- That China should first of all try to get itself out of the mess (which seems to have already been taking toll, check the latest Q3 GDP number and other stats). And do whatever it could to achieve this.
- If this means currency depreciation, let it fall. If this means VAT rebate, do it. If this means lowering profit tax, do it. Dr Sester may argue that it is too minute to matter, but at this era every tiny cent matters.
- Do only what is meaningful to the long term, and do what would help with the capacity utilization of its labour, equipment, whatever. But do NOT spend just for the sake of spend, because that is wasting resources. Since resource is scarce, you do not want to put them in to the wrong place. You especially do not want to pay $85bn for 80% of AIG and then add another $65bn for what? another 61% of AIG? how do you buy 141% of a company when there is only 100% in total?
A blog on strategies, and applying strategic perspectives on business related issues, and on miscellaneous discussions about China
2008-11-14
China - "non"-helpful?
2008-11-11
翻译:婴孩战论
婴孩战论
盖日-不热车
二十世纪晚期最重要的战争是那一场?你可以争辩那是1975年11月6日在摩洛哥南境发生的那场战争。诚然,这不是另一场斯大林格勒。实际上,那天发生的事情通常人们根本不称之为战争。它的正式名称叫做‘绿色行进’。在(战争)的一边是35万没有武装手持绿色(伊斯兰)旗帜的摩洛哥平民,另一边呢 --- 离边界好多英里之内,因为他们希望能避免和那班行进者发生冲突 --- 乃一支意志摇晃、失去士气的象征性的西班牙军队在假装着要保卫一个前西班牙殖民地,西属撒哈拉。
(地图上的)西属撒哈拉挂在摩洛哥下面,在撒哈拉沙漠和大西洋汇合的地方,就如一面堵快倒的墙的样子。那大概是那附近的非洲海岸最没人想要的一块地,说不上有水只有微量的人口,那就是为什么西班牙当初得到它的原因。等到19世纪晚期欧洲列强准备好瓜分非洲的时候,西班牙早就远别了她昔日的光辉,所以只好守候着这点残羹剩饭。
不过我们在过去的世纪里学到的一件事情就是,在这个拥挤、饥饿的星球上没有什么所谓的不值钱的地方。西属撒哈拉已证明了这一点:在它往后属于摩洛哥的30年里,有人在其沿海的捕鱼权、以及那内陆100英里里的一个巨大的叫饱克拉BOU CRAA的硫酸盐矿赚了大钱。
这就是为什么摩洛哥国王哈珊二世,一个在CIA(中情局)不乏朋友的刁钻老苏丹,决定了把那班忠诚的东西往下运到摩洛哥南部边境,然后每人递上一支可以上镜头的小绿旗,然后送他们越过边境往那些西班牙军队处去。
摩洛哥人必须越过传统军事征服的臼巢框框去想,理由非常简单,摩洛哥的武装力量惨不忍睹。他们是如此的不堪,他们对世界军事史的仅有贡献就是在闹剧喜剧章里露露脸。比如说,国防部长有一次想要让摩洛哥空军的战斗机去击落哈珊二世某次外访回来乘坐的波音727。结果失败了。真的不骗你,喷气战斗机拦截不了一架巨大、肥胖、迟笨的民用飞机,而且还事先知道了目标的这个行程路线图呢。这样的一支军队必须要有不战而胜的征服方法,因为要它打赢一个公平的战争的概率是零。
当然摩洛哥人有着面对积弱而士气低落的西班牙殖民政府的优势,那是西班牙独裁者佛朗哥将军终于可以死去的时候。假如你的年纪允许你记得那些早期的周六直播节目(Saturday Night Live),你可能记得那车里翠丝(Cherry Chase)不断重复的笑话,“这是刚刚收到的消息:佛朗哥将军仍然是死的!”这笑话的之所以成功是因为那老将军花了很长时间才终于死掉,那意味着像摩洛哥那样的贪婪的新兴列强有着非常充足的时间去计划如何向西班牙的前殖民地伸出他们的手。
对于对战斗着迷的战争迷们这可能没啥了不起,不过这可是极端高效率的侵略。西班牙军队一枪没发。行进者们跨过了边界,让沙子入了鞋肚,高喊了这神圣的一块缺水的平坦沙漠现在已成为了摩洛哥不可分割的一部分,随后就回家了。自从那以后,西属撒哈拉就由摩洛哥控制了。虽然当地的游击队POLISARIO玻璃萨里奥曾经在某段时间里给他们制造过一点麻烦。
使得我提名这怪诞的一幕作为“当代最重要的战争”的候选者是因为它展现了一种获得有争议领地的崭新方法。如果过去的100年里我们学会了一件事,那就是传统的军事征服变得越来越没效率了。这是在所有军事史里最最令人诧异的一个变奏。19世纪的由始至终,那些由英法领头的欧洲列强,获得他们想要的土地的方法是基于他们有更好的军事技术、运输和组织。不同意这种观念的本地人通常会成为历史前进的巨轮的牺牲品而消失无踪。而这只是一个在这世界所有角落发生了数千年的故事的新版本:更大、更强的部落在所有他们能达到的地方取代并抹去相对弱的部落。那是那时代的规范,甚至在与白人接触前的北美,那瓦左人(navajo)便在白人出现前很久就在美国西南部把乌特人(Ute)给取代了。
回到现代,甚至在当传统战争的天平是除了更进一步往第一世界倾斜别无他向的时候,那些科技先进和组织完善的国家们却都在后撤之途,同时以前的受害国已开始反攻,不但要求他们之前的失地而且正在渗入前殖民主的领域。现在最重要的是士气,和国家的意志。这是西班牙人没有的,摩洛哥人有的。所以,即使西班牙军队完全可以抹去那些行进者,他们却无法开枪。武器只当你愿意去使用它的时候才是武器。一个技术先进的军队,假如没有开火的意志,就根本不是什么军队。
只有我们这些专注的战争呆子才似乎能感到这是何等的荒诞,在军事史上这是何等的史无前例。直到20世纪,我们的难题不是如何让军事上相对卓越的一方去开火 --- 而是如何使得他们在把相对弱势的部落、军队或国家消灭前停火。在20世纪前,我从来没听过有一个军事强势的部落或国家失去开战保卫疆土的意愿的例子,或是为了占领较弱的邻居领土而开战的例子。
20世纪是一个重大的转折点。德日等新兴列强尝试去模仿19世纪的老牌殖民列强却遭到了完全的、灾难性的失败,即使他们通常在战场上打了胜仗。那是两次世界大战带给我们的荒诞的教训:狭义的军事超级优势已经不足够了。即使有可以控制战场全局的德军(在某种程度上日军也不赖),德日两国在战争结束时不但没有增加一寸土地,还把自己家园变成废墟,自己的文化受到阉割,他们的出生率跟着也有好几代在世界排居后列。
即使是老牌殖民帝国,包括英法,也是在挺大的麻烦中结束这个世纪的。他们失去了抵抗他们曾经统治过的殖民地涌来的移民潮的意志。在军事理论的意义上我们正处于一个非常奇怪的时刻,我们的武器无损可是我们战斗的意志已荡然无存。
那些最早成立的殖民地是最成功的。例如,北美洲的北部,现在的美国和加拿大,变成了欧洲殖民者的永久财产(至少看起来是这样,直到最近之前吧)。有两件事情决定了这结果:首先,他们17-18世纪就来了,在他们良心开始行动之前,其次就是,大多数的土著人口都是微小的打猎和收捡食物者(这在澳大利亚亦然,虽然时代晚了很多)。所有其他地方 -- 拉丁美洲、非洲、亚洲 --- 当地人都在离在旧式军事理论家眼中的所谓军事优势很远的情况下大举反攻推进。这就是我们今天在南非看到的,和(虽然进程相对缓慢一点)在欧洲和美国南部看到的。在其他地方,特别是被法国人殖民过的地方(他们在这方面从来都比不上英国人),大批的殖民人口被完全消灭了,就像在阿尔及利亚的几百万法国人一样。
这样我们看到了一个军迷们需要很长时间才能面对的令人震惊的教训:军事上超级优势的影响力在现代已经远远不及出生率和简单无情的意志的影响力了。
啊,出生率 --- 真奇怪它是怎么在左右两派阵营都变成了不能谈的敏感题目的。左派做梦也不敢想像去告诉第三世界的人们去减低他们制造婴儿的速度,而右派们,虽然控制(人家)生育的决定可以延迟毁灭他们自己的国家,他们又不能达成一致的意见去实施。
所以出生率是一个没有对手的武器,没有“反武器”之“武器”。所以他一般都会赢。摩洛哥人很清楚地表明了他们的“绿色行进”完全就是来自于他们的出生率。那些他们送往边界的“志愿者”的数目是35万,刚刚好就是摩洛哥每年新生婴儿的数目。所以这基本上就是生存空间(lebensraum)的理由,就如那世纪前些时候德国人用过的理由。你可能听过那吧,一个叫“东方战线”的小东西。你可能现在会说假如有什么政策是曾经决定性的一败涂地的,那就是纳粹想要往斯大林哪里挤出一点生存空间的那个尝试。这完全就是事实啊。那是因为纳粹用了旧式的方法,就是武装征服的方法。
在后1918的世界里想要成功,在那威尔逊(woodrow wilson)的梦中“小国”即使没有自卫能力也有存在权的世界里要成功,你需要用相对慢的、看起来不明显的军事方法,比如,出生率和移民。这种缓慢征服的经典案例就是科索沃。在战场上塞尔维亚人总能打败阿尔巴尼亚人,即使是人数不如对方的时候也是。不过阿尔巴尼亚人在所有军事产业里的一个中有庞大的优势 --- 婴儿制造业。根据BBC,科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人50年前的出生率是令人惊奇的平均每个妇女生了8.5个婴儿。
科索沃阿尔巴尼亚人证明了军事技术其实无关重要,因为尝试以旧式方法 --- 科索沃解放军(KLA)的武装反抗 --- 去征服科索沃而失败了。那是全军覆没啊。当地的塞尔维亚民兵,一帮疲乏的中年业余者和警察,一举打扁了KLA。跟着发生的是现在这些日子里失败者获得胜果的漂亮演示。阿尔巴尼亚人把战争里阵亡的KLA士兵的衣服武器弹药扒掉,然后把尸体向那些易蒙的西方记者展示,告诉他们这是塞尔维亚人的“大屠杀”。是大屠杀没错,就算是吧,不过那时因为KLA连个屁仗都不会打(在战场上被杀了)。他们活着手持武器的时候,他们只能给人当笑话;死后没有武器了呢,他们却能使得己方变成受害者而赢得支持,并直接导致了美军的介入。
要以阿尔巴尼亚人在科索沃胜利的方法赢得战争,你需要制造很多的婴儿。就是这么简单。要理解那是怎么运作的,你需要摒弃那些说婴儿是因为‘爱’才来到这世界的无聊的自由派思想。在这世界的很多地方,婴儿制造是武器生产的一种形式。
在有些地方,这是公开的政策。例如,在巴勒斯坦的巴勒斯坦人和以色列人中就有一场全面的出生率战争在进行中。而这种斗争中最令人垂丧的其中一点,从以色列人的角度来说,就是当你让人家在占领区里生活越难过的时候,人家竟然就越能生出更多的小孩来。比如说,在加萨地带,就有非洲之外最高的生殖率之一,每位妇女5.6个孩子。
以色列的总体出生率是大概每个妇女2.8个孩子,对于一个富裕国家这算高了。不过在所有地方里最让人惊奇的出生率,甚至比加萨巴勒斯坦人还高的,是在一些最极端的犹太复国团体中,就是那个叫做哈热地(haredi)的“超正宗”犹太人。直到最近他们每位妇女能生8到9个孩子。当以色列移民新闻报道他们的出生率降到每位妇女只有7.7个孩子的时候这曾引起了很大的恐慌呢。
7.7,那是比马里(7.38)还高啊。马里是(以国家为单位的)世界纪录保持者。
那些(以色列)殖民者从不隐瞒他们用多生孩子来改变“大以色列”人口版图以使其偏向他们一方的企图 --- 这里凌驾一切的主要目的是要保证巴勒斯坦人永远不能成为多数。
有趣的是在这些超正宗社区里却有很多想要用以色列军事优势以传统方法来解决问题的声音,他们要驱除或消灭巴勒斯坦人。这些人失败了。他们的领导人,梅尔卡哈尼(meir kahane)在纽约被一个来自埃及的的士司机暗杀了。不过在他死前好久他就已经输掉这场辩论比赛了。当前的这些日子里你用这些方法无法就此不了了之的,即使你得到每一个在得克萨斯的获得重生的受洗犹太复国支持者(注:这里似乎指的是小布什)的毫无保留的支持也是。
假如你想要一个离你家近点的例子,去北爱尔兰吧,在那里以新教多数人口定出边界的地方里新教人口已经越来越少了,这乃得益于天主教的高出生率(注:天主教反对避孕)。到了2001年的时侯,天主教徒占北爱人口46%,1961年时只有35%。
可是当那令人生畏的天主教占多数的日子逼近的时候,在俄斯特镇(ulster)一件好玩的事情正在酝酿。天主教出生率比新教减得还要快。这种事情在一个部落突破进入中产阶级的时候总是会发生的。这说明了一个当代人口斗争中的一个真正的脑力难题:假如你真地恨你的敌人部落,你能做的最好的事情就是使得他们富裕。富人不会有那么多孩子。当然也有像超正宗以色列人那种例外,他们相当富有却全心全意的尽可能尽力制造最多的孩子。不过一般而言,金钱可以让人从建立大家庭里的想法分心出去想别的。所以,那压迫敌人部落的老方法通常是起反作用的。假如像ian paisley那种俄斯特狂人得逞的话,天主教将会被压到贫民区里,他们过去30年的出生率就会高好多,他们就可开始一场科索沃式的大多数人主政的政变,就像阿尔巴尼亚人对塞尔维亚人做的一样,甚至还有美国空军如对付贝尔格莱德一样去炸掉贝尔法斯特的每一座电视塔,他们是这样教训塞尔维亚人的,“在你们没把科索沃让给你们的阿尔巴尼亚小兄弟之前,不许看电视!”
