Superpower Showdown - James Pickerton

Here is the new essay by James Pickerton, "Superpower Showdown - America needs a new strategy for dealing with China, a country we can’t contain and can’t afford to fight", in "American Conservative". He saw than it is impractical to maintain global hegemony the Bushism way, and that the "balance of power" paradigm of leveraging one against the other might be more practical. He gave his opinions on many writings in recent years, including those of Kaplan and Pillsbury, and on containment, Taiwan, and self-fulfilling prophecy.

• "So America’s grand strategy for the next century should be twofold, First, we must recognize that rising powers inherently bring rising threats. Second, such rising powers should be balanced, played off each other, and not directly confronted. Why? Because the cost of American participation in nuclear-era world war, for any reason less than national survival, is simply too great. America would be wise to accept a reduced role in Asia in exchange for a reduced responsibility for participating in the inevitable future regional conflicts.
• So the time has come for a different strategy that is neither hawkish nor dovish—merely realistic. It’s a foreign-policy approach that’s been proven in the past, in the historical crucible of great-power jockeying. "

For the time being I do not have much to say, except a small correction of fact. He said

• "we recently learned that cyber- snoops at Shandong University had decrypted Secure Hash Algorithm-1, one of the basic codes of the U.S. military. " -- Certainly what the computer scientists in Shandong did was great accomplishment. However, the hash encryption they broke was an academic breakthrough, on a code published in NSB, and widely used in credit card and other commercial application. US military uses more sophisticated encryption.

This is a sober reflection of US foreign policy, except for his assessment of Japan going down the nuclear road, as that will not be an Asian affair, because nukes can strike the Amrican continent just as easily.

Update (Dec 10): great comments on this article by Green Apron Monkey, and on the background of the publisher.

---

Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats tried very hard to understand what Zoellick mean by "stakeholder" and try to become one (WSJ Dec 7, and here), while Koizumi's thought there is no such need for Japan.

Categories:

• china
• us
• pol

Light viewing: Baidu vs google ad

Categories:

• ent

Light viewing: North Korean parade and pictures

This is from North Korean TV (I guess). Great clips, except for the narrator. The Korean she spoke sounds quite different from what I heard in Daejeongguem.


also this one


NK Girl

NK Boy

March

Women soldiers

Phalanx

Parade

NK looks like China frozen in the 1970s.
a few dozens more photos in links 1 2 3 4

Anyway, as an optimist, I would like to present to you the future of Korea, as shown by this picture below. (This is a North Korean student (see flag on her left collar), presumably in a function took place in S Korea.)


...and this wish from South Korean pop stars


...and it, wishfully, started at the DMZ

Categories:

• korea
• ent
• war

China population (i) - gender ratio problem and "one-child policy"

There is a report in New England Journal of Medicine (NEMJ) titled "The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years"

To be precise, it is no longer a one-child policy any more

• In most rural area, a second child is permited if the first is a girl
• In some cities, couples who do not have siblings are allowed to have 2 children
• No control for "endangered" minority of small population, and 3 children for larger minorities such as Tibetan, Uighur and Mongolian. There is no enforcement so effectively the policy does not apply, especially in rural areas where more children were born per couple

The imbalance in gender ratio is troublesome, and may lead to various social problems and even unrest. (even though some argue Darwinian selection would take care of itself and even result in improvement in the gene pool)

A note on the rural two-child policy. In theory, the policy of allowing a second child if the first is female will not change the gender ratio at birth, because each birth in independent.

• This is a classical problem for high school probability. Assuming natural birth, the gender ratio of the first child is 104, so is the second child. In fact, if track record has anything to do with reproduction, the ratio of girls will only be higher for this sub-group of couples

In practice, this is also demonstrated to be true according to data from the NEMJ paper.

• Rural biase is less severe than that in urban, because of the 2nd child policy
• The high gender biase for second child is largely due to selective abortion
• However, the average of all birth order is the same for urban (1.16) and rural areas (1.15), with different policies. In fact, rural figures is even less biased! (perhaps a result of less incentive for selective abortion for the first child)
• I do not know when the two-child policy was implemented in rural China, but 105 looks too good to be since the data include that back to 1980, when it was one-child for all. Presumably the availability of gender prediction technology such as ultrasound (though illegal, but widely used) co-incide with the introduction of two-child amendment, which saved a lot of female fetus.
• The rationale for more relax policy for the rural area is perhaps an answer to gender biase (less discriminance, and virtually no infancide in urban). However, there is an adverse effect to the "quality" of the next generation (education opportunity and arguably "gene pool"), since now that rural birth is 50% higher than that in urban (on top of the exisiting gap in fertility rate).

What about overall population growth? This will be the topic of my next post.

For the full article click below

---

The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years
Therese Hesketh, Ph.D., Li Lu, M.D., and Zhu Wei Xing, M.P.H.

China's one-child family policy has had a great effect on the lives of nearly a quarter of the world's population for a quarter of a century. When the policy was introduced in 1979, the Chinese government claimed that it was a short-term measure and that the goal was to move toward a voluntary small-family culture.1 In this article, we examine to what extent this goal has been achieved and the implications for the future of the policy. First we explain why the policy was introduced and how it is now implemented. We also examine the consequences of the policy in regard to population growth, the ratio between men and women, and the ratio between adult children and dependent elderly parents. Finally, we examine the relevance of the policy in contemporary China and whether the time has come for the policy to be relaxed.
Background
In 1979, the Chinese government embarked on an ambitious program of market reform following the economic stagnation of the Cultural Revolution. At the time, China was home to a quarter of the world's people, who were occupying just 7 percent of world's arable land. Two thirds of the population were under the age of 30 years, and the baby boomers of the 1950s and 1960s were entering their reproductive years. The government saw strict population containment as essential to economic reform and to an improvement in living standards.2 So the one-child family policy was introduced.
The policy consists of a set of regulations governing the approved size of Chinese families. These regulations include restrictions on family size, late marriage and childbearing, and the spacing of children (in cases in which second children are permitted). The State Family Planning Bureau sets the overall targets and policy direction. Family-planning committees at provincial and county levels devise local strategies for implementation. Despite its name, the one-child rule applies to a minority of the population; for urban residents and government employees, the policy is strictly enforced, with few exceptions. The exceptions include families in which the first child has a disability or both parents work in high-risk occupations (such as mining) or are themselves from one-child families (in some areas).
In rural areas, where approximately 70 percent of the people live, a second child is generally allowed after five years, but this provision sometimes applies only if the first child is a girl — a clear acknowledgment of the traditional preference for boys.3 A third child is allowed among some ethnic minorities and in remote, underpopulated areas. The policy is underpinned by a system of rewards and penalties, which are largely meted out at the discretion of local officials and hence vary widely. They include economic incentives for compliance and substantial fines, confiscation of belongings, and dismissal from work for noncompliance.
The policy depends on virtually universal access to contraception and abortion. A total of 87 percent of all married women use contraception4; this statistic compares with about one third in most developing countries.5 There is heavy reliance on long-term contraception, with intrauterine devices and sterilizations together accounting for more than 90 percent of contraceptive methods used since the mid-1980s.4,6 The number of sterilizations has declined since the peak in the early 1990s (Table 1). For the majority of women, no choice in contraception is offered; 80 percent of women in a recent large study said they had no choice and just accepted the method recommended by the family-planning worker.4 The use of these long-term methods keeps abortion rates relatively low, with 25 percent of women of reproductive age having had at least one abortion, as compared with 43 percent in the United States.7 The main reasons given for abortion are contraceptive failure and a lack of government approval for the pregnancy under the one-child policy.8 Women who proceed with an unapproved pregnancy are known to be reluctant to use antenatal and obstetric services because they fear they will face pressure to have an abortion or fines for violating the one-child policy.9,10 Many deliveries of babies that have not been officially sanctioned occur at home without trained personnel, a practice that is associated with the risk of maternal or neonatal mortality. A study carried out in rural Sichuan province in 1990 reported a doubling of maternal deaths for unapproved pregnancies as compared with those receiving government sanction.11

View this table:[in this window][in a new window]
Table 1. Trends in the Use of Contraceptive Methods among Married Chinese Women, 1982 to 2001.

