2009-05-27

Map: anti-podal maps


(Via Armcontrolwonk) This map shows where the opposite (anti-podal) point on the earth is. i.e. North Pole corresponds to South Pole. One can easily check up one's anti-podal point by change the coodinate (change lattitude from N to S, then add/subtract 180 on longitude). But it is neat to view this on a globe.

ACW cited this when he read that vibration typically get 'magnified' on anti-podal points as noted by astronomers observing the moon and some planets. He thinks this may be used to measure earthquake (and nuclear tests).

The physical explanation may be quite simple, as the anti-podal point represents THE equi-distant (both on earth surface and via the mantle/core) point, such that all waves arrive IN PHASE (ignoring fluctuations in rock type/etc). This means it would be difficult to measure earthquake anti-podally since these are random events and one does not know where to place the probe in advance, but for monitoring nuclear tests with known sites this could be pretty effective.

A few interesting observations
  • Very few land has land as antipodal points, mainly because there are only 30% land on earth and most of it is on the northern hemisphere. (this makes ACW's plan more difficult/costly)
  • The few land-land pairs include (this site provides a great tool)- Beijing's anitpode is a few hundred km south of Buenos Aires, Xian and Santiago (Chile) are almost exact antipode pairs (perhaps the only major city pair). Jakarta/Bogota and Singapore/Quito are also close enough. New Zealand's antipode is Spain (auckland/Seville). -- play these games to test your geographic knowledge.
  • The Yucatan meteorite at Chicxulub crater, which allegedly killed the dinosaurs, would probably have had created some folding under the ocean between NW Australia and Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean. However,  some people believe that the Chicxulub antipode is actually the Deccan Traps inside India because techtonic movement shifted the Indian subcontinent
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The map above shows the wave-front of the DPRK shock (test). Ideally these contours should be circle, but they are distorted because of rock/water structure the p-wave passes through (changes the speed the sound wave travels).

Given these contours, it is now easy to measure future shocks (from the same location) much more accurately. The trick is to put an array of probes spaced on a chosen contour such that the signal these probes received are all "in phase". Adding these signals (time-plotted) up will result in strong signal since the noises are not in phase and tends to cancel out. This will achieve similar or even better results than a measure from the antipode.



2009-05-25

How credible is DPRK's nuclear stockpile?

In 2006 North Korea claimed it conducted a "nuclear test". But many analyst suspected it was a faked test mimic by traditional explosive, for 2 reasons:
  1. the energy was only bout 1/3 of the Hiroshima bomb, showing that the explosion is likely really from a nuclear bomb. Because for a chain reaction to happen, there need to be at least certain critical mass of Uranium (or Plutonium), as demonstrated first by physicists Rudolph Pierls. And the Hiroshima bomb is just over the critical mass
  2. There had not really been confirmed radioactive trace from the surrounding international observation. (The US said the signal is "consistent" with a nuclear test, but radioactively of this small amount (for underground test) is easy fake. Note also the choice of word, "consistent" is a much weaker word that "confirm", which will mean consistency in both strengh, spectrum, and also spatial distribution. "consistency" only means that there is some radiation detected and that no obvious contradiction)
The most recent claim has a magnitude of 4.7 (vs 4.2 in the previous test). The energy is about 3 times larger ( 10^(4.7-4.2) = 3.1 ), making the total energy similar to that of the Hiroshima bomb.

For a nuclear test it still seems to be very minor. Two possibilities
  1. It is a real nuclear blast, but DPRK has barely enough Pu/U, so they used all the 'available' material for this "test"
  2. It is another fake test, they figured the previous test was 2/3 short in magnitude, and got the right amount to make a more credible fake (it would to too expensive to use more)
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p.s. it is hard to accurately measure the energy with seimological measure, as the rock/water of the surrounding is complex and differ from the calibration references (for both seimic calibration and also underground nuclear test energy calibration). the most reliable data is perhaps the 'relative scale' (i.e. the difference) in energy for data taken by the same probe(s).
e.g., from one source (NEIC National Earthquake Info Center, which i think is the USGS) the numbers read 4.7 (2009) and 4.3 (2006) so the difference is 10^0.4<3.>

2009-05-19

Cheung on RMB again

I am going to revisit this topic again and again, until Beijing listens. I think this is what Prof Cheung is trying to do. So what I have to do is to just check his blog regularly and quote him when he makes some (seemingly/relatively) new point(s).