使他们富有是你能对付这种在我们欧洲和北美见到的通过移民来征服土地的策略的唯一办法。没有人可以真诚的告诉你现在在美国有多少非法移民,不过就以我上班的途中看到的,我倾向于这些估计中偏高的点,大约2000万人从墨西哥潜入了美国南方找工作了。
以我所知,没有人在说拉丁裔移民决定了以生一大堆孩子作为征服得克萨斯和加利福尼亚的方法,那是那些以色列移民正在实施的方法。拉丁意义的“重新征服”,假如它真的发生,将会是如墨西哥这种国家通过提高出生率并降低死亡率的方法从第三世界升级到第二点五世界的一个史无前例的结果。
到了1970年的时候,墨西哥正处于一个仅有足够医疗服务以维持人民生命的危险阶段,所以死亡率没错是大幅下降了,可是人民还是维持在穷到还想要一大堆孩子的地步。在1970和2000年间,墨西哥人口翻倍了,从4800万到9800万。所以在格兰德河(rio grande 注:墨美的分界河)的一边你看到一大群年轻的穷人,在河的另一边呢,一大堆渴望着廉价劳工的资金和公司。就这样,一条如格兰德河般充满泥巴的小溪已没有足够的宽度来把这两个群体隔开了。
随着墨西哥人口的增加及其生活水平的提升,其生育率实际上却开始了让人惊叹的下潜,直到平均每个墨西哥妇女只有2.39个孩子的比例,仅仅比以色列的2.38排行高两个座次。
那使得拉丁人出生率下降的唯一因素 --- 指的是在他们的祖国,不是那些移民到美国的人们 --- 是因为那些农民有了点钱,使得他们开始把自己想象为消费者,并开始对于购买新的卡车和平屏电视比起对于生小崽子更有动力了。
以上的这些进展是非常缓慢的,起码比起传统的军事征服来说是这样。出生率要等数十年才能看到效果,阿尔巴尼亚人在科索沃的胜利是20世纪中叶出生率的结果。而且,在世界的一些其他角落,比如美国和欧洲,历史上新移民会融合入本地人中而不是像巴尔干和中东那里保存着古老的部族仇恨。说到头,那是一个文化的问题,不是种族的问题。对美国拉丁裔人口的研究告诉我们,在两代之内,大部分的美籍拉丁裔人都在为了要巡查边境以把那些天谴的移民拒诸境外而咆哮了。真的怪诞的事情是 --- 我可以以自身成长经验看到的来作证 --- 本地文化渗入了移民的事情,比如在美国的墨西哥人扬弃了天主教而变成重生的新教徒的事例。你只要去任何年轻的,热切的美国新教教堂,比如拿撒勒教堂(nazarene),你会看到好多的墨西哥家庭,他们都有好多的孩子,在以得克萨斯-墨西哥口音的英语唱着古老的苏格兰圣诗。事实上,我曾经看到一篇真的可以笑死你的文章,那是一个美国浸信会作家写的,他在担心浸信教徒的出生率正在下降 -- 其实拿撒勒人力每个妇女都在生3个以上的孩子。因此,那些反移民博客一直在预测的美国变成墨西哥的噩梦一幕,可能演变成真,不过只是你会称为“种族”意义上的墨西哥 --- 我的意思是,你的二年级全班合照里可能有三分之二是拉丁裔的面孔 --- 不过这些拉丁裔脸孔后面已完全吸收了整套的受洗重生美国的世界观图像,那图像其实来自于几百年前在美国南部定居的苏格兰裔和爱尔兰裔人。
人们对于这些缓慢的人口征服的焦虑有一点是有分歧的。这分歧是以他们最真实的恐惧来归类的:你是不想在外出时见到那些脸孔?抑或你是不想进口那些移民的祖国文化?这整个争论目前是如此的受到检查压制,使得辩论双方都绝对的不诚实,没有人愿意掏开心来说出自己的心里话。我怀疑对于有些人来说他们不能接受的是那些新脸孔,他们希望走在他们的大街上的都是跟他们长大的过程中见到的肤色形状是一样的。假如这就是你想要的,那么无论你在什么地方,我可保证假如你有足够的财富来为这种事情忧心(而不是为了你的下一顿饭的着落忧心),那好,你的确有忧心的理由。因为,人类迁移的原因不碍乎食物、金钱、牧场和工作之类的东西。那数千年前移入欧洲的日耳曼部落有一个比较合理的看法:他们把战争称为“人类的移动”。匈奴人把哥特人赶离了北亚大草原,然后嘣的一声,等你回过神来,哥特人已经在亚德里安诺普把罗马军队消灭了。
那些脸孔是要变的。我们正处于一个新的军事历史时代,在这时代里拥有全然的意志去抵抗移民性“征服”的国家唯有那些斯大林主义的国家。当然他们不曾碰到许多类似的难题啦 -- 没有太多移民会尝试去偷渡进入北朝鲜或者前苏联 --- 不过即使这些国家真的面对着真正意义的人口挑战,他们还有着开火的意志。柏林围墙是一个很恶劣的案例,他们开枪不是为了把人赶走而是要阻止人离开。
不过这些日子里这些斯大林主义国家并不是完全属于朝阳工业哪一类,而又没有一个自由民主国家还有把手无寸铁却又想闯关的人们射杀的意志(闯入,闯出都一样)。即使是那些以色列人,他们可能是在人口问题上最最狠的第一世界人民,也不会把越过比室吧(beersheba)找咖啡店工作的非洲人射杀。他们顶多就把他们送回苏丹让他们在那里被射杀而已。
所以这些人群的迁移,那缓慢的人口战争,会一直延续下去。大概除了用钱去砸他们使得他们留在家里之外,我们完全没有可以抗衡的行动。基本上,无论你在何处,你在大街上看到的肤色和特征总会改变的。对于这些脸孔法西斯们假如有什么事情是值得安慰的,那就是,这样说吧,是欧洲人首先走这一步棋的。因为啊,这里没几个非裔美国人是纯非洲血统的,也没几个墨西哥印第安人身体内没有流着几滴西班牙人的血。只是现在这些脸孔们的血统要朝反方向混了。
对于大多数人的真正的担忧,如果可以让他们大声讲出来的话,就是文化。假如你是法国人,你不希望巴黎变成金沙萨吧,因为让我们诚实点说,金沙萨是一个地狱坑啊。假如你是英国人,你不希望伦敦变成卡拉奇吧,因为卡拉奇是一个噩梦。假如你是美国人,你也不想要休斯顿 --- 呃,糟了,你去过休斯顿吗?假如你还有半边脑袋,你根本就不要去想要休斯顿,那个糟糕的蒸笼。
事实是,大部分从这些地方入侵的人们都倾向同意你的观点。这是他们一开始离开那些地方的原因。没有人比刚果人更清楚刚果是怎样的一个地狱坑。我曾经读过关于刚果内河渡轮的这样一个报道,他们对于不同舱等有这样的俗称。头等舱是“欧洲”,二等舱是“中国”,意思是不那么伟大,不过还凑合。三等舱是“刚果”,没有人愿意去那里,特别是刚果人最不愿意去。
所以,要针对这些新征服来评价你的处境,你需要决定你是在一个科索沃 --- 两个永远彼此仇视的部落,整出婴孩作为武器 --- 或是那艘刚果渡轮,在那里若有可能的话没人愿意太来真格。当然,在这两种模式间有一大片的模糊或重叠的地带。以北爱尔兰为例,到处是部落仇恨的喧闹,可我就不相信他们有把自己变成科索沃的能耐。他们太喜欢电视机和汽车了。
那就是这场争论的可笑之处:欧美的死硬派希望我们以古老的凉血意志去封锁边界,可是这些先进国家里的“弱者”却常常能很成功的把这些移民的下一两代同化为仇视移民的本地人。那旧模式,刺刀守边境的模式,甚至都没影了。这是面对事实的时候了。让我们去面对改变吧。
如果你能应付这些新脸孔,您将可能看到你那“弱弱”的欧美文化的胜出,慢慢地,没有光荣地却无可置疑地胜出。然后你将可能活到可以看到一片全新的脸庞的时候,乍一看他们好像刚从卡拉奇或金沙萨过来的,直到你把音量打开听到他们在咆哮着我们需要怎么去驱赶那些该死的新移民。

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原文
War of the Babies
by Gary Brecher
What was the most important battle of the late 20th century? You could argue it was the one that took place on the southern border of Morocco on November 6, 1975. Of course, we’re not talking about another Stalingrad here. In fact, what happened that day isn’t usually called a battle at all. Its official name is "The Green March." On one side were 350,000 unarmed Moroccan civilians carrying green (Islamic) flags, and on the other -- miles inside the border, because they were hoping not to have to confront any of the marchers -- was a shaky, demoralized token force of Spanish troops pretending to defend a former Spanish colony, the Spanish Sahara.
The Spanish Sahara hangs below Morocco where the Sahara meets the Atlantic like a crumbling brick wall. It was about the least desirable chunk of coastal Africa around, with no water to speak of and a tiny population, which is why the Spanish got it. By the time the European powers were ready to divide up Africa in the late nineteenth century, Spain had long since lost its glory and tended to get the scraps and leftovers.
