Sun Bin: 2008/10

2008-10-31

ZT: 保內地經濟增長，遠遠重要過參與國際救市

I am not a big fan of the Apple Daily editorial, not for the HK verion, or frankly not a fan at all. When one has to slip so much political agenda into every editorial it is hard to be fair and objective.

However, partisan as it is one as a reader should not lose his rationality, especially when it got things right despite all the prejudice. I agree 100% with today's column, only that, the politicised title is not helping it push its message to the intended ears, and I replaced its title with the conclusion: it is far more important to preserve domestic economic growth than participate in international rescue efforts. Because, (1) the ability to maintain economic growth inside China has a much larger impact to global economy than any money China can throw to IMF or the like, (2) It is uncertain how effective or efficient any of these US/Europe-led efforts are, we have seen the track record of IMF 10 years ago, and what it had done to Indonesia.

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金融海嘯不是機遇　胡溫不宜貪功

面對席捲全球的金融海嘯，中國人民銀行在兩個月內三度減息，儘管對內地股市的刺激作用有限，但表明了中國領導人胡錦濤、溫家寶參與國際社會穩定市場、穩定經濟合作的意向。不過，對於美國總統喬治布殊呼籲中國增購美債、英國首相白高敦敦促中國注資國際貨幣基金組織（ IMF ），胡、溫的反應相當冷淡，中國外交部昨日僅表示，願在力所能及的範圍內，積極考慮參與救援計劃。
對於今次百年一遇的金融海嘯，內地傳媒不時有意無意提出陰謀論，反對動用外匯儲備參與國際救市行動，特別是反對增購美債、反對注資 IMF 籌設的一萬億美元救市基金，中國持有大量美債更頻遭炮轟。根據美國財政部 10 月 16 日公佈的數據，中國至今年 8 月持有美國國債 5,410 億美元，居第二位，僅次於日本的 5,859 億美元。
中國官方新華社旗下《瞭望東方周刊》也質疑「金融危機是一次合謀」，並引述金融界人士說：「無論美國怎麼救市，它的根本目的是發動一次貨幣戰爭，通過美元貶值、國債估值下降，到時候由日本、中國這些與它金融聯繫比較多的國家買單。」
這種以貨幣戰爭看待金融海嘯的陰謀論，顯然深受去年 6 月出版的暢銷書《貨幣戰爭》影響。這本書以陰謀論分析國際財團透過搶奪貨幣發行權，操縱國際金融、經濟、政治運作，在內地引起廣泛關注。據稱，主管金融工作的副總理王岐山讀後還批示，要求所有財金官員研讀。
與陰謀論同時大行其道的是機遇論。一些學者、官員認為，金融海嘯是中國參與重整國際金融秩序的機遇，對胡溫裹足不前甚為不滿，呼籲政府採取更具力度和規模的救市行動，大有取美國而代之、趁其病（手羅）其命的氣概。《貨幣戰爭》的作者宋鴻兵更明言：「中國應該考慮如何在即將到來的國際金融戰爭中贏得戰略主動權，最終實現在一個國際『後美元體系』中的貨幣霸主地位。」
在華爾街五大投資銀行同時受損之際，金融海嘯的陰謀論難有說服力，機遇論則未免太過自大。陰謀論、機遇論對是否參與國際救市的主張不同，但又是一脈相承，都是基於中國龐大的外匯儲備而引發的民族主義情緒，都是要求胡溫向美國說不。截至今年 9 月底，中國外匯儲備達 1.9 萬億美元，雄居世界首位，在金融海嘯襲擊環球之際顯得格外耀眼，也為胡錦濤、溫家寶在任期屆滿前建功立業創造了條件。
但是，以中國現行一黨專政的政治制度，注定中國不可能取代美國成為世界領袖。何況，論經濟實力、科技實力、軍事實力，中國現時都不足以充當世界領袖。由於參與國際救市的策略，涉及中國外交戰略、貨幣戰略的調整，貪功、貪快，並不足取，保內地經濟增長，遠遠重要過參與國際救市。
中共元老鄧小平在 1989 年六四事件後提出 24 字外交戰略「冷靜觀察，穩住陣腳，沉著應付，韜光養晦，善於守拙，決不當頭」，放諸今日金融海嘯的局勢，顯然並未過時。

2008-10-29

China's dynasty cycle

hat-tip: mutant palm

This is well known among Chinese historian. We call it a 'metastable cycle' -- referring to the peak as metastable. It had been brought to the mass in the late 1980s by the famous TV documentary "River Elegy" before the tragedy in 1989. It is nicely presented in English below.

Why such cycle does not occur in other part of the world? I suspect there are a few reasons

China is "isolated" geographically
China is homogenous (culturally/"linguistically"(the characters)/economically/etc) so that it is easy to 'unify'
The Confucius teaching values of a single authority (supports unity and maintains the metastable stage until a major natural disaster comes as the trigger)

There had actually been some efforts to re-create the Roman Empire in Europe. e.g., the Holy Roman Empire which has been famously ridiculed as neither Holy nor Roman nor Empire -- because Europe lacked ingredients 2 and 3 above.

The Cycle helped China to remain as the 'largest country' in the world for most of the past 2 millenia while also prevented China from any revolutionary ideas in thinking (scientific/technological, cultural, political/social) like what happened in Europe during the Renaissance. A unified country means relative long period of peace for development, the flip-side is that the absolute authority such as Confuciusm prevents diversity and competition like China enjoyed during the Warring States Era.

ZT: Mongolia and China

I copied the article here since the source is blocked by the GFW

(update: inside the GFW - here)

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蒙古人如何看中国："回归已经没有可能"(组图) 世界博览

中国和蒙古要走向崛起，成熟的历史观必不可少。

对于中国人来说，蒙古是一个特殊的国度。因为历史上很长的一段时间里，蒙古曾经是中国的一部分。对于中国人来说，蒙古又是一个陌生的国度。我们对这个与中国有4000多公里边境线的邻国，是那么无知，以至于国内有些人还在一厢情愿地谈论“回归”的可能。

“回归，是100%没有可能的。”无论是蒙古人，还是在蒙古的中国人，对这一问题的回答不容置喙。关于蒙古大呼拉尔第43次讨论回归中国的议题，也纯粹是好事之徒的画饼充饥。现实情形是，蒙古人拒中国千里之外尚且不及，又何谈投怀送抱呢？