Here are the key points I would like to emphasize
  1. China can made Shanghai a financial centre (at least at the regional level) if it opens up its currency, which means getting an independent (or currency market "neutral") anchor for the RMB -- i.e. the Commodity Basket!
  2. One key strength of the Commodity Basket is that it is (largely) linear independent of any existing currency (eg USD or EUR). It provides a new dimension for other currencies in the  world to "reference". I say "largely" because some currencies do depend on some commodity (eg OPEC on oil, and AUD on its minerals, etc) but all these dependencies are only partial and more importantly, they are influenced by human factors such as the macro-economic policies (interest rates, etc) of these countries. OTOH, a Commodity Basket peg provides a "pure" axis for other currencies in this world to reference on. Countries such as Singapore can use RMB as one of the main component of its basket (it can also chose its own basket, in which case it will help to stabilize the commodity price -- i.e. make it more difficult for speculators to influence the short term price fluctuation). I think this is the most important reason for adopting the Commodity Peg.
I agree with Cheung that many countries (esp developing countries) would use RMB as one of the reference in their currency peg. However, I do not agree with him that overseas Chinese would affect the demand of RMB (perhaps Koreans would be so patirotic as to put once own saving to the state, very few people from other nationality will, Chinese are no exception). The reason for anyone, ethnic Chinese or not, to put his money in RMB is because it provides a unique proxy that nom other exisiting currency provides, and that it has very clear transparency. Commodity Peg provides both.

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《金融中心上海将远胜香港》(二○○九年四月十四日)发表后,读者差不多一致同意。该文提出的第五点,行内的朋友拍案叫好。我是这样写的:

「搞金融中心,你道上海胜香港最重要是哪一点呢?我赌你猜不中。这是严格地说,港元没有自己的面目。钩着美元或转钩人民币,港元算不上是可以独当一面的货币。多年以来,港元在国际上打出一点名堂,算是了不起,但要搞出一个举足轻重的国际金融中心,自己的货币可以独当一面非常重要。

「回顾历史,英镑曾经雄视地球,今天还清楚地有自己的面目。伦敦是世界级的金融中心,有其因也。美元的成功故事不用说,面目得来不易,带起华尔街。七十年代日圆呼之欲出,一时间东京红得发紫,可惜政策出了大错,一蹶不振二十多年了。欧洲采用欧元之前有三几只货币有看头,但国际上不成大器。今天的欧元有面目,但金融中心没有国籍名堂。再者,金融危机出现后,欧元能否保得住是问题,因为不同的国家需要有不同的货币政策。当年佛利民反对蒙代尔的欧元建议就是为了这一点。

「要搞起一个重要的国际金融中心,货币有自己的面目重要。这是说货币需要是一只名牌,有公信力,容易被各方接受为结算单位。弱币不成,强币较好,但太强也不成。与物价水平衡量,币值稳定重要;国家本身的生产力可靠也重要。人民币有十三多亿人口的可靠生产力支持,过了一个难关,而如果依照我多次建议的以一篮子物品为人民币之锚,物价当然稳定,所有难关都过了。这里要说的,是不久前周小川先生提到凯恩斯三十年代建议的以三十种物品为货币之锚,与我建议的方法不同,施行会有困难。我建议的要点,是为锚的一篮子物品要化为任何人可以大约地在市场自由成交的物价指数。这是重点,我解释过多次了。」

这里要说的,是北京不久前公布会在二○二○年在上海推出国际金融中心。那是十一年后,他们在等什么?不明白北京的朋友怎样想。经济的发展历来千变万化,见一步走一步要反应快,要判断准。搞金融中心可不是搞北京奥运,不是要按着既定的时间表进行的。金融中心早就应该搞,而对中国来说,数千年来,最有机会达大成的时机是今天。夜长梦多,再等是劣着。让我分点说说吧。

(一)搞国际金融中心最重要的条件是没有外汇管制——即是说,外人要多少人民币皆可按市价购买,其进、出口政府一律不管。搞国际金融中心,有汇管不能搞。这里有一个传统的谬误,虽然我认为是维护某些利益团体的借口。这是有些人认为放开汇管要等到什么时机成熟云云。是大错。已故的香港财政司郭伯伟曾经对我说,二战后,香港有关当局也认为需要有汇管,放开要等时机成熟。但他们当时不知怎样管,于是不管。后来见不管的效果好,就想也不再想了。

二十年前,佛利民最执着的是中国立刻解除汇管。他对我举出人类历史无数的汇管为祸的例子。后来北京把汇管放宽了不少,但不少沙石今天还在。要是中国没有放宽汇管,不会有今天。目前看,全部放开是搞国际金融中心的先决条件。

我不要在这里指出哪些团体或机构因为人民币有汇管而获利,但要指出一点北京朋友信奉的,是神话。他们认为汇管可以阻止资金外流。其实不然。汇管可以阻止或妨碍的是生意的正常运作,要把资金搬出国外的人总有办法。几个月前美国的外交部公布的中国投资于美国金融的数字,比中国央行的估计高出一倍!

