A blog on strategies, and applying strategic perspectives on business related issues, and on miscellaneous discussions about China
2006-06-11
democracy and cat theory
Chen as Bao Zheng in his 2000 campaign ad
Related: 安替:昔日的邱毅?今日的陈水扁?只有制度,而不是圣人,才能真正除恶扬善
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“It doesn’t matter,” Deng Xiaoping said, “whether a cat is white or black. If it catches the mouse, it is a good cat.”
The reason I am a big fan of Deng XP's "cat theory" is that only undisputable and quantifiable restuls are credible measures for the effectiveness of any idea, action, or strategy, or theory, in business, politics or our daily lives.
HK commentator Wang Anran once said, "The litmus test for the real practice of the idea of democracy, is that people shall have the right to recall the leader, and that they are not intimidated when making such request. To implement democracy, it is not [just] about a system, [the system is only a means to the end] more important is that people's power shall be strong enough to recall an incompetent leader, without having to wait until his term ends. US has exercised democracy in this form, the Phillipines, Indonesia also have done this. So should HK!..."
- 真正的民主理念,是人民有权罢免国家的领导人,而且不怕提出这个诉求。要落实民主,不是一个制度,而是人民的力量真的足以使到无能的领导人下台,不必等到他的任期届满。美国有这个经验,菲律宾、印尼也有这经验,香港也一样可以有这经验!......这经验是:将一个无能的领导人赶下台来。
Democracy in the Chinese language means "Determined by people" literally,which slightly differs from (but arguably more broadly defined) than the Greek/English definition. So the more that people can determine what they want, the closer we are toward a democracy. It doesn't matter if we take the UK, US, French or German system. The system guarantees that we have the pathways to practice democracy. But no system is perfect. Results are objective and undisputable.
Is Taiwan more advanced in democratic development than HK? Can the Taiwanese people proudly shout over the strait that "we mee every test of democracy?" Will the other regime applaud if democracy prevail in Taiwan? or will it be very afraid? We will see in the next few months.
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Related: Apple Daily Editorial (Jun 7)
Editorial: 扁辭職是最佳方案
股市禿鷹案,昨天金檢局前局長李進誠遭判10年徒刑;同時,台北地檢署偵結全民電通掏空案,民進黨大老、海基會副董事長張俊宏被求刑7年。民進黨當局弊案連結,上下交征利,怎麼向全民交代?
不應託辭扁未涉案
泛藍現在的策略是罷免、倒閣交互運用,務必扳倒扁當局。馬英九也鬆口同意罷免。可是民進黨高層一致保駕護航,主張不應提罷免案,因為門檻過高,肯定不過關,不該浪費資源,造成政治動盪,不利國家發展。至於倒閣,民進黨揚言倒閣就解散國會,重選立委須按新制,就是113席和單一選區兩票制,嚇阻立委不敢倒閣,尤其親民黨等小黨,認為倒閣與重選立委是消滅他們的陰謀。
我們認為,罷免和倒閣是在野黨的《憲法》權力,無可厚非。如果民意厭惡扁政府,而貪瀆案又證據確鑿,即使過不了高門檻,也應反映民意,明知不可為而為,盡在野黨的責任。倒閣問題複雜,但也是表達民意不滿的另一途徑。再不就是上街示威。三管齊下,即使扳不倒扁,也讓他明確了解民意對他的反感;否則又搞以前那套轉移、斷尾的老把戲,走過場了事,等事過境遷,又日久玩生,故態復萌。
民進黨以扁本人未涉違法為由,力抗罷免和辭職的呼聲,實在牽強。總統辭職並不僅以違法為要件,道德瑕疵和家人的玩法弄權,領導權威破產,信任瓦解都是總統必須引咎辭職的理由。
選擇傷害最小方案