Population Growth
When the one-child policy was introduced, the government set a target population of 1.2 billion by the year 2000. The census of 2000 put the population at 1.27 billion,12 although some demographers regard this number as an underestimate.13 The collection of population statistics in China is known to be subject to manipulation to conform with family-planning regulations, since the process is overseen by officials who are often unwilling to uncover any violations of the rules.14,15 Chinese authorities claim that the policy has prevented 250 to 300 million births. The total fertility rate, which is defined as the mean number of children born per woman, decreased from 2.9 in 1979 to 1.7 in 2004, with a rate of 1.3 in urban areas and just under 2.0 in rural areas.16 This trend has created a distinct demographic pattern of urban families with predominantly one child and rural families with predominantly two children.
However, the policy itself is probably only partially responsible for the reduction in the total fertility rate. The most dramatic decrease in the rate actually occurred before the policy was imposed (Figure 1). Between 1970 and 1979, the largely voluntary "late, long, few" policy, which called for later childbearing, greater spacing between children, and fewer children, had already resulted in a halving of the total fertility rate, from 5.9 to 2.9.3 After the one-child policy was introduced, there was a more gradual fall in the rate until 1995, and it has more or less stabilized at approximately 1.7 since then.16 In addition, many countries have had substantial declines in fertility during the past 25 years, and China's neighbors in East Asia have some of the lowest total fertility rates in the world: 1.04 in Singapore, 1.38 in Japan, and 0.91 in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.17 Even allowing for the fact that these countries are more developed and urbanized than China, the parallels are hard to ignore. It is reasonable to speculate that there would have been a further decline in China's total fertility rate had the voluntary policy of the 1970s continued.

View larger version (10K):[in this window][in a new window]
Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate (Mean Number of Children Born per Woman) in China, 1969 to 2004.

The Sex Ratio
The effect of the policy on the sex ratio has received much attention. The sex ratio at birth, defined as the proportion of male live births to female live births, ranges from 1.03 to 1.07 in industrialized countries.18 Since the onset of the one-child policy, there has been a steady increase in the reported sex ratio, from 1.06 in 1979, to 1.11 in 1988, to 1.17 in 2001.19 There are marked and well-documented local differences, with ratios of up to 1.3 in rural Anhui, Guangdong, and Qinghai provinces. Data from the 2001 National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey, which was carried out among a nationally representative sample of 39,600 women of reproductive age and is the most recent large-scale survey of reproductive health and fertility, show clearly that the increased sex ratio is not confined predominantly to rural China,19 as has been previously assumed20 (Table 2). There is a marked gradient across birth order: in rural areas, the sex ratio for the first birth is 1.05 (within normal limits), but it rises steeply with birth order. In urban areas, the sex ratio is 1.13 for the first birth and peaks at 1.30 for the second birth but decreases for the third and fourth births (which are rare in urban areas). The picture that emerges is that some urban Chinese make the choice to perform sex selection with the first pregnancy, since they are allowed only one child. In rural areas, most couples are permitted to have a second child, especially if the first is female. So if the second (or subsequent) child is female, the pregnancy often "disappears," allowing the couple to have another child in an attempt to have a son.

View this table:[in this window][in a new window]
Table 2. Ratio of Men to Women According to Birth Order in China, 1980 to 2001.

What happens to all the missing girls is a matter of speculation. Sex-selective abortion after ultrasonography undoubtedly accounts for a large proportion of the decline in female births.20,21 Actual figures are impossible to obtain, because sex-selective abortion is illegal but is known to be widely carried out, helped by a burgeoning private sector. Nonregistration of female births also contributes to the sex-ratio gap.14,15 A 1995 household survey carried out in three provinces found a normal sex ratio in the under-14 age group, with the actual number of girls exceeding the number registered by 22 percent.22 Although infanticide of girls is probably very rare now, less aggressive treatment of sick female infants is known to occur.23
The Chinese government has acknowledged the potentially disastrous social consequences of this sex imbalance. The shortage of women may have increased mental health problems and socially disruptive behavior among men and has left some men unable to marry and have a family.24 The scarcity of females has resulted in kidnapping and trafficking of women for marriage and increased numbers of commercial sex workers, with a potential resultant rise in human immunodeficiency virus infection and other sexually transmitted diseases.25 There are fears that these consequences could be a real threat to China's stability in the future.26
Although the one-child policy has been blamed for the high sex ratio, it is probably just one contributory factor. There was a high sex ratio in China in the 1930s and 1940s, mostly resulting from infanticide of girls, and then the ratio declined in the years after the Communist Revolution of 1949.27 Many other Asian countries with declining fertility rates and a traditional preference for males are also seeing sex-ratio imbalances — Taiwan, 1.19; Singapore, 1.18; South Korea, 1.12; and parts of northern India, 1.2028 — largely because of sex-selective abortion.27 In China, the marked increase in the sex ratio between the 1980s and 1990s coincided with much easier access to cheap ultrasonography and not with any substantial change in enforcement of the one-child policy. It is likely, therefore, that even in the absence of the policy, sex-selective abortion would continue, although it would probably be less common. The solution will come only with a change in attitudes toward female offspring. Publicity campaigns promoting girls are now widespread and acknowledge the importance of such change (Figure 2).

View larger version (46K):[in this window][in a new window]
Figure 2. Billboard in Hebei Province Promoting Girls.

The advertisement reads, "There's no difference between having a girl or a boy — girls can also continue the family line."
But there are some indications that the traditional preference for boys may be shifting. In the National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey, 37 percent of women (predominantly young, urban women) claimed to have no preference for one sex over the other, whereas 45 percent said the ideal family consisted of one boy and one girl. In fact, slightly more women expressed a preference for one girl (5.9 percent) than for one boy (5.6 percent).29 Although these expressed preferences have not yet been translated into a normalization of the sex ratio, this may happen in the near future.
Ratio of Old-age Dependency
The rapid decrease in the birth rate, combined with stable or improving life expectancy, has led to an increasing proportion of elderly people and an increase in the ratio between elderly parents and adult children.30 In China, the percentage of the population over the age of 65 years was 5 percent in 1982 and now stands at 7.5 percent but is expected to rise to more than 15 percent by 2025.28 Although these figures are lower than those in most industrialized countries (especially Japan, where the proportion of people over the age of 65 years is 20 percent), a lack of adequate pension coverage in China means that financial dependence on offspring is still necessary for approximately 70 percent of elderly people.31 Pension coverage is available only to those employed in the government sector and large companies. In China, this problem has been named the "4:2:1" phenomenon, meaning that increasing numbers of couples will be solely responsible for the care of one child and four parents.
Initiatives are under way to improve access to government pensions and to encourage saving for private pensions in an attempt to reduce the burden of the 4:2:1 phenomenon.7 In addition, a specific measure has been introduced to address the problem: in urban areas, couples who are themselves both only children are allowed to have more than one child. As only children reach reproductive age, many couples will meet these criteria, though how many will take advantage of the opportunity to have more than one child remains to be seen.
The Future of the Policy
The Chinese government is facing an important challenge: the need to balance the basic human right of reproduction with population growth, which, despite the policy's success, is still increasing at a rate of 8 per 1000, or 10 million people, per year (equivalent to the population of Belgium). In making decisions about the future, several factors must be taken into consideration.
First, relaxation of the policy can be considered only if fertility aspirations are such that a baby boom will not result. There is now good evidence that China is becoming a small-family culture. Data from the National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Survey show that 35 percent of the women questioned preferred having only one child and 57 percent preferred having two children, but very few women (an average of 5.8 percent) wanted more than two29 (Table 3). Young, urban, educated women wanted fewer children than did their counterparts in rural areas. In other studies, 75 percent of respondents in wealthy Jiangsu province were satisfied with their one child regardless of sex, whereas in poorer Yunnan province, 55 percent were satisfied with an only boy, but only 30 percent were satisfied with an only girl.8 And in Tibet, where most couples are permitted to have three children, 65 percent of the women wanted only one or two children.32 However, the survey also showed that in urban areas of China, where (with very few exceptions) only one child is allowed, 43 percent of women still preferred having two, so the one-child restriction remains unacceptable for nearly half of urban Chinese women.