(二)像中国那么庞大而有经济实力的国家,搞国际金融中心大有可为。但要打出名堂,人民币在国际上要成为名牌,要有自己的面目,不容易。数千年来,中国货币能打出名堂的成功机会最高是今天。这是因为国际金融大乱,人民币推出去会给国际人士在保值上多了一个选择,何况炎黄子孙满布地球,给祖宗一个面子我是相当肯定的。

自由地放人民币到地球云游四方,国家赚钱,有需要时收回就赚了利息。另一方面,放人民币出去不是要在国际上取代美元或其它先进之邦的名牌货币,而是因为我在《人民币的故事》(二○○九年三月三日)指出的一个重要观点:

「目前的形势是,因为这些年落后之邦发展得非常快,先进之邦如在梦中,从汇率的角度衡量,前者与后者之间出现了一个很大的断层,连接不上了。上层之间有竞争,下层之间也有竞争,但上层与下层之间的竞争是脱了节的。北京的朋友认为可以容易地打上去,推出腾笼换鸟,失之轻浮。治安转劣,是腾笼换贼乎?回乡归故里是连笼子也换了吗?」

目前看,上述的「断层」很现实,但向前看,这断层早晚会收窄,会平服下来。因为这些年发展中国家的生产力上升得快,而先进之邦的法定最低工资高企不下,需要的过渡期会为时甚久。人民币放出去,其它落后之邦或发展中国家的货币,不直接或间接地跟着人民币走是很愚蠢的。我反对中国做什么发展中国家的一哥,也反对中国要领导世界什么的。但我肯定今天把人民币放出去,会协助发展中国家的发展,从而可以远为容易跟他们贸易而获利。

(三)这就带来另一个重点。自二○○三年起我极力反对人民币兑美元升值,同时解释过多次,这反对不是人民币兑美元的本身,而是其它发展中国家的币值跟着美元走,人民币兑美元升值,于是兑其它竞争国家的货币也升值。解除汇管,人民币自由进出,发展中国家多了一个重要的选择,情况会很不相同。

这是说,依照我解释过的,一九九七的亚洲金融风暴之后,发展中国家的币值与人民币达到了一个均衡点,成为一个层面,跟着的发展是这层面与先进之邦的币值层面出现了一个相当大的断层。如果人民币独自在国际上提升,对中国的竞争力会带来灾难性的影响。人民币有外汇管制,不放出去,亚洲的发展中国家没有选择,跟着美元走,人民币兑美元升值是劣着。但如果央行解除汇管,让人民币自由外流,聪明的发展中国家会把其币值跟着人民币走,或起码会重视与人民币汇率的调节,也会考虑以人民币作为他们的一部分外汇储备。读者要知道,任何国家都可以随时选择及调校他们的国际币值。这调校要考虑到自己的竞争力、国际贸易的利益与国民收入的实质享受。这也是汇率在市场浮动的主要功能。如果大有差池,不按经济原则处理自己的货币的国家,执政者是要下台的。

这些年我担心因为中国有汇管,人民币兑美元升值等于兑其它发展中国家的货币升值,在竞争中会中计。解除汇管,让发展中国家多了人民币的选择,他们不按经济原则处理币值,不维护自己的外贸利益,中计的就转到他们那边去。这也是说,只要人民币解除汇管,稳定着自己的货币的购买力,避开了不可以接受的通胀或通缩,美元兑人民币怎样变动中国大可不管。中国要管的是与其它发展中国家的互相得益的竞争,而如果人民币不自由放出,他们的币值老是跟着美元走,中国不能不管人民币兑美元是何价。

上述的道理不浅,但属一等的经济分析。是纯正的价格理论。纵横学问五十年,我认为除了价格理论,可取的经济学没有其它。

(四)人民币解除汇管,有机会带来另一项麻烦。以小人之心度君子之腹,四方君子可以凭炒买炒卖来扰乱人民币在国际市场的运作。机会不高,也不难处理。中国要稳定人民币对物品的购买力,而最简单的方法是用我建议过无数次的、把人民币与一篮子任何人可以在市场直接成交的物品指数为货币之锚,也即是与这篮子物品的价格指数挂钩了。肯定可行,我解释过多次,这里不再说了。人民币下了这个锚,对任何货币的汇率皆自由浮动。这样,在货币的话题上,中国是不怕任何扰乱的。

这里要说的,是如果人民币与一篮子物品为锚,其它发展中国家的币值会跟着人民币走的意向一定激增,而某程度他们选用人民币作储备也可以肯定。这些判断我乐于赌身家。

(五)也说过多次,无锚的货币制(fiat money)不可取。这一点,不少经济学者同意,只是以大国而言,他们想不出怎样把货币下一个固定的锚。十多年前跟进朱镕基的货币政策时,我霍然而悟,想出了可以用一篮子可以在市场成交的物价指数为货币之锚。

八个月来,为了跟进地球金融危机而读到不少美国行内专家的货币言论,更证实了无锚货币不可取之见。这些专家不少是老朋友,他们的学问我历来欣赏。无锚货币的困难他们当然知道,但在美国现有的经济结构下,转用我提出的下锚制不容易。欧元可以采用,而人民币采用是更容易了。

