(Continuation from this earlier post)
Let's first look at two essays from within China.
1) Pursue for hegemony is NOT the the objective of TGYH (韬光养晦 ≠ 卧薪尝胆) -- the link is to an essay by Wang Yusheng, diplomat and academic, ex-Ambassador to APEC
According to Wang Yusheng, TGYH is a long term strategy. It is not, as Pillsbury has suspected, a tactical ploy. China should always maintain low profile and be humble. Humble is a virtue in Chinese culture. Adopting this strategy is also for the long term benefit of China herself. Hegenomy does not do China any good -- after all, what does US get by sacrificing so much resources and lives in Iraq? Deng's wisdom is quite obvious to the peace loving people and pragmatic business community. However, it is not as straightforward to the hawks in China, or their equivalents in the US. Therefore, from time to time, especially recently, people (in China and also some China specialists in US) debate about what TGYH strategy really is. Mr Wang's article serves as a reminder to the Chinese people about what TGYH really means. He first refuted the misconception that TGYH is a short term (or deceptive) tactical move to buy time, by spelling out the difference between the world today and the ancient China political environment in Warring State Era. From Deng's view TGYH is good for China irrespective of her (economic) developmental stage or how powerful she is.
Deng Xiaoping is quoted as saying "even if China is well developed and has become a strong nation in the future, we will never seek to become a leader, never seek hegemony, never seek a sphere of influence, never involve ourselves with any faction in world politics, never interfere with the internal affairs of other nations." ("即使将来中国强大了，也永远不当头，不称霸，不谋求势力范围，不搞集团政治，不干涉别国内政") As a senior diplomat who is close to the senior leadership, Mr Wang knows the diplomatic strategy in China very well. His quote and interpretation of Mr Deng should be very accurate and should also represent what is in the minds of the present leadership -- unless the current leadership is rejecting Deng, which is a fairly unlikely scenario.
He also points out a few areas of misunderstanding of the rest of the world about China. China does not believe in hegemony or Huntington's theory of culture clashes or Kennedy's rise and fall of power. He asserts that such views are "very western". The wisdom of the world today has surpassed these. Being a hegemon does not necessarily get you the best benefit. China has learned that minding her own business and integrating into the rest of the world is the golden rule to successss. Wang also points out that any effort to pursue hegemony by any country any time in the future will be futile and short-lived, using an analogy that "even if you use all your ten fingers, you cannot suppress ten fleas at the same moment" (一个国家，即使国力超强，十个指头也不可能按住十个跳蚤) (incidentally a corollary is that it is impossible for US to sustain its hegemony as the cost to maintain will evetually drain its resources, thus supporting a school of thought in China that China should be patient and wait for any hegemony to fade back to multi-polarity, instead of confronting it.).
2) Wang Dao (王道 the kingly way) vs Ba Dao (霸道 hegemony)
Xiao Dong's elegantly written short essay (originally published in an overseas Chinese paper in the US) argued from the same perspective as Wang. He first point out that hegemony is an out-dated concept in international politics, and hence should not be pursued by China. He then goes on to discuss the heavenly objective of political achievement, based on the ancient Chinese doctrine of Wang Dao (The Kingly Way). Pillsburyry did an excellent job in studying Chinese theory of statecraft circa 800-300B.C. However, he has focused on the hegemony aspect of the statecraft, and missed the highestst form of statecraft called Wang Dao. Wang Dao basically means achieving the ultimate respect of the world through righteous morality and supported by good ruling, which ensures your winning the hearts of all foreign power and their people. (What US did to Europe after WWII in the name of Marshall Plan was a close implementation of Wang Dao, but Wang Dao emphasizes domestic governance as historically China never bothered about its neighbors) Wang Dao has always been considered the idealistic achievement in China statecraft. Because it is so difficult to achieve, most kings have compromised for hegemony and given up on Wang Dao. It is therefore overlooked by even experts like Pillsbury. Note that Confuciusus advocated Wang Dao and despised Hegemony.
Xiao goes on to argue that Wang Dao is also consistent with the highest form of achievement in Sun Zi's "Art of War" , quoting Chapter 5, "the righteous target and strategy shall be emphasized as the ultimate goal, while the deceptive tactic is (only) auxiliary and complementary to the righteous goal." (<<孙子兵法>>中除了说"兵者﹐诡道也"﹐要"以奇胜"外﹐更提倡"以正合"。) He then quotes Mencius and uses historical facts to show that only the Kingly Way will lead to sustainable achievement, while any hegemony is ephemeral. Finally he concludes that TGYH should never be given up, and should be adopted as a permanent measure, with Zheng Dao (The Righteous Way, replacing the feudal term "Kingly") as the ultimate goal and practice. Only with Zheng Dao will China be able to bring back the glory she once enjoyed in ancient time.