View this table:[in this window][in a new window]
Table 3. Preference among 39,600 Chinese Women for Number of Children, According to Age, Residence, and Educational Level.

Second, what was appropriate in 1979 may not be so now. China has undergone massive socioeconomic change during the past 25 years. With the freedoms that have resulted from wealth and globalization, the one-child policy seems increasingly anachronistic. Increased wealth and freedom also make it harder for the government to enforce the policy. Economic disincentives are not a deterrent to many wealthy people, and increased freedom of movement has made it difficult for family-planning authorities to track down people if they choose to flout the regulations.
Finally, the evidence of slowing population growth, the high sex ratio, the increasing number of elderly people, and the risks associated with avoidance of medical care by women with unapproved pregnancies suggest that a relaxation of the one-child policy would be desirable.
Several options for the future have been suggested. One possibility is that everyone could be allowed to have up to two children, with a space of at least five years between them.1 It has been predicted that this option would yield a total fertility rate of 1.7 during the next two decades, which would help to normalize the sex ratio, reduce the 4:2:1 phenomenon, and be acceptable to the majority of people.
But the government feels that vigilance is still essential. It is feared that any wavering in implementation of the policy may compromise the goal of keeping the population below 1.4 billion by 2010, which in turn could threaten economic growth and stability. There are particular concerns about the increasing level of migration from rural to urban areas, which has fueled substantial urban growth.
Therefore, in 2002 it was announced that there would be no fundamental policy changes but that certain aspects of policy implementation would be relaxed.33 For example, couples are to be allowed choice in contraceptive methods as part of so-called client-centered family-planning services. These changes have now been introduced in 800 counties (out of a total of 3000), and more are planned. Furthermore, couples no longer need to obtain permission to have a first child, a move that spells the end of the very unpopular system of local birth quotas, which meant that couples were forced to delay pregnancy if the local quota was exceeded. These changes, together with declining fertility aspirations, have reduced (though not eliminated) the tensions associated with the government's efforts to control population growth and have allowed the government to adopt a cautious and gradual approach to relaxing the one-child policy.

Categories:

• china
• social
• pop

Mystery of HK's Kai-Tak development

Ming Pao commented on the diverging trends in mainland and HK officials, observing a recent function for Beijing-Hongkong exchange with an illuminiating title, "京港交流 京官學好 港官學差" (Beijing-HK Exchange: Beijing officials change for better, HK offcials degenerate for worse)

I am not going to repeat the details of the examples, as it is not surprising to those who have suffered the Tung era and its legacy. But the discussion talks have about how the stubborn rejection of building government office at Kai Tak (which puzzled the Beijing counterparts) , and it reminds me of the mystery of the Kai-Tak redevelopment.

The HKG airport was relocated to Chek Lap Kok in 1998. Since then then many plans have been proposed and discussed, e.g.

• Residential development to house 240,000-340,000 residents, i.e. up to 5% of HK population (while still leaving significant space for parks and green areas)
• Build an ocean terminal capable of accommodating cruise ships the size of the Queen Mary 2
• House the Hong Kong Sports Institute, as well as several stadiums

More than 7 years have passed, the lot looks exactly the same as a day on July 1998.

We all know that HK is an extremely crowded city, and the living space is extremely limited. This hurts HK's competitiveness and increases the cost of operation. The size of Kai Tak (357 hectare or 3.57 km²) is larger than the full size of Tsimshatsui + TST East (6.85 km² for Yaumatei+Tsimshatsui+Mongkok).

This will qualify as one of the examples of biggest wastage of resource in HK, or even in the world. Let's try to quantify it

• Sino Land won the 50,752 square foot Kowloon Bay site with a bid of HK$1.82 billion
• that is $1.82bn for 4715 sq meter, or HK$0.386M/sq m
• whole of Kai Tai could worth HK$1379bn
• assuming a 4% return, one year rent of this piece of land worths HK$55.2bn/yr and HK$386bn for 7 years (up to Aug/2005, and counting, and higher if one compounds the return), i.e. HK$55k per person for the 7M in HK
• So when you drove through HK Eastern Expressway, or sit on top of Braemer Hill for 10 minutes, HK government has squandered away HK$1M of taxpayer's money
• Even if one takes into account price elasticity, and that 30-40% of the land is to be used as parks and roads, the opportunity cost is no less than HK$150-200bn for the past 7 years
• (Note: the case of Tamar site is peanut in comparison to Kai Kai)

Why Kai Tak has been basically left aside, while many reclamation proposals to narrow our harbors were being pushed forward, remains one of the biggest myths of the supposedly efficient HK government run by technocrats.

But of course, like all the myths I have tried to raise to your attention, the cause is probably due to bigotry, or corruption. In this case, it is probably related to the lobbying of real estate magnates such as Li Kashing, to limit land supply and protect the profit of Cheung Kong. But then why are they still filling up your harbor and bulldozing the green hills? I can speculate for a few "reasons" but I will let you ponder about them first.

Categories:

• hk
• econ
• biz

The triumph of Taiwanese people

The mayor election in Taiwan resulted in a landslide victory for pan-blue.

KMT chairman Ma Ying Jeou said, "The KMT did not beat the DPP. The DPP was defeated by itself," Ma also said, "This is the triumph of the Taiwanese people" He had a beautiful speech after victory, "We should be happy, but only for tonight, because we have too many problems to solve...we need to roll up our sleeves and face the challenges..."

I hope his party follow through with what he said, and is aware of the fact the there is still much to do in his party reform.

Of course it is, it was the triump of Taiwanese people in 1999 when he won the mayor, in 2000 when DPP replaced KMT and hence led to Lee Tenghui being ousted, in 2005 again when Lien Chan was defeated. It also shows that ideology only plays a secondary role in voters' mind, it is about who being clean, being rational, and cater to the voters' needs.

The triumph of the Taiwanese people is not about which party has won, it is because the bad apple that is more rotten will be rejected by the people. It applies to pan-blue in 2000 and 2004 and now to pan-green.

This is democracy.

p.s. Annette Lu became the smartest among DPP leaders in the past two weeks. After the defeat, she gracefully acknowledged that this was a victory for democracy and that bad results can imply a turning point for good.

