2007-06-16

This is causality

There is a legend among Oxford students, where degrees and honours are determined by a final examination of 6-8 3-hour exams in the final year summer.

In science subjects there are typically 8-12 questions and the students will try to finish as many as possible. But complete answer of about 3 questions would probably give you an "alpha" grade as each question carries a full score of 25 and this score will be squared (3x625=1875, vs 10 questions of 10 scores each scoring 10x100=1000). Therefore, the "top first" would score as many as 5000 in a paper (for a rare "alpha plus" score) while to get alpha you only need to score 2000.

In humanity subject, the paper quite often is a single essay on a very concisely phrased question/issue. To illustrate the paper and the how the scores are determined we have this legend

  • Question: "What is risk?" (I do not know what the subject is, probably philosophy or literature, or economic!. It is just an un-verifiable legend anyway)
  • A student went in, answered with three words, left the examination hall and got an alpha
  • His full essay for the 3 hour exam? "This is risk."

---

In HK it is unlikely that this will happen, as we know. There is no trust/mutual-respect in our education system for this. The student would not dare the risk and the professor will assume the student is unruly. But I think Mr Lam Kay would score an alpha in this

To spray salt on his wounded feet, I would also like to add these

  • When Tung's father passed away and left OOIL (Oriental Overseas), it went bankrupt
  • When Tung left OOIL, OOIL stock price shot to the sky between the period of 1997-2004

This "Folk-Guy" had some track record but nobody I knew agreed with me when I talked about that 10 years ago. sigh...

2007-06-09

No winter in HK in half a century?

The HK Observatory must have missed the controversy it stirred last year. As it is making noise again. The new story? -- No winter in HK in half a century.

Yeah, right, global warming, skyscraper trapping heat and that. I just do not believe these linear projections. People also said, China's GDP/cap grows at 10% p.a., at this rate it will surpass that of US in 20 year ( (50000/7000) at 10% p.a.-- PPP) or 33 years (log(50000/2000)/log(1.1) at nominal).

A few issues to consider

  • There's got to be some negative feedback (i.e. self correcting) factor in any system, especially so as HK is not a close system by itself. It has only 1050km2 of land where the so-called "skyscraper trapping effect" is only applicable to some 20% of the area.
  • As for the global trend in "warming", let's also remember that it is far from conclusive (see the other side of the argument). Furthermore, it may not be just global. It may be pan-solar-system. e.g., The temperature in Mars has risen by a comparable amount during the same period.
  • I also do not understand why the skyscraper can trap the heat but not the coolness as Mr Lam claimed

Maybe Mr Lam is trying to be funny. He said, "We would really start losing the very distinct seasonal march throughout the year".

Anyway, I would believe Deng Xiaoping if Deng and Lam contradicts. Deng told us HK will not change for half a century. @_@

Sensation and Rationality in Chinese culture (and writing) - 中國文章的理性與感性

In an essay called "中國文化的理性與感性", HK blogger Lamkay wrote about the blurred line of rationality and sensation (not sure what the best word one should use to translate the word "感性", perhaps sensationality or sensuality :) ) in Chinese culture, in a care-free/"sensational" writing style which was quite "sensual" at first look. This naturally triggered a debate, as his essay itself is not, strictly speaking, written in a way that rational at all.

While I disagree with Lam Kay in quite a few issues (e.g. the non-issue (IMHO) of Queen's Pier, and the "sensual" style of writing). I think he brought out his subject (or what I thought was his subject) brilliantly in that essay and I was among the very few who jumped into his defense in this series of discussion. During the discussion I was asked to quote some examples of "Chinese culture" that sidestepped rationality because they focused too much on "sensuality". I didn't have something handy at the moment. But now there is one - Davesgonechina's cittique on Lung Ying Tai's Cambridge speech.

I hope Dave's comments on Lung Yingtai's speech could illustrate why I have been so frustrated at our education in Chinese (esp. writing) classes, and at many essays that I read in Chinese media (including those from some "prominent" self-claimed "westernized" columnist at Apple Daily today). I have a lot to agree with Lung, and I have great respect for her. I would also agree with a lot of her general conclusions, but before one reads into her logic flow and indulges into her "文采", one should probably read what Dave has to say.

Lam Kay call it the 'problem' of our culture. I would try be more precise and call it a problem in our writing style (文章, instead of 文化). My grudge is purely on such essays that try to discuss about more "serious" topics. (I totally enjoy the movie critiques from the scribbler (寫手) in Apple Daily, for example. I think he is great in writing about culture and esp. movies). Because, loose logic in such essays often lead to loose logic in one's daily life, and hence also a lot of decision making processes. To some historians this has indeed been a major hindrance in the progress of China for the past two centuries.

Maybe it is an over-generalized statement to equate 中國文章 and 中國文化. But 中國文章 is a facet of 中國文化, and how one writes directly correlates with how one thinks. I do not think one should discredit the generalized "Chinese culture", or even Chinese "writing style". I am only agaist one single element within our (generalized) "culture", or more precisely, style of writing/debate.

related link:
Lung's original in Chinese, English translation by ESWN. I think I can see and understand where Lung comes from, and agree broadly that PRC should make life easier for Taiwanese people if it wants to win them over (as the govt did to HK). I have to agree with Dave's critique on her slopiness.