“想知道中国人在蒙古人的心里是什么位置吗？日本人在中国人心里是什么样，中国人在蒙古人心里就是什么样。”一位在蒙古生活了多年的朋友这样跟我说。

中国人在蒙古的真实境遇

到过蒙古的中国人，多多少少都有过不愉快的经历。我去蒙古之前，朋友就告诫我说，自己一个人要小心，特别是晚上的时候，要离街上的醉鬼远一点儿。

Idre’s Guest House酒吧的老板曾经对我说:“我从不接待中国人，因为你分不清谁是生意人，谁是旅行者。”他很坦诚地当着我的面表达自己对中国商人的厌恶感。

中国在蒙企业是这种抵触情绪的最大受害者。山东正元公司相关负责人曾向我提及，2003～2005年间，正元公司在苏赫巴托省开发金矿时，当地的环保警察与县长经常会来找麻烦。2006年在公司另外一个项目场地，地方环保警察让所有中国工人站成一排，在太阳底下站着，自己则坐到蒙古包里喝起酒来。“这是一种侮辱，但我们又不得不忍气吞声，其他的外资企业便不会受到这样的对待。”正元公司负责人李德亮对此表示无奈。

在乌兰巴托，曾有多名中国劳工向我倾诉自己在蒙古被打被抓的遭遇。我在二连浩特的一个朋友也曾亲口告诉我，前几年他曾在苏赫巴托广场被小偷偷去手机，谁知追到小偷后却被当地警察带到警察局，小偷被放走，自己反而挨了打。

在蒙古的中蒙混血儿，一般不会主动对别人谈及自己的中国血统，特别是有中国血统的蒙古官员对此更是讳莫如深，因为这是断送政治前途的危险举动。

我在蒙古时值奥运，现任侨协会长李有生对我说，中蒙选手争夺射击金牌时，蒙古选手手枪出现问题，当时电视台主持人脱口而出，是不是中国人搞得鬼？一家大众媒体的主持人在毫无调查的情况下，口无遮拦，无疑是不负责任的。然而这“脱口秀”的背后，却有着更深层次的动因。

蒙古人对中国人的种种不友好，蒙古媒体无疑起了推波助澜的作用，他们往往将集于一点的事情渲染成一个面，以至于中国大使馆不得不做一些公关工作来维持中国在蒙古的形象。然而，如果当地报纸做了关于中国的正面报道以后，往往不久就要再做对应的负面报道进行中和，由此可见其国内读者的社情民意。蒙古的政党同样如此，在议会选举中，反华往往成为选举的政治筹码。在一个民主国家，这至少反映了当地民众的好恶。

在蒙古如此的舆情之下，中国民间要求蒙古回归的民族主义者们，无疑缺少更深层面的思考。既不知己，也不知彼，只顾自己在网上自说自话，有时只能帮倒忙。

2006 年，是对中蒙关系颇具考验的一年。只因这一年是大蒙古国建立800周年。前中国驻蒙大使高树茂出于淡化历史、搁置争议、共同发展的考虑，说出了“成吉思汗是你们的，也是我们的，既然我们都是成吉思汗的子孙，就要共同发展”的话，结果依然被蒙古媒体列为最不受欢迎的外国人之一，说这是大国沙文主义的表现。

高大使这样说过:中国的崛起，历史观必须走向成熟，坦率地说，历史问题不正视，很多周边国家的问题都无法解决。国家发展是有阶段的，有一个大的长远的战略利益在其中，国家一再强调尊重蒙古主权，但是我们民间却有不同看法，不能说这些人是不爱国的，但要认真思考这些问题。

驻蒙使馆工作的多位朋友在谈及中蒙当前的主要问题时，都不约而同提到“增信释疑”这四个字。的确，如果做一下换位思考，小泉去靖国神社参拜，中国人尚且暴跳如雷。当蒙古懂中文的人打开中国网站，看到的都是要求收回蒙古的言论时，蒙古人会怎么想？这个问题绕不过去，中蒙民间就不可能有真正的友好往来。

博物馆反映的历史观

中国人对蒙古特殊的情感，全因我们的“海棠叶”情节。而蒙古人对中国人的种种不友好，也起源于这片“海棠叶”。不同的是，中国人对这片海棠叶充满向往，蒙古则充满厌恶。二者的根本分歧在于中国将蒙古建国看作国家分裂与领土缺失，蒙古则看作是民族解放与国家独立，看成自己在苏联红军的帮助下，彻底摆脱了中国将近300年的“殖民统治”。

我的蒙古朋友孟和在跟我聊历史的过程中，曾反复用到“征服王朝”这一概念。“蒙古在元代也曾征服过中国，为什么不说现在中国是蒙古的一部分呢？”

蒙古人这种史观的叙事范本，全部躺在它的国家博物馆里。位于首都乌兰巴托市中心苏赫巴托广场西北的国家博物馆共由10个分馆组成，记录了从匈奴王朝到蒙古国长达两千多年的历史。通过展品的内容、陈列样式与展馆大小等细节，我们可以了解蒙古人对自己的历史究竟是持怎样一种态度。

与中国民族大一统史观不同，蒙古国人并不认为自己是中华民族的一部分。在蒙古国家博物馆的墙上，这一点被特别强调出来。蒙古国家博物馆在不同展厅里是这样叙述自己国家历史的:匈奴帝国，鲜卑帝国，柔然帝国，突厥人建立的突厥帝国、蓝突厥帝国、维吾尔帝国及最后的蒙古帝国、满族统治之下的蒙古、革命前夜的蒙古、共产主义时期的蒙古与民主化后的蒙古。

世界上所有的国家博物馆，在看似千奇百怪种类繁多的展品背后，实际上都有一个相同的目的，即向参观者证明自己国家民族的正统性与唯一性，蒙古国家博物馆也不例外。蒙古国家博物馆展厅的历史排序，无疑是想告诉参观者，蒙古国是自古以来中亚各个帝国的合法继承者，历史上各个帝国的统治者或是蒙古人的直接祖先，或与蒙古人有着千丝万缕的联系。两千多年来，中亚的居住者、建国者与统治者的后代，便是现在的蒙古人。蒙古国家博物馆告诉人们的，并不只是蒙古人对国家正统的申述，还有他们对外来统治者的态度。满族或者中国，在这里被当成一个侵略者的角色，用来批判。

突厥王朝的展厅，是蒙古与代表土耳其政府的土耳其国际合作机构共建的，因为突厥帝国创立者的后裔就是现在的土耳其人。蒙古人能坦然面对古代突厥人的统治，却无法坦然面对满族或者中国人的统治。