Having reviewed these two essays, both widely quoted in the Chinese media (one of them from a prominent diplomat close to Deng, the other was listed in dozens of prominent web-sites for Chinese military academics and popular web-sites, perhaps as an explicit message to convince those who believe the time for TGYH is up), we should not be in much doubt about Deng's original intention and that such interpretation is the best strategy for China's own good, even thousands of years into the future. Inevitably, there are hawks in China, just like those in US. Therefore, to answer the question "Is China a threat", we need to understand if the aforementioned belief should prevail in China, and if there are abundant fundamental driving forces to ensure that the rational strategist will prevail against the hawks.
(to be continued in Part III)
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Wang's essay in Chinese below
关于“韬光养晦”的再思考
www.XINHUANET.com
2001年夏秋之交，国内一些报刊先后发表和转载了我的文章：关于“韬光养晦”战略相关问题的探讨。
文章主要介绍邓小平同志提出“韬光养晦，有所作为”战略的时代背景，认为“韬光养晦”战略充分考虑了国际形势，特别是中国处于社会主义初级阶段这一现实和面临的任务，并非权宜之计。文章认为，中国应坚持以经济建设为中心，不能放弃“韬光养晦”战略，应该联系外交实践，总结经验，更好地运用这一战略。
3年过去了。国内外形势发生了重大而深刻的变化。为此，国内一些专家学者和广大读者对“韬光养晦”战略也开始有了新的思考和认识。
有些人认为，中国的大国地位和大国能量是一种客观存在，无法回避；美国遏制中国崛起和独霸天下的战略也是一种客观存在，无法回避。“树欲静而风不止”，继续奉行“韬光养晦”战略，实际上是“苟且偷安”和“鸵鸟政策”，“客观上帮了美国霸权主义的忙”。他们认为，不能老是以“韬光养晦”为主，邓小平当年提出“韬光养晦”时的国内外环境既已发生变化，就应适时调整政策，以“有所作为”为主。
还有一些人赞成继续奉行“韬光养晦”战略方针，认为“小不忍则乱大谋”；中国现在国力不够强大，不能不“忍辱负重”，10年、20年，甚至几十年，这是必要的代价。但总有一天中国会扬眉吐气。等中国真正强大了，就可以明确地对霸权主义说“不”，可以战而胜之，甚至“不战而屈人之兵”。
这些意见是社会各界人士关心国家命运和前途的一种表现。不同意见的提出和探讨，有助于澄清问题，有助于深入领会邓小平外交思想，也有助于我国外交工作更加贴近社会。
目前，社会上对“韬光养晦”不是权宜之计分歧似乎不大，但对“韬光养晦”的战略目标和图谋，意见显然不同；对“韬光养晦”与“有所作为”的关系，认识很不一致；对什么是“有所作为”以及怎样才能“有所作为”，想法也不一样。以下笔者仅就这些问题谈谈个人看法，以期引起对“韬光养晦”一些问题的再探讨。
“韬光养晦”≠“卧薪尝胆”
“卧薪尝胆”的要害是“复仇”和“争霸”，有明显的敌人，而且，为了达到目的，可以不择手段。历史上越王勾践可以俯首称臣，下跪求饶参拜，甚至亲口尝吴王夫差的粪便。我们讲的“韬光养晦”，其核心不是图谋霸权，也没有假想敌人；其根本目的，对内是要抓住机遇，以经济建设为中心，振兴中华；对外是要追求“和而不同”和“共同繁荣”的世界，而且是有原则的，不是屈辱的，更不是乞求的。在事关国家主权和领土完整以及重大国际问题上，中国作为最大的发展中国家，是要“有所作为”的；如果触及不可以容忍的底线，中国也是“不怕鬼，不信邪”的。我们绝不能像某位学者说的那样，当今时代，发展中国家只有放弃美国担心你要发展的那种武装，完全投向美国，安全才有保证。如果那样，中国可就真地成了“东郭先生”了。中国不仅需要有现代化的强大国防，而且要认真准备军事上的“杀手锏”，以防“天有不测风云”。