---

Lien Chan, had you abdicated before 2004, you could have this picture 21 months earlier.
Triumph of the people: A bride goes to vote
Triumph of the people: Handicapped goes to vote

Categories:

• taiwan
• pol

Introducing an essay from a Taiwan writer: "Three bows by one chairman" (一个主席的三鞠躬)

(via ESWN, update, English translation now available * )
This is a pretty long essay by Taiwan writer Long Yingtai (龙应台), "Three bows by one chairman" (一个主席的三鞠躬). I highly recommend this to anyone who is interested in Taiwan and China (unfortunately there is no English translation yet)

• It is published in China Youth Daily, the organ for Communist Youth League which has become very progressive in recent years. Given the content and that an alert reader can quickly draw the parallel between KMT and CCP, this would have been censored a few years ago
• It acknowledged, properly, the achievement of democracy, and freedom of speech in Taiwan since 15 years ago, and that the achievement supersedes any negativity and drawback of the ideology obssess political bickering of the parties
• It painted a comprehensive picture of the 50 years of white terror in Taiwan
• It showed us what kind of mis-management that has lead to the current separatism, and even some hatred toward the corrupted and authorative KMT of the Chiang era, and part of the reason why pan-Green has received wide support among young and educated Taiwanese
• One question the writer raised, "those who were wrongly accused and persecuted as CCP collaborators/sympathizers were rehabilitated, and compensated; what about the real CCP collaborators [do they deserve the way they were treated?]"
• It praised Ma Ying Jeou's courage to apologize for the wrongs done by his party, but it acknowledge the change in political system is what has led to Ma's actions

It is a very balanced view of Taiwan's history and even current situation, although it is not news to those who live and grow up in Taiwan. It will certainly provide great insight to foreigner in Taiwan. However, the greatest impact it could generate is, if the leaders in CCP read this.

Note (*): I translated the title as "one chairman", literally, as it reflects the symmetry in the use of numbers in the original title, and more importantly, to reflect the 'loneliness' of such action, loneliness among other parties in Taiwan and mainland, and among others within his party.
---