But one thing we’ve learned over the last century is that on this crowded, hungry planet, there’s no such thing as worthless land. Spanish Sahara has proven that: in the 30 years it’s belonged to Morocco, big money has been made from the fishing off the coast and the huge phosphate mine at Bou Craa, a hundred miles inland.
That’s why the Moroccan King Hassan II, a wily old sultan with friends in the CIA, decided it was worth his while to ship all those loyal subjects down to Morocco’s southern border, hand out little green flags for the cameras, and send them across the border toward those Spanish troops.
The Moroccans had to think outside the traditional military-conquest box, for the simple reason that Morocco’s armed forces are pathetic. They’re so bad their only contributions to military history have been in the "slapstick comedy" department. For instance, the Minister of Defense once tried to have fighters from the Moroccan Air Force kill Hassan II by shooting down his Boeing 727 as it came home from a foreign trip. They failed. Seriously: jet fighters failed to intercept and destroy a big, fat, slow civilian airliner even when they knew its exact flight path. A military like that pretty much has to resort to unarmed conquest, because its chances in a fair fight are zero.
Of course the Moroccans had the advantage of facing a weak, dispirited colonial Spain just at the moment the Spanish dictator, General Franco, finally got around to dying. If you’re old enough to recall those early SNL seasons, you probably remember Chevy Chase’s running joke, "This just in: General Franco still dead!" The reason that joke worked is that it took the old General a long time to die, and that meant that greedy up-and-coming regional powers like Morocco had plenty of time to plan ways of getting their hands on former Spanish colonies.
It may not have been very exciting for combat fans, but it was an extremely effective invasion. The Spanish troops didn’t fire a shot. The marchers walked over the border, got sand in their shoes, shouted about how this sacred patch of waterless, flat desert was now an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco, and went back home. And since then, the Spanish Sahara has been dominated by Morocco, although the local guerrilla army, POLISARIO, gave them some serious problems for a while.
What makes this weird episode my nominee for "Most Significant Battle of the Era" is that it showed the new way of winning disputed territory. If there’s one thing that we should have learned over the past hundred years, it’s that traditional armed conquests are getting less and less effective. This is one of the most surprising twists in all military history. All through the nineteenth century, the European powers, led by the British and French, took the land they wanted on the grounds that they had better military technology, transport and organization. Locals who disputed that notion tended to disappear as casualties of inevitable progress. And that was just an updated version of what had been happening all over the world for thousands of years: bigger, stronger tribes displace and wiped out weaker tribes whenever they could. That was the norm, even in pre-contact North America, where the Navajo were displacing the Ute in the American Southwest long before the white guys showed up.
Now, even though the balance in conventional warfare is if anything tilting further toward the first world, the technologically advanced and organized countries are in retreat, and the former victims are pushing back, not just claiming their old territories but infiltrating the former colonizers’ countries. What matters now is morale, national will. The Spanish didn’t have it, and the Moroccans did. So even though the Spanish troops could have wiped out those unarmed marchers, they failed to open fire. Weapons are only weapons if you’re willing to use them. A technologically advanced army without the will to fire is no army at all.
Only us dedicated war nerds seem to realize how weird this is, how totally unprecedented in military history. Until the 20th century, the problem wasn’t usually getting militarily superior forces to open fire -- it was getting them to stop before the weaker tribe, army or country was totally wiped out. I don’t know of a single case, before the 20th century, of a militarily superior tribe or nation lacking the will to defend its territory, or for that matter, take the territory of weaker neighbors.
The 20th century was the big turning point. New powers like Germany and Japan tried to imitate the older colonial powers of the 19th century and suffered total, disastrous defeat, even though they usually prevailed on the battlefield. That’s the weird lesson of the two world wars: military superiority in the narrow sense just doesn’t cut it any more. Despite the total battlefield dominance of the Wehrmacht (and to a lesser extent the Imperial Japanese forces), Germany and Japan ended the war not just without additional territory but with their home territories in ruins, their cultures gelded, their birthrates for generations to come among the lowest in the world.
Even the older colonial powers, Britain and France, finished the century in big trouble, without the will to resist the immigrants from the colonies they’d once ruled. We’re at a very strange moment militarily: our weapons still work but our will is gone.
The colonies that were established earliest are the most successful. For example, northern North America, now the U.S. and Canada, passed into permanent possession of the European settlers (or so it seemed, until recently). Two things determined this: first, they were settled in the 17th and 18th century, before conscience set in, and because most of the native population had been relatively tiny groups of hunter-gatherers (which also holds true for Australia, though it was settled much later). Everywhere else -- in Latin America, Africa, Asia -- the locals have been pushing back the colonizers without coming close to what old-style military theorists would call military superiority. That’s what we’re seeing now in South Africa, and more slowly in Europe and the southern United States. In other places, especially those colonized by the French (who were never as good at it as the Brits), huge colonial populations were totally eliminated, like the million-plus French residents of Algeria.
So there’s a shocking lesson that military buffs have been slow to face: military superiority doesn’t matter nearly as much right now as birthrate and sheer ruthless will.
Ah, birth rate -- funny how it’s become such a taboo subject for both Left and Right. The Lefties wouldn’t dream of telling third-world people to limit their baby-making, and most right wingers can’t bring themselves to endorse birth control even if it could slow the destruction of their own countries.
So birth rate is a weapon without a counter-weapon right now. So it tends to win. The Moroccans made it clear that the Green March was all about birth rate. The number of "volunteers" they sent to the border was 350,000, exactly the number of births per year in Morocco. So this was basically a "Lebensraum" argument like the one the Germans tried earlier in the century. You might have heard about that one, a little dust-up called the Eastern Front. And you might be saying right now that if any policy ever failed decisively, it was the Nazis’ attempt to elbow themselves a little living space from Stalin. Which is totally true. But the Nazis tried it the old-fashioned way, with armed conquest.
To succeed in the post-1918 world, the world Woodrow Wilson dreamed up where "small nations" have rights even if they can’t defend them, you need to use slower, less obviously military methods, like birthrate and immigration. The classic example of this kind of slow conquest is Kosovo. The Serbs could always defeat the Albanians on the battlefield, even when outnumbered, but the Albanians had a huge advantage in the most important military production of all -- babies. According to the BBC, the birthrate of Kosovo Albanians 50 years ago was an amazing 8.5 children per woman.
The Serb/Albanian conflict offers damn near perfect lab conditions to prove my case that birth rate trumps military prowess these days, because the Serbs always beat the Albanians in battle, yet they’ve lost their homeland, Kosovo. Here again, we can blame Woodrow Wilson and his talk about "rights." In places where tribes hate each other, a tribe that outbreeds its rival will become the majority, even if it can’t fight. So, after generations of skulking at home making babies, letting the Serbs do the fighting, the Albanians finally became the majority in Kosovo and therefore the official "good guys," being oppressed by the official "bad guys," the Serbs. At least that’s the way the nave American Wilsonian types like Clinton saw it. So when the Serbs fought back against an Albanian rebellion in Kosovo, and dared to beat the Albanians, Clinton decided to bomb the Serbs into letting go of Kosovo, the ancient heartland of a Christian nation that had spent its blood holding off the Turks for hundreds of years.
The Kosovo Albanians proved that military skill doesn’t matter, because they tried and failed to conquer Kosovo the old-fashioned way: armed rebellion by the Kosovo Liberation Army. It was a wipeout: local Serb militias, a bunch of tired middle-aged part-timers and cops, crushed the KLA. What happened next is a beautiful illustration of the way losers win these days: the Albanians took the bodies of KLA men who’d been killed in battle, stripped all weapons and ammo from them, and showed them to gullible Western reporters as victims of a Serb "massacre." It was a massacre, all right, but only because the KLA couldn’t fight worth a damn. Alive and armed, they were a joke; dead and disarmed, they helped win Kosovo by making their side the "victims," which led directly to U.S. military intervention.
To win the way the Albanians won in Kosovo, you need to make a lot of babies. It’s that simple. And to see how it works, you have to drop the namby-pamby liberal idea that people only have babies out of "love." In lots of places on this planet, baby-making is a form of weapons production.
In some places, it’s open policy. For example, in Palestine there’s an all-out birthrate war going on between the Palestinians and the Israelis. And one of the most frustrating things about this kind of struggle, from the Israeli perspective, is that the worse you make life for the people in the occupied zones, the more kids they have. The Gaza Strip, for instance, has one of the highest fertility rates in the world outside Africa, at 5.6 kids per woman.
The rate for Israeli overall is about 2.8 children per woman, high for a rich country. But the most amazing rates anywhere, even higher than for the Gaza Palestinians, are in the most extreme Zionist groups, the Haredi "ultra-orthodox" Jews. Until recently they averaged eight or nine children per woman. There was actually a big panic in the Israeli settler press when news hit that their rate had dropped to a mere 7.7 kids per woman.
That’s actually higher than the rate for Mali (7.38 per woman), which has the highest birthrate in the world.
The settlers don’t hide the fact that they’re producing as many kids as they can in order to change the demographics of "Greater Israel" in their favor -- above all to make sure the Palestinians never become the majority.
What’s interesting is that there were plenty of voices in the ultra-Orthodox community in favor of using Israel’s military superiority to settle the problem the old-fashioned way, by expelling or wiping out the Palestinians. Those people lost out; their leader, Meir Kahane, was assassinated by an Egyptian cabbie in New York, but he’d lost the debate long before he died. You just can’t get away with those methods these days, not even with every born-again Baptist Zionist in Texas backing you to the hilt.
If you want an example closer to home, just go to Northern Ireland where the Protestant majority the border was designed to maintain has been getting smaller and smaller, thanks to the higher birthrate among Catholics. As of 2001, the Catholics were about 46% of the population, up from 35% in 1961.
But as the dreaded "Catholic Majority" date approaches, a funny thing is happening up in Ulster: the Catholic birth rate is slowing down even faster than the Protestant rate. This always happens when a tribe breaks out of its slums into the middle class. This illustrates one of the real brain-twisters of contemporary demographic struggle: if you really hate the enemy tribe, the best thing you could do would be to make them rich. Rich people don’t have nearly as many kids. Of course there are exceptions like the Ultra-Orthodox Israelis, who are fairly well-off and just dedicated to making as many kids as possible, but generally, money distracts people from starting big families. So the old methods of keeping down the enemy tribe are usually counterproductive. If the Ulster hotheads like Ian Paisley had had their way and kept the Catholics down in the slums, their birthrate over the past 30 years would have been much higher and they’d be ready to stage a Kosovo-style "majority rule" coup like the Albanians did against the Serbs, complete with the USAF blowing up every television tower in Belfast like we did to the ones in Belgrade, just to teach those Serbs a lesson: "No TV till you let your little Albanian brother have Kosovo!"
Makin'em rich is the only way you’re going to settle the kind of conquest-by-immigration we’re seeing now in Europe and North America. Nobody will even say honestly how many illegal immigrants there are in the U.S. right now, but just from what I see driving to work, I’m inclined to go with the higher estimates, something up to 20 million people who snuck in from Mexico and points south looking for work.
As far as I know, nobody’s claiming the Latino immigrants decided to have a lot of kids as a way of reconquering Texas and California, the way the Israeli settlers are doing. La reconquista, if it happens, will be an unforeseen result of rising birth rates and falling death rates for countries like Mexico that are just moving up from the third world to, say, the second-and-a-halfth.
