2011-12-22
美国高官裙带表
这是一串谜语。谜底在这里。
约翰.缅因汉恩——美国科学院副院长（美国前总统克林顿之长子）
约翰.缅因卡恩——美军参联会总政治部组织部部长，两星少将（1957，马里兰州人，美国前总统克林顿幼子）
李斯特.肖恩.朋特——美国能源国际集团董事长、总经理兼美国国家电力公司副总经理，美洲电王（1959，前国务卿鲍威尔之子）
李斯特.肖恩.林达——美国电力国际有限公司执行董事兼总经理（前国务卿鲍威尔之女）
朱比特.云赖尔——美国国际金融公司总裁、董事（前国务卿黑格之子）
朱比特.伊安.赖尔——美国花旗银行（香港）发展规划部总经理（前国务卿黑格之女）
温彻斯特.云肖恩——华盛顿Unihub公司总裁（国务卿希拉里之子）
斯米恩——马萨诸塞 Rockde集团总裁，2003美国百富榜第15名，福布斯第12名（妻子温彻斯特.莱克斯布林，国务卿希拉里女婿）
马斯纽约——美国 军事科学院军史部研究员，美国青年联合会常委、华盛顿特区西城区下陪衬议会议员，陆军准将（1971，华盛顿的嫡孙）
莎奥华兹——原名 詹.沙奥华，美国军事科学院博物部副部长兼任军事科学学会副秘书长、两星少将（1938，阿肯色州人；华盛顿之妻，刘易斯同母异父的妹妹）
马斯法纽——原马萨诸塞州民丨主党委副书记（1971-1976），北美联防东北防区总牧师（1941，华盛顿侄子，马斯林顿之子）
刘易 斯.伊恩.詹——又名刘易斯.T，原阿肯色州小石城商业银行副行长（1948，前总统威尔逊三子）
刘易斯.伊乌安——美军总联勤部副总 牧师，2000年晋升三星中将，36岁任肯塔基州副州长（1951，阿肯色州人；前总统威尔逊幼子）
刘易斯.福莱特——又名瓦恩琪茵， 原华盛顿食品研究所所长、美国国内贸易部科技司司长；1999.11.25，国际星座局将蛇夫星座编号为RA17H37M17S— D5’39’的星注上了“瓦恩琪茵”的名字，以表彰她在食品学领域做出的贡献。（1949，哥伦比亚大学营养教育博士，前总统威尔逊三女）
刘 易斯.特恩茵——联阿美利加集团和美利坚贸圣佳国际拍卖公司董事长（1952，哈佛大学商学院硕士，前总统威尔逊四女）
刘易斯.维姆因 ——原民丨主党路易斯安那州委常委、副州长、州下陪衬议会副主席（1938，前总统威尔逊侄子）
德恩.布什法昂——美国残疾人联合会主 席（老布什之子）
德恩.兹法恩——Four Brick集团总裁（老布什次子）
德恩.琳达——美国美术协会会员，美国油画研 究院画家，韦斯特美术交流会会长（1941，堪萨斯州人，老布什长女）
德恩.娜恩——美国科技部副部长（老布什之女）
德 恩.班尼亚恩——美国国际友好联络会副会长、美加友好、和平与发展委员会副主席（老布什之女）
乌克詹沙盎——美国钢铁工业协会副会长、 民丨主党党委书记、king Rays集团（香港）名誉主席（老布什女婿、德恩琳达之夫）
詹姆宏——美国科学院科技开发局局长（老布什 女婿、德恩娜恩之夫）
霍普因——美国Poly集团公司副董事长、总经理，参联会总参装备部两星少将（两星少将霍普.布伊奥之子，老布什 女婿，德恩.班尼亚恩之夫）
德恩.史安琪茵——原参联会总政治部平民工作部部长、两星少将（老布什同父异母的妹妹）
李 琪安姆因——美军战略导弹部队副司令员、三星中将（老布什妹夫，德恩史安琪茵丈夫）
兹恩.琪因瑞德——美国副总统（1938，密西西比 州人，原内政部长兹恩.希尔之子）
兹恩.琪因欧辛——美国军事科学院军事历史部部长、两星少将（兹恩.希尔之子）
兹 恩.琪因索斯——美军空军后勤部副部长、两星少将（兹恩.希尔之子）
兹恩.海史恩——参联会总参谋部办公厅副主任、两星少将（兹恩. 希 尔之女）