扁前幾天放話說可以考慮組聯合內閣或在野黨組閣。這當然違反他權力下放給蘇貞昌的諾言;可是也許可以幫他度過難關,也促成泛藍的內訌或分裂;可是會更傷害綠色選民的心,對08年大選弊多於利。目前藍綠糾葛相纏,任何對策都既傷人也傷己,沒有萬全之策。政客們如果有良心,就選擇對國家傷害最小的方案。
目前,還在等待拉扁下馬的最後一擊。其實弊案很多,知悉的人應多多爆料,好讓扁死了懶驢打滾和僥倖之心。畢竟扁辭職是社會和經濟代價最小的選擇,比罷免和倒閣溫和節省得多,也有利於民主慣例的形塑。
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Ming Pao Op-ed
歐陽五﹕阿扁堅拒下台的背後
【明報專訊】6月5日,台北股市遭遇「黑色星期一」,八大類股齊跌,指數重挫244點。
同一天,民進黨新「鐵三角」蘇貞昌、游錫、柯建銘在台北喜來登大飯店聚餐,遭遇不明火警,虛驚一場。
而在陳水扁的故鄉台南市,民進黨基層群眾罕有地加入嗆扁聲浪,首日就有上千人連署,要求陳水扁下台。
這三件事,並非完全不相干。聯想到近日台南接連發生的兩起有感地震,島內坊間盛行的「呂秀蓮將代理總統」等傳言,似乎都印證出台灣政局走向的高度不確定性。
在「駙馬爺」趙建銘遭羈押的這些日子裏,台灣民選領導人陳水扁坐困愁城。他宣示權力下放,砍掉左右手馬永成、林錦昌,並讓「國安會」兩位副秘書長去職,但並未如在野黨領袖和輿論所期望的那樣,「知所進退、主動下台」。觀察家分析,阿扁堅拒下台,原因複雜,大致有三﹕
1. 眷戀權力,更擔心失去權力。一旦提前去職,對於阿扁來說,將失去最大、最有效的保護傘,「總統府」、「第一家庭」、「第一親家」涉嫌的種種弊案將浮出水面,無所遁形。且,民眾疑慮重重的「三一九槍擊案」也有可能重新提上日程被追究偵緝。
2. 體制因素,奈他不何。歷經李登輝、陳水扁十餘年的主導,台灣的「雙首長制」明顯偏向「總統制」,「總統」雖大權在握,卻有權無責。依現行憲政體制,其地位很難撼動,「罷免」門檻特別高,「倒閣」存在大風險。對於在野黨,特別是諳熟法律卻又書生氣有餘、手段不足的馬英九來說,很難真正有所作為,「謀定後動」有其難言之隱。
3. 對弊案的可能控制。上台6年,阿扁對媒體、軍隊墨甚深,檢調也難言中立。檢調這次約談趙建銘,某種程度是順應民意,但遲滯十餘日才進行,給趙建銘留出進入「總統府」聽阿扁「訓斥」的機會。陳水扁的「御用律師」顧立雄出馬、「法務部長」施茂林表示很快就結案的放話,都給人想像的空間。本周,台開案將偵結,趙建銘能否交保是輿論的一個焦點。但無論起訴與否,都可能無法真正傷及陳水扁和他的「第一家庭」。
台灣政局多變,阿扁能抗多久,有待繼續觀察。也許,真如台灣媒體所言,不是不報、時候未到,民意終會作出自己的裁決。吊詭的是,這些年台灣習慣以普選、民主傲視華人社會,但如此多的弊案,卻至今無法像其他一些國家和地區一樣讓「總統」下台。從深層意義上講,這也折射出「台灣式民主」還有很長的路要走,民主固然可貴,法治更要健全。
2006-06-09
Valuation of the Cathay Pacific Dragon Airline Merger
(right click to download: the CX/KA merger song)
source: "I actually like this song", video
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The much anticipated HK airline merger has been speculated for over a year. Final bits of difference kept delaying the public announcement. CX called off a planned press conference on Thursday evening. However, according to CX insider note, the deal was finally reached by the 5 parties at the top floor of Pacific Place on Thursday night.
Update: Deal is finally announced
- 1) CX to pay HK$12.29bn in total, in cash and new stocks
- a) KA valued at HK$10bn
- b) CX will pay Citic and CNAC a total of HK$8.22bn for 82.2% share, ending up with 100% KA in total (KA will keep its brand for at least 6 years)
- c) CX will pay HK$4.07bn to buy another 10% of CA. CX will end up with 20% CA in total
- 2) CNAC will acquire 10.16% CX share with 5.39bn, presumably using the cash it received from selling KA/CA
- 3) CX and CA will form a cargo JV, which will be based in Shanghai
- 4) CITIC share in CX will be reduced from 25.4% to 17.5%
- 5) CNAC will hold 7.34% CX, and none in KA
- 6) Swire to maintain control of CX in future under side agreements
His "Method 1" deaverages the profits from 3 categories, passenger, cargo and 'others'. He suggested we could use benchmarking and look for comparables. In addition, he thought it is possible to adjust the benchmarking ratios using capacity and load factors using simple ratios.
There are a couple problems about that.