Map: Avenue Joffre and the old Shanghai



Davesgonechina at Mutant Palm posted a link to a set of historic maps from the map collection "hundred years of humiliation". The topic of humiliation is a complicated one. It could drive one to work hard on the one hand (to reclaim the old glory) but it could also lead to a sense of insecurity and in turn a whole series of mishaps amidst the urge to catch up (as China has gone through during that 140 years, i.e. 1940-1980). The most tragic example being that of Great Leap Forward. In short, it is no different from the case where some gambler who lost a small fortune in either the casino or the stock market and wanted to reclaim the lost land with highly leveraged (and hence risky, and often irrational) bets. No surprise he ended up lost a bigger fortune.

A good training against irrationality is to learn to play the game of bridge, where decision making should purely be based on statistics and consistency, as Deng Xiaoping has learned and also practiced. The rule is the same as what you have learned in your high school probability class, that each event is independent of the previous one and hence each decision should be make independently and rationally, no matter what has happened before this very moment.

This is also why Deng has left the words of Taoguangyanghui to his sucessors. TGYH is indeed the most rational choice for China for the next 50 years, or perhaps, forever. It does not really mean hiding low. What it really means is that, when you manage yourself well, good things will come; and all you have to (and should only) bother is to manage your own country well.

So much digression, what I want to talk about is actually on geography. I had been to the city of Shanghai like a 100 times, and have heard about the French Concession in various books, movies and TV dramas (the Bund 上海灘 being the most famous one). I know Huaihai Road = Avenue Joffre and that but I didn't know where the exact boundary the concession was. My rule of thumb is those roads planted with London Plane (法国梧桐) are inside the old French Quarter.

I found such a map from that book (post #12). I also then found this webpage on all the concessions in other Chinese cities in the 1920s. Here are some of the keys for the Shanghai map above

2007-06-08

Taiwan's friends - updated

I blogged about the collection of micro-pals Taiwan had a couple years ago.
I also made some prediction, which basically stated that the size (GDP/pop) of these states will fall while the total number may not, as the larger the economy of the states are, the larger the incentive to take the mainland over Taiwan (less easy to be bought).

I was in general right. As Chad and now Costa Rica switched sides, while a tiny St Lucia came on board. Going forward, I maintain that same trend will continue, i.e. the next to go is likely to be one of Burkina Faso, Malawi, Guatemala, Dominican Republic or Paraguay. While a nano-state might come aboard between now and the 2008 Olympic.



I am sure the diplomats in both sides of the Strait understand this. But there is not much they could do to change such trend. (i.e., either for PRC to keep a nano-state or ROC to keep a larger one)

p.s. editgrid tool via erica.

2007-06-06

China's river system, and the Painted Veil

I watched a beautiful movie in the plane 2 months ago, the Painted Veil. Great lead actor and actress, splendid cinematography and that. I love the movie.

There is only one small problem that has bothered me. The village is filmed in the Guilin area, chosen for its picturesque Karst landscape (Guilin to Karst is like Sedona to the Monument Valley, i.e. avec water and greenery), while one important thread is that the cholera infected village is easier reached from the Chinese city where the Fanes lived by water. Shanghai and Guilin belong to 2 different water system and so there is no way one can take a boat from Shanghai to reach Guilin - as shown in the map below. (but actually it is feasible -- thanks to the First Emperor Qin -- see note below)

Shanghai belongs to the Yangtze River System, while Guilin belongs to the Pearl River System. Today the estuaries of these 2 systems form the most vibrant economic zones in China, the Yangtze Delta and the Pearl Delta.

The two systems are separated by watersheds, indicated by the black lines on the map. The 7 major rvier systems in China are
  • Yangtze, Pearl and Yellow River, as shown by the major watersheds in the map below
  • Amur/Heilongjiang/Songhua River in Northeast, this is as large as the big three but can also be classified as international river system now (especially when Russia got the estuary of Heilongjiang/Amur when it took outer Manchuria)
  • Liao River in Liaoning, and Hai River in Beijing/Tianjin area -- these are smaller, and Hai River is almost dried up these days
  • Huai river, not clearly shown in this map -- should locate between Shanggai and Shandong (between Yellow and yangtze)

Other than the 7 systems, there are

  • Smaller river systems such as Min Jiang in Fujian, etc.
  • Inland Rivers, mostly in Xinjiang, with Yili River the largest (also an international river)
  • other (international) river systems include Yaluzanbu (Yar-klungs gtsang-po / Bramaputra), Nu Jiang (Salween), Lancang Jiang (Mekong)
Coincidentally, if the film-makers were to follow the settings of the original book, the city Walter lives would be HK, not Shanghai. One would then be able to sail from HK upstream to Li Jiang in Guilin (via Guangzhou/Pearl River, Wuzhou/Xi Jiang/Guijiang and finally reach Li Jiang (LJ in the map).



Note:
1) Another tidbit is that the Chinese government back then would not have employed a British micro-biologist. But the Colony of HK would
2) There is actually a canal, Ling Qu, built by Qin Shihuangdi, connecting the Pearl and Yangtze systems. But it is unlikely that one would take a boat from Shanghai to Guilin via Ling Qu.

Postscripts in the BT case in HK

I blogged about the BT case in HK some 18 months ago.
Today a link to this great essay below was sent through to me -- strange link via the commentary of a totally unrelated blogpost (couldn't find it in either author's orginal blog), but a very nice surprise that it is written by one of the smartest artists in HK, and yes, there are smart artists in HK.