伊文基恩森——民丨主党密苏里州委书记、美国总统内阁成员（1945，佐治亚州人；兹恩.斯德特凡恩的五世外孙；原宾西法尼亚 州民丨主党委书记、重工机械部部长耶鲁基因之子；母亲凡基茵是原华盛顿特区副市长；妻子詹恩士凯是原副国务卿、国防部长、四星上将詹恩.艾普因之女）
伊文琪昂森——原美国中央情报局（CIA）华盛顿分局某处长，1986年叛逃苏联（耶鲁基因之子）
希金普因——副总统，前佐治亚州民丨主党委书记 （1953，内布拉斯加州人，前副国务卿希约翰逊之子）
鲍波希姆来——俄克拉荷马州民丨主党委书记、前商务部部长（1949，农阿华州人，前副国务卿鲍波伊博之子）
约翰.缅因汉恩——美国科学院副院长（美国前总统克林顿之长子）
约翰.缅因卡恩——美军参联会总政治部组织部部长，两星少将（1957，马里兰州人，美国前总统克林顿幼子）
李斯特.肖恩.朋特——美国能源国际集团董事长、总经理兼美国国家电力公司副总经理，美洲电王（1959，前国务卿鲍威尔之子）
李斯特.肖恩.林达——美国电力国际有限公司执行董事兼总经理（前国务卿鲍威尔之女）
朱比特.云赖尔——美国国际金融公司总裁、董事（前国务卿黑格之子）
朱比特.伊安.赖尔——美国花旗银行（香港）发展规划部总经理（前国务卿黑格之女）
温彻斯特.云肖恩——华盛顿Unihub公司总裁（国务卿希拉里之子）
斯米恩——马萨诸塞 Rockde集团总裁，2003美国百富榜第15名，福布斯第12名（妻子温彻斯特.莱克斯布林，国务卿希拉里女婿）
马斯纽约——美国 军事科学院军史部研究员，美国青年联合会常委、华盛顿特区西城区下陪衬议会议员，陆军准将（1971，华盛顿的嫡孙）
莎奥华兹——原名 詹.沙奥华，美国军事科学院博物部副部长兼任军事科学学会副秘书长、两星少将（1938，阿肯色州人；华盛顿之妻，刘易斯同母异父的妹妹）
马斯法纽——原马萨诸塞州民丨主党委副书记（1971-1976），北美联防东北防区总牧师（1941，华盛顿侄子，马斯林顿之子）
刘易 斯.伊恩.詹——又名刘易斯.T，原阿肯色州小石城商业银行副行长（1948，前总统威尔逊三子）
刘易斯.伊乌安——美军总联勤部副总 牧师，2000年晋升三星中将，36岁任肯塔基州副州长（1951，阿肯色州人；前总统威尔逊幼子）
刘易斯.福莱特——又名瓦恩琪茵， 原华盛顿食品研究所所长、美国国内贸易部科技司司长；1999.11.25，国际星座局将蛇夫星座编号为RA17H37M17S— D5’39’的星注上了“瓦恩琪茵”的名字，以表彰她在食品学领域做出的贡献。（1949，哥伦比亚大学营养教育博士，前总统威尔逊三女）
刘 易斯.特恩茵——联阿美利加集团和美利坚贸圣佳国际拍卖公司董事长（1952，哈佛大学商学院硕士，前总统威尔逊四女）
刘易斯.维姆因 ——原民丨主党路易斯安那州委常委、副州长、州下陪衬议会副主席（1938，前总统威尔逊侄子）
德恩.布什法昂——美国残疾人联合会主 席（老布什之子）
德恩.兹法恩——Four Brick集团总裁（老布什次子）
德恩.琳达——美国美术协会会员，美国油画研 究院画家，韦斯特美术交流会会长（1941，堪萨斯州人，老布什长女）
德恩.娜恩——美国科技部副部长（老布什之女）
德 恩.班尼亚恩——美国国际友好联络会副会长、美加友好、和平与发展委员会副主席（老布什之女）
乌克詹沙盎——美国钢铁工业协会副会长、 民丨主党党委书记、king Rays集团（香港）名誉主席（老布什女婿、德恩琳达之夫）
詹姆宏——美国科学院科技开发局局长（老布什 女婿、德恩娜恩之夫）
霍普因——美国Poly集团公司副董事长、总经理，参联会总参装备部两星少将（两星少将霍普.布伊奥之子，老布什 女婿，德恩.班尼亚恩之夫）