- Usually it is easy to find revenue split, but very difficult to find profit split. Especially for airlines. Because, apart from a few cargo planes, most of the cargos actually go into the belly of the passenger planes. (A main reason why CX does not fly to Hawaii. no cargo to fill) Now how do you allocate the cost to cargo?
- Load factor and profit is a highly non-linear relationship. e.g. a company can be just breaking even at load factor of 65%, while the profit at 90% load would be 5 times as much as that at 80%. That is why airlines tend to fill their last seats at deeply discounted coach tickets, since there is very small incremental cost.
His "Method 2" is a highly level benchmarking using comparables. That sounds a simpler job. However, I believe for KA, CX is a much closer comparable than CA. In fact, KA is almost a clone out of CX, as many of the staff were cross-trained back in the honeymoon years.
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Applying CX's multiples (PE, PB, etc) to KA's corresponding numbers (and adjust for asset/debt) should yield the fair market value for KA, fairly accurately. Those numbers should be published when the transaction becomes official. (Kong Chan worries about data availability and compromised on the elss accurate methods.)
However, "fair market value" is what KA should sell for in an IPO. It is the price for you and me. For CX, the value is much larger. And Citic/CNAC know this. CX needs to pay the premium for
- Elimination of a competitor. No more price cutting in China routes. No more bickering on route expansion, hence saving management resources and time to market. Price premium for all ex-HKG flights (both CX and KA, in particular those that overlap)
- Synergy: lower cost in maintaining the China outports, PEK/TPE/SHA/XMN, feed traffic LAX-HKG-China, better utilization for both passenger and cargo due to larger scale, consolidation of HKG base and corporate overhead, etc.
- Potential growth: assuming KA's routes (developing Asia and China) will grow faster than CX's more matured markets (Europe, Japan Australia and N America)
- Other intangible (and tangible) benefits: getting into China market for CX, the leverage inside oneworld alliance, etc.
This is good news for CX and KA. But bad news for consumers in HK. Monopoly is never a good thing for consumers.
p.s. Bloggers seems to have some technical glitches recently. I could not put this into his comment field.
2006-06-06
Haditha and Chinese statecraft
1) Evolving reports about Haditha, suffice it to say the scandal (whatever the final finding is) hurts not only the US reputation and the already weakened domestic support, but also the situation in Iraq. Such events are going to drive more Iraqis into the arms of bin Laden and his allies, and lead to vicious cycles of anti-US resistance and more brutality from already distressed US soldiers.
2) Thomas Barnett believes the mistakes in Haditha is a result of US not getting more systematic and serious on nation-building in Iraq. I have no doubt Bush sincerely wants to get on nation-building in Iraq, although I could agree with Barnett that Bush is not serious enough, in that various interest groups and distraction has kept him from focusing on the right direction. I also agree with him that economic is a crucial element in the formula, which has largely been overlooked. Ahh, I mean Iraqi economics, not Halliburton economics. So the disagreement between Barnett and Bush's clan (Or Cheney?) is on implementation and tactic, not on strategy.
- Barnett also seems to be very defensive on and sympathetic with the US military, which is fine, as every suspect is presumed innocent. Although I believe no one is perfect and it is not surprising if there are bad eggs in a big basket, especially if the weather condition is hot and hostile.
I believe there is more fundamental issue about Haditha. It would be easier to comprehend if we draw on the works by ancient Chinese statecraft, which the pentagon (and Philsbury) are aware of but seem to have focused on the less important aspects.
Why does the alleged crime in Haditha have anything to do with Chinese statecraft? One needs to note that Chinese statecraft has a much longer and wider view of war, to the extent that there is no clear boundary between war, politics and diplomacy. i.e., The objective is to solve a problem with minimum cost and maximum impact, whether it is done by militaristic, political, economic or diplomatic means. Enlarged your options would surely lower your cost.