金 手 指 : 篤 爆 政 府 如 何 殺 死 創 意 工 業

政 府 想 修 例 將 上 下 載 侵 權 檔 案 列 為 刑 事 罪 行 , 網 民 激 動 又 憤 怒 , 大 呼 BT 無 罪 。 這 個 反 應 是 必 然 的 , 向 來 吃 慣 的 免 費 午 餐 要 暫 停 供 應 , 怎 能 不 激 動 ? 但 事 實 並 非 表 面 看 來 般 簡 單 。
有 些 網 民 怨 聲 載 道 是 因 為 他 們 拿 金 牛 想 買 午 餐 , 但 飯 堂 沒 有 午 餐 賣 , 只 有 免 費 午 餐 派 , 於 是 他 們 才 跟 隨 群 眾 食 免 費 午 餐 , 食 得 和 味 , 還 可 收 回 金 牛 。 現 在 免 費 午 餐 暫 停 供 應 , 他 們 自 知 手 握 金 牛 高 人 一 等 , 奈 何 沒 有 任 何 優 勢 , 因 為 根 本 無 人 賣 午 餐 。
網 民 用 點 對 點 下 載 檔 案 通 常 有 兩 種 情 況 : 一 、 明 顯 因 為 貪 檔 案 免 費 , 不 想 「 執 輸 」 ; 二 、 為 了 方 便 , 例 如 不 想 沖 涼 換 衫 吹 頭 落 街 找 CD 舖 買 CD , 回 到 家 中 還 要 將 CD import 到 iTunes 成 為 電 腦 檔 案 ( 轉 換 過 程 還 可 能 遇 到 甚 麼 security coding , 要 搞 上 半 天 ) , 在 電 腦 播 放 音 樂 , 倒 不 如 安 坐 家 中 下 載 侵 權 檔 案 罷 了 ; 又 例 如 心 血 來 潮 想 聽 首 懷 舊 金 曲 或 看 齣 非 主 流 日 本 動 畫 , 明 知 走 遍 全 港 影 視 店 找 都 未 必 找 到 , 那 倒 不 如 安 坐 家 中 , 下 載 侵 權 檔 案 。
貪 免 費 的 網 民 , 就 好 似 昔 日 問 你 借 所 有 DVD 、 VCD 或 CD 光 碟 的 朋 友 , dub 完 碟 第 二 日 還 給 你 , 現 在 的 互 聯 網 令 這 一 借 一 還 快 過 閃 電 , 但 大 家 都 知 道 , 這 些 損 友 避 無 可 避 , 他 們 總 有 辦 法 不 費 分 毫 拿 到 想 要 的 東 西 。 而 貪 方 便 的 網 民 , 即 使 拿 金 牛 , 也 未 能 在 網 上 經 合 法 途 徑 付 費 下 載 所 要 檔 案 。 除 了 用 BT , 根 本 別 無 他 選 。


肯 試 聽 就 有 衝 動 買
BT 被 廣 泛 使 用 透 視 了 網 民 對 音 樂 、 電 影 的 需 求 及 需 求 模 式 的 改 變 。 他 們 渴 望 從 一 個 包 羅 萬 有 的 檔 案 庫 內 快 捷 、 方 便 地 下 載 數 碼 化 作 品 。 但 現 時 的 版 權 持 有 人 根 本 無 意 提 供 網 上 收 費 下 載 去 滿 足 顧 客 的 需 要 , 只 是 強 迫 人 代 入 古 老 的 賣 唱 片 手 法 。 我 Erica 可 以 肯 定 講 句 , 即 使 政 府 立 例 管 制 下 載 侵 權 檔 案 , 唱 片 市 道 並 不 會 因 此 轉 好 , 因 為 漠 視 顧 客 需 要 的 公 司 是 不 會 賺 錢 的 。
針 對 唱 片 業 而 言 , 要 知 道 傳 統 CD 的 缺 點 , 是 將 10 首 歌 錄 成 一 隻 CD 的 綑 綁 式 銷 售 , 顧 客 可 能 只 聽 過 其 中 兩 首 , 所 以 買 CD 存 在 很 大 風 險 , 往 往 令 顧 客 卻 步 。 但 苦 無 途 徑 逐 首 歌 買 , 所 以 用 BT 下 載 當 是 試 聽 。 有 人 聽 完 會 買 CD 以 示 支 持 ; 亦 有 人 聽 完 會 全 碟 delete , 免 得 位 。 聽 眾 想 試 聽 代 表 他 們 有 購 買 的 衝 動 , 衝 動 是 短 暫 且 脆 弱 的 , 聽 眾 走 到 CD 舖 那 股 衝 動 已 所 餘 無 幾 , 再 被 大 半 隻 CD 的 非 主 打 歌 打 擊 , 更 覺 沮 喪 。 沒 抓 緊 顧 客 購 買 的 衝 動 , 是 誰 之 過 ?
在 CD 動 輒 賣 幾 十 萬 張 的 90 年 代 初 , 每 個 學 生 青 年 都 帶 discman , 後 來 MD 興 起 , 聽 眾 用 CD 錄 成 MD 。 現 在 , discman 和 MD 機 連 街 邊 收 賣 佬 都 當 是 古 董 , 人 人 用 MP3 或 iPod , 方 便 將 歌 曲 分 類 , 自 訂 playlist , CD 難 賣 , 理 所 當 然 。