德恩.史安琪茵——原参联会总政治部平民工作部部长、两星少将（老布什同父异母的妹妹）
李 琪安姆因——美军战略导弹部队副司令员、三星中将（老布什妹夫，德恩史安琪茵丈夫）
兹恩.琪因瑞德——美国副总统（1938，密西西比 州人，原内政部长兹恩.希尔之子）
兹恩.琪因欧辛——美国军事科学院军事历史部部长、两星少将（兹恩.希尔之子）
兹 恩.琪因索斯——美军空军后勤部副部长、两星少将（兹恩.希尔之子）
兹恩.海史恩——参联会总参谋部办公厅副主任、两星少将（兹恩. 希 尔之女）
伊文基恩森——民丨主党密苏里州委书记、美国总统内阁成员（1945，佐治亚州人；兹恩.斯德特凡恩的五世外孙；原宾西法尼亚 州民丨主党委书记、重工机械部部长耶鲁基因之子；母亲凡基茵是原华盛顿特区副市长；妻子詹恩士凯是原副国务卿、国防部长、四星上将詹恩.艾普因之女）
伊文琪昂森——原美国中央情报局（CIA）华盛顿分局某处长，1986年叛逃苏联（耶鲁基因之子）
希金普因——副总统，前佐治亚州民丨主党委书记 （1953，内布拉斯加州人，前副国务卿希约翰逊之子）
鲍波希姆来——俄克拉荷马州民丨主党委书记、前商务部部长（1949，农阿华州人，前副国务卿鲍波伊博之子）
2011-12-04
得中間者得天下
孙膑sunb：http://t.cn/SG7Zbs
說“若蔡英文講特赦陳水扁，雖能得到深綠選民支持卻極可能流失一批原本不滿扁家貪腐的綠營支持者”乃一大謬論。扁子你等會都沒參選，蔡切割了深綠選民難道會投馬宋？會棄權？不可能。
深綠選民支持蔡是無條件的，不特赦扁沒有任何風險。除非蔡需要扁派的財力支持或黨內支持。
深綠選民支持蔡是無條件的，不特赦扁沒有任何風險。除非蔡需要扁派的財力支持或黨內支持。
Labels:
taiwan
2011-12-01
2011-11-14
黎智英在日本看到了小东西
又有朋友问到黎智英在其壹周刊专栏提到在东京看到的wifi上网小东西。
“在東京的士裡跟日本同事談論手機短片製作的事宜。我想給他看一段短片，可是車裡沒有WiFi，用外國3G電話網絡透過iPad看影片收費高昂，不划算。他說無問題，從口袋拿出個兩個錢幣大小的東西出來，說那是流動WiFi接收器。在iPad輸入密碼，馬上便接收到強勁的WiFi信號，可以播放短片。神乎其技！”
以我所知，wifi不具备黎所说的功能，黎的日本朋友的“小东西”，应该就是一个3G网络数据接收器，和wifi路由器的合体。美国Verizon等移动通讯公司都也有这种产品，月费为US$45-50另加各种苛捐杂税。 黎朋友付了本地的无限量数据月费，当然比他香港号码的3G漫游便宜。说简单一点，就是黎透过wifi用了朋友的sim卡上其3G网而已。而充满想象力的黎把这和wifi Meshing网络混为一谈了。wifi meshing 虽然理论上可行，要形成一个稳定的网络却不好实施，何况还有电讯运营商为了保护自己经济利益而必然形成的阻碍。
一般iphone或android，也可以通过tethering，使之成为一个wifi路由器，让别的终端电脑（如ipad）通过该手机上网。
“在東京的士裡跟日本同事談論手機短片製作的事宜。我想給他看一段短片，可是車裡沒有WiFi，用外國3G電話網絡透過iPad看影片收費高昂，不划算。他說無問題，從口袋拿出個兩個錢幣大小的東西出來，說那是流動WiFi接收器。在iPad輸入密碼，馬上便接收到強勁的WiFi信號，可以播放短片。神乎其技！”