Long before Haditha, there was this short essay in PLA's newspaper, the "China Defense/PLA Daily" (中国国防报) (original in Chinese cached below). The essay analyze how the pentagon and Bush 'regime' misread Sun Zi and other Chiense statecraft, even though most strategists in US have spent considerable time on learning Sun Zi. A important point in the discuss is the idea of "Great Scrupulousness on War" (慎战) [square brackets are my additions to the original essay]
- Sun Zi (Ch 2), "[After wins, weapons get dulled, and soldiers get tired, your ability to attack is weakened. Prolonged expedition leads to exhaustion of domestic resources..... So I will do anything to win the war quicker even if that would mean I adopt very clumsy and stupid tactics. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.] If one is not thoroughly acqainted with all the downsides of going to war, then one is not able to understand [and apply] all the upsides of war"
- 《孙子》说:“[其用战也,胜久则钝兵挫锐,攻城则力屈,久暴师则国用不足。夫钝兵挫锐,屈力殚货,则诸侯乘其弊而起,虽有智者,不能善其后矣。故兵闻拙速,未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而国利者,未之有也。] 故不尽知用兵之害者,则不能尽知用兵之利也。”
- Wu Qi, "It is easy to win a war, but difficult to maintain and guard after the win. Therefore, in all the wars in this world, it is a disaster if one wins 5 wars, a tired nation if one wins 4 wars, a hegemone if wins 3 wars, a king if wins 2, an emperor if it only takes one war to reach there.
- Xun Zi offered an explanation to Wu Qi, "People will be tired and used after several wars. The leaders will become arrogant after a few wins. Leading tired people with arrogant leader, I have not heard a single case that the nation is not annihilated."
- 《吴子·图国》进而提出一个振聋发聩的独特思想:“然战胜易,守胜难。故曰,天下战国,五胜者祸,四胜者疲,三胜者霸,二胜者王,一胜者帝。是以数胜得天下者稀,以亡者众。”为什么胜仗打多了反而是坏事?对此,《荀子·议兵》解释说:“数战则民疲,数胜则主骄,以骄主驭疲民,未有不亡者也。”
- Hundred War Strategy concluded, "Armed force is a dangerous tool. Going to a war itself is an immoral thing. You go to war only if there is no other choice. You cannot go to war because you are strong, your nationa is big, you have a large population [not the right reason mean there are pitfalls you have not considered and there is no guaranteed win - SB]......war is like fire, if you are not careful you are going to burn yourself sooner or later..."
- 《百战奇略·好战》总结历史上穷兵黩武之害,说得非常好:“夫兵者,凶器也;战者,逆德也。实不获已(万不得已)而用之,不可以国之大、民之众,尽锐征伐,征讨不止,终至败亡,悔无所追。然兵犹火也,弗戢将有自焚之患。黩武穷兵,祸不旋踵。”
- [I will add this] Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. ( 孙子曰: 兵者,国之大事,死生之地,存亡之道,不可不察也。)
The audience of this essay is for the PLA officers and soldiers, not for foreigners. So the author's intention is not propaganda against US or the infamous war on WMD. He wanted all PLA officer to understand the essence of grand strategy, and the scrupulous approach to war.
Inevitability?
While I do not have much doubt that US military is very well disciplined in general and these (Haditha, etc) are isolated events, I also believe human being are not perfect. However well trained the marines are, there will be some bad eggs. Even good eggs could turn bad occasionally under extreme environment. The question is, one in how many for the bad eggs? This then leads to a conclusion that it is a matter of sooner or later that such tragedy will happen. Better training will delay such happening, but there is no way to guarantee it not happening forever, especially when place under unfriendly environment such as, local distrust and hostility to a foreign occupying force. The source of the problem is the problematic war itself. If one is aware of such downside, one would have planned for it, or would have stop the prolonged war soon after Saddam was capture (assuming the war cannot be avoided given how evil Saddam was).
IMO it is not about nation-building. Nation-building is easier said than done, espeically if mistakes has already been made. It is, as Sun Zi said, one of the many side effects of a prolonged war, and it is about the ability to fully anticipate the downside of such a war. This is not spoken with hindsight. Should we anticipate more disasters like such? Very likely, unless the Iraqi's view on the occupation can be turned into one that is not for its oil or for setting up a puppet government.
Simple solution
Given such consideration, it is not difficult to identify the source of the problem and hence locate the solutions:
- Leave Iraq to Iraqis, get out asap
- (A transition model would be to leave it to UN and nations not involved with the invasion, hoping the local would be less hostile. But US itself, which is already distrusted by many in Iraq, needs to get out asasp)
- What about nation-building?
- What if a "Hamas" (the mullahs and their proteges) is elected?
- Leave the nation-building to the Iraqi. For the pessimists: the worse case scenario? A Saudi Arabia or a Shah Pavhlevi? Let's trust the Iraqi, most of whom had rejected and hated Saddam. Let's trust democracy.