配 合 顧 客 進 化 改 革
在 創 意 工 業 界 未 使 盡 渾 身 解 數 提 供 收 費 點 對 點 上 下 載 銷 售 平 台 之 前 , 政 府 不 應 輕 舉 妄 動 胡 亂 改 例 , 假 設 了 所 有 網 民 都 是 貪 免 費 的 侵 權 罪 人 。 要 知 道 唱 片 業 界 忽 略 了 一 大 群 貪 方 便 的 潛 在 顧 客 , 未 有 因 顧 客 的 進 化 行 為 而 改 革 , 藉 互 聯 網 發 展 新 的 銷 售 渠 道 , 等 於 斷 自 己 米 路 , 這 並 不 是 政 府 的 責 任 。 網 民 有 demand , 業 界 無 配 合 網 民 的 supply , 所 以 才 孕 育 了 不 正 常 的 supply 。
iTunes Music Store 每 首 歌 賣 99 仙 美 金 , 一 年 賣 10 億 首 歌 。 已 經 有 成 功 例 子 擺 在 眼 前 , 香 港 竟 然 無 人 跟 風 , 業 界 食 古 不 化 , 令 無 辜 的 網 絡 供 應 商 在 修 例 之 後 廣 受 牽 連 , 要 記 錄 網 民 24 小 時 的 網 上 活 動 , 政 府 還 要 犯 險 , 不 顧 網 民 私 隱 去 緝 兇 。 條 例 實 質 是 懲 罰 了 ISP , 犧 牲 了 網 民 的 私 隱 , 保 護 了 版 權 , 但 不 見 得 能 提 高 版 權 持 有 人 的 報 酬 。
假 如 有 一 個 包 羅 萬 有 的 收 費 檔 案 庫 , 讓 網 民 合 法 、 快 捷 、 方 便 地 下 載 數 碼 化 的 作 品 , 將 創 意 工 業 發 揚 光 大 , 作 品 多 了 人 欣 賞 , 版 權 持 有 人 荷 包 多 了 錢 , 皆 大 歡 喜 , 但 未 必 是 拯 救 創 意 工 業 街 根 本 問 題 的 靈 丹 妙 藥 。 不 肯 創 新 改 革 的 創 意 工 業 有 這 種 自 相 矛 盾 的 現 象 , 是 因 為 政 府 有 意 保 護 , 令 業 界 放 慢 改 革 的 步 伐 。 請 政 府 不 要 干 預 , 強 迫 他 們 面 對 現 實 , 才 能 自 救 。

2007-06-01

An option for China's PR campaign

I discussed about the cost of China's cautiousness towards political reform before. Now Jimmy Lai of Apple Daily suggested a baby step for the leadership in Beijing to test the water, by trying HK.

update: Editorial from HK Economic Journal
信報 林行止專欄 林行止 2007-06-05
拋棄政治包袱 主動平反六四  

一九八九年的「六四風波」,至今已十八個年頭了,在仍有表達意見自由的海外華僑社區,特別是感同身受的香港和澳門特區,每年此際都有大規模的悼念和要求平反六四的群眾活動,年復一年,參與者的悲憤情緒並未隨歲月流逝而淡化!  

非常明顯,北京政府並無為六四平反的絲毫象,民建聯主席馬力的「輕佻之言」,很可能是內部會議的結論;在這種政治氣氛下,別說維園燭光晚會被視為「政治表演」,外國即使是中國最重要的商業夥伴美國的譴責,北京亦當耳邊風。六四後,北京「經濟沒有底線」的策略非常成功,如今經濟和股市同樣火紅,國內一億股民忙於炒股,當年這場轟轟烈烈的反腐敗、反貪污、反官倒的學生和工人運動,似乎已被拋諸腦後;除了「天安門母親」和極少數「不識好歹」的民主鬥士,一般內地同胞的六四意識已慢慢淡化,不像部分港人鍥而不捨並有站起來走出去的勇氣。在賺錢至上政治免談的港人或談政治必以北京馬首是瞻的政治應聲蟲心目中,悼念六四亡魂的活動沒有經濟效益且與北京對立,智者不為;然而,如果沒有這班愛國的熱血人士,香港便會淪為一個沒有正義感沒有民主精神內涵的市儈城市!  

在六四問題上,筆者過去曾希望北京政府能做點實事,以文明開放的態度對待在囚及流亡海外的異見人士,同時建立健全的三反(反腐敗、反貪污、反官倒)機制,間接回應八九民運的訴求。這些年來,內地經濟高速發展令北京政府對其施行的政策─包括不為六四平反─信心大增,雖然與六四有關的領導人早已不在其位,但經濟與股市齊飛,一片歌舞昇平,當年令世人血脈賁張的血腥鎮壓,當然不提為妙。  

可是,除了看中中國市場的商界人士,世人對「六四風波」─其實是對任何血腥屠殺─不會忘卻,國際間對中國的敵意,亦因此不會消除,近年對中國改革開放三十年仍行一黨專政一孩政策的指責已清晰可聞,為此北京在國際上必須處處提防,步步為營,不敢從容開放,是中國成為文明大國的心魔和實際障礙。  

一九九九年六月三日,西方傳媒引述八九年六月底美國駐華使館軍事參贊上呈國務院的「現場報告」,指在「六四風波」中被軍隊射殺輾斃人數二千六百餘名、受傷人數約七千……。北京政府若不對此作出清楚交代,麻煩(精神困擾)未完未了。以台灣的經驗,在國民黨一黨獨大時期,一九四七年二月二十八日開始的大屠殺,無聲無息,因為在高壓統治下,人民公開不敢怒不敢言;但國民黨的威權稍為動搖,紀念「二二八事件」便成為全民運動,亦是導致國民黨失去政權的主要因素。歷史會否在內地重演,有關當局也許應深入研究;拆除「六四風波」這個定時炸彈的最佳方法,莫如北京趁奧運舉行在即、經濟形勢一片大好中主動提出!  