click below for the essay in Chinese

一个主席的三鞠躬2005年11月23日
龙应台

　 中新网10月31日电──中国国民党主席马英九30日下午首次以党主席身份，参加上世纪50年代“政治受难者”秋祭追思会，同时他也代表国民党，三度向“白色恐怖”受难者家属表达歉意。
　 据香港文汇报引述台湾媒体的报道，马英九指出，虽然“白色恐怖”时期他只是小孩子，但既然他现在身为主席，就必须承受国民党过去的责任。
　 据报道，马英九30日参加一项名为“五十年代政治受难者秋季追思会”，在致词中他指出，过去他四度参加这个活动，但这次是他首次以国民党主席的身份参加祭典，他要代表国民党，向50年代受难者家属表达歉意。马英九三度向受难者致歉，他也是国民党迁台40年来，首度公开为“白色恐怖”事件道歉的国民党主席。
　 1
　 在北爱尔兰的恐怖爆炸活动盛行时，你进入一个餐厅时，朋友会说，嘿，不要坐在靠窗的位子，因为，当恐怖分子持机关枪从街上疯狂扫射时，坐在窗边的人先罹难。
　 如果你从古城耶路撒冷搭公共汽车到犹太人的屯垦区去，朋友会拉住你说，不要坐公共汽车，公共汽车是自杀炸弹最大的目标。
　 纽约的高楼、伦敦的地铁、巴格达的饭店、雅加达的市场，在“危险”的威胁阴影下，人们驻足不前。平常生活里不可或缺的寻常空间，成为恐怖区。
　 恐怖分子──那身上绑着炸弹冲进超级市场的人，究竟做了什么？
　 第一，他滥杀无辜。如果他只挑那“罪有应得”的人，震动不会那么大，绝大多数的人觉得与自己无关，日子可以照样过。但是一旦滥杀无辜，所有的人都被威胁了，他要的效果，也才能达到。
　 第二，他的目标，在他心目中，是正确的、正义的。因为目标有道德的崇高性和优越性，因此滥杀无辜是一个必要手段。
　 如果这可以构成恐怖活动的核心定义的话，那么执政者以公权力整肃异己，就是不折不扣的国家恐怖行为了。
　 2
　 最早的记忆，是小学五年级，1962年。大家都很喜欢的年轻的数学老师正在讲课。教室外楼地板突然响起人声杂沓，匆忙而紧张。穿着黄色卡其衣服的一堆人，手里有枪，冲了上来。数学老师早已蹿出教室，奔向走廊尽头。孩子们在惊慌中四散。
　 我们趴在四楼的栏杆往下看。追捕者的脚步声还在楼梯里砰砰响着，往下追赶。布着黄沙的操场上，数学老师的尸体呈大字型打开，脸往上，刚好和我们对望。那黄沙，看起来那么淡漠，荒凉。
　 那是我第一次听见“匪谍”这个词。
　 然后就听得多了。哪一个老师开学时突然不见了，最怪异的是，没有人问，也没有人谈。一个每天在身边的人，突然“蒸发”了，而大家都假装它不曾发生。
　 耳语。连耳语都很少。只知道隔壁人家的大儿子被吉普车带走了就没再回来。但是，连他的父母都不吭声。做父亲的照样上船捕鱼，做母亲的赤脚坐在地上修补渔网。那是好大一张网，铺开来可以盖住一整条船。小孩闹着玩钻进去，一被缠住，怎么扯都脱不了身。
　 1972年，我读大学二年级。突然几个同学不见了。“小胖的男朋友昨晚给抓走了”，是我听到的惟一完整的句子。以后的几十年，事情没在光天化日之下浮起来过。
　 我们过着正常的、幸福的、向往未来的日子：读书，考试，毕业。恋爱，留学，结婚。还有，我们继续爱国，支持我们的领袖。小小的蛛丝马迹，确实被我们看见，譬如说，报纸新闻版上时不时就出现一则豆腐干大小的方块：“勾结奸匪媚敌求荣的×××、×××、×××等三人昨晨伏法。”像阳光下的蜘蛛网，我们把它撩过，抹净了脸，继续热切地走向光明。
　 3
　 那被扔进黑暗里的人们，则继续腐烂。究竟是些什么人，被国家扔进了黑暗？
　 是王志鹏这样不识字的马祖渔民。在1965年7月的一个早上，因为天气特别清朗，王志鹏说，“今天气候很好，风向、潮流也不错，开到大陆很近。”船主听见了，马上去报告，王志鹏变成“叛乱犯”。
　 判决书说：“……按共产匪徒窃国以来，祸国殃民，世人有目共睹，大陆爱国同胞，无不以生命为赌注，冲出铁幕以求自由，王、林二员竟愚昧无知，投匪妄举实可悯而不可恕。惟查王、林二员知虑浅薄，本于我反攻政策，用示矜恤，依法减轻从宽处有期徒刑五年，以为试法者戒。”
　 是中学英语老师柯旗化。一整代人读他所编写的《新英文法》而考上高中、大学、留学，但是没有人知道，他因为思想“左倾”而被监禁17年。罪证之一，据说，是他所拥有的《汤姆历险记》，作者是马克·吐温，和“马克思”有关系。都姓“马”。
　 是进步青年林书扬和陈明忠，参与了反贪官污吏的民众运动，一次一次被逮捕，林书扬被关了35年，陈明忠“只有”21年。是中央日报总编辑李荆荪，是关切劳苦大众的作家陈映真，是台大医生郭琮，是作家和编辑柏杨，因为一幅涉嫌影射的漫画。
　 是知识青年大学生，我的同代人，因为他们私下组成读书会，研读《资本论》，很多人被判了20年～25年的徒刑。不等服刑期满，已经有人在牢里成为精神病患者。
　 当然还有真正的“匪谍”，譬如朱谌之，坚持自己的政治信仰到最后一刻。
　 4
　 很多年、很多年之后，我们才知道，在50年代的“白色恐怖”时期，军事法庭受理的政治案件有29407件，受难人大概有14万人。司法院的数据更高，政治案件达六七万件，如果以每一个案件平均牵连三个人计算，那么受军事审判的政治受难人应当在20万人以上。如果把这些人的家属和亲人算进去，受到政治迫害的大概就有100万人。
　 很多年、很多年之后，我们才知道，报纸上那豆腐干大小的新闻背面，藏着什么样的现实：以1950年代的前五年为例，国民党政权在台湾至少杀害了四千多人，监禁了8000个以上的“匪谍”，而所谓“匪谍”，真正的共产党只是极少数。大多数，是对现状不满、心怀理想的知识分子和文化人，是有正义感的工人和农民，是糊里糊涂不知所以被构陷的小市民。贫穷的50年代，一个人的平均月薪是200元，检举“匪谍”的奖赏却可能高达20万元。
　 制度，鼓励构陷。制度，创造冤假错案。
　 1984年12月，台湾最后两个政治犯走出了监狱；坐满了34年零7个月的思想监狱，他们走进陌生的阳光。
　 5
　 有这么多“无辜”的人受难，是因为，主事者必须“滥杀无辜”才能达到他要的震吓效果：只有在无辜的人也会遭难时，人们才会真正的心生恐惧，才会屈服。
　 同时，主事者相信自己动机的高尚，信仰自己目标的正确。“台湾是反共抗俄的基地。凡是食息于台湾的人，不论男女老幼，都应该一面有死守台湾的决心，另一面有打回大陆的决心……假如丧心病狂，竟与奸匪相勾结，……那就真正死有余辜。”（1950年7月17日《中央日报》社论）
　 为了一个自认“崇高”的目标，整肃意见相左的人，不惜滥杀无辜，以制造震吓效果，是民间做的，叫做恐怖主义。政府为之，叫做国家恐怖主义。
　 6
　 成千上万的人，本来应该是我们尊敬的老师、倚赖的同事、宠爱的子女、依恋的情人，却在我们看不见、听不见的角落里叹息、哭喊、疯狂，流血，倒地时满口尘埃。而同时，我们在校园的阳光里追求个人的幸福，经济在起飞，社会在繁荣，国家建设在大步开走。
　 你几乎以为，那些未经审判就被枪毙的人，那些被扔在黑暗中逐渐腐烂的人，是社会进步必付的代价：以他们腐烂的尸体来肥沃我们的经济发展。
　 可是有一个问题还是避不开的：我们长期默许黑暗的存在，是因为我们天真。在我们的天真里，那掌权者所教给我们的价值，仍旧是公平、正义、和平、真理那一套。他必须这么教，否则他无法令我们相信他目标的崇高和正确。然而，我们是认真的。
　 因为我们天真，所以我们认真，愈天真的人，愈认真。当社会繁荣到某一个程度，我们就不可避免地回过头来跟他较真，试图去看清楚、弄明白，公平正义究竟在哪里。
　 你再怎么天真也不能不看见漫天的蜘蛛网，不能不听见鬼魅一样的叹息，踩到青草堆里的白骨。
　 7
　 台北市文化局新闻稿
　 发稿日期：民国九十年十二月十一日
　 《拨开历史的迷雾———黄荣灿墓勾起“二·二八”与白色恐怖记忆》
　 走进“二·二八”纪念馆，一幅震慑人心的木刻版画“恐怖的检查”，令人印象深刻，卡车上满载荷枪的军人托着枪杆，向跪地求饶的小贩们威吓，私烟散了满地，惊恐溢于言表。这幅画被视为台湾“二·二八”事件的“圣画”，也常在民主运动中使用，但作者姓名却总被隐匿。很少人知道这是一位来自四川，年方29岁的年轻版画家的创作，但火热生命却亡魂于白色恐怖中，直到半个世纪之后才被人发现葬身处。
　 11日上午，龙应台以文献会主委身份，会同日籍学者横地刚、政治受难人互助会总会长吴澍培等人，赴六张犁公墓探视木刻家梅丁衍在六年前于荒烟漫草中找到的黄荣灿墓址。黄荣灿，木刻版画家，四川重庆人，民国三十四年自大陆来台，任职师大美术系，作育英才无数，作者当年亲眼目睹“二·二八”事件，作品“恐怖的检查”是现存极稀少纪录“二·二八”事件景况的美术作品。“二·二八”之后，黄荣灿并未逃离台湾，相反地仍积极活跃艺坛，遇害前还在中山堂举行现代画展，被喻为台湾第一位研究抽象画派者。民国四十一年十一月因匪谍嫌疑于马场町被枪决，事件发生后，不仅几位美术系老师合开的美术研究班草草结束，画坛写实主义也随之夭折，一位当时正在影响台湾近代美术发展的巨擘自此殒落。
　 半个世纪即将过去，民国八十四年发现黄荣灿先生埋骨的六张犁公墓，当地统计出的白色恐怖受难者坟冢达两百多座。逝者已矣，但历史不容空白，龙应台表示，从“二·二八”、白色恐怖、台湾文化协会、乃至于更早的芝山岩事件、清代义冢，一段段清楚的历史切片，都给人很大的省思空间。黄荣灿用他火热的艺术生命走访兰屿原住民，并用心描绘当时生活在贫困中的底层民众生活，带来具有人道关怀的写实主义画风，非常具有启发性。龙应台希望透过严肃的历史，使规划中的纪念公园还原白色恐怖的史貌，也让台北人学会逃脱纷扰的争论，用更宽广的文化胸襟面对未来。
　 8
　 台北市文化局新闻稿
　 发稿日期：民国九十年十二月十七日
　 《魂葬六张犁———文化局将指定白色恐怖“乱葬岗”为历史建物》
　 民国四十一年苗栗客籍人士徐庆兰因叛乱被逮捕，同年8月于马场町刑场被枪决，此后尸首即不知去向。直到民国八十二年5月28日，才被他弟弟曾梅兰锲而不舍地在六张犁公墓的竹丛里找到埋尸处。经过整理，当地一共发现两百零一个白色恐怖受难者的墓碑，隐没近半世纪的历史，终于又重新出土。
　 文化局长龙应台17日下午会同台大历史系教授王晓波、台大城乡所教授夏铸九、中原建筑系教授宪二，前往六张犁公墓顶会勘白色恐怖墓冢的历史保存价值。母亲被当作“匪谍”遭枪毙的王晓波教授表示，战后国际冷战，从1949到1954年之间，国民政府进行言论管制，处决许多异议分子，六张犁公墓所浅浅掩埋的这批冤魂，都是当年枪决后没有家属领回埋葬的受难者。