- The chance a "Hamas" would be elected is much more likely if US occupation force stay. If a "Hamas" is elected, are you going to sabotage it? or invade it again? Does that mean democracy is wrong for Iraq? Do you trust the people? As Thomas Barnett correctly pointed out, "it is the economic, stupid!" If Iraq are well-off and happy. Iraq will be a good world citizen. This is what we should focus on, making them happy. With all the oil underground, this is not difficult as not if they are left to their own.
- The problem for this government is that it is widely viewed as American puppet. Even though there was a democratic election, many people did not participate. Leave it to their own, they have no choice but forming their own government
Update: see the source of 4GW.
p.s. see useless tree as well, which I very much agree with. He also elaborated on what US military did right in the beginning of the war (re: Sun Zi) and offered a better translation of Sun Zi's line "故兵闻拙速,未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而国利者,未之有也。".
Related: 3 months ago the brilliant journalist Francesco Sisci compared "political black holes" and "rouge states", which leads to questioning the implication of TWII (the war in Iraq) implies for GWOT.
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美国鹰派伊拉克战争背错《孙子兵法》值得反思
中国国防报
2004-04-27 13:06
click to read more
尽管美国新保守主义鹰派的智囊们号称学习了有“东方兵学鼻祖”之称的《孙子兵法》,尽管伊拉克战争刚刚结束时,日本《朝日新闻》撰文称,伊拉克战争是美国借用中国《孙子兵法》的现代版,但实际上美国鹰派远未领会到以《孙子兵法》为代表的中国古典战略文化的精髓。可以说,伊拉克战争,美国新保守主义鹰派背错了《孙子兵法》。这里不妨借中国古典兵学,为伊拉克战争“看病”,或许会有一番道理。
“道”
中国古典战略文化特别强调“道”或“道义”。“道”、“道义”用今天的话说就是政治、公理、正义或人心。这恰恰是迷信实力的人所不以为然的。
《孟子·公孙丑上》说得好:“得道者多助,失道者寡助。寡助之至,亲戚叛之(‘亲戚’在这里可以理解为国内外人民,包括盟邦);多助之至,天下顺之。”又说:“以力假仁者霸(中国古代战略文化中所谓‘王’‘霸’有其特定的含义,与今天的霸权主义有别,但其基本精神仍可参考)……以德行仁者王……以力服人者,非心服也,力不赡也;以德服人者,中心悦而诚服也。”
《管子·重令》则说:“地大国富,人重兵强,此霸王之本也,然而与危亡为邻矣……天道之数,至则反,盛则衰。人心之变,有余则骄,骄则缓怠。夫骄者,骄诸侯(‘诸侯’在这里可以理解为列国);骄诸侯者,诸侯失于外;缓怠者,民乱于内……此危亡之时也。”
《荀子·王制》有一段话跟今天的伊拉克形势非常贴切,这段话的大意是:别国有别国的家园领土,他们的人民也愿意为保家卫国而战。如果我们倚恃强力,战而胜之,那么对别国人民的伤害必然非常大。对别国人民的伤害越深,他们对我们的仇恨就越深,就越是会天天和我们战斗。并且我们倚恃强力所取得的“胜利”越大,我们对自己人民的伤害就越深。对我们人民的伤害越深,人民对我们的仇恨也越深,他们就越是会天天背离我们。这样,别国的人民要和我们拼死战斗,我们的人民也要背离我们,这就是那些强悍的霸主最后反而衰弱的道理。得到土地却失去人民的支持,背上累赘而丧失成功的机会,这就是那些庞大的帝国最后反而崩溃的道理。