对中国“韬光养晦”战略，国际上一直都很关注，一般都持肯定态度。但也有两个动向值得注意。
一是蓄意歪曲，如美国2002年的《中国军力报告》，硬把中国的“韬光养晦”战略说成是“在国际上进行战略欺骗”。这是极个别的。
二是有误解和习惯性的误判。如美国知名学者约翰·米尔斯海默，他一再强调，所有大国都是无情的权力追逐者，中国也不例外。如果中国日益强大，也将仿效美国，使用理想主义的辞令来描绘中国的外交政策；也会像美国一样，最大限度地占有世界权力。他是根据历史的经验和美国现在的行为作这种判断的，正好像美国总统国家安全事务助理赖斯女士所说，“多极化”是一种“竞争理论”，它“导致了第一次世界大战”。他们的看法并非没有一点道理。历史上，由于资本主义政治经济发展不平衡规律的影响，当一个占统治地位的帝国衰落而另一个帝国兴起的时候，后者就必然要向前者挑战，要求重新划分势力范围，重新瓜分世界，从而引起对抗和战争。
但米尔斯海默先生和赖斯女士似乎没有看到，现在时代真的大不一样了。发展中国家的兴起，是不可逆转的时代现象。发展中大国的兴起，其性质也不同于历史上某个帝国的兴起。它们要求的不是重新划分势力范围和重新瓜分世界，而是“平等的伙伴关系”，是公平和公正的国际政治经济新秩序，是国际关系民主化。这一点已经为大量事实所证明。不仅正在兴起的中国如此，印度、南非和巴西等大国也大体如此。从亚欧会议的成立和实践情况可看出，很多欧洲发达国家，包括原来是帝国主义和殖民主义的国家，也开始认识到这一点。
“韬光养晦”与“有所作为”
“韬光养晦”和“有所作为”不是对立的，而是辩证的统一。前者是矛盾的主要方面，后者也是不可或缺的。
过分强调“韬光养晦”，消极地理解和执行，容易陷于被动和“无所作为”，甚至在国际上被“边缘化”，或为人所用。这当然是中国外交需要警惕的。过分强调“有所作为”，容易“左”，实际上是自不量力，充好汉，打头阵，引火烧身。固然，随着中国综合国力的提高，在国际上“有所作为”的分量也要相应增加，如对贫困国家的援助，有选择地参加联合国维和行动，积极推动重大国际安全问题的合理解决等。这一切说明，中国的“韬光养晦”战略是积极的、主动的，而不是消极的，无原则的。但如果“有所作为”太过了，甚至以一种“大国主义心态”处理国际问题，热衷于在国际事务中起“带动”和“领导”作用，热衷于“富人俱乐部”成员地位，事事想冲在前面，那就可能引起本可避免的、不必要的对抗，从而影响乃至破坏“韬光养晦”的大局。
邓小平同志在作“韬光养晦，有所作为”指示的同时，一再强调，“千万不要当头”，而且说，“头头可不能当，头头一当就坏了。搞霸权主义的名声很坏，当第三世界的头头名声也不好。这不是客气话，这是一种真实的政治考虑。”他还说，即使将来中国强大了，也永远不当头，不称霸，不谋求势力范围，不搞集团政治，不干涉别国内政。邓小平同志的这些话，我们应该牢牢铭记在心。这些话也是对国际上关心中国事务人士的很好回答。
“有所作为”和“有所不为”
要真正“有所作为”，首先要深入了解和掌握国际形势总体发展趋势，以及时代的主要问题和矛盾。在我看来，冷战结束后，世界各国民众普遍渴望和平与发展，渴望国际关系民主化；美国新霸权主义和它当前反恐谋霸的一系列政策行为，与之背道而驰。这之间的矛盾和斗争，正在形成新世纪的主要矛盾。
其次是要“有所为，有所不为”。一个国家，即使国力超强，十个指头也不可能按住十个跳蚤。“有所作为”不能没有重点，不能没有选择。一定要看有关事情的性质及其与我国切身利害关系如何。
具体说来，目前在国际上，我国提出国际关系民主化和发展模式多样化，努力推动世界多极化的发展，主张“和而不同”，要求在联合国框架内解决重大国际安全问题；在亚太经合组织（APEC），提出以承认多样性和自主自愿、协商一致为主要内容的“APEC方式”, 在上海合作组织提出新安全观，在同东盟关系方面，积极推动自由贸易区的早日实现；在反恐方面，既认真进行国际合作，又同有关国家保持一定距离，提出反恐要标本兼治，不应搞双重标准，不能随便给人扣“恐怖主义”帽子；在周边关系方面，积极奉行“以邻为伴，与邻为善”方针，等等，都是中国外交争取在力所能及和可行的范围内“有所作为”。而且，这种“有所作为”，随着中国综合国力的增长和形势发展，在可预见的将来，还要加强。（王嵎生）
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