台灣「二二八事件」距今已六十年,可是,當年目擊這場慘劇的美國駐台北副領事(一九四五─四七)葛超智(George H. Kerr, 1911-1992)上呈國務院的報告,最近─五月十七日才在「井底蛙」網站(www.froginawell.net)公開。葛超智在一九六五年出版《台灣被出賣》(Formosa Betrayed,相信台灣必有譯本),揭露國民黨主導的「二二八大屠殺」,他因此主張台灣獨立,這當然不見容於國民黨,該書甫出版國民黨不僅整批搜購,而且購下其版權,此書因此絕市場,直至一九九二年才由台灣出版公司(Taiwan Publishing Co)出第二版;該書五百餘頁,現在可在網上(www.romanization.com)免費下載。  

葛超智那份以美國駐南京使館名義發出的「備忘錄」(打字稿),長達二十三頁,寫於一九四七年四月二十一日,對在他目擊大屠殺後約一個半月,慘事歷歷在目,寫得特別詳盡生動。據葛超智的說法,二月二十八日軍民發生衝突後,當年的台灣省主席陳儀擺出與「暴民」談判的姿態,實際上是緩兵之計,等待渡海而來的數千國民黨軍隊;軍隊於三月九日登陸,屠殺便開始……。  

六十年前的舊事,台灣人不會忘記,「二二八事件」仍是國民黨的政治包袱,民進黨「好好運用」,肯定會成為國民黨奪回政權的絆腳石。北京政府應汲取教訓,不是回應香港平反六四的訴求,而是為了中共的長治久安,主動為六四平反,是敢於面對現實有遠見的表現。

2007-05-26

America's fear of China:

Another great report from the Economist below.

In parallel I would recommend James Kynge's book: China Shakes the World, which has some interesting anecdotes on how China stumbled upon the its road to success "by accident" in the past 25 years, in which Kynge understated Deng's role in the reform. Deng's wisdom is precisely what Kynge did not see, that the success is not by plan, but by a carefully crafted incentive system. The fact that all the local officials were so much incentived to get rich is because of one simple KPI (key performance metric) set by Deng, GDP growth. like TSR (total shareholders' return) in the corporate world, China used its own KPI (mainly GDP growth) to promote its bureaucrats. And it worked, so far.

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America's fear of China

May 17th 2007From The Economist print edition

China is a far-from-cuddly beast; but bashing it is a bad idea

IF THE guest list determined a meeting's value, the Strategic Economic Dialogue between China and America on May 22nd would be a roaring success. Almost half the Chinese cabinet is trooping to Washington, DC, for the second of the twice-yearly discussions, conceived by Hank Paulson, America's treasury secretary, between the world's largest economy and its fastest-growing one. The process was designed, in large part, as an antidote to the latest case of Asiaphobia among America's politicians. It is not working.
The itch to get tough with Beijing is urgent in Congress. Brandishing China's growing bilateral trade surplus as proof, congressmen from both parties have denounced the country as a currency manipulator, an illegal export-subsidiser, a violator of rights to intellectual property and all-round trade scoff-law. China-bashers have introduced a dozen bills in the new Congress. Some are bound to languish, but others may be passed—though there would then be further hurdles to jump, not least the president's power of veto (George Bush has other conflicts on his mind). The most threatening include proposals that would declare China's cheap currency an illegal subsidy and allow American firms to seek compensatory tariffs.

Politics in Beijing is less open, but the circumstances are similarly unhelpful. Because they have no electoral legitimacy, China's Communist leaders need to deliver the economic goods even more than most congressmen do. Worried about unemployment, the Chinese are loth to let their currency, the yuan, appreciate much faster than at today's snail's pace. And as with all dictatorships, there is the need to seem tough. With the five-yearly Communist Party congress only months away, China's president, Hu Jintao, cannot be seen to be bowing to American pressure on the yuan or anything else.