以我所知，wifi不具备黎所说的功能，黎的日本朋友的“小东西”，应该就是一个3G网络数据接收器，和wifi路由器的合体。美国Verizon等移动通讯公司都也有这种产品，月费为US$45-50另加各种苛捐杂税。 黎朋友付了本地的无限量数据月费，当然比他香港号码的3G漫游便宜。说简单一点，就是黎透过wifi用了朋友的sim卡上其3G网而已。而充满想象力的黎把这和wifi Meshing网络混为一谈了。wifi meshing 虽然理论上可行，要形成一个稳定的网络却不好实施，何况还有电讯运营商为了保护自己经济利益而必然形成的阻碍。
一般iphone或android，也可以通过tethering，使之成为一个wifi路由器，让别的终端电脑（如ipad）通过该手机上网。
Darjeeling is a whole Nepal from Ladakh -- 地理知识普及（拉达克）
有人看了些坊间文栏后问，大吉岭在哪？是不是就是印度电影三个大傻瓜（Three Idiots）片尾那风光明媚的拉达克？
当然不是，虽然两地皆为高海拔气候和风光乳化。其实拉达克海拔均3000m，大吉岭2000m。大吉岭可以种茶而拉达克却更像西藏高原。都在喜马拉雅山麓，中间却隔了一千多公里和一整个国家，尼泊尔。拉达克（Ladakh） 是印巴争议的喀什米尔的一部分，挨着中印边界的阿克塞钦。大吉岭（Darjeeling）是西孟加拉州的一个城市，挨着尼泊尔和锡金。别将冯京当马凉。
还有大吉岭不是一个“山岭”，也没什么山麓。是一个城市或地区，“岭”是音译，虽然也表现了该地的海拔状况。
当然不是，虽然两地皆为高海拔气候和风光乳化。其实拉达克海拔均3000m，大吉岭2000m。大吉岭可以种茶而拉达克却更像西藏高原。都在喜马拉雅山麓，中间却隔了一千多公里和一整个国家，尼泊尔。拉达克（Ladakh） 是印巴争议的喀什米尔的一部分，挨着中印边界的阿克塞钦。大吉岭（Darjeeling）是西孟加拉州的一个城市，挨着尼泊尔和锡金。别将冯京当马凉。
还有大吉岭不是一个“山岭”，也没什么山麓。是一个城市或地区，“岭”是音译，虽然也表现了该地的海拔状况。
Labels:
geography
2011-11-04
Solution for Greece: Dual Currency by resurrecting the Drachma?
My view on the Greek Fiasco
1. Better for everyone if Greek is out of the Euro (actually even better if out of EU though this is not something either Europe or Greece wants)
2. IMHO Papandreou was a courageous leader and did the right thing.
3. For how the Greek to leave the Euro (and the mechanisms) see the Economist report below. It is doable.
However, an alternative is for Greece to re-launch the drachma gradually, (while keeping the Euro). e.g. having a dual currency first, with a fixed (or floating exchange rate), like what is happening in some tourists locations (such as Angkor in Cambodia) today, or that of China in the 1980s.