无锚货币的一个无可救药的缺点,是适当地调控货币量难于登天。这些年美国联储用上调控利率的方法,基本上是价格管制,违反了费沙的不可能错的分析,也违反了价格浮动是引导资源使用最重要的功能。我曾经指出,美国的次贷之灾的其中一个主要起因,是联储把利率辘上辘落。利息是提前消费或提前投资之价,利率应由市场决定,央行不要管,但这重要的市场利率运作,是要在人民币下了一个可以在市场运作的锚才可以安枕无忧。

我明白如果把人民币下了一个稳定的锚,让利率自由浮动,央行的调控经济的权力会大幅下降。这是正着:市场的运作一般可靠,远胜政府的左右。不是说政府不要管经济:应该管的事项多得很,但该管的不管,不该管的却干预频频,出错的机会十之八、九也。

上海搞国际金融中心,原则上是前途无限的。要放开汇管才可以搞,而央行的工作会转到另一些重要的事项去。央行还在等什么?北京的朋友还在等什么?国际金融中心是那么重要的工程,有大成可勒碑志之,北京今天的领导人为什么要把这样重要的功绩推到接班人那边去?他们为什么要胡里胡涂地把自己的名字押在新《劳动合同法》这项劣迹上?难道将来的历史怎样写对他们不重要吗?


2009-03-28

Warming?

1) A Berkeley professor dares to debunk the popular wisdom about the future of energy.


IMO the rationale for energy conservation should simply be, "we do not have unlimited source of energy (at least, before we can efficiently convert/store solar energy, to a level on par with what chlorophyll does)". Global warming mongering is like predicting China's GDP/cap will surpass that of US in 15 years -- simple straight line projection ignoring any non-linear effects/secondary corrections.

2009-03-25

The Answer for Zhou Xiao Chuan

The answer for Zhou is already written here - as advocated by Prof Stephen NS Cheung and I recapped some 3.5 years ago. All issues Zhou raised are addressed in this system, which Zhou lamented for its being shelved some 70 years ago. China can go ahead with this solution alone while persuading G20/IMF/WB to follow suit. This is an area where China can and should lead, by doing it first, because China does not have the legacy of the developed nations. If China does so, it would surely be first joined by most nations which are now pegging their currencies to the USD or Basket (eg the gulf nations, ASEAN, some Eastern European non-Euro countries including Russia, may also follow suit)

Zhou's said, in an essay (in Chinese original here)
  • 国际储备货币的币值首先应有一个稳定的基准和明确的发行规则以保证供给的有序;其次,其供给总量还可及时、灵活地根据需求的变化进行增减调节;第三,这种调节必须是超脱于任何一国的经济状况和利益
  • an international reserve currency should first be anchored to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set of rules, therefore to ensure orderly supply; second, its supply should be flexible enough to allow timely adjustment according to the changing demand; third, such adjustments should be disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of any single country. The acceptance of credit-based national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The crisis again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability.
  • 超主权储备货币的主张虽然由来以久,但至今没有实质性进展。上世纪四十年代凯恩斯就曾提出采用30种有代表性的商品作为定值基础建立国际货币单位“Bancor”的设想,遗憾的是未能实施
  • Though the super-sovereign reserve currency has long since been proposed, yet no substantive progress has been achieved to date. Back in the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed to introduce an international currency unit named "Bancor", based on the value of 30 representative commodities. Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted.
  • 超主权储备货币不仅克服了主权信用货币的内在风险,也为调节全球流动性提供了可能。由一个全球性机构管理的国际储备货币将使全球流动性的创造和调控成为可能,当一国主权货币不再做为全球贸易的尺度和参照基准时,该国汇率政策对失衡的调节效果会大大增强。这些能极大地降低未来危机发生的风险、增强危机处理的能力
  • A super-sovereign reserve currency not only eliminates the inherent risks of credit-based sovereign currency, but also makes it possible to manage global liquidity. A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control the global liquidity. And when a country's currency is no longer used as the yardstick for global trade and as the benchmark for other currencies, the exchange rate policy of the country would be far more effective in adjusting economic imbalances. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability.
  • 改革应从大处着眼,小处着手,循序渐进,寻求共赢
  • he reform should be guided by a grand vision and begin with specific deliverables. It should be a gradual process that yields win-win results for all
(English recap from AP, and WSJ  seems to have missed some key points above)
  • Zhou said the proposed new currency also should be used for trade, investment, pricing commodities and corporate bookkeeping.
  • "A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control global liquidity," Zhou wrote. "This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability." Zhou also called for changing how SDRs are valued. Currently, they are based on the value of four currencies — the dollar, euro, yen and British pound. "The basket of currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation should be expanded to include currencies of all major economies," Zhou wrote. "The allocation of the SDR can be shifted from a purely calculation-based system to one backed by real assets, such as a reserve pool, to further boost market confidence in its value."
The Economists spelled out what China's objective really is (we all know it is neither practical or feasible to replace the USD in the medium term, as most media reported superficially, or the Chinese wishfully)
  • Mr Zhou’s proposal is China’s way of making clear that it is worried that the Fed’s response to the crisis—printing loads of money—will hurt the dollar and hence the value of China’s huge foreign reserves, of which around two-thirds are in dollars.
The key issue is how to make the transition "gradual" (大处着眼,小处着手,循序渐进) to minimize potential risk. And the only way to a first step is to (i) shift the RMB peg from USD to a basket of currencies then (ii) to a basket of commodities. China did the (i)  in 2005 but it needs to do (ii), perhaps but making a gradual shift, by, e.g. first with a 90% currency b. basket + 10% commodiy basket, then lowering the weight of currency basket smoothly