照理说，从1636年清军入关前征服内蒙开始算起，到1911年清朝灭亡，有清一代对外蒙古统治将近300年，比起后来苏联70年的间接“统治”要长出很多。但如果你到蒙古国家博物馆就会发现，300年历史的第五展厅“满族统治下的蒙古”，不及“共产主义时期蒙古”展厅的三分之一，是10个展厅中空间最小的。

第五展厅展品的内容只突出两个主题:军事与刑具。前者强调清朝对蒙古的军事征服；后者用图片加实物刑具的方式，刻意突出满族统治的残酷、黑暗。实际上稍对蒙古历史了解的人，只要做一个简单的对比，就可以看出蒙古国家博物馆陈述立场的偏颇。

1921 年苏联控制蒙古以后，没收佛教寺院的财产，摧毁庙宇，逮捕喇嘛，基本上毁灭了藏传佛教。在1932年蒙古出现反抗苏联的行动后，苏联当局开始在蒙古进行清洗迫害。从1933～1953年，有36000人死亡或失踪，而当时的蒙古只有73万人。短短20年间，这个国家将近5%的人非正常死亡。在文化上，蒙古遭受了与越南同样的命运，传统蒙文被改为俄罗斯式的斯拉夫文字，隔断了他们自身文化的传承。

以上数据都来自蒙古国家博物馆，对比便知，第五展厅描述清朝对蒙古的残暴统治，只是大而空的宏观论述，缺少历史证据的支撑，却几乎占到整个第五展厅的三分之一；而苏联统治下对蒙古货真价实的残暴统治，却隐藏在共产主义时期蒙古工业化大生产的成就展品中，被轻描淡写般带过。这分明是用政治来解释历史，用当下来诠释过去，印证了克罗齐那句“一切历史都是当代史”的名言。

在第七展厅“革命前夜”里，有一段描写更是赤裸裸地表现了蒙古人对中国商人的愤恨，现照录如下:“中国商人充斥乡间，从牧民手中以低价收购皮革、羊毛、骆驼毛等商品，再将这些商品高价卖出，迫使蒙古人负债累累，由于牧民不能读懂中国商人的账本，中国人因此很容易耍花招，蒙古人经常反抗他们的压迫。”

蒙古国家博物馆在这段文字旁，别有用心地配上了一幅没有具体出处的图片，上面是一个带着镣铐正在受刑的蒙古人，暗示中国人对蒙古的残暴统治。在这里，满族人的官府与汉人的商人都是被当作中国人来看待的。

1911年辛亥革命后，外蒙古宣布自治，八世呼图克图出任皇帝。1919年，北洋政府派徐树铮将军入蒙，解散自治政府，外蒙古重归中国。“蒙古如此之少的人无法与中国人抗衡，先后向俄、日、英、法、美求救，但均遭拒绝。”蒙古国家博物馆回忆这段历史时这样记录到。

在蒙古国家博物馆的描述里，从没有“分裂”这样的词汇，他们形容北洋政府的军队时用到的词汇是“入侵。”其中一幅北洋军在广场阅兵的照片令人印象深刻，兵士们看上去趾高气昂，旁边的英文图说是:中国政府撤销蒙古自治的一个庆典。

这是该展厅极少有英文图说的一幅照片。这颇让人奇怪，与其他展馆相比，这个展馆的英文解说少的可怜，只有在涉及“中国军队侵略”的内容上，才会出现英文图说。我因此怀疑是有些历史蒙古人不想让外国游客知道。

其中一幅1919年徐树铮与蒙古王公贵族的合影或许可以印证我的想法。照片中立者为徐树铮与蒙古贵族，右侧与后立者为北洋诸将，背后是各国国旗。这至少表明，当时徐的介入与取消蒙古自治，是得到部分蒙古上层与国际支持的，这或许颇让现在的蒙古人感到难堪，因此英文介绍便被隐讳不提。

中国人被区别对待的现实原因

历史永远是现实的拐杖，现实才是行走着的双腿。中苏关系恶化以后，苏联控制下的蒙古也被灌输了反华教育。但据在蒙古生活多年的老华侨回忆，那时的蒙古民间，对中国并无反感，只是两国政府彼此保持距离。

然而今天的情况却刚好反了过来。如今，中国已经连续9年成为蒙古最大的贸易伙伴，中蒙贸易额占蒙古贸易总额的50%，用驻蒙大使馆政务参赞柴文睿的话说就是，过去蒙古是反华但不反华人，而现在蒙古人却比较反感中国人。

中国敞开国门以后，一批中国商人裹挟着伪劣商品来到蒙古淘金。这些人在蒙古人眼中的形象，与蒙古国家博物馆里描绘的中国商人并无二致。这部分人是抹黑中国的先锋队。随着中蒙经贸往来的加深，淘金的大部队纷至沓来。据中国使馆统计，去年一年中国公民赴蒙人数达20万人次。在人口只有280万人口的蒙古，这个比例相当大。这20万人次，又大多集中在人口只有130万的乌兰巴托，难怪蒙古人会惊呼:“中国人来了！”

如今在蒙古国，中国人几乎涉足到了所有的商业领域。其中最主要集中在矿产与基础设施建设方面，以至于很多蒙古人会抱怨说，中国人正在掠夺他们的资源，抢夺他们的饭碗。很多富裕起来的中国人在蒙古偏偏又不注意自己的形象，将自身的恶劣品行带入蒙古。一些华侨向我反应，有些中国老板在当地一掷千金，随意追求蒙古女人，在公共场合大声说话，这些都造成了极坏的影响。

蒙古人由此生成的，便不仅仅是抱怨，还有嫉恨。中国在改革开放初期，国民的经济状况远不如蒙古，那时蒙古认为中国是个穷国，现在却完全颠倒过来，这里面不能说没有妒忌的心理因素在作祟。

除了嫉恨，在蒙古国人最深层的心理层面上，还有对中国的恐惧。如果你有机会站在博格达山顶俯视整个乌兰巴托，你就会体会到蒙古人的这种恐惧。蒙古国全国人口只有280万，只相当于北京市东城区的人口。当一个国家一半的人口可以被一眼望穿的时候，当一个国家主要的经济、政治、文化都夹在几山之间的时候，又有谁会对旁边这个拥有13亿人口的大国放心呢？驻蒙大使馆政治部主任孙洪量说的更为到位:“与其说蒙古恐惧，不如说他疑虑，包括蒙古在内的大多数国家，都不知道中国以后要走向何处。”