这些话反复告诫今天的人们,在国际关系中要讲道义,多做好事,以德服人,不要轻侮列国,以强凌弱,以大欺小,否则就会到处树敌,丧失人心,以致众叛亲离,在国际上陷于孤立和被动,甚至败亡。
“刚柔”
中国古典战略文化从哲学的高度反对纯刚纯强,强调刚柔相济,进而强调以柔克刚。这是中国传统战略思想的主要特色之一。《老子》最注重这点:“柔弱胜刚强。”“天下莫柔弱于水,而攻坚强者莫之能胜。”“天下之至柔驰骋天下之至坚。”“故坚强者死之徒。是以兵强则不胜,木强则折。强大处下,柔弱处上。”
《列子·黄帝》发挥说:“天下有常胜之道,有不常胜之道。常胜之道曰柔,常不胜之道曰刚。”
古兵书《军谶》残篇云:“纯刚纯强,其国必亡。”
《三略·上略》也说:“柔者德也。刚者贼也。弱者人之所助,强者怨之所攻。”
以上所引片段充满了关于刚柔的朴素辩证法。这种“贵柔”思想的深层含义是:从长远的、大战略的观点看,弱小的新生事物具有真正强大的生命力;而处于极盛时期的事物貌似强大,在一定条件下最终要走向腐朽没落。引申到国际政治上,“贵柔”不是片面地反对富国强兵,也不是主张对外越软弱越好,而是要向“水”那样寓刚于柔。水的柔软无以复加,而且它总是处于低下的位置,但水的冲击力(例如洪水、波涛)则强大无比。按此原理,一个真正强大的国家要把自己放在适当的位置,要懂得平等待人,以理服人,这样才有可能维持长盛的局面。而如果倚恃一时的优势,处处逞强、骄横跋扈,则迟早会向自己的反面转化,招致不祥的后果。
“慎战”
中国古典战略文化历来主张“慎战”,即使对待正义战争也是如此,严厉批判穷兵黩武的“好战”思想。这一点对于美国鹰派们具有特殊的意义。
《老子》说:“夫佳兵者不祥之器,物或恶之,故有道者不处。”“胜而不美,美之者,是乐杀人。夫乐杀人者,则不可以得志于天下矣。”又说:“民不畏死,奈何以死惧之”。
《孙子》说:“故不尽知用兵之害者,则不能尽知用兵之利也。”又说:“主不可以怒而兴师,将不可以愠而致战……怒可以复喜,愠可以复悦,亡国不可以复存,死者不可以复生。故明君慎之,良将警之,此安国全军之道也。”又说:“百战百胜,非善之善者也。”
《吴子·图国》进而提出一个振聋发聩的独特思想:“然战胜易,守胜难。故曰,天下战国,五胜者祸,四胜者疲,三胜者霸,二胜者王,一胜者帝。是以数胜得天下者稀,以亡者众。”为什么胜仗打多了反而是坏事?对此,《荀子·议兵》解释说:“数战则民疲,数胜则主骄,以骄主驭疲民,未有不亡者也。”
《百战奇略·好战》总结历史上穷兵黩武之害,说得非常好:“夫兵者,凶器也;战者,逆德也。实不获已(万不得已)而用之,不可以国之大、民之众,尽锐征伐,征讨不止,终至败亡,悔无所追。然兵犹火也,弗戢将有自焚之患。黩武穷兵,祸不旋踵。”
美国鹰派们凭借美国是唯一超级大国的独特地位,罔视公认的国际关系准则,置联合国及其他国际组织(甚至包括美国自己建立的联盟)于不顾,在反恐的大旗下,动辄先发制人,想打谁就打谁,想怎么打就怎么打,一个没打完就准备着打下一个。对他们来说,上述古圣先贤的至理名言是多么响亮的警钟!
隐患
虽然,美国鹰派不乏搞战略的行家,不能说他们对上面道理不懂,而且,他们并非排斥东方文化。比如《孙子兵法》自20世纪90年代起,就一直受到美国军方的推崇,海湾战争中,美军人手一册《孙子兵法》,伊拉克战争更号称美军《孙子兵法》的现代版。但实际上,美国鹰派对于以《孙子兵法》为代表的东方古典战略文化的精髓缺乏领悟。他们采取的是实用主义态度,仅仅将《孙子兵法》当作行军打仗的教科书,却完全忽略了其在大战略层面上的教导。同时,美国绝对优势的军事力量和号令天下的强烈欲望也使其头脑发热。所以,尽管他们的思考中有着细致严密的战术思考,有着实用主义的战略思考……但在更高层次的大战略上,他们的思考止步不前了。因此,尽管美军能制定出相当高明的军事计划,但在大战略决策上却终究陷入了主观、冒险的陷阱。体现在伊拉克战争上,就是美军不顾国际国内反对浪潮,执意进攻伊拉克,短时间内攻城略地,推翻了萨达姆政权,但却不可避免地在世人面前输了理,直至今日陷入困境。伊拉克战争给美国鹰派们上了沉重的一课。基督教圣经中有一句话说得好:“播种的是风,收获的将是飓风。”
美国鹰派伊拉克战争背错《孙子兵法》的隐患,看来值得人们反思了。
Poincare conjecture proved by Chinese/Russian/American mathematician
This is the most important milestone since Fermat's Last Theorem was proved by Andrew Wiles of Princeton (Cao HD also received his PhD from Princeton in 1986, a student of Yau Shingtung). Both proofs were done with hundreds of pages of paper.