By 1970, Mexico was at that dangerous stage where there’s just enough basic medical care to keep people alive, so death rates are falling sharply, but people are still poor enough to want a lot of kids. Between 1970 and 2000, the Mexican population doubled, from 48 million to 98 million. So on one side of the Rio Grande you had a lot of young poor people, and on the other, a lot of money and companies eager for cheap labor. And a muddy little creek like the Rio Grande wasn’t nearly wide enough to keep those two groups apart.
As the population of Mexico increased and the living standard rose, the fertility rate actually went into an amazing dive, to the point that the rate for Mexican women now is only 2.39 kids per woman, just two places up from Israel’s 2.38.
And the only thing that’s brought the Latino birthrate down -- in their home countries, not among the ones who immigrated to the U.S. -- is getting enough money that peasant families start thinking of themselves as consumers, and get more excited about buying a new truck or a flat-screen TV than having little Jos.
This is all pretty slow to unfold, compared to traditional military conquest. Birth rate takes decades to have an effect; the Albanian victory in Kosovo is the result of birth rates from the mid-20th century. And in some parts of the world, like the US and Europe, immigrants have a history of being absorbed by the locals rather than sticking to the old tribal hatreds in the style of the Balkans and the Middle East. It’s a cultural deal, after all, not racial. Studies of the U.S. Hispanic population show that within a generation or two, most American Hispanics are ranting about policing the borders and keeping those damn immigrants out of the country. What’s really weird -- and I can testify to this from my own experiences growing up -- is when the local culture infiltrates the immigrants, like the fact that Mexicans in the U.S. are deserting the Catholics and becoming born-again Protestants. Go to any of the younger, feistier churchers in the U.S. like the Church of the Nazarene and you’ll see lots of Mexican families with plenty of kids, singing old Scottish hymns in Tex-Mex English. In fact, I ran into a really hilarious article by a U.S. Baptist writer who worried that the Baptist birthrate is going down while the Nazarenes are having babies at a rate of three-plus per woman. So the nightmare scenario that anti-immigrant bloggers are always predicting, where the U.S. turns into one giant Mexico, might end up being true in what you might call "racial" terms -- I mean, your second-grade class photo might be two-thirds Hispanic -- but those Hispanic faces would have absorbed a whole born-again American world picture that actually comes from the Scots-Irish who settled the American south hundreds of years ago.
This is one point where people’s anxiety over these slow, demographic conquests splits according to their real fears: do you just not want to see that kind of face when you go outside, or do you not want to import the culture of the immigrants' home country? The whole debate right now is so censored, so totally dishonest on both sides, that nobody will come clean about which it is. I suspect for some people it's the faces: they want the faces on their street to be the same shape and color they were when they were growing up. If that’s what you want, then no matter where you are, I can guarantee that if you’re rich enough to worry about things like this (as opposed to where your next meal’s coming from), then yup, you definitely have grounds for worry. People move around to where the food is, the money, the good grazing, the jobs. The Germanic tribes who moved in on Europe a couple millennia back took a more reasonable view; they called wars "the movements of the peoples." The Huns push the Goths off the steppe, and boom! Next thing you know, the Goths are wiping out a Roman army at Adrianople.
The faces are going to change. We are in a new military-historical era, in which the only states with the sheer will to resist slow "conquest" by immigration were the Stalinist states. Of course they didn’t have much of a problem there anyway -- not too many immigrants trying to sneak into North Korea or the old USSR -- but even if they had faced real demographic challenge, they had the will to open fire. The Berlin Wall is a nasty case in point, where the will was used to stop people leaving.
But those Stalinist states are not exactly a growth industry these days, and no liberal democratic state has the will to shoot down unarmed people trying to get in (or out, for that matter). Even the Israelis, who are maybe the fiercest first-worlders on demographic issues, don’t shoot the poor Africans who cross to Beersheba for jobs in the cafes. They just send them back to Sudan to be shot there.
So the movement of the peoples, the slow demographic wars, are going to go on. We just don’t have a counter-move, except maybe bombarding poor people with money to stay home. Basically, no matter where you are, the complexions and the features you see on the streets are going to change. If it’s any consolation to face-fascists, Europeans got their licks in first, so to speak. Not many African-Americans around with pure African blood; not many Mexican Indians without some Spanish in them. So now the faces blend the other way.
For most people the real worry, if they were allowed to even say it out loud, is culture: if you’re French, you really don’t want Paris turning into Kinshasa, because let’s be honest, Kinshasa is a Hellhole. If you’re English, you don’t want London turning into Karachi, because Karachi is a nightmare. If you’re American, you don’t want Houston -- oh Hell, ever been to Houston? If you have half a brain, you don’t want Houston at all, the lousy sweatbox.
The thing is, most of the people who invaded from those places tend to agree with you. That’s why they moved in the first place. Nobody knows what a Hellhole the Congo is like a Congolese. I read somewhere that on the Congo riverboats, they have these slang terms for the different decks. The first-class deck they call "Europe." The second-class deck is "China," meaning not that great, but livable. The third-class deck is "Congo," and nobody wants to be there, least of all the Congolese.
So to assess your situation in terms of the new conquests, you have to decide whether you’re in a Kosovo -- two tribes hating each other forever, turning out babies as weapons -- or that Congolese riverboat, where nobody wants it too "authentic" if they can help it. There’s a lot of blurring and overlap between those two models, sure. Take Northern Ireland: a lot of yelling, a lot of noisy tribal hate, but I just don’t think they have it in them to be another Kosovo. Too interested in TV and cars.
That’s what’s funny about the debate right now: the diehards in the U.S. and Europe wish we had the old ruthless will to seal the borders, but the "weakness" of the advanced countries generally works pretty well to turn the immigrants into immigrant-hating locals in a generation or two. The old model, bayonets on the border, isn’t even in the running. Time to face that fact. So the faces will change.
If you can handle these new faces, you’re likely to be surprised to see your "weak" American or European culture win out, slowly, un-gloriously but surely, and you may live long enough to see a whole new crop of pols who look like they just came from Karachi or Kinshasa until you turn the sound on and hear them ranting about how we need to get rid of all these damn immigrants.
2008-11-07
张五常 - 不值得花就不要花
- 可以使得设备、工时免得空转的
- 最终产品能产生长远经济效益的。公路、铁路海港是。为了消费而消费的,比如嘉年华,修长城,就不是。 (除非长城可以增加国家的总体旅游收入)
- 尽可能把资金投到穷人身上。因为穷人比富人会更小心花钱,是的资金回流到社会的路途更有效。比如,承包商会话3万元吃一顿鲍鱼晚饭,或3万元买个包包送小三。资金最终流向LVHM等。民工则会缁珠计较,钱最终可能花在买廉价衣服和食物上。(当然,不能否定承包商的经济贡献。neccessary evil, 包括贪污,还是存在的。问题是,在刺激经济是要考虑到如何把低效率的资金分流途径最低化)
北京不要拜凯恩斯学派为师
。。。但克鲁明建议的处理目前金融风暴的主要方案,我认为行不通。他认为美国政府要大手花钱,由政府推出消费,因为消费者有钱也不一定会花。这是纯度一百的凯恩斯学派了。
我认为这政策行不通,因为美国政府今天的财赤庞大得惊人,再大花一笔后患无穷也。事实上,目前的金融灾难,虽然不是起于美国政府花钱太多,但庞大的财赤肯定是加重了他们目前面对的困境。佛利民生时认为伊拉克之战是大错,但又认为财政上美国负担得起。真的吗?
我的观点简单得多。不管宏观或微观,我信奉的原则是花钱要有所值,不值得花就不要花。多花不值得花的钱,早晚会闯祸,那些政府究竟可以花多少、把财赤推向后代可以推多少的分析,我知道,但不同意。花钱的原则简单,不值得花就不要花。政府大手花钱可以挽救目前的灾难吗?如果有钱大花特花,当然有助,但值不值得是另一个远为重要的问题。国债这回事,不是推到后代那么简单。这次灾难过后,国债太高可能惹来债券下跌,利率上升,通胀急起,美元大跌──会是另一场灾难。这些不容易加起来的现象组合,地球出现过。
最近的观察,是北京当局知道问题严重:不一定是恐惧金融风暴,而是知道经济数字很不对头,工业兵败如山倒。迹象显示北京开始花钱了。值得吗?
我不担心像美国三十年代那样,中国会因为不景而搞出大政府,因为中国的政府已经够大了。问题是中国比美国幸运得多,可以修改现有的为祸不浅的政策而过关。我担心的是如果北京轻视这个选择,学美国的别无选择的花钱途径,为祸不浅的政策会永远地驱之不去! 。。。
Wars in Tibet - "War Nerd" from "the Exile"
- Why i hated WWII
- The 5 lessons for strategy - who won Iraq
- Russia's other great victory (Manchuria)
- The Unloved Russo-japanese War
But some of the stuff on Tibetan military history is just so damn weird it made me feel like that scene in Ghostbusters where Rick Moranis gets possessed by some ancient demon and starts ranting: “During the rectification of the Vuldronaii the Traveller came as a very large and moving Torb. Then of course in the third reconciliation of the last of the Meketrex supplicants they chose a new form for him, that of a Sloar. Many Shubs and Zuuls knew what it was to be roasted in the depths of the Sloar that day I can tell you.”
I always liked that last bit, “…I can tell you.” Gives that human touch, especially from a five-foot-nothing little dweeb like Moranis. But let me tell you, that story about the Torb and the Shubs was light reading compared to what I’ve been digging through to research medieval Tibetan military history. Here’s an example from Karl-Heinz Everding’s lively little article, “The Mongol States and their Struggle for Dominance over Tibet in the 13th century”:
“…The troops of approximately ten myriarchies of Central Tibet (Tib. dbus gtsang) marched toward the [Stod Hor—the Mongol army, I think—GB]. They met on the dpal mo dpal thang. [Oh, that thang!—GB Sorry, couldn’t resist.] The ten myriarchies of Tibetan troops defeated the many hundreds of thousands of Stod Hor troops. As proof of having killed many thousand Hor, they cut off only the right ears [of the dead] and put them into many donkey loads (Tib. ‘drel khal). Having made Gad du Rin chen and the Dgon pa dbon prisoner and having taking [sic] them along, the ears started stinking. After they had exposed them to the sun on a cool plain, the stone enclosure where the [smell] disappeared, is today known as ‘stone enclosure of the ears’ (Tib. Rna ba’i lhas).”
And that’s one of the lighter bits. If life has been too easy and fun for you lately, you’re welcome to read the whole article in a volume with the catchy, original title of “Tibet: Past and Present.”
It’s a funny thing about writing columns on war: some pretty insignificant conflicts have tons of stuff written about them, and others, big and important wars, get no press at all. Like when I had to write about the Algerian civil wars, there was nothing any good about them anywhere.
Sometimes it’s a language problem, like with Algeria, where anything that might be any use was in French or Arabic. That was part of the problem reading up on Tibet, because I don’t read Chinese and there’s no translation program for Chinese that seems to work. (If anybody knows of one, let me know.) But there’s a much bigger problem: Tibetans are steppe people, inland Asian people, which makes them alien to us Western sea-oriented cultures, just like Mongols are alien to us. I found that out back when I was a huge fan of the Mongols—well, I still am, but I’m content to worship the Khans from afar now; back then I wanted to learn everything about them. So I checked out a book called “The Secret History of the Mongols,” supposedly written by a tame scribe taking dictation from the Khans’ family genealogist himself.
That book defeated me as one-sidedly as the British defeated the Tibetans in their 1904. That’s right, by the way, the Brits invaded Tibet just a hundred-odd years ago, though nobody seems to remember. I’ll get to that later. My point here is that after I read the “Secret History of the Mongols” I knew less than I did before. Or maybe I just knew once and for all that much as I admire the Mongol warriors, I’ll never really understand how they thought.