2009-03-22

再谈汇源案

续前文,有关商务部对汇源案的裁决的评论

“商务部依据《反垄断法》的相关规定,从市场份额及市场控制力、市场集中度、集中对市场进入和技术进步的影响、集中对消费者和其他有关经营者的影响及品牌对果汁饮料市场竞争产生的影响等几个方面对此项集中进行了审查。审查工作严格遵循相关法律法规的规定。审查过程中,充分听取了有关方面的意见。
商务部认定:此项集中将对竞争产生不利影响。集中完成后可口可乐公司可能利用其在碳酸软饮料市场的支配地位,搭售、捆绑销售果汁饮料,或者设定其他排他性的交易条件,集中限制果汁饮料市场竞争,导致消费者被迫接受更高价格、更少种类的产品;同时,由于既有品牌对市场进入的限制作用,潜在竞争难以消除该等限制竞争效果;此外,集中还挤压了国内中小型果汁企业生存空间,给中国果汁饮料市场竞争格局造成不良影响。 ”

1)关于“市场份额及市场控制力、市场集中度,进入壁垒”
b)最新数据是汇源在“百分百果汁”的市场占有率已降到32.6%。而汇源的中国软饮市场总占有率则从10.3%降到了8.5%。
(另有资料显示:可乐+汇源的所有果汁类市场占有率为20%,总软饮市场则为12%--应该是市场定义的分歧。不过都支持下述结论。)
这证明了两点。一是场份额转变之快和进入壁垒之低,二是汇源市场价值相对于去年9月已有显著的下降。

2)关于"集中完成后可口可乐公司可能利用其在碳酸软饮料市场的支配地位,搭售、捆绑销售果汁饮料,或者设定其他排他性的交易条件,集中限制果汁饮料市场竞争,导致消费者被迫接受更高价格、更少种类的产品"
a)  茶饮料领域。。。统一、康师傅仍然占据龙头地位,连同麒麟、三得利、雀巢等品牌,控制了国内茶饮料市场的很大份额
b) 瓶装饮用水市场。。。娃哈哈居首、农夫山泉、怡宝分别位居第二、第三,乐百氏第四
事实是,各种软饮在国内市场由不同公司主导,显示的所谓捆绑销售并没有商务部或一些天真的MBA们认为的那么简单。当然,不同饮料在销售渠道、品牌宣传等都有一定的规模(和synergy),可是要谈到捆绑和垄断,趋势另一回事

3)有关“垄断”
a)可乐在美国市场(所有软饮)的市场占有率为44%,百事31%,cadbury schweppe(玉泉)15% (2002年数据,美国市场变化不大)。在美国这可算“垄断”或“寡头”。中国的市场占有率分别为达能 16.3%,可乐15.5%,可乐+汇源可能有23-24%左右。与美国(或其他市场)相比,并不算集中。
b)然而,在美国这么高度集中的市场,新的进入者仍然不断制造了成功的神话。POM Wonderful 在 2002-2008的6年间,作为一家独立的公司开辟了石榴汁的市场,销售达到1.65亿美元。EnergyBrand(itaminwater)则在8年间(1998年开始vitaminwater)达到3.5亿美元销售。
c) 中国市场无论是从结构上(销售渠道、品牌认同)等都比美国分散(fragmented),因此进入壁垒只可能比美国低。

4)国内同业的反对
我是国内的同业竞争者的话,我也当然会反对这项并购。毕竟可乐是主要的竞争者。可是,商务部诸公应该知道所有潜在竞争者都是会反对这些并购行为的,因为竞争会趋于激烈。假如可乐并购汇源是(如一些网评所说)为了消灭这一品牌(如天府可乐)那竞争对手们应该是乐观其成才对。

5) 保护主义(?)
汇源是“民主企业”吗?
汇源股东包括(1)朱+管理层42%,(2)法资达能(danone) 23%,(3)美资华平基金(warburg pincus)7%,(4)其他香港市场股东(包括外资基金)35%