给两个大国当了几百年夹心馅饼的蒙古，当然深知自己的境遇。300年前，在中国与俄国之间，蒙古选择了前者；1911年，蒙古则选择了后者。在蒙古人看来，这两次选择都是处于被迫，结果也不尽如人意。因此在1989年苏联解体，蒙古再一次获得选择权的时候，变精明的蒙古选择了“多支点”外交:用合纵连横之术来对付中俄，这使得它有越来越多的资本与这两个国家叫板。

中国人在乌兰巴托的得到不友好待遇，与这个城市无度失衡的城市化也有关系，这是更深层次的一个原因。据孙洪量介绍，原来乌兰巴托只有80万人口，且多是受过良好教育的阶层。随着牧区经济的不景气，大量牧民进入城市，却又找不到合适的工作，于是便聚集在乌兰巴托周围，形成了现在城市周边的棚户区。

蒙古又是一个人口结构年轻化的城市，人均年龄不到30岁，这些年轻人在城市中找不到自身定位，剩下的便只有对社会的不满。由于有大量的务工人员在蒙古，加之历史与现实的种种原因，中国人理所当然的成了蒙古向外引导社会矛盾的替罪羔羊。

蒙古现在的民族心态，可以用两个字来概括:浮躁。苏联统治时期对藏传佛教的禁绝，和共产主义信仰的破灭，造成信仰上的真空；经济的快速发展与外部势力的介入，造成不知所措。蒙古人还没有做好准备，还不能用一种发展中国家的、上升中国家的平和心态来对待外来冲击。

蒙古还是一个骁勇好斗的民族。对外国人，许多中国人骨子人里有一种敬畏，蒙古人却相反。蒙古国人总希望挑战外国人，这是一种沦肌浃髓的草原性格，这种性格也是促成中国人遭受不友好待遇的另一因素。

在乌兰巴托最时尚的迪厅METRO POLIS，我亲眼看到过蒙古人挑衅欧美人的场面。在乌兰巴托的大街上，你会发现，几乎找不到一辆没有划痕的汽车，他们开起车来像参加那达慕。韩国人、日本人在蒙古也有过不敬遭遇，只不过中国人的不幸更为普遍而已。

转机悄然来临

否极泰来，事分两面。在蒙古国旗里有一个中国道家的阴阳图案，这表明蒙古人也相信阴阳转换的道理。中蒙民间的友好往来，虽说任重道远，但在某些地方，这种转换已经悄然发生。蒙古人对中国人的缺乏善意，从另一面分析，正是中蒙民间交往不断加深的表现。我接触到的蒙古人中，凡是去过中国特别是北京上海这样大城市的，对中国的态度便明显积极。据统计，去年一年蒙古公民赴华人数已经达到60万人次。

此次汶川地震发生后，蒙古许多企业、个人到中国大使馆来吊唁、捐款，原计划进行3天的哀悼活动，结果进行了半个月，总计捐款280万人民币。对于蒙古这样的国家，已属不易。

（文字作者:本刊特派记者王颖春图片作者:本刊特派记者王颖春）

2008-10-19

National geographic on North Korea

Related: The book " the real North Korea" by Chinese writer Ye Yonglie 真实的朝鲜叶永烈

National geographic 45 minute documentary:

Ye offered some interesting interpretation of some well known DPRK observations, e.g.,

平壤的一道特色风景线，是漂亮的女交警在十字路口持棒指挥，据说这样可以让男司机在通过路口的时候减慢车速，而且也可以因此关闭红绿灯，以求节电 I thought they used the traffic police girls to say electricity (and cost of building the traffic lights), there isn't much traffic anyway. But Ye added that they attracts the attention of the drivers :)
平壤市民的上班时间从上午7时到9时错开，以减少对于公共交通的压力 Working hours are spread between 7 and 9 am, to ease the pressure on public transport. No traffic congestion, but public transport is limited
朝鲜的交通规则跟中国一样，汽车是靠马路右侧行驶，而这辆从日本进口的大巴士的司机座位在车头右侧，旅客上下的车门反而在车头左侧。这样，旅客在上下车时非常危险，很容易被从旁边驶过的汽车撞倒。显然，这样的巴士只适合车辆靠左侧行驶的国家与地区，如日本、英国、爱尔兰、泰国、澳大利亚、巴基斯坦、南非以及中国香港——在这些国家与地区之中，除了日本之外，大多数是英联邦国家或者曾经是英国殖民地。因为在1756年伦敦桥扩建时，规定所有驾车者都必须靠左侧行驶，以免在桥上发生碰撞，此后逐渐形成英国汽车靠左侧行驶的交通规则。世界上大多数国家是实行汽车靠马路右侧行驶的，如中国、美国、俄罗斯、印度、印度尼西亚、加拿大、德国、希腊、古巴、巴西、墨西哥、摩洛哥等。朝鲜也是实行汽车靠马路右侧行驶。显然，朝鲜旅行社在从日本进口大巴士的时候，买错了车型。日本也为汽车靠右行驶的国家生产车门在右侧的大巴士，朝鲜应该进口那种车型的大巴士。A treatise on why traffics are on the left on UK, etc
平壤是朝鲜公共交通最好的城市，有公共汽车、电车和地铁。不论乘公共汽车、有轨电车还是地铁，不论坐几站，实行统一票价，全部是5朝元。按照1元人民币相当于17朝元折算，大约相当于3角人民币。朝鲜的物价在不断上涨，在2002年，统一的票价还只有2朝元。Inflation in DPRK, pubic transport ticket fare from 2 Won in 2002 to 5 won in 2008
在平壤即便是有自行车，也只是允许男士们骑。这是因为平壤汽车速度太快，曾经撞死好几个骑自行车的女士，从此，平壤政府下达禁令，不许女同胞们在平壤骑自行车。 Only man are allowed to right bicycles! (For safety - as the cars drive too fast!)
如今，朝鲜方面在专供外宾居住的特级宾馆开通了卫星电视频道，这样我在羊角岛宾馆不仅可以看到中国中央电视台各频道，而且还能看到英国BBC、日本NHK以及俄罗斯电视台和中国香港凤凰卫视。我注意到，没有韩国台。这是因为韩国台的韩语与朝鲜语完全一样，就连打扫房间的宾馆服务员也听得懂，势必会造成诸多“麻烦”。-- Now you know why more Chinese websites and TV Channels are censored/blocked in China, while those BBC/CNN/WSJ are less regulated. .. and why I had been puzzled before they unblocked wiki/en
也有例外：在古巴，开国领袖菲德尔·卡斯特罗享有崇高的威望。然而，在哈瓦那街头找不到一张卡斯特罗画像，找不到一尊卡斯特罗铜像。有的只是卡斯特罗的战友、已故古巴革命先驱格瓦拉的塑像和画像。在古巴，没有一条以卡斯特罗命名的街道，没有一座以卡斯特罗命名的建筑物。古巴人不分男女老少，都亲切地喊卡斯特罗：“菲德尔！菲德尔！” DPRK has many statue for its founder Kim Il-sung, like many other countries...except Cuba

2008-10-16

China amid the global economic turmoil

Economist has an interesting review on China's situation regarding the recent financial turmoil.