Japanese lessons

Thankfully, an all-out trade war remains unlikely. Congressional leaders seem inclined to act within the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which limit the scope and scale of any barriers that America can unilaterally impose. And some friction is to be expected in a trading relationship worth well over $300 billion a year. But although today's tensions are not cause for panic, they are a costly and unnecessary distraction—and potentially worse than that.
One worrying parallel is the Japanophobia of the 1980s and early 1990s. Back then, Japan's rising bilateral trade surplus and its mounting foreign-exchange reserves were seen as “proof” of its manipulated currency and mercantilist attitude. America's paranoia deepened as its jobless rate climbed—especially when the Japanese started buying landmarks like the Rockefeller Centre. In fact, Japan's bubble economy ended up bursting; but not before an outbreak of foolish protectionism. The economic tension even undermined support in both countries for America's security alliance with Japan.
The case against China is even weaker than the one against Japan was. Its economy is far more open. Though much poorer than Japan was then, China is already America's fastest-growing export market. And in contrast to the 1980s, the WTO now exists as an umpire for trade disputes. But logic, alas, may count for less than political grievance. America's low unemployment rate looks set to rise in the wake of the housing bust. To American voters, the Chinese are likely to become more prominent rivals, whether it be displacing America at the top of some economic league tables, winning Olympic medals or buying big American firms (the Chinese are rightly keen to diversify from treasury bonds). Most worrying, though, are the strategic risks. Japan was an ally in Asia: China is potentially a military competitor. Trade tensions could make it easier to see China as a rival and harder to enlist it as a partner.
Running such geopolitical risks would be understandable if China's policies posed a true threat to America's economic health. But they do not. China's intellectual-property violations cost American firms far less than many would have you believe: pirated DVDs may sell for peanuts in the markets of Shanghai, but if Hollywood tried to sell the genuine articles at full price, it would quickly discover that most Chinese could not afford them. Similarly, a stronger yuan would do little to dent America's trade deficit (see article).
So much to lose, so little to gain
The bilateral trade imbalance, the target of so many American politicians' anger, is an economic red herring. Its rise reflects changing supply patterns in Asia: America now imports more stuff that has passed through China—and correspondingly fewer goods from South Korea and Taiwan. China's overall surplus and America's overall deficit have less to do with the value of the yuan than with Chinese saving and American profligacy. True, a stronger, more flexible yuan makes sense for China, because it would help shift spending towards imports and would give Beijing's policymakers greater control over interest rates, making it easier to prevent the economy from overheating. But the effect on America would be small.
Rather than picking fights over the currency, Congress should step back and ask why Americans are so upset with China in the first place. The answer is that China is a scapegoat for broader economic anxieties to do with stagnant wages, rising income-inequality and dwindling health and pension benefits. These insecurities, which also lie behind the bad idea of introducing labour standards in trade agreements (see article), are much better tackled head on—at home.
Comprehensive health-care reform to create a system where all Americans have access to portable health insurance would do a lot to reduce workers' anxiety and equip them for an economy that these days demands frequent job shifts. Reform of the payroll tax, a regressive levy that hits the less affluent hardest, would be a good way to shift resources to needier Americans. By contrast, raising barriers to cheap Chinese imports would disproportionately hit the wallets of poor and middle-income American consumers—the very people the Democrats in particular claim to be protecting.
By scaling back its China-bashing, Congress could avoid such blunders. It would also leave more room to engage Chinese officials on subjects that actually matter. Top of the trade agenda ought to be the successful conclusion of the Doha round of global talks. No country has more at stake in a vibrant WTO than China, yet Beijing has been scandalously unwilling to help push for a Doha deal.
But the greatest prizes of Sino-American diplomacy are nothing to do with trade. Avoiding war and conflict, naturally, comes top of the list, whether by co-operation over North Korean and Iranian nukes or by building the trust that minimises the odds of a clash in the Taiwan Strait. Then there is China's expansion into Africa, particularly its cosy relations with genocidal Sudan. Global warming, too, ought to be centre-stage. China is building a new coal-fired power plant every week and is set to surpass America as the biggest source of greenhouse gases within a year. If the world is to contain its carbon emissions, America must not only clean up its own act but also help China to green its economic growth.
Mr Paulson wants the strategic dialogue to address some of these broader issues. Congress should stop distracting him.

Everything you need to know about the RMB valuation



The Economist has an excellent review on the RMB valuation.


  • Why the exchange rate is a fussy issue


  • Why the accusation from US politicians are logically flawed


  • Why a (mild) appreciation may not necessarily lead to disaster in China


  • Why China should appreciate RMB for its own benefit

Enjoy.

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Lost in translation

May 17th 2007 BEIJING AND HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition

If China sharply revalued the yuan, as American politicians are demanding, it could actually hurt the United States and help China
Stephen Jeffrey
CHINA is being cast as the villain once again. By holding its exchange rate artificially low, it is stealing jobs and causing the United States to run a huge trade deficit. Beijing must therefore be forced to revalue the yuan. These are the arguments behind an increasingly protectionist mood in Washington. Yet they are largely flawed. A stronger Chinese currency would not much reduce America's trade deficit. Indeed, the irony is that China, not America, has more to gain from setting the yuan free. Without a more flexible exchange rate, there is a growing risk that China's sizzling economy will boil over.
America's anger at China is clearly growing. In February it filed a complaint to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against Chinese export subsidies. In late March the Department of Commerce announced tariffs of 10-20% on glossy paper imported from China, to offset the impact of alleged government subsidies. This reversed a 23-year-old policy of not imposing countervailing duties on a non-market economy. Then in early April the Bush administration filed two more complaints: one on Chinese pirating of DVDs and CDs, and the other over restrictions on the sale of foreign films and music in China.