This way Greece will not have to be out of the Euro right away, both preserving the Euro integrity (sort of), and its EU membership. (Greece has already violated all the fiscal requirements anyway, so launching a dual currency adds little damage to the situation today)
In the market both currencies are legal tenders, while most government payments, especially wages for the public sectors will be denominated at the new drachma (eg 1 Euro = 1 Drachma, or 340 Drachma today, but the rate will float afterwards). This is not a prefect solution. But it allows for a continuous adjustment, which can be up or down depending on how the Greek economy goes. It basically achieves all the fiscal terms imposed by the EU, without causing as much disruption domestically
===
1) The Economist: The barriers to leaving are high but could still be crawled over by a country determined to leave
2) NYT 1998: Joining Euro A Dim Hope For Greece
3) Will Greece Pull an Iceland?
====
Breaking up the euro area
How to resign from the club
The barriers to leaving are high but could still be crawled over by a country determined to leave
Dec 2nd 2010 | from the print edition
MEMBERSHIP of the euro is meant to be for keeps. Europe’s currency union is supposed to be immune from the sort of speculative attack that cracked the exchange-rate mechanism, the system of currency pegs that preceded it, in 1992-93. A lesson from that time is that when the foreign-exchange markets are far keener on one currency than another, even the stoutest official defence of a peg between the two can be broken. Inside the euro zone, no one can be forced to devalue because no one has a currency to mark down.
The strains in euro-zone bond markets this year show that there are other ways for markets to drive a wedge between the strong and the weak. Concerted selling of their government bonds has forced Greece and now Ireland to seek emergency loans from other European Union countries and the IMF. Portugal may soon join them in intensive care. Spain is in the markets’ sights and the trouble is spreading to Italy, home of the world’s third-largest market for public debt.
The convergence of government-bond yields that was spurred by the euro’s launch has thus been sharply reversed. The idea that the euro itself might also be reversible and that one or more countries might revert to national currencies is no longer unthinkable. This would be costly and cause huge financial shocks for both leavers and those left behind. But the bar to exit, though high, would be surmountable.
1. Better for everyone if Greek is out of the Euro (actually even better if out of EU though this is not something either Europe or Greece wants)
2. IMHO Papandreou was a courageous leader and did the right thing.
- a) He was elected and entitled to make most decision for his people, but he knows this is a decision much more important and he wants to make sure his people agrees. This is what A RESPONSIBLE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEADER SHOULD DO. For this I have difficulty understanding why some people have been blaming him for being irresponsible.
- b) By throwing the question open he can assure the support of his people, (and/or the opposition) to support the terms of the deal. This is better for everyone, Greece or EU, going forward. This is also what a responsible member in EU should do, making sure himself and his successor(s) will keep to the words
3. For how the Greek to leave the Euro (and the mechanisms) see the Economist report below. It is doable.
However, an alternative is for Greece to re-launch the drachma gradually, (while keeping the Euro). e.g. having a dual currency first, with a fixed (or floating exchange rate), like what is happening in some tourists locations (such as Angkor in Cambodia) today, or that of China in the 1980s.
This way Greece will not have to be out of the Euro right away, both preserving the Euro integrity (sort of), and its EU membership. (Greece has already violated all the fiscal requirements anyway, so launching a dual currency adds little damage to the situation today)
In the market both currencies are legal tenders, while most government payments, especially wages for the public sectors will be denominated at the new drachma (eg 1 Euro = 1 Drachma, or 340 Drachma today, but the rate will float afterwards). This is not a prefect solution. But it allows for a continuous adjustment, which can be up or down depending on how the Greek economy goes. It basically achieves all the fiscal terms imposed by the EU, without causing as much disruption domestically
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1) The Economist: The barriers to leaving are high but could still be crawled over by a country determined to leave
2) NYT 1998: Joining Euro A Dim Hope For Greece
3) Will Greece Pull an Iceland?