The Tibetans are even harder to figure out, because on top of that Central Asian weirdness is all this Richard-Gere do-gooder nonsense about the peace-loving Tibetans assaulted by the ruthless Red Chinese. Both parts of that story are wrong, wrong, wrong. The Tibetans were never peaceful people at all. They were one of the most warlike peoples in Central Asia and even conquered the Chinese capital, Chang’An, in their heyday. And the Red Chinese—who could be brutal when the situation called for it, sure—were actually very decent when they took over Tibet in 1950. They felt bad about it at the time, a weird mixture of professional military embarrassment and sheer pity, taking the PLA, battle-hardened from twenty years of fighting the Kuomintang and the Imperial Japanese, into battle against the “Tibetan Army,” such as it was.
The military history of Tibet divides pretty clearly into two parts: the glory days of the 7th-9th century, when Tibet actually challenged China for dominance in south-central Asia, and the sad, slow decline ever since, where the slogan would be: “Tibet, where old meets new and loses.” The Chinese takeover in 1950 was just the latest in a series of one-sided defeats for Tibet.
The invasion was organized by one of Mao’s best generals, a short little dude with a knack for one-liners and a can-do attitude. You may have heard of him: Deng Hsiao-Peng. The guy who brought down the Gang of Four, coined the anti-Cultural Revolution line, “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice”? Yeah, him. He had one of his classic lines about how organizing the attack on poor ol’ Tibet made him feel: “….like a tiger trying to catch a fly.” They love those animal sayings, the Chinese. Don’t like actual animals much, but they love to make them into proverbs—or soup, depending on whether it’s quip-time or lunchtime.
Deng only requested 80,000 troops for the invasion—not much for the PLA and its alleged addiction to human-wave tactics. The plan was always to do an Invasion Lite, with lots of talk about the ancient friendship of Tibet and China—which was also a lie, of course.
Against the Chinese the Tibetans had not so much an army as a mobile family campground—the Tibetan soldiers took their whole families with them on maneuvers. The governor of Tibet’s eastern province called the Lamas back in Lhasa to say, “Umm, I’ve got Chinese massing on the border, Your Holiness Sir!” He was told that it was very impertinent of him to bother the Holy Administrators because they were on their annual picnic. I’m sorry but it’s hard to feel much sympathy with a country like that.
When the Chinese crossed the border, the Tibetans fought as well as they could, which was pretty damn badly. Their army was mostly cavalry, a lot of it still armed with swords. There were about 200 artillery pieces and about that many machine guns to defend the whole country. The Chinese veteran soldiers, who’d marched thousands of miles and fought every kind of enemy, couldn’t believe it when they saw Tibetans charging them with swords raised. They didn’t so much defeat the Tibetans as restrain them, the way you would an escaped lunatic. “Whoa, take it easy there fella, c’mon, put down the sword before somebody gets hurt….” They could have wiped out the entire Tibetan force like the British did in similar circumstances in 1904, but whatever else you can say about the ChiComs, they were a lot harder on their own people than on foreigners, and they just flat-out pitied the Tibetans. They got the captured Tibetan soldiers together and lectured them on socialism—they were big believers in motivational seminars, those Maoists, talk your ear off—then gave the Tibetans money and noodles and a pat on the back and told them to go home and not play with swords any more.
If there were any Tibetan war nerds around in 1950, which is kind of hard to imagine, then it must have been a hard day for them. But they should have seen it coming, because the Brits had invaded Tibet just a half-century before—and they weren’t nearly as nice to the Tibetans. I keep telling you guys, you’ve got the completely wrong idea about the Brits. You’ve been watching too many of those BBC comedies where everybody’s cute and harmless. The Brits, up to the mid-20th-century, were stone killers, the most ruthless conquerors of the past thousand years.
They invaded Tibet in 1904 basically because they were bored. I’m serious. They owned everything on the planet worth having, so they were always having to invent new “menaces” to get funding for more invasions, grabbing the places they hadn’t considered worth taking in their earlier waves of conquest. So in the late 1800s they started talking up the Russian “threat” to swarm over the Himalayas and take away India. That was such utter crap that even the Brits talking up the threat must have had a laugh about it over their port, back at the officers’ club. Russia was weak, so weak that the Japanese crushed it on land and sea in 1905. The British knew Russia was in no position to threaten India. What they wanted was an easy conquest that would produce lots of medals, honors, stuff to wear on their chests in the London social season so they could snag an heiress and never have to work. So they invaded Tibet.
The guy who ran that invasion, Francis Younghusband, was quite a piece of work himself. One of those India-born Brits, who were generally fiercer and crazier even than the homegrown English. And he had that other feature that makes for a really ruthless conqueror: he was, like his biographers say, “deeply religious.” If you hear that about a guy who’s about to invade your country, go down to the basement, hoard lots of water and canned goods, and try to make yourself invisible for the next few years, because it’s not going to be pretty.
Younghusband marched into Tibet in December 1903 with a force of Sikhs and Gurkhas—pretty scary mix, like rottweiler plus pit bull. And the Gurkhas were definitely the pit bulls in that pair. Sikhs are very tough but not blood-crazy. The Gurkhas were not only devoted lovers of knife-work, especially on POWs, but ancient enemies of the Tibetans. It didn’t take much to push them to a massacre. The Tibetans knew the British were dangerous and tried not to resist at all. But as the British force pushed farther and farther into Tibet, the local commanders decided to resist. That was a mistake. This wasn’t Tony Blair’s cool Britannia they were dealing with. On March 31, 1904, Younghusband encountered a Tibetan militia force of about 2000 guarding a pass near Gyantse. He must have had a hard time keeping a straight face or wiping the drool from his lips, thinking about the medals he’d get for this one, because the Tibetans were armed either with spears and swords or at best with matchlock muskets. That’s right: the kind of 17th-century firearm that won’t fire unless you apply the smouldering wick to the firing pan. Younghusband decided to play with the poor fuckers he was facing. He said, “My friends, my friends, what’s all this hostility? Why dees paranoia? Here, I’ll tell MY soldiers to take the bullets out of their rifles, and you tell YOUR soldiers to put out the flame of their matchlocks.” The Tibetans, who had no idea that Younghusband’s troops had modern repeating rifles, put out their matchlocks. Younghusband then ordered his troops to open fire. 1300 Tibetans were killed, with almost no British casualties.
Younghusband thought it was a great triumph. But this was already late in the Imperial era and the people back home had had enough of this kind of triumph; in fact, it sort of made them sick. The whole thing was hushed up, and remains hushed up to this day—ask any Brit you know if they ever heard of their invasion of Tibet and I guarantee they’ll plead ignorance. It’s probably better that way, makes it easy to put one of those “Free Tibet” rising-sun stickers on your Land Rover without feeling like a hypocrite.
It’s much easier to be a do-gooder about Tibet if you’re totally ignorant of Central Asian history, like the days when Tibetan conquerors filled up whole carts with the ears of guys they’d killed. Even this idea that Tibet is the homeland of Buddhism, the most Buddhist place on the planet, is crap; Tibet got Buddhism very late, trying it on a couple of times before it took.
The glory days of Tibet were before Buddhism, which is probably not a coincidence. If I had to respect any religion it’d be the Buddhists because they’re quiet and they seem pretty well-behaved, but it’s not the kind of creed you’d want to conquer with. Before you got your army out the door, some annoying Zen type would be saying in that quiet serious voice they put on, “Is not the greatest conquest that of peace?” To which you’d have to say, “No, it’s a tossup between Alexander and the Mongols and would you please put your neck a little farther out the door? It’s at a bad angle for me from there.” And that wouldn’t set the tone for a happy war of conquest, the local monk getting his head blown off at the start.
The Tibetans in their conquering days—which means roughly in Charlemagne’s time—were followers of something called Bon, or Bun, which sounds either like the department store in Seattle or part of a hamburger, but apparently was some sort of mix of Taoist magic and Mongol shamanism. Sounds pretty fun. And it worked as a military religion, almost as good as Mithras or Anglicanism. The Tibetans had a fearsome reputation as warriors who were honored to die in battle, thought they were headed for their version of Valhalla, which would probably involve big vats of tea with yak-butter and maybe central heating if they were especially worthy.
The little I’ve been able to find out about medieval Tibetan armies came mostly from a great site I found where Chinese military buffs get together and talk about really cool stuff, like why the Tibetans had a reputation for particularly tough, impenetrable body armor.
According to these Chinese war nerds, who really seem to know their stuff, the Tibetans’ main weapon was something like the Persian/Byzantine cataphract or heavily armored cavalryman, and they used mail to cover the horse as well as the rider. According to their enemies, the Tang-dynasty Chinese warriors, the Tibetans were excellent with the sword and spear but weak on missile weapons, i.e. archery. One of the cool details I read on this China History Forum site and can’t help mentioning even though it’s kind of off-topic is how the Tang armies dealt with barbarian enemies who wore lacquered armor: they fired burning arrows into the breastplates! Whoa! “One clay-pot barbarian roasted in shellac, coming up! Rice or noodles with that?”
The Tibetan Empire these warriors protected stretched from the Silk Road to the Bay of Bengal. Tibetans ruling Bangladeshis—wish I could’ve seen that. Sitting there in the felt boots they never took off from one year to the next, pouring sweat like the Abominable Snowman in Bugs Bunny: “Gosh it’s hot!”
Seriously though, heat was a real danger to steppe armies. The Mongols actually abandoned part of what’s now Pakistan because they just said fuck it, it’s too hot. Not that they couldn’t handle heat, but they expected the occasional nice refreshing blizzard out of Siberia to cool themselves and their beloved ponies off. Uninterrupted heat, year-round, they considered disgusting and unnatural. And speaking as a fat man, I have to say I agree. (There were fat Mongols, by the way. Subotai was so fat no pony would carry him. You skinny people think you own everything.)
Climate seems crucial to the whole idea of a Tibetan empire. I mean, have you seen a map of Asia? Tibet is one big flat mountaintop. Only place in the world as high and dry as Tibet is the Andean highlands in South America. Now there they grew potatoes; what did the Tibetans grow to feed their armies? I haven’t been able to find out yet, but one thing that occurred to me is that the era when the Tibetan empire was going strong was the same time the Vikings pushed into the far north and even set up a colony in Greenland. It was one of those warm phases you get every few centuries, when some Dark-Ages Al Gore starts shrieking, “Global warming! ‘Tis Satan’s work! We’re doomed!” But more enterprising conquerors see opportunity, like the sales seminars say, where doomsayers see only crisis. Warm weather meant the Norsemen could pop out enough kids to send the long ships into every creek in Eurasia. And I’m thinking maybe it meant the Tibetans could have their day in the sun too—before those ears started to stink.
So if the planet really does warm up again, who knows? Watch out, all you tropical products: the Norse might ride again! The Tibetans might grow enough barley or whatever to march on Beijing!
Yeah. Those are about equally likely. Makes a nice fantasy though.
2008-11-02
Reading list Oct 2008
- What do the average mainlanders think about the Taiwan issue: The douban discussion on the issue of "Unification with Taiwan" -- douban's readers are mostly well educated and those who love movies and books. The commenters are mainly from the mainland, plus a few from Taiwan (but mostly blue-biased).