市场资料来源:

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p.s. 如前文(及众多网友)疑,可乐可能“做了商务部工作”。最可圈可点的是商务部猪公之一姚坚似乎露了馅“可口可乐继续并购的意愿还是有的”,什么叫“还是有的”?就是“只有一点”吧?
明明知道可乐的意愿已经不大,还要去否决,不是摆明在帮可乐吗?看来商务部诸公其实不笨,只是比较容易被做工作而已。

  • 汇源集团内部人士给《中国经营报》记者发来短信:“我上次不是给你说过:结果会以商务部按《反垄断法》不批。”他坚定地指称,“这是可口可乐操作的结果。可口可乐一早就不打算买了,汇源早就做好了准备。”
  • 在上海的会面上,朱新礼捺着性子追问可口可乐公司总裁及首席执行官穆泰康,可口可乐大举投资,是否意味着在并购问题上产生了动摇?而穆泰康则回应,希望汇源能够同意降低收购价格。记者未能了解当时情况,或许是因为可口可乐方面压价太多,朱新礼并未让步。
  • “(并购案被否)是可口可乐操作的结果。一颗红心、两手准备,(并购案被否)我们早都有准备的。”汇源集团内部人士直言不讳。“可口可乐早已不打算买了,可口可乐董事会反对的声音越来越多,这是事实。商务部裁决中说‘商务部与可口可乐公司就附加限制性条件进行了商谈,要求申报方提出可行的解决方案’,那只是程序问题,可口可乐有意提出更为严苛的方案以让审批无法获批。”
  • 商务部新闻发言人姚坚则强调,“据我所知,可口可乐继续并购的意愿还是有的,不存在可口可乐公关商务部的情况。”
  • 汇源集团内部人士指称:商务部禁止收购的理由,经不起考问。关于集中之后对市场进入的限制问题。目前果汁行业不存在进入限制,果汁行业的准入门槛很低,只要企业有资金、设备,就可以做。目前国内果汁消费量人均不足1公斤,与欧美发达国家年人均50-70公斤的消费量相差很远,市场空间非常大。另外,可口可乐与汇源远达不到行业垄断,汇源的强项是高浓度果汁与中浓度果汁,这两者总和远不及低浓度果汁的销量。
  • “以《反垄断法》为依据,没有理由否决这起并购案,担心什么呢?”一直以来,商务部研究院外资研究部主任马宇研究员通过写博文的方式支持并购,为此还遭受了网民的攻击与漫骂。“并购案为什么被否决?因为品牌问题?反垄断审查只涉及竞争,不涉及品牌。担心可能造成垄断?果汁是一个完全竞争的行业,果汁不是那种不可替代的生活必需品,消费者拥有自主的选择权,即使可口可乐并购汇源之后在果汁领域也不构成事实上的垄断。”

2009-03-19

中国商务部的一班白痴

商务部就可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司案反垄断审查做出裁决。

我基本上同意量子博客在“出乎意料的判決”文的观点。

商务部的裁决完全没有理由,而且不符合国家利益。因为
  1. 软饮的进入壁垒很低,汇源管理层卖了盘后过了“不竞争期后”要重新建立一个新品牌并不难。
  2. 垄断只在市场集中度高的产品有作用。国内外的软饮市场集中(垄断)度并不高。国内已有品牌包括娃哈哈、康师傅和旺旺等都有足够能力可以与之抗衡。在美国,包装果汁的市场领导者是tropicana(占橙汁市场60-65%),属于百事集团,不是可口可乐集团。
  3. 捆绑销售在果汁和碳酸饮料之间作用比不明显。基本上没有人知道tropicana和pepsi间的关系。比如说,美国的麦当劳卖可口可乐(不卖百事,因为以前麦当劳的对手是burger king属于百事集团),可是麦当劳的果汁是tropicana,而不是可乐集团的minute maid。
  4. 可口可乐拥有minute maid品牌,真的要进入中国果汁市场也不一定需要汇源。
商务部的裁决其实正中可乐公司下怀,因为这交易是金融海啸前达成。也就是说可乐花了比目前市场价格高2倍多的代价,正愁着没有借口把交易取消。现在商务部帮了外国公司省钱,损害了汇源股东了利益,还落了人家口实。(外间甚至有人认为可乐公司对商务部进行了游说!至少可乐公司应该是故意不去解决商务部提出的问题的 - 商务部否决并购的其中一个理由是可乐公司没有对其关于垄断问题给出令人满意的解决方法,假如我本来就对这项交易后悔了,为什么还要去尽心回答你的问题?)