- According to Huang Daren (Chancellor of Sun Yatsen University), Zhu said, "This is international team work, Russian made great contribution. We progressed step-by-step, I was lucky to be at at the right place to finish the goal with Cao Huaidong, taking the ball passed by our international colleagues."
- 中山大学校长黄达人转述朱熹平的话说:“其实国际上很多团队都在做这个事情,做出了很大的贡献,特别是俄国数学家,这个猜想的完成,是国际数学界的同行们你一步我一步,共同做出来的。我只是比较幸运,由我和曹怀东完成了临门一脚。”
Poincare conjectured that a simply connect space is essentially a sphere, topologically. i.e. you can squeeze and mould (without inducing or splitting hole or gaps) to change any objects that are "simple connected" to become a sphere.See Ming Pao, Google news for report. For more technical introduction and historical (insider) notes see this blog (in Chinese). As usual, blog is at least 2 weeks ahead of MSM.
Zhu did not publish for 4-5 years when he switched from PDE to Geometric Analysis about 10 years ago. His employer, Sun Yatsen University did not attempt to pressure him. ZYS Chancellor Huang said, his school tried not to exert pressure on professors who have already proved themselves. He added, for these people, research is their lives. If this report is true and such policy is widely (and effectively) implemented in China, we may expect to see major transformation in China's academic developement. (According to Yau, Zhu refused a professorship from MIT and said he preferred to stay at SYSU)
Cao HD is already 46 year old. Zhu is 44. Unfortunately, they are not "young enough" (under 40) to be become the first Fields Medal for a Chinese (doing his research in China). Still, enormous achievement. This is the Peaceful Development, the development that pentagon worried so much about.
p.s.
1) Thurston had received his Fields Medal already in 1982 (same year when Yau Shingtong got his).
2) Freedman got his in 1986 for proving the case in 4-dimensional space.
3) Smale the case of dimension larger than and equal to 4 and got his in 1966.
4) Fields Medal is awarded every 4 years to mathemticians who are under 40 year old. Typically there are 3-5 receivers.
2006-06-04
Viewing: Beijing pictures
我爱北京天安门 (I Love Beijing Tiananmen) - click for mp3

People's Hero Monument in TAM Square - click for close view

2006-06-03
The annual ritual: pentagon's new report (updated)
I usually do not have much to say about these old whines repackaged in new bottles. But other than the rhetorics (figure inflation and 'intransparency' aka 'show me your underwears'), the summary and the China's Strategy sections are actually pretty good. The recognition of the '24 characters' and the translation of the added phrase shows that pentagon actually gets what China's objectives are. The number of pages it spent on strategy showed a genuine interest in understanding China. It is a good thing for both the US and China. Hopefully this would finally lead to true understanding and mutual trust. For this, I would praise the new report. Anyway, since it is inevitable that someone would ask my view and I have talked so much about an abstract term called "strategy" (even though strategy does not neccessarily apply to military, and increasingly less so), I feel obliged to create a post, even if that means borrowing other people's good stuff.
- 0) Excutive summary: pretty standard, and quite a fair summary. Except the last 2 paragraphs where it raised the same rhetoric question of China's intention, despite the fact that the answer lies a few paragraphs above (Taiwan)
- 1) Key dev/China' grand strategy: some pretty obvious inaccuracy (intentional biase?) here, on East Sea dispute with Japan. Chinese drilling was on undisputed area. Pentagon made a mistake in saying that the drilling in on the disputed area. The implication on who is stepping over the line is totally changed.
- 2) Understanding China's Strategy: it is worth noting that despite the rhetoric on China's increase in military spending, it fairly noted that such increase "lagged behind the growth in overall government expenditure over the same time".
- 3) China's doctrine: many inaccuracies here:
- a) Korea: China did feel the threat.
- b) India 1962: it was 100% self defense. The report irresponsibly confused active defense in the tactical sense with agressive offense.