It showed a chart demonstrating that the housing price relative to income in China had in fact fell in the past 8 year, probably based on government statistics. While I have no major disagreement with Economist's analysis or even preliminary conclusion, this chart deserves some discussion.

The government stats (if that is what the chart was based upon) should be the full market, i.e. including the rural area and villages, where I am not quite sure what land price means because even the ownership is not well defined yet. But to say that housing price/income fell by 30% in the past 8 years would mean that income increased 30% faster than housing in that period.

This is certainly debatable for large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai (which carries a lot of weight in the nation -- unless, of course, if the government used unweighted means so that the weight of a hut in the village is the same as that luxury villa in Pudong, which is not quite the right way to calculate)

The average wages had a bit more than doubled in the past 8 years, say grew by 150% (about 12% p.a.).
But for Shanghai I heard the a high end apartment costed about 10k/sq m in 2000 and about 300k/sq m now. The price per square meter had risen by about 200% (probably lower for the market overall), and probably higher. Inflation had been mild until last year so adjusting to 'real' value shouldn't change the picture too much (maybe 30-50% cumulatively?). So for Shanghai (with policies encoruaging real estate purchase around 2000) the price/income ratio remained about the same (instead of declined by 30%)
Take Shenzhen for example, the price/sq m (for new apartments) is about 15k a year ago and probably the same now, and about 7k in 2005. I do not know the price in 2000 but i would venture something around 5-6k, which means a 150-200% growth over the period, nominal. The trend is similar to that of Shanghai
Caveat: of course we know that even the property price is not a fixed measure, as quality in general had increased significantly in China during this decade
The keyword in the Economist is probably "nationwide". There may be bubble in Beijing/Shanghai but it is not a nationwide one. So yes, the index would be higher for BJ/SH but at the national level we probably have to trust Economist's chart
Regarding the definition issue the chart shows the index (so the number in 2000 is also defined similarly), the only change is perhaps the relative weight between urban and rural but that would not be as large as to elevate it from -30% to a bubble

All said, property price had rose but it was not as big a bubble as that in the US, and more likely only a small bubble which would be absorbed by inflation in longer terms. If the chart was wrong then the index probably remain unchanged instead of having fallen for 30% as it showed. The conclusion remains that the price is not outrageous if one did not think so in 2000.

Going forward there should be adjustment/correction given the global economic environment but the Economist is right that it is probably only a "soft landing" in China. This correction is mainly a result of international finance and trade rather than an internal bubble.

If this is true then the recent turmoil in the world actually works to China's favour, provided it does not worsen from today's level. It provides a "soft landing" to the overheated economy, corrects the inflated commodity market, and eases the inflation pressure (though this one may not really be good) for China.

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China's economy

Domino or dynamo?
China is pretty well placed to cushion a global downturn

CHINA has become the main engine of the world economy, accounting for one-third of global GDP growth in the first half of this year. Will it keep humming? Compared with many other emerging economies, notably Brazil and Russia, which have recently suffered big capital outflows, China has so far largely shrugged off the global credit crunch. But there are signs that China’s economy is sputtering. Export volumes have slowed markedly; the growth of industrial production dropped to a six-year low in the 12 months to August; car sales fell by 6% in the same period; and China’s property boom seems to be turning to bust.

Some of the recent slowdown reflects the temporary closure of factories around Beijing during the Olympic games, which cleared the air but made China’s statistics even hazier than usual. Yet the underlying economy has also weakened, especially in the housing market. Property sales in big cities have shrunk by around 50% over the past year. In Shenzhen prices of new luxury apartments have fallen by up to 40%. Average prices nationwide have started to slide, although they were still up by 5.3% in the year to August. Falling sales and a rising stock of new homes mean that prices are set to decline in more cities in 2009.

Predictions that average house prices could fall by up to 50% have recently grabbed the headlines. But they seem much too gloomy. After all, there has been no nationwide house-price bubble. Since 2000 average home prices have actually decreased relative to average incomes, in contrast to the surge in America until 2006 (see chart). As a result, average home prices are unlikely to fall for long.

China’s banks should also be able to withstand falling house prices better than their American counterparts. In America it was easy to get a mortgage for 100% or more of the value of a home, but Chinese buyers must put down a minimum deposit of 20-30%, depending on the home’s size, and as much as 40% on second homes. This provides banks with a large buffer as prices fall. Loans to property developers are riskier and banks’ profits will be hurt as developers go bust. But according to Wang Tao, an economist at UBS, these loans account for only 7% of total bank lending.

More generally, China’s banks should be better insulated from the global credit crunch than Western banks because the country’s system is funded through deposits rather than capital markets. Chinese banks’ loans amount to only 65% of their deposits, compared with far higher ratios in America and western Europe.

A fall in house prices will in any case hurt Chinese consumers much less than their American counterparts because Chinese households are not up to their necks in debt. Total household debt amounts to only 13% of GDP, against 100% in America. Chinese consumer spending actually strengthened this summer, with retail sales rising by 17% in real terms in the year to August. The main impact of the property downturn will be to depress construction.

The government also has room for manoeuvre. Inflation, which had been its main concern, fell to 4.9% in the year to August from 8.7% in February. This was largely thanks to lower food prices, but the growth in money supply has also slowed. Goldman Sachs forecasts that inflation will fall to 1.5% in 2009, which gives the central bank scope to ease monetary policy. Interest rates were cut for the second time in a month on October 8th, to 6.9%, and the government is expected soon to ease credit controls, especially for property.