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可乐公司并购价格:US$2.4bn=HK$18.6bn
汇源市值:HK$12.2bn (股价 HK$8.3)
商务部宣布后汇源股价掉了23%停牌 (昨天股价HK$10.3)
-- 估计还会再下。交易宣布前(2008年9月)股价为HK$4. 市值约HK$6bn !我们可以用国内其他饮料公司去年9月和今天的股价做benchmark。例如,青岛啤酒(0168.hk) 掉了15% (从 HK$17.8 到 HK$15)汇源股价(假如没有可乐的交易)大概会在HK$4和3.4  之间。

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related:

2) 狗拿耗子 : "商務部有一位研究員出來講話,說這次審批是從法規操作層面的角度來考慮。真的有這麽白癡嗎?彙源的股東首先就不見了25億美元,這些可是中國人好不容易從美國人手上騙來的錢。那中國在海外的收購怎麽辦?現在是中國在海外大肆收購的最好時機,商務部那幫蠢才,把什麽都搞亂了"

2009-03-17

See wing-ching's view on China's investment in US treasury


See's view follows what Brad Sester said, the major risk in US investment is the exchange rate risk (i.e. potential USD depreciation in future). To mitigate such risk, China should lend money in RMB-denomiated bonds (to the US)

The implications are
  • the interest rate is determined by RMB rate
  • potential issue with China's forex control and also RMB market rate (increased demand by the time the RMB bonds are due -- but this could work in China's advantage, sort of, as it receives the appreciated notes, though the 'apparent downside' is the impact on export, but you can't have it both ways)
  • this may help release the political pressure from US on the rate of RMB appreciation (vs USD) in future, as by then RMB appreciation will mean that the US government would have to pay more (the US government can always hedge the risk through forward contracts with the i-banks but there is small cost associated with such hedging. In fact, China can also do such hedging if it keeps on buying US Treasury bonds)
  • if, by the time China's holding in RMB denomiated bonds reaches the size of USD (or EUR/etc) denominated bonds, the net impact of RMB appreciation (or depreciation for that matter) on China's reserve holding would be neutral. i.e. China does not need to hedge!

2009-03-15

Risk on China's foreign reserve

Brad Sester, "The main financial risk that China faces, after all, isn’t the risk that the US won’t honor its Treasuries, or even the risk that the US would walk away from the Agencies. It rather is the risk that the dollar and euro will eventually depreciate against the RMB, reducing the RMB value of China’s reserve portfolio."

2009-02-24

ZT: 李泽楷绝技考

The HK media hasn't really been fair with Richard Li. Although I do not think he is a likeable person, he really does not deserve all the criticism he has attracted.

1) selling STAR to Murdoch - HK did not lose much, it is a satellite license which has no real cost and he made billion by selling to an Australian/American
2) Acquiring HKT - it was a very smart and responsible deal for the original PCCW shareholders (like what Steve Case did for the original AOL shareholders). Yes the original HKT shareholders suffered, but they had the choice to take cash when the deal was sealed
3) Privatisation of PCCW this year - as Cheung argued, $4.5 was a good price and well over the market value.

Yes, his wealth came from government favour such as the satellite license (how was it granted?) and the Cyber Port real estate project which became Bel Air, but more fault was with the AOs and Tung Cheehwa (or ICAC for that matter).

李泽楷绝技考

那天跟一位朋友进午餐,见他手上持着《壹周刊》,封面又是李泽楷,标题大字云:《$306万买起$280亿电盈》。心想:李察真的那么厉害吗?为什么曾荫权不委任他作财政司长了?禁不住问朋友取得该期《壹周》,回家后翻了几次,才知道三百六十万不是买起电讯盈科(简称电盈),而是以该数「种票」,成功地种成电盈私有化。后来才知道《壹周刊》可能计错数,或种票者生得蠢。原来支持私有化的股份足够之后(当日赞成的总市值逾五十亿元),成功「种票」的费用只需三千元。另一方面,要成功地「种票」而毁灭了李泽楷(简称李察)的私有化大计,不需要论股份多少,不怕麻烦三千元足够!后者是反种,不怕麻烦易过借火,奇怪没有人处理好反种票后去敲诈李察一笔。古怪法例会导致古怪现象,反种「敲诈」是否非法我赌法庭判不出来(一笑)!

电盈私有化的舆论真的热闹了。报道多,不易懂,李察虽被赌王誉为「叻仔」,但传媒皆仿效杜甫写李白:众人皆欲杀也。为了好奇我挂个电话给一位知情的朋友,问他可否解画一下。他说可以,谈了好一阵,跟着送来好些文件及资料,都是可以公开的。从这些资料及读到的传媒报道中,我提出了四个问题,浅的,得到的答案也浅。

我提出的四个问题如下:一、为什么要用而又可以用借钱派息的方法来收购外股作私有化?二、股份投票怎么会用人头算的?三、每股四元五毫的收购价是偏低了吗?四、李察为何要搞私有化?这四点应该是读者需要知道的,没有其它。整件事,牵涉到的公司或机构有好几家,股权与数字的分布变化多,说起来相当复杂,但基本上无关宏旨,引进容易产生混淆,这里一概不管。读者要知道的是李察的一家公司与另一家公司组合,以四元五毫一股作价,收购外间所有的电盈股份,实行电盈私有化。