　 上周二文化局才在此就版画家黄荣灿事迹进行回顾，坟地现场虽经受难者家属稍做整理，但保存状况并不理想，现场也没有任何历史的说明，文化局希望经由历史建筑或古迹的指定，确认这批墓冢的保存范围与文化价值，让白色恐怖历史出土，具有正面的文化意义。
　 龙应台表示，今天的指定有三层意义：第一是打破过去只从“建筑”或“美学”的观点来认定古迹或历史建筑，而从历史的眼光，使所谓“文化资产”的内涵更深厚；第二是把阴森的墓地和恐怖的记忆，转化为积极的历史教育场所，让下一代人透彻认识国家的滥权所可能带来的灾难后果；第三层意涵则是把受难者的乱葬岗纳入文资法的保护对象，避免遭到可能的破坏。
　 文化局在指定历史建物的法定程序完成之后，将协助社会局把乱葬岗保存成为白色恐怖受难者的纪念墓园。
　 9
　 “1999年，我为了编辑《二十世纪台湾》画册，在许多单位的档案室搜寻有价值的历史照片。一天晚上，我在一家过去很有影响力的报社的相片柜底部找到一袋沾满灰尘的照片。打开袋子，赫然看见一批血淋淋的枪杀照片，发布单位是“军事新闻社”，发布时间是1950年。这些照片是“国防部”发往特定新闻单位，以便刊在报纸上作为警示之用，或许画面过于血腥，绝大部分均未曾公布。后来我向该报购买了这批珍贵的照片，还不确定能否以某种形式向外公开。
　 “2000年，我向台北市文化局局长龙应台提到此事，把照片给她看，最后决定以文化局的名义在‘二·二八’纪念馆的地下展厅举行特展。这是一项极为勇敢的决定。台湾社会还没有成熟到能客观看待不同政治颜色的献身者的程度，在长达50年滴水不漏的反共教育后，把共产党员以正面形象展示出来，无论其中强调何种人权或人道思想，结果都不可能是风平浪静的。
　 “2000年8月25日，《1950仲夏的马场町———战争、人权、和平的省思》特展在‘二·二八’纪念馆揭幕。这次展览打破禁忌，客观陈述了上世纪50年代初国民党政权在台北马场町刑场大肆枪杀共产党员与左翼人士的历史。由于选题特殊且披露了新史料，这个展览被媒体广泛报道，展览场每天都挤满了观众，说这是该纪念馆开馆以来影响最大的一次展览，应该不为过。”——徐宗懋，《亚洲周刊》2005／11－06
　 10
　 我记得那个中午，是午休时间，徐宗懋把照片在我桌上摊开，阳光刚好穿过百叶窗照进来，一条一条印在照片上，白花花一片。有好几张照片，是执刑者对着被枪毙者的正面近距离拍的，当作死刑完成的证据。死者的眼睛呆滞而突出，对着镜头。
　 我看看玻璃窗外，对面摩天大楼建到一半，吊车在空中滑动，工人，蚂蚁一般细小，在升降机里挥手。远处传来消防车的呼啸声，由远而近，由近而远。这些50年前因为政治信仰而被枪毙的人可知道，世界最高的楼，即将出现在这个繁华的城市里？他们的牺牲，值不值，用什么标准来量？谁又有资格来说？
　 徐宗懋完全清楚我的处境：这黑白照片里的，都是被国民党政权所虐杀的人。现在，2000年，是民进党执政的时代。办这个展览，很可能为我招来两批人马的攻讦。那卫护国民党的，会认为这是用过去丑恶的历史来打击已经失去政权的国民党。那支持民进党的，会认为我在为中国共产党辩护，更可能认为，我故意强调“外省人”在白色恐怖中被杀之众多，来淡化“二·二八”事件中国民党杀害“本省人”的相对罪责。
　 政治风暴，是逃不掉的。
　 我看看徐宗懋，说，“办吧。”但是请他在展览时，凡是枪毙者的正面照，都必须用一面黑纱罩着。照片旁边写上一句话：“为了尊重死者和死者可能幸存的家属，我们加上黑纱。如果您愿意看，请自己揭开。”
　 展览开幕后，民众反应热烈，但是攻讦果然如排山倒海而来。我被称为“刽子手”、“加害者”、“文化希特勒”、“共产党的同路人”……
　 11
　 我其实只是不相信，人权应该以政治立场来区隔。国民党、共产党、民进党、他妈的党，如果人的尊严不是你的核心价值，如果你容许人权由权力来界定，那么你不过是我唾弃的对象而已。不必吓我。
　 从10岁那年看见数学老师在黄沙操场上的“大”字尸体，我大概已经开始慢慢走向今天。
　 12
　 台湾的民主，在“两颗子弹”之后，被很多人拿来讪笑，作为负面教材。是的，民主了之后，仍旧有权力的滥用、官商的勾结、多数的暴力、庸俗之凌驾于品位、混乱无能之取代效率。电视上呈现的叫嚣和充血，被当作台湾民主的注册商标，外地人开心地嘲笑，台湾人羞耻地低头。
　 我总觉得，奇怪，为什么你偏偏看不见那静水流深的地方？
　 13
　 1987年8月30日，“台湾政治受难者联谊总会”成立。
　 1988年9月27日，“台湾地区政治受难人互助会”成立。
　 1992年，刑法100条废止。刑法100条，所谓的“言论内乱罪”，结合“动员戡乱时期”的“惩治叛乱条例”，是导致4000人被枪毙、上万人长期监禁的法源条例。
　 1997年9月26日，“50年代白色恐怖案件平反促进会”成立。主要诉求：1、推动平反活动。2、催促政府公布相关资料。3、成立六张犁和马场町的“白色恐怖纪念公园”。
　 1998年6月17日，公布制定《戒严时期不当叛乱暨匪谍审判案件补偿条例》。9月5日设立“财团法人戒严时期不当叛乱暨匪谍审判案件补偿基金会”，开始对受难者家属发放补偿金。
　 1999年，控制言论、提供文字狱法源基础的《出版法》废除。
　 2000年8月，台北市政府历经两任市长，设立了马场町纪念公园，悼念在此被枪杀的所有政治犯。
　 2000年12月，台北县政府立碑纪念“鹿窟事件”。1952年12月29日，军警包围台北县鹿窟山区，大肆围捕地下共产党人，前后四个月逮捕200多人，是50年代台湾最重大的政治案件。
　 2001年，修订《陆海空军刑法》，使军人也受合乎宪法的人权保障。原有四十四项“惟一死刑”修订后只剩下两项。
　 2001年，修订《冤狱赔偿法》，扩大赔偿范围，包括流氓。
　 2002年，废止《惩治盗匪条例》。
　 2002年6月2日，长年监禁政治重犯的绿岛设立了人权碑，碑文作者是曾在此监禁12年之久的作家柏杨：“在那个时代，有多少母亲，为她们被囚禁在这个岛上的孩子，长夜哭泣。”
　 2003年1月11日，六张犁“乱葬岗”正式成为“戒严时期政治受难者纪念公园”，对民众开放。
　 14
　 《戒严时期不当叛乱暨匪谍审判案件补偿条例》是个令人伤心的疗伤剂。“补偿条例”？为何不是“赔偿条例”？“补偿”，代表你对我宽大，“赔偿”才代表你向我认错。受难者家属要求政府更改文字，但是政府尴尬了：用“赔偿”，那么是不是代表从前的法律全都错了呢？是不是所有的法官、警察、狱吏、公务员，当年的军人，都得追究责任、判刑呢？
　 “补偿”，是一个暂时止痛折衷的办法。到2004年9月为止，依据这个条例已经受理了7454件，申请人数18046人，已经接到补偿的有5984件，其中死刑是695件。最高的补偿金是600万台币。
　 冤假错案在补偿之列，那么，真正为共产党渗透到台湾来的“匪谍”被逮捕、枪杀，在60年后的今天，补偿不补偿？
　 15
　 我把条例拿在手上。短短14条，薄薄两张纸，却重得像铁，沉得像一口黑井。那文字，简单，利落：
　 第二条本条例所称戒严时期，台湾地区系指自民国三十八年五月二十日起至七十六年七月十四日止宣告戒严之时期；金门、马祖、东沙、南沙地区系指民国三十七年十二月十日起至八十一年十一月六日止宣告戒严之时期。
　 第三条……为处理受裁判者之认定及申请补偿事宜，得设财团法人戒严时期不当叛乱暨匪谍审判案件补偿基金会；其董事由学者专家、社会公正人士、法官、政府代表及受裁判者或其家属代表组成之。
　 受裁判者及其家属代表不得少于基金会董事总额四分之一。
　 第六条补偿范围如下：
　 一执行死刑者。
　 二执行徒刑者。
　 三交付感化（训）教育者。
　 四财产被没收者。
　 第七条基金会应独立超然行使职权，不受任何干涉，依调查之事实及相关资料，认定受裁判者，并受理补偿金请求及支付。
　 第八条有下列情形之一者，不得申请补偿：
　 ……
　 二依现行法律或证据法则审查，经认定触犯内乱罪、外患罪确有实据者。
　 凡是依照今天的“现行法律”不算触犯内乱外患罪的，或者没有实据的，都可以获得补偿。
　 是的。即使是真正的“匪谍”，只要当时不是经过正当程序的审判，在今天都是补偿的对象。
　 16
　 2005年10月30日下午，上百位老人家，佝偻着背，拄着拐杖，相互扶持地蹒跚行走。秋天的风猎猎地吹，他们的头发，全白了。
　 这地方叫马场町。过去这几年，每一年秋天，他们来到这里悼念他们50年前倒下的左翼同志。尸体在移走前，地上总有一摊血。人们把土聚拢来，把血掩上。据说，因此这儿就有了一个山丘。
　 2005年10月这一场秋祭，他们献给那永远年轻的同志的诗，是这样的：
　 安息吧！死难的同志，别再为祖国担忧。
　 你流的血、照亮的路，指引我们向前走。
　 你是民族的光荣，你为爱国而牺牲。冬天有凄凉的风，却是春天的摇篮。
　 安息吧！死难的同志，别再为祖国担忧。
　 你流的血、照亮的路，我们继续向前走。
　 2005年，半个世纪之后的国民党主席也在现场，他向老人家深深、深深鞠躬，老人家微微回礼。
　 马英九背起国民党的十字架，向历史忏悔，是一个重要的象征，但却不是孤立的、独特突发的事件，而是台湾民主道路上标志里程的众多指路牌之一。他的深深一鞠躬，透露的不仅只是国民党的内在改变，最核心的驱动力，其实在于台湾的民主，造成了台湾整体的深层质变。
　 没有民主，不会有马英九的鞠躬。
　 17
　 2005年2月27日，被国民党政权监禁过21年的政治犯陈明忠破天荒地踏进了国民党的中央党部，发表演讲，题目是“被扭曲的历史集体记忆”。老人最后的结束语是这么说的：
　 “我与妻子，及妻子的兄长为‘二·二八’和‘白色恐怖’的受难者，然而，今天到中国国民党中央党部的目的，不是为了个人与家庭的悲惨遭遇来讨什么公道。只是希望同样的苦难不要在下一代发生，因此台湾各政党如果对‘二·二八’有真正的理解与反省的话，光是道歉或是补偿是不够的，更重要的是，能解决发生悲剧的历史根源，结束两岸的内战敌对状态，岛内的族群问题自然可以迎刃而解，缔造永远的和平。”
　 老人的宽厚、平和，令人动容。这是一个不曾被打倒、拒绝被扭曲的灵魂。
　 18
　 可是，“解决发生悲剧的历史根源”从哪里开始？如果埋着血的土堆不被打开，如果乱葬岗的尸骸不被发现，如果无数的陈明忠还在黑暗里从脚腐烂到喉咙，如果人们没有勇气把那“被扭曲的历史集体记忆”摊开在阳光下，请问，“解决悲剧的历史根源”从哪里开始？
　 2005年11月22日于台湾清华