Although by themselves these actions are trivial, together they point to an increasing appetite for tougher action against China. The Bush administration is under increasing pressure, particularly from Congress.
Congressmen complain that the so-called China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (a series of high-level talks between the two countries launched last year by Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary) has so far failed to produce results. The recent deterioration in trade relations does not bode well for the next meeting, which begins on May 22nd. Many commentators now reckon that Congress will inevitably pass some kind of China-bashing legislation later this year. A sharp economic slowdown in America as a result of the collapsing housing market would make this even more likely.
The biggest risk comes from measures linked to China's supposed exchange-rate misalignment. The infamous Schumer-Graham bill, which proposed a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese goods to offset the yuan's alleged undervaluation, was withdrawn last year. But the two senators behind it are working with others on a new WTO-compatible version that could soon appear. Although the new bill is unlikely to include across-the-board tariffs, it could have sharp teeth.
Meanwhile, the target of all this hostility looms ever larger: China's trade surplus with America increased to $233 billion last year, accounting for almost 30% of America's total deficit. China's total current-account surplus reached an estimated $250 billion, or 9% of GDP, up from only 1% in 2001. Worse still, in the first four months of 2007, its trade surplus jumped by 88% compared with the same period in 2006.
The making of myths
China officially abandoned its decade-long policy of pegging the yuan to the dollar in July 2005. Since then it has risen by only 8% against the greenback. Because the dollar itself has weakened, the yuan's trade-weighted exchange rate has barely budged. In real trade-weighted terms it is about 10% cheaper than at the dollar's peak in 2002. As a result, it is not just the usual protectionist suspects that demand action, but many mainstream American economists are now calling on China to revalue by 20% or more. Yet the standard arguments for a revaluation are based partly on a series of myths.
The first myth is that there is overwhelming evidence that the yuan is grossly undervalued. China's large bilateral trade surplus with America proves nothing. It largely reflects Asia's changing supply chain. Much of what America buys from China today once came from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. China now imports components from these countries, assembles them and exports the finished goods to America. Knock out these and America's bilateral deficit with China shrinks by more than half. Even so, China's overall current-account surplus is also huge. The surge in its foreign-exchange reserves, to over $1.2 trillion, also suggests that the yuan is undervalued: without those massive purchases of dollars, the currency would have risen.
However, not all economists agree that the yuan needs to be sharply revalued. At one extreme is Morris Goldstein, of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who argues that the yuan is undervalued by 40% or more against the dollar and should immediately be revalued by 10-15%. In the other corner many highly respected economists, including Robert Mundell, an economics Nobel prize-winner, and Ronald McKinnon, of Stanford University, strongly argue against a big appreciation of the yuan.
The devil to measure
Economists find it devilishly hard to define the “correct value” for a currency. On purchasing-power parity (PPP), the yuan is clearly undervalued against the dollar. Perhaps by as much as 50%. But PPP is not useful for determining the optimal exchange rate between two countries of such different levels of income. It is natural for average prices to be lower in poorer countries because wages are lower. As countries get richer and their productivity rises, their real exchange rates appreciate. And although the depreciation in the yuan's real trade-weighted value since 2002 looks perverse, this follows a real appreciation of 50% between 1994 and 2001 (see chart 1).
A study by two IMF economists, Steven Dunaway and Xiangming Li, found that estimates for the undervaluation of the yuan ranged from zero to nearly 50%, depending on which method was used. Another recent study, by Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie Chinn and Eiji Fujii, concluded that using conventional statistical methods it is hard to prove that the yuan is much undervalued. Such uncertainty may partly explain why America's Treasury Department has so far ducked labelling China as a currency manipulator in its twice-yearly report to Congress. Another reason is that it is loth to give ammunition to the protectionist lobby.
Myth number two is that the sharp increase in China's trade surplus is due to an explosion in cheap exports. Until 2004 China's surplus was relatively modest, but it soared over the next two years (see chart 2). Jonathan Anderson, chief Asia economist at UBS, points out that export growth actually slowed between 2004 and 2006 (see chart 3). The main reason for the bigger trade surplus was a sharp slowdown in the annual real growth rate in imports, from more than 30% in early 2004 to less than 15% last year.
The entire increase in China's trade surplus since 2004 has come from trade in heavy industrial materials and equipment. China used to import increasing amounts of steel, aluminium, chemicals and machinery, but import growth collapsed after 2004 when the government started to tighten policy, causing a sharp slowdown in construction, one of the biggest importers of machinery and materials. At the same time China continued to invest heavily in metals and equipment, creating substantial excess capacity, so import growth remained relatively weak last year. Mr Anderson argues that imports should recover as overcapacity is used up.
The third fallacy is that imports from China destroy jobs and harm the American economy. It is hard to see how China can be blamed for job losses when America's unemployment rate (4.5%) is close to its lowest for decades. Trade with China may affect the composition of jobs in America, but it has little impact on total employment. It is true that some workers are harmed by trade with China, just as there are some losers from all international trade. But the American economy overall is better off, so in theory there is ample room to compensate any losers.
Trade with China helps, not harms the average American. Thanks to imports from China, prices are lower and real incomes higher. Commentators often refer to the “cheap” yuan as being an unfair subsidy for Chinese exporters. But it is a moot question who exactly is subsidising whom. Not only do cheap imports subsidise American consumers, but China's large purchases of Treasury bonds also hold down American interest rates, thereby subsidising home buyers. Suppose that overnight the yuan rose by 30%, what would happen? American interest rates would rise as China needed to buy fewer Treasury securities and prices at Wal-Mart would increase. If consumer spending and imports then collapsed, this would certainly reduce America's trade deficit, but in a much more painful way than most Americans have in mind.
Wishful thinking
The biggest myth of all is that a revaluation of the yuan would greatly reduce America's trade deficit. The real cause of the deficit is that Americans spend too much and save too little. This means that the country has to import surplus savings from abroad by running a current-account deficit. If a stronger yuan did not cause Americans to save more, it would do little by itself to reduce the trade deficit.