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Breaking up the euro area
How to resign from the club
The barriers to leaving are high but could still be crawled over by a country determined to leave
Dec 2nd 2010 | from the print edition
MEMBERSHIP of the euro is meant to be for keeps. Europe’s currency union is supposed to be immune from the sort of speculative attack that cracked the exchange-rate mechanism, the system of currency pegs that preceded it, in 1992-93. A lesson from that time is that when the foreign-exchange markets are far keener on one currency than another, even the stoutest official defence of a peg between the two can be broken. Inside the euro zone, no one can be forced to devalue because no one has a currency to mark down.
The strains in euro-zone bond markets this year show that there are other ways for markets to drive a wedge between the strong and the weak. Concerted selling of their government bonds has forced Greece and now Ireland to seek emergency loans from other European Union countries and the IMF. Portugal may soon join them in intensive care. Spain is in the markets’ sights and the trouble is spreading to Italy, home of the world’s third-largest market for public debt.
The convergence of government-bond yields that was spurred by the euro’s launch has thus been sharply reversed. The idea that the euro itself might also be reversible and that one or more countries might revert to national currencies is no longer unthinkable. This would be costly and cause huge financial shocks for both leavers and those left behind. But the bar to exit, though high, would be surmountable.
The idea of breaking up the currency zone raises at least three questions. First, why would a country choose to leave? Second, how would a country manage the switch to a new currency? Third—and perhaps most important—would leavers be better off outside the euro than inside it?
The main reason why a country might choose to leave the euro is to regain the monetary independence it sacrificed on joining and to set monetary policy to suit its own economic conditions. This could apply to the strong as well as the weak. Germans may long to have the Bundesbank in charge again. It would surely not take risks with long-term inflation, by keeping liquidity lines open to weak foreign banks, or with its political independence, by buying government bonds. And given the strength of the German economy, it might raise interest rates soon.
As it is, the European Central Bank (ECB), though based in Germany and modelled on the pre-euro Bundesbank, has had to react to the economic and financial weaknesses of the rest of the euro zone in ways that Germans do not like. Add to this taxpayers’ disgust at having to stand behind the public debts of less thrifty countries, and the idea of abandoning the euro looks enticing to some Germans. That appeal might extend to countries, such as Austria and Netherlands, with strong economic ties to Germany. They might prefer to join a new D-mark block than to stay with the euro, were Germany to leave.
Weak economies might also hanker for a monetary policy tailored to their own needs. The euro may have abolished market-based nominal exchange rates but it has led to marked divergences in real exchange rates (see chart). Consumer prices in peripheral countries have risen at a faster rate than in Germany since the start of the euro in 1999. So have wages, making it hard for firms in those countries to compete with Germany in foreign markets and with low-cost imports from Asia in their home markets. Leaving the euro would allow Italy, Spain and the rest to devalue and bring their wage costs into line with workers’ productivity.
How could this be done? Introducing a new currency would be difficult but not impossible. A government could simply pass a law saying that the wages of public workers, welfare cheques and government debts would henceforth be paid in a new currency, converted at an official fixed rate. Such legislation would also require all other financial dealings—private-sector pay, mortgages, stock prices, bank loans and so on—to be switched to the new currency.
The changeover would have to be swift and complete to limit financial chaos. Bank deposits would have to be converted at the same time, and the same rate, as overdrafts and mortgages to keep the value of banks’ debts in line with their assets. When Argentina broke its peg with the dollar in 2001, it decreed that bank deposits should be switched at a more favourable exchange rate than loans, in an effort to appease savers. This imposed losses on an already crippled banking system, and led to a sharp contraction in domestic credit.
The central bank would have to distribute new notes and coins fast. It would also have to set interest rates, and would need a lodestar, probably an inflation target, to guide it. Whatever the official exchange rate at a changeover, the new currency would quickly find a market level against the euro and other currencies. A new D-mark would be expected to rise against the now-abandoned euro; a new drachma or punt would trade at a big discount to its official changeover rate—a devaluation, in effect.