第一题问:据我所知,派息一定要有钱赚才能派,可以借钱派,但没有钱赚不能派,李察的公司何来赚百多亿那么多钱了?找到的答案是:好些年前李察的公司重组,在会计上积累了一些可分配的储备,称distributive reserve,所以今天没有赚那么多钱还可以借钱派息。这样的处理是经过会计师及律师的工作,没有理由怀疑,何况证监会不可能不监察着。再问:派息收购,外间的股东也有息派吗?答案是没有,因为派息是处理为股票成交后的事。这是股市的一种正常运作。又再问:为什么李察不私人借钱而要用公司去借呢?这里的答案要猜测一下:私人不容易借那么多钱。结论于是明确:收购电盈的公司多了电盈的股票,但同时增加了负债,打个平手。大家知道,任何公司,只要负债够高,免费送出去也没有人要。

第二题,关于种票。我问:是香港哪项发神经的法例,使私有化的决定用人头算而不是用股份多少算的?答案是香港的公司法例说的:不是完全发神经,因为有四关要过。其一是与收购有关的持股人不能投票;其二是有权投票而又投了票的,以股份算,赞成票不能低于百分之七十五;其三是以有权投票的总股份算,投反对票的不能超过该总股份的百分之十;其四是以人头算,不管股份多少,不投不计,投反对票的要低于一半。

这解释了为什么容易有种票这回事。李察种票应该是刑事的,因为他属有关人士,在法庭做了誓章。无关的外间人士种票却不是犯法(在澳洲是合法的)。如果无关人士种票是非法或刑事,香港的法庭与监房会忙得不可开交也。

一手盈科一千股,分开下注一千手有一千个人头,拆细分头一手可以有一千个人头。进行电盈私有化决议时,一千个人头的总股价成本(不算手续费)只三千多元(每股约可赚一元)。困难是怎样去找一千个人头呢?你不易,我不易,李察也不易,但可以办到。关键是你和我到处找一千个人头,找不到那么多,有数十个也不错。李察呢?每找一个人头都需要该仁兄或仁姊收口,否则坐牢去也。收口可以敲诈,李察钱虽多,不会多得那么厉害吧。他的智商用不着达到「叻仔」那个层面才懂得是要听天由命的。

第三题,关于电盈股票所值。这里的答案必然是武断的。有三项资料读者可参考。其一是去年七月李察在国际上放盘招标,出售他公司持有的电盈股份,九月初收到的高标,算出来是每股在三元五毫五仙与三元八毫五仙之间,李察嫌少,不沽,害得盈科股价大跌。其二是去年十二月底出价四元二毫收购搞私有化,收到风声一些外间的基金大股东会反对。于是收回私有化决议,加三毫以四元五毫作价,二月初再推出,过了关。读者须知,基金的君子们一般精打细算,不是什么善男信女,他们接受四元五角,不可能是盲毛或仁慈之举。其三是以四元五毫算电盈的市盈率,超过二十倍。从有线电讯的前景看,这市盈率算是很高的。

这里我要加进自己的武断:综观目前的经济情况与前景,电盈四元五毫我不会问津。不是空口说白话。母亲当年储存了不少「香港电话」的股票,一箩一箩地放在床下底(西湾河曾经传为佳话)。虽然母亲授权我处理,我知道她只买不卖数十年,对「电话」有感情,不敢轻举妄动。但当我在报章读到香港政府会用钱收回当时电话的专利权,立刻替母亲沽清,一股不留。从来不教人买或卖什么股票,但昔日的「电话」经验使我在文章中提及:除非消息灵通,不要下注靠政府保护而有专利的股票。目前这类股票在中国不少,还算安全,因为政府本身是大股东。待得政府成为局外人,走得快必定好世界!

第四题:李察为什么要把电盈私有化呢?这一题,连武断的答案也没有,只能猜测。不离谱的猜测,是去年五月九日恒生公布决定把电盈剔出恒生指数的成分股,六月十日执行,跟着电盈的股票成交量萎缩,李察可能因而感到意兴阑珊。股票上市的额外经费不菲,舆论麻烦,如果集资的用场不大,私有化一般是正着。资料显示,电盈被剔出成分股后不久,李察于七月初在国际放盘招标。

上述可解李察目前的舆论之困乎?应该可以,因为虽然涉及的公司有好几家,文件、法例、数字等错综复杂,但拨开了这些,核心的问题与答案皆浅。李泽楷绝技考,我找不到绝技,也看不到有商业道德问题。话得说回来,李察这个人的确有招惹舆论的奇异功能,不知下一趟会是哪方面的题材了。个性若此,狗仔如斯,夫复何言哉?诚哥龙生两种,大可仰天一笑!