Another reason why even a big rise in the yuan would do little to reduce America's deficit is that there is little overlap between American and Chinese production, so American goods cannot replace Chinese imports. Instead, other countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, would probably replace the Chinese. Shifting purchases to higher-cost producers amounts to imposing a tax on American consumers, says Stephen Roach, chief economist of Morgan Stanley.
Even where America and China do compete, as in electronics, the high import content of China's exports blunts the impact of exchange-rate movements on export prices, because a rise in the yuan reduces input costs. About half of China's exports consist of goods that have been assembled from imported components. And domestic wages and materials account for about 30% of the cost of those re-exports. Mr Anderson estimates that a 10% rise in the yuan would increase average export prices by only 3-5%.
If a yuan revaluation encouraged other Asian economies to follow suit, the impact on America's trade deficit would be larger, but still modest. If a 10% revaluation of the yuan were matched by all other Asian currencies, the dollar's trade-weighted index would fall by 4%. Yet, the 19% decline in the dollar's trade-weighted index since early 2002 has failed to trim the deficit.
None of this means that a yuan revaluation leaves America's trade deficit unchanged, simply that any change would probably be small. Nouriel Roubini, of Roubini Global Economics, finds evidence that China's trade balance is affected by movements in its exchange rate: the yuan has fallen sharply against the euro since 2002 as a result of the dollar's decline, and China's exports to Europe have consequently grown at a faster rate than its exports to America. A stronger yuan might therefore curb China's exports to America, but America's deficit would continue to loom large if imports from China were simply replaced by those from elsewhere.
Chinese whispers
Many of the arguments heard in America in favour of a big revaluation of the yuan are flawed or at least exaggerated. However, many of the arguments used in Beijing for why a revaluation would endanger China's economy are equally suspect. For instance, the common claim that a big jump would seriously harm China's growth and employment contradicts the argument (also favoured by Beijing) that an appreciation would have little effect on China's trade surplus with America.
Or take another popular line of defence: it is often asserted that China cannot afford a more flexible exchange rate until its dodgy banking system is reformed and strengthened. Eswar Prasad, an economist at Cornell University, says this argument has it completely backwards. The distortions caused by today's rigid exchange-rate regime may themselves be the biggest threat to Chinese financial stability. A sound banking system requires an independent monetary policy, which uses interest rates rather than blunt directives, to guide credit. And a country cannot control its monetary policy unless it accepts a more flexible exchange rate.
By tying the yuan closely to the dollar, China has been forced to hold its interest rates lower than is prudent: higher rates would attract more “hot money” from abroad, putting upward pressure on the currency. The real rate of interest paid on bank deposits is negative and lending rates are far too low for such a fast-growing economy. Cheap money results in excessive bank lending and poor investment decisions, which could lead to an increase in non-performing loans. Excessively low interest rates are also fuelling stockmarket and property bubbles.
News that China's real GDP surged by a breathtaking 11.1% in the year to the first quarter and that consumer-price inflation had risen to 3.3% in March (it eased to 3% in April), stoked fears that the economy is out of control. But concerns about overheating in the usual sense of excess demand are exaggerated. China's widening current-account surplus and its strong investment imply excess supply. Excluding food, the inflation rate is only 0.9%. Instead, the real concern is that excess liquidity, as a result of the surge in foreign-exchange reserves and low interest rates, is flooding into shares (see article). Households are withdrawing money from low-yielding bank accounts to bet on the stockmarket. China needs much higher interest rates to cool its asset markets. To regain control over its monetary policy China needs to let the yuan rise.
A revaluation could also help the government succeed in shifting the balance of growth away from investment and net exports towards consumption. A stronger exchange rate would boost consumers' purchasing power, allowing them to buy more foreign goods. Excess saving in China is as much to blame for global imbalances as inadequate saving in America.
Most of the increase in saving has come from Chinese companies, which are earning record profits. But household saving is also kept high by the poor public provision of health, education and pensions. Partly as a result, consumption accounts for an unusually low share of GDP.
The good news is that the mix of growth is starting to become more balanced: over the past year, investment has slowed while retail sales have quickened, rising by 15.5% in the year to April. In other words, consumer spending is now growing faster than GDP. Dragonomics, a Beijing-based research firm, estimates that consumption rose from 37% to 40% of China's nominal GDP growth in 2006 and is set to rise again this year.
The stronger growth in Chinese consumer spending has got much less attention in America than the sharp increase in the country's trade surplus. The contribution of net exports to China's growth has increased so far this year. However, the near doubling of its trade surplus in the first four months of the year was probably a one-off, because firms brought forward their shipments so as to avoid an expected reduction in export-tax rebates. Exporters are also thought to be overstating their export revenues in order to dodge capital controls and bring in foreign money to invest in Chinese assets. If so, the trade surplus should stabilise in coming months.
In the long run, stronger domestic consumption could trim China's trade surplus. The government can encourage this by spending more. Its spending on health care and education rose by an average of 50% last year and it is budgeted to rise by more than 60% this year—but from such low levels that it could take years to increase social spending by enough to encourage households to save a lot less. Meanwhile, a stronger yuan would help to rebalance the mix of China's growth.
Mirror image
This turns the whole debate about China's exchange-rate policy on its head. It is China that has the most to gain from allowing the yuan to rise. If the spat between America and China were to ignite protectionism or financial instability, it could endanger the whole world economy. All the more foolish, therefore, that economic relations are based on misperceptions on both sides. America needs to stop making China a scapegoat for the failures of American policy. Only if it gets its own economic house in order, by boosting domestic saving, will its “advice” to Beijing seem credible. Likewise, China has no right to criticise American policy when its own economy remains unbalanced.
America is right that China needs to revalue, but for the wrong reasons. And arguing that a revaluation helps America's economy makes it less likely that Beijing will act. Moreover, if George Bush foolishly slapped harsh trade sanctions on China, America's economy would be the biggest loser. Likewise, China is foolish to resist a more flexible exchange rate partly because it does not want to be seen as caving in to America's demands, when it is in its own interest. If the world's two leading engines of growth remain at loggerheads, everyone will pay the price.