Categories:

• taiwan
• pol

Did pan-blue really win?

Pan-blue won the city and county mayor election. But what can we say about the grand presidential election in 2008? Not much.

History has shown us that voter can vote for different parties in different polls. There is also the Taipei and Kaohsiung mayor election in 2006 which may allow for a re-alignment.

Even in this election, the election of city/county councillors and township mayors have received little attention. But these are relevant information for presidential vote in 2008, and they demonstrated how voters would vote for different parties in different polls.

Here is the results according to Chinatimes

	2005		2001
	blue	green	blue	green
mayors	52.26%	43.07%	47.40%	45.30%
councillors	44.63%	24.60%	43.40%	19.70%
township mayors	47.54%	24.42%	47.60%	20.10%
	change over 2001
	blue	green
mayors	+4.86%	-2.23%
councillors	+1.23%	+4.90%
township mayors	-0.06%	+4.32%

Pan blue's performance was weaker than pan-green in both of the other polls. Pan-green made solid advance (+4.3% and +4.9%), presumably at the sacrifice of independent candidates. Another interpretation for the mayor-election win of pan-blue is the Ma Ying-Jeou spillover effect. i.e., Ma single handedly boosted the votes of many candidates (e.g. Keelung). But Ma did not tie his politcal fate to the 2nd and 3rd polls. If that is indeed the case, then Ma would have a clear edge in 2008.

In any case, Ma Ying-Jeou was right, "we need to roll up our sleeves and face the challenges", there are a lot more to be done if he wants to become the next president.

---

Fig. The NT$1000 note satire on DPP corruption,with picture of 3Chen +Su + Hsieh, titled "Bald Eagle Bank, Money group rules" created by KMT during the election. KMT's success relies largely on the corruption scandal linked to Chan and Hsieh's protege. What would the result in 2008 be (if) DPP is not affected by such scandal?

(Bald Eagle is related to the stock market trading scandal)

Categories:

• taiwan
• pol

Controversy in the process to build world class universities in China

Singtao Daily reported that Harvard mathematician Yau Shingtung's criticism on the research practice in China has been censored.

The controversy is two fold

1. widespread plagiarism
2. that some professors in top universities in the US, are "cheating" in their double tenure arrangement with universities in China; among them he named one of his student, Tian Gang, a tenure professor in the mecca of mathematics, Princeton University

Some background informations

• Yao himself is one of the best mathematicians in the world today, Fields Medalist of 1982, defnitely the best ethnic Chinese mathematician alive; the famous Calabi-Yau manifold represents perhaps one of the most important tools in our pursue for the theory of everything in physics, the string theory (viz. the Calabi-Yau compactification reconciles the difference of 10 dimensional string space to the 4 dimensional space we live in)
• What is Fields Medal? It is the equivalent of Nobel Prize for mathematics. In fact, one can argue, a Fields Medalist is more "prestigeous" than a Nobel Prize laureate, because it is awarded every 4 years and only to those under the age of 40, e.g. Princeton professor (chair of department) Andrew Wiles, whose contribution is as significantl as Yau's (finishing the proof of Fermat's theorem), did not received the award and is not going to because he is now over 40
• Tian Gang is among the early waves of graduate students China sent to the US in the mid 1980s (Ph.D. in Mathematics, Harvard under Yau, 1988; M.S., Peking University 1984; B.S., Nanking University, 1982 )
• The summer vacation in Princeton last from late May to early September, about 3.5 months, Tian can afford to spend 3.5 months in Beijing, which is quite significant, almost 1/2 of the time he spends in Princeton. But Tian will also have to attend various conferences worldwide in the summer, so that may take away 1-2 months of his time.