- e.g. "2008-10-31 11:31:51 xelodia
至於海角七號引出的台灣日本情節問題
這中間的五十年殖民史就不提了,網路上找都有
我只講講自己身邊的例子
我的外公外婆那一輩的就是接受日本殖民
的確就像影片裏的茂伯會信手拈來就講的一口流利日文
不過從以前到現在,我是完全不會感受到他們認為自己是日本人
當然,他們也不認為是中國人,我們就是台灣人罷了
日本,中國,這都是過去發生在台灣這塊土地上無法抹滅的歷史
但是,是會常常聽到他們說日本人殖民台灣跟國民黨接管台灣的差別
最常講的就是說他們那時候都夜不閉戶,治安良好的不得了
日本人跟台灣人之間,雖然說殖民與被殖民,到後期其實也相安無事
那之後光復就真的像歷史故事講的,當你發現你終於回歸祖國懷抱,同胞來台灣接管時
結果居然現實-國民政府軍當初來台的各種狀況及歧視以及228事件-是如此的不堪
那種身份認同的錯覺,你無法接受這樣的人是你的同胞,而這樣的同胞的所作所為甚至還不如把台灣當殖民地的日本人
可能這樣的狀況下,有少部份人就因此更認為自己應該是日本人,另一部份人認同自己回歸到台灣人的身份,當然還有不少部份人也還是認為我是中國人
因為那時隨著蔣介石從中國來台的人數也佔了當時全台人數中不小的比例
到了我爸媽的年代,也可以說現在在檯面上左右台灣去向的那一輩
日本殖民這段歷史對他們來說也不過是聽長輩講故事的內容罷了
實際生活上,並沒有受到日本文化影響到太多,更不用說到哈日
那再到我這一代,我1981年的
我們受到的日本文化我想跟祖先被殖民過更沒關係了
那只是日本強力的次文化擴散到世界各地,台灣只是其中一個離日本近而接受度也好的國家
不論流行事物,服裝品牌,動漫畫,電玩,當然更不用說A片
我去歐洲旅遊時才發現日本次文化不只存在於台灣,連七龍珠都被翻成法文版在電視上播放
在美國的超市還能看到日本設計的什麼超人玩偶在販售
我想台灣跟中國對於日本的不同點只是在於仇日程度,而這影響到了接受程度
並不是台灣因為被日本殖民過了就特別哈日
就像上面台灣網友說得,香港娛樂產業也佔據台灣好一陣子
前幾年的韓流也是讓一堆台灣人迷了一陣子
連我媽煮飯還會一邊切菜一邊看韓劇
我想這是台灣沒有像中國那樣高漲到有時會無限上綱的民族意識
對外排斥的狀況並不明顯
台灣的民族意識會高漲大概只有兩種狀況
一種是在打國際賽的時候
另外一種就是中國政府又來文攻武嚇了
所以那時候才會說共產黨其實才是民進黨的最佳助選員
因為中國說要丟飛彈來台灣,真的讓台灣人更抓狂更不爽 " - 温家宝:关于深入贯彻落实科学发展观的若干重大问题
- 向格老致意
- The CIC, the world’s best performing sovereign fund?
- 前苏联何以成为经济大萧条中的大赢家
- Dr. Doom
- Smart People Saying Dumb Things
- Andrew Lahde: Goodbye!
- map sites and some gmap images
- 西方记者眼中的--朝鲜【图片集】
- China As An Island
- The Geopolitics Of China
- The Bush abdication, viewed from the Petraeus angle
- 1978 Lee Kuan Yew met Deng Xiaoping
- The "Russian area" in China
- Kubin on modern Chinese writers
- a few interesting sites for interesting maps
- The banned CCTV internal party show
- Fareed Zakaria interviews Wenjiabao transcript
- To vote or not to vote
- Corruption in the COnstruction of the Suzhou Museum?
- 假如22个最难的汉字出现在一篇文章里
2008-10-31
ZT: 保 內 地 經 濟 增 長 , 遠 遠 重 要 過 參 與 國 際 救 市
對 於 今 次 百 年 一 遇 的 金 融 海 嘯 , 內 地 傳 媒 不 時 有 意 無 意 提 出 陰 謀 論 , 反 對 動 用 外匯儲 備 參 與 國 際 救 市 行 動 , 特 別 是 反 對 增 購 美 債 、 反 對 注 資 IMF 籌 設 的 一 萬 億 美 元 救 市 基 金 , 中 國 持 有 大 量 美 債 更 頻 遭 炮 轟 。 根 據 美 國 財 政 部 10 月 16 日 公 佈 的 數 據 , 中 國 至 今 年 8 月 持 有 美 國 國 債 5,410 億 美 元 , 居 第 二 位 , 僅 次 於 日 本 的 5,859 億 美 元 。
中 國 官 方 新 華 社 旗 下 《 瞭 望 東 方 周 刊 》 也 質 疑 「 金 融 危 機 是 一 次 合 謀 」 , 並 引 述 金 融 界 人 士 說 : 「 無 論 美 國 怎 麼 救 市 , 它 的 根 本 目 的 是 發 動 一 次 貨 幣 戰 爭 , 通 過 美 元 貶 值 、 國 債 估 值 下 降 , 到 時 候 由 日 本 、 中 國 這 些 與 它 金 融 聯 繫 比 較 多 的 國 家 買 單 。 」
這 種 以 貨 幣 戰 爭 看 待 金 融 海 嘯 的 陰 謀 論 , 顯 然 深 受 去 年 6 月 出 版 的 暢 銷 書 《 貨 幣 戰 爭 》 影 響 。 這 本 書 以 陰 謀 論 分 析 國 際 財 團 透 過 搶 奪 貨 幣 發 行 權 , 操 縱 國 際 金 融 、 經 濟 、 政 治 運 作 , 在 內 地 引 起 廣 泛 關 注 。 據 稱 , 主 管 金 融 工 作 的 副 總 理 王 岐 山 讀 後 還 批 示 , 要 求 所 有 財 金 官 員 研 讀 。
與 陰 謀 論 同 時 大 行 其 道 的 是 機 遇 論 。 一 些 學 者 、 官 員 認 為 , 金 融 海 嘯 是 中 國 參 與 重 整 國 際 金 融 秩 序 的 機 遇 , 對 胡 溫 裹 足 不 前 甚 為 不 滿 , 呼 籲 政 府 採 取 更 具 力 度 和 規 模 的 救 市 行 動 , 大 有 取 美 國 而 代 之 、 趁 其 病 (手羅) 其 命 的 氣 概 。 《 貨 幣 戰 爭 》 的 作 者 宋 鴻 兵 更 明 言 : 「 中 國 應 該 考 慮 如 何 在 即 將 到 來 的 國 際 金 融 戰 爭 中 贏 得 戰 略 主 動 權 , 最 終 實 現 在 一 個 國 際 『 後 美 元 體 系 』 中 的 貨 幣 霸 主 地 位 。 」
在 華 爾 街 五 大 投 資 銀 行 同 時 受 損 之 際 , 金 融 海 嘯 的 陰 謀 論 難 有 說 服 力 , 機 遇 論 則 未 免 太 過 自 大 。 陰 謀 論 、 機 遇 論 對 是 否 參 與 國 際 救 市 的 主 張 不 同 , 但 又 是 一 脈 相 承 , 都 是 基 於 中 國 龐 大 的 外 匯 儲 備 而 引 發 的 民 族 主 義 情 緒 , 都 是 要 求 胡 溫 向 美 國 說 不 。 截 至 今 年 9 月 底 , 中 國 外匯儲 備 達 1.9 萬 億 美 元 , 雄 居 世 界 首 位 , 在 金 融 海 嘯 襲 擊 環 球 之 際 顯 得 格 外 耀 眼 , 也 為 胡 錦 濤 、 溫 家 寶 在 任 期 屆 滿 前 建 功 立 業 創 造 了 條 件 。
但 是 , 以 中 國 現 行 一 黨 專 政 的 政 治 制 度 , 注 定 中 國 不 可 能 取 代 美 國 成 為 世 界 領 袖 。 何 況 , 論 經 濟 實 力 、 科 技 實 力 、 軍 事 實 力 , 中 國 現 時 都 不 足 以 充 當 世 界 領 袖 。 由 於 參 與 國 際 救 市 的 策 略 , 涉 及 中 國 外 交 戰 略 、 貨 幣 戰 略 的 調 整 , 貪 功 、 貪 快 , 並 不 足 取 , 保 內 地 經 濟 增 長 , 遠 遠 重 要 過 參 與 國 際 救 市 。
中 共 元 老 鄧 小 平 在 1989 年 六 四 事 件 後 提 出 24 字 外 交 戰 略 「 冷 靜 觀 察 , 穩 住 陣 腳 , 沉 著 應 付 , 韜 光 養 晦 , 善 於 守 拙 , 決 不 當 頭 」 , 放 諸 今 日 金 融 海 嘯 的 局 勢 , 顯 然 並 未 過 時 。
2008-10-29
China's dynasty cycle
This is well known among Chinese historian. We call it a 'metastable cycle' -- referring to the peak as metastable. It had been brought to the mass in the late 1980s by the famous TV documentary "River Elegy" before the tragedy in 1989. It is nicely presented in English below.

Why such cycle does not occur in other part of the world? I suspect there are a few reasons
- China is "isolated" geographically
- China is homogenous (culturally/"linguistically"(the characters)/economically/etc) so that it is easy to 'unify'
- The Confucius teaching values of a single authority (supports unity and maintains the metastable stage until a major natural disaster comes as the trigger)
ZT: Mongolia and China
中国和蒙古要走向崛起,成熟的历史观必不可少。
对于中国人来说,蒙古是一个特殊的国度。因为历史上很长的一段时间里,蒙古曾经是中国的一部分。对于中国人来说,蒙古又是一个陌生的国度。我们对这个与中国有4000多公里边境线的邻国,是那么无知,以至于国内有些人还在一厢情愿地谈论“回归”的可能。
“回归,是100%没有可能的。”无论是蒙古人,还是在蒙古的中国人,对这一问题的回答不容置喙。关于蒙古大呼拉尔第43次讨论回归中国的议题,也纯粹是好事之徒的画饼充饥。现实情形是,蒙古人拒中国千里之外尚且不及,又何谈投怀送抱呢?