China’s GDP growth slowed to an annual rate of a mere 10.1% in the second quarter of this year, from 12.6% a year earlier, and most economists expect it to drop to 8-9% in 2009. But this slowdown should partly be welcomed, because the economy had been exceeding its speed limit for several years. Better still, China’s growth next year will come entirely from domestic demand, as its trade surplus shrinks. If the global downturn forces China to switch the mix of growth from exports to consumption, it would also help to make its future growth more sustainable.

The government is expected to supply a fiscal stimulus to keep growth above 8%. The package will include tax cuts and extra infrastructure spending. Economists are also urging increased spending on social welfare to encourage consumers to save less and spend more. China has ample room for a stimulus because it boasts the healthiest fiscal position of any big economy. According to Stephen Green, an economist at Standard Chartered, it has a budget surplus of 2% of GDP, if measured in the same way as in rich economies, and public-sector debt is a mere 16% of GDP. China’s readiness to use fiscal lubrication is the best reason for hoping that its economic motor will not stall.

2008-10-12

Crash Master - Shiller

By now many people have probably heard of Robert Shiller, of the Case-Shiller Index for housing price.

Time has an good story about him, and his pithy advice on how to treat (prevent) bubbles

What's the antidote to that kind of mass delusion? Shiller seems to have no interest in substituting his judgment, or the government's, for the market's. Instead, he sees information and innovation as the counter to group think. An active market in house-price futures and options--Shiller has recently helped launch such securities on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange--would let skeptical speculators prick housing bubbles, he argues. If banks wrote continuous-workout mortgages--in which the terms changed depending on house prices, unemployment and the like--homeowners might be less addicted to rising prices. If government subsidized financial advice for the nonrich, salespeople angling for commissions might be less influential.

John Mauldin's "geopolitics of China"

John Mauldin's "Geopolitics of China" (p.s. based on Stratfor's analysis) is a very good treatise on "what China want", starting with its geopolitical constraints, to what it logically needs and matches with what historically (and even today) China's (geopolitical and) strategic goal is.

"The only thing that's crystal clear about China is the need to look long term, at the underlying forces that don't change day by day. Nobody does this better than my friend George Friedman and his team at Stratfor. Their geopolitical focus filters out the noise in the popular press and concentrates on the real drivers behind national policy. This is especially critical for a market like China, where traditional financial statement analysis is impossible and profit motives just don't apply."

I have a few notes but these do not change the key theme and flow of Mauldin's analysis. So please go read it, judge for yourself before coming back for my notes below.

Geopolitics

The map (above) is not entirely accurate for those who know the geographies. e.g.among places excluded in the "island" are Xian which is part of the "China proper", historically, politically and demographically, and a number of other locations such as Liaodong penisular. If Mauldin reads historically maps of China he would probably recognize that both the NW of Korea (i.e. NW coast down to south of Pyongyeong) was included into the Chinese empire until late Ming) and North Vietnam formed part of "geopolitical China". The real both is the mountains of southern Vietnam (Ho Chi Ming path) and the more mountainous East/SE Korea (Silla, Paekchi) -- referencing the historical map of Han/Tang/North Song dynasties would fill the gaps in Mauldin's "China as an island" argument. China was really defended by naturally barriers from all sides with the technology a couple hundred years ago -- e.g. This East Han map (from jp.wiki.org) where Han expanded wherever it could constrained only by geography

The geographic barrier is best illustrated with this East Han map. As Mauldin discussed, we have the Gobi to the North, Tibet to the South West and central Asian desert to the West, plus the Himalayas beyond Tibet and the tropical rain forest and mountains to the SWS. The only area that Han had not explored is the Northeast (later known as Manchuria), where the Liao (Chitan), Jin and Qing (Manchu) were based. Today inner Manchuria became part of China are the Han China was conquered by the Manchus around 1644
Mauldin said "It is important to understand that over a billion people live in an area about half the size of the United States." the more precise measure if perhap 1/3 the size of USA. This makes China's population density (over useful land) perhaps 7 time higher than US perhaps 20% of land in US is also desert like Gobi, so 3/(1/3)x80%=7)
"However -- and this is the single most important fact about China -- it has about one-third the arable land per person as the rest of the world. This pressure has defined modern Chinese history -- both in terms of living with it and trying to move beyond it." -- understanding this will help one understand why the PRC leaders often talked about survival as one key elements of 'human right", they are serious about this, historically many people die (in fact, famine was commonplace in Chinese history) whenever there was upheaval (and vice versa)
As mentioned above, historically the "buffer zone" would include Vietnam and NW Korea -- both people were very much sinicized, culturally advanced and often friendly to (pay tribute to) the Han China. As a matter of fact, they used Chinese character until very recently
It should also be noted that historically China was often "forced" to expand, notably the westward exploration in Han (and also Tang) was forced on by Mongolian (Hun/Turk) invasions. "Chinese strategy remained constant: the slow and systematic assertion of control over these outer regions in order to protect the Han from incursions by nomadic cavalry." I should add that Han China had been satisfied with the "East Han order" for almost 2000 years and the major change in territory was complete by the Manchurian. Expansion had ceased to be part of the strategic objective for Han China after early Tang, parhaps because of the Confucius doctrine and just arrogance (despise the culture/wealth/resources of the neighboring countries)

Mauldin then went on to assert that China has 3 geopolitical imperatives

Maintain internal unity in the Han Chinese regions.
Maintain control of the buffer regions.
Protect the coast from foreign encroachment.

#1 explains why presnt day PRC was so obsessive on Taiwan, #2 expalin Xinjiang and Tibet. While Maudlin was discussing about Mao's strategy, I should also add that Mao made a point not to build infrastructure (to isolate China from external invasion) in the buffer areas and located all the strategic industries deep into the mountains (again, to be more defensible)

"Although Taiwan presents no immediate threat, it does pose potential dangers that China cannot ignore."

Maudlin was right on when he commented on the implication of the Korean war, "From the Soviet point of view, fighting between China and the United States was the best thing imaginable. But from Stratfor's point of view, what it demonstrated was the sensitivity of the Chinese to any encroachment on their borderlands, their buffers, which represent the foundation of their national security" Yes, Soviet managed to play China against the US and thwarted China's development for about 30 years. But this eventually led to the Sino-Soviet split and Nixon's visit. And the rest was history (without China US could still win the Cold War as that is inevitable, but it could take a couple more decades).