In my opinion

• Yau is right in criticizing the widespread plagiarism, such practice is not helping China's bid to world class university
• It is stupid (and wrong) for the Ministry of Education to cernsor constructive criticism from Yau
• The building of world class research and education is one of the most important (and often overlooked by hostile factions in US and Japan) elements of China's "peaceful development" or "peaceful rise"

However, Yau's accusation of Tian is more controversial, in my view. It is related to the building of world class university in China that was widely reported earlier in the blogosphere and MSM. Yao has accused Tian of "cheating" by collecting as much as RMB1M for 1-2 months visiting professorship in Beijing University (while the base salary in Princeton is perhaps about the same or slightly higher)

• Many US professors (mostly ethnic Chinese) have accepted similar arrangement in the past in HK and Taiwan
• Nobel laureate in physics, Yang Chenning, has had dual appointment in Chinese University of HK and SUNY (Stony Brook), although the financial arrangement has not been disclosed
• Many retired professors in US, took up professorship and department chairs in the universities in HK, making as much as RMB1.5-2M base salary (plus other benefits), in addition to about 0.5M of retirement stipend from the US
• In a effort to attract world class talent, universities in China have to pay an ultra-high premium, 10x the average annual professor salary in China for 1-2 month of visiting commitment. Does this represent the force of the market, or as Yau has accused, "cheating" or "dishonesty"?
• Are our scientists, making US$70-130k in US universities, like professor Yau himself, underpaid? or overpaid? considering senior investment bankers and business excetutives who make US$0.3-2M+ on average, and some for multi-millions?
• Would the efforts of China's universities to attract talent this way really help to raise the standard of research and education in China? is 1-2 month presence enough to cultivate the research atmosphere and ensure sufficient exchange? Do universities in China have any other feasible option?

China's Ministry of Education should encourage discussion of the issues above, which might provide reasons (albeit controveersial) for such activities and defend the reputations of people like Tian, instead of silencing them.

update:

1. related post by ESWN
2. Yau has also made less controversial and very to the point criticism (the student he accused of plagiarism seems to also point to Tian) to the academic research in China, which I largely agree
3. Yau's auto-biography in a lecture is a very interesting treat.

Categories:

• china
• social
• edu

Democide in 20th century

Professor Rummel has done a lot of research in democide. I picked up this table in his site about democide in 20th century.

One of his observation is that the more power you have, the more damage you can do. Not surprising, considering the biggest democides occurs in USSR and China, both are large countries.

But it might be more illuminating if we look at other measures as well. e.g.,

• the notorious Khmer Rouge and Rwanda fell quite low in his list in such measures
• the dictators will not succeed if there was not enough collaborators in their countries to carry out the orders or to act even without order (but with silent permission)
• if you are put into the location in the time involved, what is the chance that you are killed, and what is the chance that you would have killed another human being?

So I decided to look at another measure, murder per capita. This is not to say the whole nation commit murder collectively, instead, the theoretical basis is that the % of collaborator within its population is roughly the same across population. It is not a well supported assumption, but it is indicative to certain extent (and it assumes no cultural or racial difference of % people turning wicked and crazy).

I then used Rummel's figures, and did a very rough estimate of the population of these countries during the relevant period, by averaging the beginning and end period populations of these countries.

Country	Demo -cide (k)	Pop (M)	Year	Murder /cap
USSR	61,911	141	1937	43.9%
Cambodia	2,035	7	1975	27.9%
Germany	20,946	87	1939	24.1%
Turkey	1,883	17	1900-50	11.1%
Japan	5,964	63	1900-50	9.5%
Poland	1,585	25	1900-50	6.3%
CCP	38,702	650	1900-80	6.0%
Yugoslavia	1,072	23	1987	4.7%
Vietnam	1,670	43	1950-85	3.9%
Pakistan	1,503	78	1950-80	1.9%
KMT	10,075	530	1900-50	1.9%

A few notes

• This is an incomplete list based only on Professor Rummel's table, he did not include the 1M or so killed in Rwanda. I am also curious as to why Korea War was labeled "suspect", perhaps because the numbers was too hard to verify
• This is a very rough esstimate, considering error in both number killed and also in averaging the population base
• I used "murder/cap" as a measure, because most of the cases occurred within a generation. The population base for USSR might be bigger if we count across generations, but I suppose most of the deaths are from 1924-1953, i.e., Stalin era.
• The numbers do not include indirect kills, such as famine in Great Leap Forward, and the famine and wounded death of civilian under German and Japanese occupation, or German/Japanese soldiers/civilians who were killed by allies, but the ultimate responsibility should be shouldered by the war aggressors
• Including 32M died in Great Leap forward, CCP's murder per head is 10.9%, immense for such a huge country
• Indirect death (including famine death and those killed by CCP/KMT resistance) during the Japanese invasion in 1937-45 in China, according to Rummel was(line 143) 19.605M, 5 times the direct death of 3.949M inflicted by Japanese army; If we assume the same proportion for SE Asia, the total democide would be 5x5.964=29.82M; i.e. 47.3 death per 100, so Japan (and Germany) topped USSR if including indirect death
• Indirect death inflicted by German (Russians killed) probably need to multiplied by a similar factor
• Some argued that Nazi German is much worse than fascist Japan, we can quantify it now. Nazi is about twice as worse than fascist Japan, and fascist Japan probably beat fascist Italy by a much larger factor because Italy did not make the top 10 list by Rummel
• Some of the death occurs during the process of self defense, e.g. KMT (China) conscripts died in the process of movement and desertion during Japanese invasion; and America/France were repsonsible for many of Vietnam's death. Some of the USSR kills should probably be counted on Hitler's bill by similar reasoning
• Arguably CCP and KMT could be grouped together under China. I followed Rummel's classification because most of the KMT kills was before 1949 (though it continues in Taiwan, but the population base was much smaller), and CCP kills were after 1949. So the crimes were commited by different generations.

Here are a few obseravtions

• USSR (under Stalin) tops the list, on average a 100 people killed 44, mostly their own people, followed by Khmer Rouge's Cambodia
• If we do not limit the numbers to 20th century, Ghenghis Khan may top the list, because the Mongolian population is much smalled than those they killed
• Turkish surprised me by making #4, I guess it is the Amernian genocide, civil war, plus hte first world war (for which the population base should probably be much larger).
• The biggest muder on its own people are from dictatorships such as USSR, Cambodia and CCP
• The biggest threat to neighbors are Germany (24/100 direct, perhaps 100 or 120 for indirect kills) and Japan (9.5/100 for direct and 47.3 for indirect kills)
• If we accept that the German had sincerely reflected, it makes Japan the most dangerous aggressor and threat to its neighbors
• On average, about one in every 2 Japanese is responsible for the death of one person. If we assume the women basically did not participate in the killing, then on average every one man in Japan living between 1937-1945 was responsible for a death, indirectly
• But the above is only an indicator for you to see the scale of the horror, because many Japanese men (maybe 50-70%) did not participate in the war and those who did each scored an average of 2 or 3 death
• This does not include the innocent death (and indirect death) in Hiroshima/ Nagasaki, or the Tokyo firebombs, because Tojo and his collaborators should ne held responsible, not America. It would top the 29.82M number up to around 30-31M
• The millions of death in Russo-Japanese war in 1905 was also not counted, but that likely involves a different generation of criminals.

These are horrible things. We should never let them happen again.

Categories:

• world
• japan
• war
• pol