“想知道中国人在蒙古人的心里是什么位置吗?日本人在中国人心里是什么样,中国人在蒙古人心里就是什么样。”一位在蒙古生活了多年的朋友这样跟我说。

中国人在蒙古的真实境遇
到过蒙古的中国人,多多少少都有过不愉快的经历。我去蒙古之前,朋友就告诫我说,自己一个人要小心,特别是晚上的时候,要离街上的醉鬼远一点儿。
Idre’s Guest House酒吧的老板曾经对我说:“我从不接待中国人,因为你分不清谁是生意人,谁是旅行者。”他很坦诚地当着我的面表达自己对中国商人的厌恶感。
中 国在蒙企业是这种抵触情绪的最大受害者。山东正元公司相关负责人曾向我提及,2003~2005年间,正元公司在苏赫巴托省开发金矿时,当地的环保警察与 县长经常会来找麻烦。2006年在公司另外一个项目场地,地方环保警察让所有中国工人站成一排,在太阳底下站着,自己则坐到蒙古包里喝起酒来。“这是一种 侮辱,但我们又不得不忍气吞声,其他的外资企业便不会受到这样的对待。”正元公司负责人李德亮对此表示无奈。
在乌兰巴托,曾有多名中国劳工向我倾诉自己在蒙古被打被抓的遭遇。我在二连浩特的一个朋友也曾亲口告诉我,前几年他曾在苏赫巴托广场被小偷偷去手机,谁知追到小偷后却被当地警察带到警察局,小偷被放走,自己反而挨了打。
在蒙古的中蒙混血儿,一般不会主动对别人谈及自己的中国血统,特别是有中国血统的蒙古官员对此更是讳莫如深,因为这是断送政治前途的危险举动。
我在蒙古时值奥运,现任侨协会长李有生对我说,中蒙选手争夺射击金牌时,蒙古选手手枪出现问题,当时电视台主持人脱口而出,是不是中国人搞得鬼?一家大众媒体的主持人在毫无调查的情况下,口无遮拦,无疑是不负责任的。然而这“脱口秀”的背后,却有着更深层次的动因。
蒙 古人对中国人的种种不友好,蒙古媒体无疑起了推波助澜的作用,他们往往将集于一点的事情渲染成一个面,以至于中国大使馆不得不做一些公关工作来维持中国在 蒙古的形象。然而,如果当地报纸做了关于中国的正面报道以后,往往不久就要再做对应的负面报道进行中和,由此可见其国内读者的社情民意。蒙古的政党同样如 此,在议会选举中,反华往往成为选举的政治筹码。在一个民主国家,这至少反映了当地民众的好恶。
在蒙古如此的舆情之下,中国民间要求蒙古回归的民族主义者们,无疑缺少更深层面的思考。既不知己,也不知彼,只顾自己在网上自说自话,有时只能帮倒忙。
2006 年,是对中蒙关系颇具考验的一年。只因这一年是大蒙古国建立800周年。前中国驻蒙大使高树茂出于淡化历史、搁置争议、共同发展的考虑,说出了“成吉思汗 是你们的,也是我们的,既然我们都是成吉思汗的子孙,就要共同发展”的话,结果依然被蒙古媒体列为最不受欢迎的外国人之一,说这是大国沙文主义的表现。
高大使这样说过:中国的崛起,历史观必须走向成熟,坦率地说,历史问题不正视,很多周边国家的问题都无法解决。国家发展是有阶段的,有一个大的长远的战略利益在其中,国家一再强调尊重蒙古主权,但是我们民间却有不同看法,不能说这些人是不爱国的,但要认真思考这些问题。
驻 蒙使馆工作的多位朋友在谈及中蒙当前的主要问题时,都不约而同提到“增信释疑”这四个字。的确,如果做一下换位思考,小泉去靖国神社参拜,中国人尚且暴跳 如雷。当蒙古懂中文的人打开中国网站,看到的都是要求收回蒙古的言论时,蒙古人会怎么想?这个问题绕不过去,中蒙民间就不可能有真正的友好往来。
博物馆反映的历史观
中国人对蒙古特殊的情感,全因我们的“海棠叶”情节。而蒙 古人对中国人的种种不友好,也起源于这片“海棠叶”。不同的是,中国人对这片海棠叶充满向往,蒙古则充满厌恶。二者的根本分歧在于中国将蒙古建国看作国家 分裂与领土缺失,蒙古则看作是民族解放与国家独立,看成自己在苏联红军的帮助下,彻底摆脱了中国将近300年的“殖民统治”。
我的蒙古朋友孟和在跟我聊历史的过程中,曾反复用到“征服王朝”这一概念。“蒙古在元代也曾征服过中国,为什么不说现在中国是蒙古的一部分呢?”
蒙 古人这种史观的叙事范本,全部躺在它的国家博物馆里。位于首都乌兰巴托市中心苏赫巴托广场西北的国家博物馆共由10个分馆组成,记录了从匈奴王朝到蒙古国 长达两千多年的历史。通过展品的内容、陈列样式与展馆大小等细节,我们可以了解蒙古人对自己的历史究竟是持怎样一种态度。
与 中国民族大一统史观不同,蒙古国人并不认为自己是中华民族的一部分。在蒙古国家博物馆的墙上,这一点被特别强调出来。蒙古国家博物馆在不同展厅里是这样叙 述自己国家历史的:匈奴帝国,鲜卑帝国,柔然帝国,突厥人建立的突厥帝国、蓝突厥帝国、维吾尔帝国及最后的蒙古帝国、满族统治之下的蒙古、革命前夜的蒙 古、共产主义时期的蒙古与民主化后的蒙古。
世界上所有的国家博物馆,在看似千奇百怪种类繁多的展品背后,实际上 都有一个相同的目的,即向参观者证明自己国家民族的正统性与唯一性,蒙古国家博物馆也不例外。蒙古国家博物馆展厅的历史排序,无疑是想告诉参观者,蒙古国 是自古以来中亚各个帝国的合法继承者,历史上各个帝国的统治者或是蒙古人的直接祖先,或与蒙古人有着千丝万缕的联系。两千多年来,中亚的居住者、建国者与 统治者的后代,便是现在的蒙古人。蒙古国家博物馆告诉人们的,并不只是蒙古人对国家正统的申述,还有他们对外来统治者的态度。满族或者中国,在这里被当成 一个侵略者的角色,用来批判。
突厥王朝的展厅,是蒙古与代表土耳其政府的土耳其国际合作机构共建的,因为突厥帝国创立者的后裔就是现在的土耳其人。蒙古人能坦然面对古代突厥人的统治,却无法坦然面对满族或者中国人的统治。
照 理说,从1636年清军入关前征服内蒙开始算起,到1911年清朝灭亡,有清一代对外蒙古统治将近300年,比起后来苏联70年的间接“统治”要长出很 多。但如果你到蒙古国家博物馆就会发现,300年历史的第五展厅“满族统治下的蒙古”,不及“共产主义时期蒙古”展厅的三分之一,是10个展厅中空间最小 的。
第五展厅展品的内容只突出两个主题:军事与刑具。前者强调清朝对蒙古的军事征服;后者用图片加实物刑具的方式,刻意突出满族统治的残酷、黑暗。实际上稍对蒙古历史了解的人,只要做一个简单的对比,就可以看出蒙古国家博物馆陈述立场的偏颇。
1921 年苏联控制蒙古以后,没收佛教寺院的财产,摧毁庙宇,逮捕喇嘛,基本上毁灭了藏传佛教。在1932年蒙古出现反抗苏联的行动后,苏联当局开始在蒙古进行清 洗迫害。从1933~1953年,有36000人死亡或失踪,而当时的蒙古只有73万人。短短20年间,这个国家将近5%的人非正常死亡。在文化上,蒙古 遭受了与越南同样的命运,传统蒙文被改为俄罗斯式的斯拉夫文字,隔断了他们自身文化的传承。
以上数据都来自蒙古 国家博物馆,对比便知,第五展厅描述清朝对蒙古的残暴统治,只是大而空的宏观论述,缺少历史证据的支撑,却几乎占到整个第五展厅的三分之一;而苏联统治下 对蒙古货真价实的残暴统治,却隐藏在共产主义时期蒙古工业化大生产的成就展品中,被轻描淡写般带过。这分明是用政治来解释历史,用当下来诠释过去,印证了 克罗齐那句“一切历史都是当代史”的名言。
在第七展厅“革命前夜”里,有一段描写更是赤裸裸地表现了蒙古人对中 国商人的愤恨,现照录如下:“中国商人充斥乡间,从牧民手中以低价收购皮革、羊毛、骆驼毛等商品,再将这些商品高价卖出,迫使蒙古人负债累累,由于牧民不 能读懂中国商人的账本,中国人因此很容易耍花招,蒙古人经常反抗他们的压迫。”
蒙古国家博物馆在这段文字旁,别有用心地配上了一幅没有具体出处的图片,上面是一个带着镣铐正在受刑的蒙古人,暗示中国人对蒙古的残暴统治。在这里,满族人的官府与汉人的商人都是被当作中国人来看待的。
1911年辛亥革命后,外蒙古宣布自治,八世呼图克图出任皇帝。1919年,北洋政府派徐树铮将军入蒙,解散自治政府,外蒙古重归中国。“蒙古如此之少的人无法与中国人抗衡,先后向俄、日、英、法、美求救,但均遭拒绝。”蒙古国家博物馆回忆这段历史时这样记录到。
在蒙古国家博物馆的描述里,从没有“分裂”这样的词汇,他们形容北洋政府的军队时用到的词汇是“入侵。”其中一幅北洋军在广场阅兵的照片令人印象深刻,兵士们看上去趾高气昂,旁边的英文图说是:中国政府撤销蒙古自治的一个庆典。
这是该展厅极少有英文图说的一幅照片。这颇让人奇怪,与其他展馆相比,这个展馆的英文解说少的可怜,只有在涉及“中国军队侵略”的内容上,才会出现英文图说。我因此怀疑是有些历史蒙古人不想让外国游客知道。
其 中一幅1919年徐树铮与蒙古王公贵族的合影或许可以印证我的想法。照片中立者为徐树铮与蒙古贵族,右侧与后立者为北洋诸将,背后是各国国旗。这至少表 明,当时徐的介入与取消蒙古自治,是得到部分蒙古上层与国际支持的,这或许颇让现在的蒙古人感到难堪,因此英文介绍便被隐讳不提。
中国人被区别对待的现实原因
历史永远是现实的拐杖,现实才是行走着的双腿。中苏关系恶化以后,苏联控制下的蒙古也被灌输了反华教育。但据在蒙古生活多年的老华侨回忆,那时的蒙古民间,对中国并无反感,只是两国政府彼此保持距离。
然而今天的情况却刚好反了过来。如今,中国已经连续9年成为蒙古最大的贸易伙伴,中蒙贸易额占蒙古贸易总额的50%,用驻蒙大使馆政务参赞柴文睿的话说就是,过去蒙古是反华但不反华人,而现在蒙古人却比较反感中国人。
中 国敞开国门以后,一批中国商人裹挟着伪劣商品来到蒙古淘金。这些人在蒙古人眼中的形象,与蒙古国家博物馆里描绘的中国商人并无二致。这部分人是抹黑中国的 先锋队。随着中蒙经贸往来的加深,淘金的大部队纷至沓来。据中国使馆统计,去年一年中国公民赴蒙人数达20万人次。在人口只有280万人口的蒙古,这个比 例相当大。这20万人次,又大多集中在人口只有130万的乌兰巴托,难怪蒙古人会惊呼:“中国人来了!”
