輩講故事的內容罷了
      實際生活上,並沒有受到日本文化影響到太多,更不用說到哈日
      
      那再到我這一代,我1981年的
      我們受到的日本文化我想跟祖先被殖民過更沒關係了
      那只是日本強力的次文化擴散到世界各地,台灣只是其中一個離日本近而接受度也好的國家
      不論流行事物,服裝品牌,動漫畫,電玩,當然更不用說A片
      我去歐洲旅遊時才發現日本次文化不只存在於台灣,連七龍珠都被翻成法文版在電視上播放
      在美國的超市還能看到日本設計的什麼超人玩偶在販售
      
      我想台灣跟中國對於日本的不同點只是在於仇日程度,而這影響到了接受程度
      並不是台灣因為被日本殖民過了就特別哈日
      就像上面台灣網友說得,香港娛樂產業也佔據台灣好一陣子
      前幾年的韓流也是讓一堆台灣人迷了一陣子
      連我媽煮飯還會一邊切菜一邊看韓劇
      
      我想這是台灣沒有像中國那樣高漲到有時會無限上綱的民族意識
      對外排斥的狀況並不明顯
      台灣的民族意識會高漲大概只有兩種狀況
      一種是在打國際賽的時候
      另外一種就是中國政府又來文攻武嚇了
      所以那時候才會說共產黨其實才是民進黨的最佳助選員
      因為中國說要丟飛彈來台灣,真的讓台灣人更抓狂更不爽 "
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