Maudlin discussed about the premise in which China feels the threat from US Navy. However, as Maudlin concluded, such a concern is only economical, to achieve such objective US needs only to stop trading with China (rather than a blockade). In other word, there is no reason for US to blockade China. The real objective of China's naval aspiration (or that to prepare against a sea blockade on the east), is Taiwan. The only reason US may impose a blockade to China is if war breaks out in Taiwan. PRC does not like that idea.

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Finally, one piece of good news (vs Maudlin's concern in his concluding paragraph that the rift between coastal and interior China could destabilize and perhaps lead to catstrophic results in China), is that modern technology has greatly shortened physical distance, to such an extent that the distinction between coastal and interior China are much blurred after China completed it new road network at the turn of the century. As of today, we have already witness strong growth in the interior (and migration of factories from coastal to interior). Meanwhile, as China's economy grows it becomes more frequently a customer of the good it produces itself, which aleviates the dependency on export. What China needs is to toe the line carefully and buy time to become less vulnerable to external economic turbulence. The 2008 recession is the biggest test it has to cope with.

2008-10-11

Map: China = Σ (34+1 nations)

Hatip: Thomas Barnett

Map of China - by population benchmarking from strangemaps.wordpress.com

Here, for easy reference, is a list in descending order of magnitude of those Chinese territories (their population in brackets) followed by the foreign country they compare to.

Guangdong (113 million) Germany plus Uganda (3)
Henan (99 million) Mexico
Shandong (92 million) Philippines
Sichuan (87 million) Vietnam
Jiangsu (75 million) Egypt
Hebei (68 million) Iran
Hunan (67 million) France
Anhui (65 million) Thailand
Hubei (60 million) U.K.
Guangxi (49 million) Burma/Myanmar
Zhejiang (47 million) South Africa
Yunnan (44 million) Colombia
Jiangxi (43 million) Tanzania
Liaoning (42 million) Argentina
Guizhou (39 million) Sudan
Heilongjiang (38 million) Poland
Shaanxi (37 million) Kenya
Fujian (35 million) Algeria
Shanxi (33 million) Canada
Chongqing (31 million) Morocco
Jilin (27 million) Afghanistan
Gansu (26 million) Saudi Arabia
Inner Mongolia (24 million) North Korea
Taiwan (23 million) Yemen
Xinjiang (20 million) Madagascar
Shanghai (18 million) Cameroon
Beijing (16 million) Angola
Tianjin (12 million) Cuba
Hainan (8 million) Austria
Hong Kong (7 million) El Salvador
Ningxia (6 million) Sierra Leone
Qinghai (5 million) Slovakia
Tibet (3 million) Jamaica
Macau (0,5 million) Cape Verde

2008-10-10

Chen Shui Bian's contribution to TWII

Source: finance.yahoo.com

May 20th 2000 to March 20th 2008, underpeform Korea by 120%

On May 20th 2000, when Chen Shui Bian took over, TWII was 9120, Korea KOS 731, Hong Kong HSI 14478, Dow Jones 10627.

On Mar 19th, 2008, before the election, TWII was 8179, KOS 1622, HSI 21867, DJI 12100.

TWI underperformed all the benchmark markets, and fell by 10.3% while the closest benchmark(with similar industry mix, stage of economic development and market) KOS rose by 122%.

This is the price the people of Taiwan paid for the pursuit of ideology. (note also that the lag started to widen significantly in his second term -- sort of echoing my hypothesis in my previous post regarding long term accountability)

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p.s. Some may argue that TWII also underperformed under the pragmatic Ma Ying-jeou. But it was not nearly as worse/significantly, albeit there had only been a few months and we need more data to test. TWII underperformed the benchmarks by 10-15% in the past 6 months

Mar 19 to Oct 9, 2008

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Not really related: on a separate topic of the infamous Arms Procurement Deal, US Presidential Candidate McCain has offered his candid insight

“These sales ... would help retain America’s edge in the production of advanced weaponry and represent a positive sign in these difficult economic times,”

It is just about the money. So no need to get too upset, Mr Hu, nor get too excited, those on the island.

Cheung on sub-prime

From 互不相干二三事

再转谈另一项。美国次贷带来的金融风暴，尽管求教过朋友，不明白的地方仍多。例如输掉了那么多的钱，究竟到了哪里去？想来不是昔日荷兰的郁金香危机的扩大版本。想到另一个可能，不能肯定。希望读者有以教我。
美国的经济学者反对政府救市，我站在哪一边举棋不定！其中一个困难，使我在众议院通过之前出弹弓手。是这样的︰如果政府不救，因为美国工会多，最低工资高，有福利也有失业金，市场暴跌可能引发百分之二十以上的失业率。三十年代的大萧条，出现过近百分之三十的失业率。这数字作研究生时吵过好一阵。有说是真的，有说是夸张了。面对难关，我宁可信其有。我认为佛利民的《美国货币史》对大萧条的解释──货币量应加反减──只对一半。更重要的一半是当时的劳工市场不够自由，工资下调不容易。朱镕基在九十年代推出严厉的宏观调控，经济增长依旧，是历史上非常重要的一课。当时中国劳工市场的合约够自由肯定是重点。我是因为朱老的政策经验而对三十年代的大萧条有了新的体会。
如果目前的美国没有上述的劳工市场的诸多约束，选择「不救」应该是明智之举。市场的运作会调整得快，而十年前亚洲金融风暴的经验，是市场下跌得快时回升也快。短痛是胜于长痛的。问题是美国的劳工市场沙石太多，一下子导致无数企业关门，责任政府负担不起。这样看，出资救市是可以理解的选择，不幸地短痛会换来长痛。
除非我读到的资料有重要的失实之处，我认为目前金融市场的不幸处境，不是短期可以清理的。格林斯潘支持出资抢救，但最近他在一间大学讲话，说会复苏得快。比我乐观。我衷心希望他对，我错。

1) Where the money went - I thought the money was mostly spent, on Iraq, on Walmart, etc. e.g. a 40-something couple in bay area sold their house for 1M and bought another at 250k in Colorado to retire. They pocketed 750k in cash pay the capital gain (which goes to Iraq), save some and "spent" some. Whoever bought that house became the loser.

2) In my view, the government spending 700bn is ok, but it should spend on the source of the problem (and at the right price). i.e. to provide credit directly or to buy real estate, not on the derivatives.