The switch to the euro was smooth, but it was planned for years in great detail and in co-operation among countries. The reverse operation would be far messier. The mere prospect of euro break-up could cause bank runs in weak economies as depositors scrambled to move savings abroad to avoid forced conversion. If Germany were the leaver, it would face an inward flood.
To prevent such a drain, a weak country thinking of leaving the euro would have to impose caps on bank withdrawals, other forms of capital controls, and perhaps even restrictions on foreign travel. That might not work in a region as integrated as Europe—and if it did it would depress the economy by limiting the circulation of cash for commerce. It would also cut the country off from foreign credit, because foreign firms and banks would fear that their money would be trapped. Trade would suffer badly, at least for a while.
A departing country would also have to prepare for legal challenges. A change in the currency in both weak and strong countries would impose devastating losses on businesses and depositors at home and abroad. Savers who could not get their money out of banks before its forced conversion would not be happy to be paid in a devalued currency. Many would sue, as happened in Argentina. The legal uncertainty would further hamper the banks, which would be loth to extend credit for fear they might yet be forced to make depositors whole.
Foreign banks and pension funds holding weak economies’ euro-denominated government bonds would suffer an effective default. They might sue, too. A sovereign might expect to win its legal battles if it drafted its conversion laws well and if it could assert the primacy of its law over European law. But the European dimension would at the very least mean that costly legal battles would drag on.
All the while a government seeking to replace the euro with a devalued currency could scarcely rely on bond sales to finance its operations. But such a country would have long been cut off from capital markets anyway. The prospect of monetary independence would give it new options. In the run-up to passing a conversion law, the government could pay some of its bills, including wages, by issuing small-denomination IOUs, which could be traded for goods and services. These would form a proto-currency that would trade at a discount to the remaining euros in circulation—a shadow price of the devaluation to come. Since the money supply would be shrinking fast, as euro deposits fled the country, this sort of paper would be accepted readily. Scrip issued by the province of Buenos Aires circulated freely months before Argentina’s dollar peg broke.
Germany would be in a happier position. Should it opt to leave, it would have an incentive not to convert its stock of euro-denominated debts to claims in a new, stronger currency. It could instead choose to repay those depreciating debts over time. Rather than invite legal disputes, however, it might instead go for a comprehensive conversion and keep balance-sheets straight. Germany would in any case be able to issue cheap debt in the run-up to conversion. A rush out of euros into German assets in anticipation of revaluation would drive up the prices of Bunds—conceivably to a point where the interest rates on them were negative.
Even so, Germany would face costs it could not control. A new D-mark would surely rise steeply, harming the country’s exporters. Exit from the euro area would deplete its customers in the rest of the zone of the cash and credit needed to buy German goods. As a big creditor, it holds lots of assets elsewhere in the zone. The value of these would plummet in new D-marks, and a contraction in credit in the rump of the euro zone would mean that the value of assets, including businesses that might otherwise have survived, would be destroyed. Germany would no longer be able to influence the euro area’s monetary policy. It could not prevent the ECB from stoking inflation, which would undermine the real value of German loans made to euro-zone banks, businesses and governments.
A determined country could leave the euro and establish its own currency again: nothing is truly irreversible for a sovereign nation. But even the most wilful and powerful state could not fully control the banking chaos and social unrest that a forced currency conversion would unleash. It would be a curious decision for Germany to seek to abandon the euro in search of greater monetary and fiscal stability. It would first have to endure a long period of financial disarray.
Countries at the euro zone’s periphery that face years of austerity and high unemployment inside the euro may find it harder to believe that things could be much worse if they left. A devaluation would spare them the grinding wage deflation needed to price the unemployed back into work (though it would not address the economic weaknesses that lie behind poor competitiveness). The spectre of bank runs, high funding costs, default and social unrest might not seem so scary in today’s conditions: some countries are already vulnerable to these. Efforts to ameliorate these problems have so far proved inadequate (see article).