如今在 蒙古国,中国人几乎涉足到了所有的商业领域。其中最主要集中在矿产与基础设施建设方面,以至于很多蒙古人会抱怨说,中国人正在掠夺他们的资源,抢夺他们的 饭碗。很多富裕起来的中国人在蒙古偏偏又不注意自己的形象,将自身的恶劣品行带入蒙古。一些华侨向我反应,有些中国老板在当地一掷千金,随意追求蒙古女 人,在公共场合大声说话,这些都造成了极坏的影响。
蒙古人由此生成的,便不仅仅是抱怨,还有嫉恨。中国在改革开放初期,国民的经济状况远不如蒙古,那时蒙古认为中国是个穷国,现在却完全颠倒过来,这里面不能说没有妒忌的心理因素在作祟。
除 了嫉恨,在蒙古国人最深层的心理层面上,还有对中国的恐惧。如果你有机会站在博格达山顶俯视整个乌兰巴托,你就会体会到蒙古人的这种恐惧。蒙古国全国人口 只有280万,只相当于北京市东城区的人口。当一个国家一半的人口可以被一眼望穿的时候,当一个国家主要的经济、政治、文化都夹在几山之间的时候,又有谁 会对旁边这个拥有13亿人口的大国放心呢?驻蒙大使馆政治部主任孙洪量说的更为到位:“与其说蒙古恐惧,不如说他疑虑,包括蒙古在内的大多数国家,都不知 道中国以后要走向何处。”
给两个大国当了几百年夹心馅饼的蒙古,当然深知自己的境遇。300年前,在中国与俄国 之间,蒙古选择了前者;1911年,蒙古则选择了后者。在蒙古人看来,这两次选择都是处于被迫,结果也不尽如人意。因此在1989年苏联解体,蒙古再一次 获得选择权的时候,变精明的蒙古选择了“多支点”外交:用合纵连横之术来对付中俄,这使得它有越来越多的资本与这两个国家叫板。
中 国人在乌兰巴托的得到不友好待遇,与这个城市无度失衡的城市化也有关系,这是更深层次的一个原因。据孙洪量介绍,原来乌兰巴托只有80万人口,且多是受过 良好教育的阶层。随着牧区经济的不景气,大量牧民进入城市,却又找不到合适的工作,于是便聚集在乌兰巴托周围,形成了现在城市周边的棚户区。
蒙古又是一个人口结构年轻化的城市,人均年龄不到30岁,这些年轻人在城市中找不到自身定位,剩下的便只有对社会的不满。由于有大量的务工人员在蒙古,加之历史与现实的种种原因,中国人理所当然的成了蒙古向外引导社会矛盾的替罪羔羊。
蒙古现在的民族心态,可以用两个字来概括:浮躁。苏联统治时期对藏传佛教的禁绝,和共产主义信仰的破灭,造成信仰上的真空;经济的快速发展与外部势力的介入,造成不知所措。蒙古人还没有做好准备,还不能用一种发展中国家的、上升中国家的平和心态来对待外来冲击。
蒙古还是一个骁勇好斗的民族。对外国人,许多中国人骨子人里有一种敬畏,蒙古人却相反。蒙古国人总希望挑战外国人,这是一种沦肌浃髓的草原性格,这种性格也是促成中国人遭受不友好待遇的另一因素。
在乌兰巴托最时尚的迪厅METRO POLIS,我亲眼看到过蒙古人挑衅欧美人的场面。在乌兰巴托的大街上,你会发现,几乎找不到一辆没有划痕的汽车,他们开起车来像参加那达慕。韩国人、日本人在蒙古也有过不敬遭遇,只不过中国人的不幸更为普遍而已。
转机悄然来临

否极泰来,事分两面。在蒙古国旗里有 一个中国道家的阴阳图案,这表明蒙古人也相信阴阳转换的道理。中蒙民间的友好往来,虽说任重道远,但在某些地方,这种转换已经悄然发生。蒙古人对中国人的 缺乏善意,从另一面分析,正是中蒙民间交往不断加深的表现。我接触到的蒙古人中,凡是去过中国特别是北京上海这样大城市的,对中国的态度便明显积极。据统 计,去年一年蒙古公民赴华人数已经达到60万人次。
此次汶川地震发生后,蒙古许多企业、个人到中国大使馆来吊唁、捐款,原计划进行3天的哀悼活动,结果进行了半个月,总计捐款280万人民币。对于蒙古这样的国家,已属不易。
(文字作者:本刊特派记者 王颖春 图片作者:本刊特派记者 王颖春)
2008-10-19
National geographic on North Korea
National geographic 45 minute documentary:
Ye offered some interesting interpretation of some well known DPRK observations, e.g.,
- 平壤的一道特色风景线,是漂亮的女交警在十字路口持棒指挥,据说这样可以让男司机在通过路口的时候减慢车速,而且也可以因此关闭红绿灯,以求节电 I thought they used the traffic police girls to say electricity (and cost of building the traffic lights), there isn't much traffic anyway. But Ye added that they attracts the attention of the drivers :)
- 平壤市民的上班时间从上午7时到9时错开,以减少对于公共交通的压力 Working hours are spread between 7 and 9 am, to ease the pressure on public transport. No traffic congestion, but public transport is limited
- 朝鲜的交通规则跟中国一样,汽车是靠马路右侧行驶,而这辆从日本进口的大巴士的司机座位在车头右侧,旅客上下的车门反而在车头左侧。这样,旅客在上下车时非常危险,很容易被从旁边驶过的汽车撞倒。 显然,这样的巴士只适合车辆靠左侧行驶的国家与地区,如日本、英国、爱尔兰、泰国、澳大利亚、巴基斯坦、南非以及中国香港——在这些国家与地区之中,除了日本之外,大多数是英联邦国家或者曾经是英国殖民地。因为在1756年伦敦桥扩建时,规定所有驾车者都必须靠左侧行驶,以免在桥上发生碰撞,此后逐渐形成英国汽车靠左侧行驶的交通规则。 世界上大多数国家是实行汽车靠马路右侧行驶的,如中国、美国、俄罗斯、印度、印度尼西亚、加拿大、德国、希腊、古巴、巴西、墨西哥、摩洛哥等。朝鲜也是实行汽车靠马路右侧行驶。显然,朝鲜旅行社在从日本进口大巴士的时候,买错了车型。日本也为汽车靠右行驶的国家生产车门在右侧的大巴士,朝鲜应该进口那种车型的大巴士。A treatise on why traffics are on the left on UK, etc
- 平壤是朝鲜公共交通最好的城市,有公共汽车、电车和地铁。不论乘公共汽车、有轨电车还是地铁,不论坐几站,实行统一票价,全部是5朝元。按照1元人民币相当于17朝元折算,大约相当于3角人民币。朝鲜的物价在不断上涨,在2002年,统一的票价还只有2朝元。Inflation in DPRK, pubic transport ticket fare from 2 Won in 2002 to 5 won in 2008
- 在平壤即便是有自行车,也只是允许男士们骑。这是因为平壤汽车速度太快,曾经撞死好几个骑自行车的女士,从此,平壤政府下达禁令,不许女同胞们在平壤骑自行车。 Only man are allowed to right bicycles! (For safety - as the cars drive too fast!)
- 如今,朝鲜方面在专供外宾居住的特级宾馆开通了卫星电视频道,这样我在羊角岛宾馆不仅可以看到中国中央电视台各频道,而且还能看到英国BBC、日本NHK以及俄罗斯电视台和中国香港凤凰卫视。我注意到,没有韩国台。这是因为韩国台的韩语与朝鲜语完全一样,就连打扫房间的宾馆服务员也听得懂,势必会造成诸多“麻烦”。-- Now you know why more Chinese websites and TV Channels are censored/blocked in China, while those BBC/CNN/WSJ are less regulated. .. and why I had been puzzled before they unblocked wiki/en
- 也有例外:在古巴,开国领袖菲德尔·卡斯特罗享有崇高的威望。然而,在哈瓦那街头找不到一张卡斯特罗画像,找不到一尊卡斯特罗铜像。有的只是卡斯特罗的战友、已故古巴革命先驱格瓦拉的塑像和画像。在古巴,没有一条以卡斯特罗命名的街道,没有一座以卡斯特罗命名的建筑物。古巴人不分男女老少,都亲切地喊卡斯特罗:“菲德尔!菲德尔!” DPRK has many statue for its founder Kim Il-sung, like many other countries...except Cuba
2008-10-16
China amid the global economic turmoil
Economist has an interesting review on China's situation regarding the recent financial turmoil.- The average wages had a bit more than doubled in the past 8 years, say grew by 150% (about 12% p.a.).
- But for Shanghai I heard the a high end apartment costed about 10k/sq m in 2000 and about 300k/sq m now. The price per square meter had risen by about 200% (probably lower for the market overall), and probably higher. Inflation had been mild until last year so adjusting to 'real' value shouldn't change the picture too much (maybe 30-50% cumulatively?). So for Shanghai (with policies encoruaging real estate purchase around 2000) the price/income ratio remained about the same (instead of declined by 30%)
- Take Shenzhen for example, the price/sq m (for new apartments) is about 15k a year ago and probably the same now, and about 7k in 2005. I do not know the price in 2000 but i would venture something around 5-6k, which means a 150-200% growth over the period, nominal. The trend is similar to that of Shanghai
- Caveat: of course we know that even the property price is not a fixed measure, as quality in general had increased significantly in China during this decade
- The keyword in the Economist is probably "nationwide". There may be bubble in Beijing/Shanghai but it is not a nationwide one. So yes, the index would be higher for BJ/SH but at the national level we probably have to trust Economist's chart
- Regarding the definition issue the chart shows the index (so the number in 2000 is also defined similarly), the only change is perhaps the relative weight between urban and rural but that would not be as large as to elevate it from -30% to a bubble
China is pretty well placed to cushion a global downturn
CHINA has become the main engine of the world economy, accounting for one-third of global GDP growth in the first half of this year. Will it keep humming? Compared with many other emerging economies, notably Brazil and Russia, which have recently suffered big capital outflows, China has so far largely shrugged off the global credit crunch. But there are signs that China’s economy is sputtering. Export volumes have slowed markedly; the growth of industrial production dropped to a six-year low in the 12 months to August; car sales fell by 6% in the same period; and China’s property boom seems to be turning to bust.
Some of the recent slowdown reflects the temporary closure of factories around Beijing during the Olympic games, which cleared the air but made China’s statistics even hazier than usual. Yet the underlying economy has also weakened, especially in the housing market. Property sales in big cities have shrunk by around 50% over the past year. In Shenzhen prices of new luxury apartments have fallen by up to 40%. Average prices nationwide have started to slide, although they were still up by 5.3% in the year to August. Falling sales and a rising stock of new homes mean that prices are set to decline in more cities in 2009.
Predictions that average house prices could fall by up to 50% have recently grabbed the headlines. But they seem much too gloomy. After all, there has been no nationwide house-price bubble. Since 2000 average home prices have actually decreased relative to average incomes, in contrast to the surge in America until 2006 (see chart). As a result, average home prices are unlikely to fall for long.
China’s banks should also be able to withstand falling house prices better than their American counterparts. In America it was easy to get a mortgage for 100% or more of the value of a home, but Chinese buyers must put down a minimum deposit of 20-30%, depending on the home’s size, and as much as 40% on second homes. This provides banks with a large buffer as prices fall. Loans to property developers are riskier and banks’ profits will be hurt as developers go bust. But according to Wang Tao, an economist at UBS, these loans account for only 7% of total bank lending.
More generally, China’s banks should be better insulated from the global credit crunch than Western banks because the country’s system is funded through deposits rather than capital markets. Chinese banks’ loans amount to only 65% of their deposits, compared with far higher ratios in America and western Europe.
A fall in house prices will in any case hurt Chinese consumers much less than their American counterparts because Chinese households are not up to their necks in debt. Total household debt amounts to only 13% of GDP, against 100% in America. Chinese consumer spending actually strengthened this summer, with retail sales rising by 17% in real terms in the year to August. The main impact of the property downturn will be to depress construction.
The government also has room for manoeuvre. Inflation, which had been its main concern, fell to 4.9% in the year to August from 8.7% in February. This was largely thanks to lower food prices, but the growth in money supply has also slowed. Goldman Sachs forecasts that inflation will fall to 1.5% in 2009, which gives the central bank scope to ease monetary policy. Interest rates were cut for the second time in a month on October 8th, to 6.9%, and the government is expected soon to ease credit controls, especially for property.
China’s GDP growth slowed to an annual rate of a mere 10.1% in the second quarter of this year, from 12.6% a year earlier, and most economists expect it to drop to 8-9% in 2009. But this slowdown should partly be welcomed, because the economy had been exceeding its speed limit for several years. Better still, China’s growth next year will come entirely from domestic demand, as its trade surplus shrinks. If the global downturn forces China to switch the mix of growth from exports to consumption, it would also help to make its future growth more sustainable.
The government is expected to supply a fiscal stimulus to keep growth above 8%. The package will include tax cuts and extra infrastructure spending. Economists are also urging increased spending on social welfare to encourage consumers to save less and spend more. China has ample room for a stimulus because it boasts the healthiest fiscal position of any big economy. According to Stephen Green, an economist at Standard Chartered, it has a budget surplus of 2% of GDP, if measured in the same way as in rich economies, and public-sector debt is a mere 16% of GDP. China’s readiness to use fiscal lubrication is the best reason for hoping that its economic motor will not stall.