3) Cheung's view on labor market is mainly related to how one deals with deflation. If he is right, then the impact on China is minimal -- because China was on the path of inflation (and general economic growth where salary should be adjusted up otherwise), and China's labor protection is actually a lot weaker than that in US. (yes, i repeat that it is true that China is more capitalistic than US even before the bail-out)

4) The problem in the US (and why Paulson was able to hijack the congress) is due to the short-term behaviors among the US politicians. i.e. they are only concerned about the blames in the short term and would rather follow the majority to vote for the bail-out (which is a less risky decision with regard to their political career)

-- this has very profound implication on political thoery regarding modern liberal democracy and accountability of politicians. While ensuring democracy with change of terms we have traded off long-term accountability for our politicans, is there any 'patch' to fix for this?

p.s. IMHO the widely talked about failure of free-marketing and liberal democracy is widely exaggerated, and the logics are flawed.

2008-10-09

Nobel prize: the Japanese experience

The diligent Japanese have finally proven they are not just the engineers who could only innovate on the breakthrough of others. They still have very strong "pipeline" (candidate) who could win another in the next couple of days, e.g., the acclaimed writer Murakami Haruki (村上春樹).

So far they have won 16 Nobel prizes, of which 15 were Japanese citizens at the time of receiving the prize. The 16th Nambu who won the physics prize this year, was educated in Japan, became a professor in Japan, and moved to US only after his 31st birthday.

氏名	受賞年	部門	理由等
湯川秀樹	1949年	物理学賞	中間子の存在の予想。コロンビア大学在籍中に受賞。
朝永振一郎	1965年	物理学賞	量子電気力学分野での基礎的研究。
川端康成	1968年	文学賞	『雪国』、『千羽鶴』、『古都』等の作品。
江崎玲於奈	1973年	物理学賞	半導体におけるトンネル効果の実験的発見。IBM在籍中に受賞。
佐藤栄作	1974年	平和賞	非核三原則の提唱。
福井謙一	1981年	化学賞	化学反応過程の理論的研究。
利根川進	1987年	生理学・医学賞	多様な抗体を生成する遺伝的原理の解明。MIT在籍中に受賞。
大江健三郎	1994年	文学賞	『万延元年のフットボール』、『燃え上がる緑の木』三部作等の作品。
白川英樹	2000年	化学賞	導電性高分子の発見と発展。
野依良治	2001年	化学賞	キラル触媒による不斉合成反応の研究。
小柴昌俊	2002年	物理学賞	天体物理学、特に宇宙ニュートリノの検出に対するパイオニア的貢献。
田中耕一	2002年	化学賞	生体高分子の同定および構造解析のための手法の開発。
南部陽一郎^[1]	2008年	物理学賞	自発的対称性の破れの発見。
小林誠	2008年	物理学賞	対称性の破れによるクオーク世代の予言（小林・益川理論）。
益川敏英	2008年	物理学賞	対称性の破れによるクオーク世代の予言（小林・益川理論）。
下村脩	2008年	化学賞	緑色蛍光タンパク質(GFP)の発見とその開発。

In fact, the Japanese have already won 4 prizes between 2000-2002 in consecutive years.

One interesting coincidence is that it seems that they tend to win Nobels when the US is in recession (e.g., 1973-74, 1987, 2000-2002, 2008; the economy wasn't great in 1981 and 1994 either).

This is a very strong refute to the myth that Japan does not (know how to) innovate which was a very popular belief from the 1980s through even today. See, e.g., The New Scientist article published in 1989, "No-bells for Japan"

"This worries policymakers even more than the league table of Nobel prizewinners does. Yoshihiro Miki, director of policy research in the government's Science and Technology Agency (STA), says that Japan has completed the 'catch-up stage' in its scientific development: it has closed the gap over the period since the end of the Second World War. To go further it will need fundamental changes to encourage its scientists to be creative. 'We need to have an environment where researchers can freely display their creativity and ability,' says Miki. "

A lot (11 to be exact) of "bells" for Japan have been awarded since, across all disciplines (except for the Economic Prize. They even won an infamous Peace Prize - even though the Japanese were not involved in international political power game such as the Israelie-Palestine deal and the Vietnam cease-fire talk), 4 in the past few days.

It should be noted that most of the works for these prizes were accomplished before the 1989 article was written (when Mr Miki lamented). e.g. the Cabibo-Kobayahi-Maskawa matrix was published in 1973. The reform in Japan started in 1860's and the first Japanese Nobel (Yukawa) was awarded in 1949 (90 years later) for works that was done in 1935 when he published the "Yukawa potential".

What Japan has shown us is that fundamental education and a reasonably funded but propoerly managed (i.e. fair) academic system (which it enjoyed) play a much more important role than government directive or intervention (which the pundits derided) when it comes to innovation.

This bring to the question of China. So far there are 9 ethnic Chinese who have won the Nobel prize. None of them hold Chinese passport

Only Gao Xingjiang's work was done entirely within China. (the only non-scientist, non-politician)
Only 2 physicists (Yang and Lee) completed their undergraduate in China, Dan Tsui was educated in US. The other 3 physicists, Chu, Ting and Tsien were not even born in China
The chemist, Lee Yuan-tseh was educated in NTU, Taiwan, which is basically the same system Yang and Lee went through
The DL is a Tibetan grew up in India and the west, and the prize he received does not exactly reflect education and scientific/cultural advanceness (and some readers, including the DL himself or many Chinese nationalists, do not think he is considered Chinese at all)

... and the Japanese lessons for China

Can China foster an environment for innovation of the Nobel quality? Yes, it has produced Gao, and partially Yang and Lee -- there will be another Dan Tsui, another Y-T Lee once in a few years since there are so many people who went to the US for PhD and stayed behind
Were these prizes more like an anomaly of the Chinese education system? Yes, considering Gao is an outlier in the circle and Yang/Lee could not have done the same work had they stayed in China (and the 50 year-vacuum afterwards) -- China today is at best the 1960s of Japan when it got a couple sporadic prizes, so we have have one or two Nobel laureate in the coming decade, but the paths of these winners will be quite different from their peers
When will China be really part of the "Nobel community" (i.e. on par with Japan, Germany, Switzerland, etc)? Probably another 3 decades, if Japan's path is to be followed. The innovation in Japan started in 1970s (or late 1960s) and the harvest started about 30 years later. Today's China resembles Japan in late 1970s, in terms of economic development and education. Yes, China is on an accelerated path, but the corruption, poor management of its research and education system could more than offset the 'economic acceleration' plus the 'population scale' it may enjoy in the next 2 decades

2008-10-01

The Wen Jia Bao Interview

Fareed Zakaria interviewd Wen Jiabao

part 2

The transcript

Sun Bin