Therein lies the danger for the euro. The cost of breaking up the single currency would be enormous. In the ensuing chaos and recrimination, the survival of the EU and its single market would be in jeopardy. But by believing that a break-up cannot happen, the euro zone’s authorities will always tend to stop short of the radical measures needed to hold the project together. Given the likely and devastating chaos, it would be a mistake for a country to choose to leave. But mistakes occur in times of stress. That is why some are beginning to contemplate the unthinkable.
2011-11-01
2011-10-26
The downside of double standard: 格達費敗亡的後遺症
國際瞭望－格達費敗亡的後遺症
格達費政權垮了，本人死了，但美國與西歐勝利了嗎？眼前是這樣，但後遺症之可怕，恐怕連歐巴馬自己都難以承受。
第一個後遺症是：不用再想阻止國際核武擴散。美國《基督教科學箴言報》在格達費未被殺之前就刊出專文：「利比亞教訓：別學格達費，要學金正日」，換言之，有核武者生，無核武者亡，「利比亞如果有力量摧毀義大利的美國軍事基地，或者讓法國南岸美國航母打擊群消失，它絕對有能力打消外界任何攻擊的念頭…利國應像北韓一樣，擁有少量但足以嚇阻侵略者的核武力量，然而格達費卻聽信西方的迷魂曲：放下核武，歡迎加入國際大家庭。」
埃及《消息報》說：不想束手就擒就應發展核武到底，格達費或許在生命最後關頭方悟及此，但北韓與伊朗將因此堅定擁核決心。六方會談即使重啟，北韓金正日也萬無可能放棄已發展好的核武，伊朗核武之路也只有加速而不會停頓，歐巴馬大可不必再為這兩事操心。
第二個後遺症是：別想再讓聯合國安理會通過瞞天過海的案子，在表決利比亞禁航區案時，俄中兩國確實想不到禁航區居然發展為空襲，上過這次當以後，最近的反應便是：即使對敘利亞只是警告制裁，兩國卻聯手否決。
第三個後遺症是：格達費死了，但利國軍火庫中的武器絕大多數卻不見了，包括飛彈乃至生化武器，這些東西絕對不是落入「愛好和平者」之手。臨時政府部隊本來就很複雜，連美國都承認其中混雜有恐怖組織，他們會不垂涎這些武器嗎？這不僅是有害利國前途，連整個中東及北非都會受影響。
See also: CSM" Be Like Kim!
第一個後遺症是：不用再想阻止國際核武擴散。美國《基督教科學箴言報》在格達費未被殺之前就刊出專文：「利比亞教訓：別學格達費，要學金正日」，換言之，有核武者生，無核武者亡，「利比亞如果有力量摧毀義大利的美國軍事基地，或者讓法國南岸美國航母打擊群消失，它絕對有能力打消外界任何攻擊的念頭…利國應像北韓一樣，擁有少量但足以嚇阻侵略者的核武力量，然而格達費卻聽信西方的迷魂曲：放下核武，歡迎加入國際大家庭。」
埃及《消息報》說：不想束手就擒就應發展核武到底，格達費或許在生命最後關頭方悟及此，但北韓與伊朗將因此堅定擁核決心。六方會談即使重啟，北韓金正日也萬無可能放棄已發展好的核武，伊朗核武之路也只有加速而不會停頓，歐巴馬大可不必再為這兩事操心。
第二個後遺症是：別想再讓聯合國安理會通過瞞天過海的案子，在表決利比亞禁航區案時，俄中兩國確實想不到禁航區居然發展為空襲，上過這次當以後，最近的反應便是：即使對敘利亞只是警告制裁，兩國卻聯手否決。
第三個後遺症是：格達費死了，但利國軍火庫中的武器絕大多數卻不見了，包括飛彈乃至生化武器，這些東西絕對不是落入「愛好和平者」之手。臨時政府部隊本來就很複雜，連美國都承認其中混雜有恐怖組織，他們會不垂涎這些武器嗎？這不僅是有害利國前途，連整個中東及北非都會受影響。
See also: CSM" Be Like Kim!
Labels:
politics
2011-10-15
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