- It also tried to justify the "intransparency" accusation with ancient Chinese 'statecraft'. But it made a big mistake that these statecraft has always been part of China's culture and logically emphasized in military schools. In fact, they are also studied in almost every country, including West Point. -- the biggest mistake is the Pentagon naively equates Chinese statecraft with "deceptive trick" (probably based on Pillsbury's imagination). In reality, wars in China before Sun Zi were like the Incas before Pizzaro. Deception was not part of military tactics and was widely despised of. Chinese statecraft contains a lot more than deception, though 'deception' was widely exaggerated given such historical background
- One regretable miss, for such an elaborated report, is the threat of terrorism China faces. It is not US that faces terrorism alone in the world. Next time US asks China to cooperate on Afghanistan (Iran!), China would probably ask for the Taliban Uyghur members it turned over to Albania
- Joseph Wang (May 23 entry: no permalink?) is not sure whether it is confused or clueless (or pretending to be confused?). In additional, Joseph re-iterated Sun Tze's doctrine on strategy,
- "China has realized for the last two thousand years that military matters, foreign policy, domestic policy, and economics are not separate realms"
- Thomas Barnett graded the new insight it offers as he would have done to a new undergraduate term paper (do not miss Joseph's comments below)
- (Update) China hand discussed about the 'second island chain'. I have a different interpretation. I, like Joseph, believe everything has to do with Taiwan. China does not have the luxury to deal with too many objectives or ambitions. China does not intend to sue force if such situation can at all be avoided (even if the Anti-secession Law is triggered, provided independence is not declared). However, China must want to maintain a credible threat to secession, so that ASL will not be triggered. Therefore, it needs to make any US involvement as costly as possible, so as to tell DPP in Taiwan that you cannot fully rely on US if you go down that path. Extending the naval capability a couple hundred miles beyond the east side of Taiwan will help such objective. I do not believe the second island line defines China's "sphere of influence" at all. Given the Tao Guang Yang Hui ("Lay low and nourish in obscurity") strategy devised by Deng and closely followed by Jiang and Hu. China's sphere of influence is defined by its own claimed border. This would be the case for at least another 30-50 years. Before that China is only interested in economic cooperation with its neighbors.
On the ocean, this means South China Sea and as far as its continental shelf stretches to. The so called second island chain does not fall into the domain of China's military ambition, and would not even exist if no support to DPP in Taiwan is expected to come from the east. - (update May 31) Slate's Fred Kaplan's commentary. He noticed the fine prints or "lagged the growth in overall government expenditures" as well. He also talked about the budget estimate and refuted the 2x/3x myth in here.
- (update June 2) Arms Control Wonk on China NFU (Nuke policy and promise)
- Arm Chair Generalist (via ACW) is struck at DoD's tone and he commented on LA Times and WP's editorials. Don't miss the exchange with Bobby in the comment field, especially the Sun Tzu "long view" comments. These are the people who got the essence of Sun Tzu
- (Hat tips Billsdue) COuncil on Foreign Relations has a more sensible view on "The Scope of China's Military Threat"
Unrelated: Why JW is angry at NED (Mar 25 entry - use edit/find to search the page)
Updated link: comments from a PLA officer (in Chinese)
Views from Taiwan: Jiang Chun-nan
- It is impossible for Ah Bian to cut himself clean from his son-in-law Chao. You can't cut something that is non-static and moving. Only when you cut off can you cut the loss. The scandals are like mud-slide, how do you cut off a mud-slide?
- Now it became a public trial of Chen Shui Bian on the media. Evidences are not necessarily verified. People would assume the accusations are true as they are keen to watch.
- Bian got his best lawyer to defend Chao. Some people picked on this. But this is only natural, as relationship by blood cannot be cut off. Even if he did not do this, he still could get himself clean from the mess. [So why bother?] However, the spirit of our legal system is everybody (even if we know he is guilty for murder) is entitled to a fair case and the best lawyer he could get. We need to separate law and politics, a fair legal case with both sides enlisting the best lawyers would help the society cultivate the spirit of law and justice. Politics and morality are separate issues [the prosecutor team may not be the best, and most likely only mediocre, but it should have the media and public behind]
- It was revealed by another DPP legilator that CSB's wife Wu lied blatantly about her meeting an exile criminal Chen Youhao, and Chen alleged money was passed in that meeting. Wu refused to comment. To the public this is like admitting she had lie. It is not against the law if she did not lie in court. But the event itself (and the lies) is as serious as bribery.
- Similarly, Bian sweared Wu did not take the Sogo gift certificates, he would step down if that is the case. Such swears are common among politicians, but not many people keep their promises. Not sure what Bian is going to do if that is indeed the case.
- Blood relationship cannot be cut off. But power and authority(&respect) can be. Power comes from position, authority comes from honesty. Bian still has power, but lost authority(&respect). How lame and pale is power without authority and respect?
1. There are rational people in Taiwan
2. Jiang has criticized pan-Blue and Ma Ying-Jeou before. He is also defend Chen Shui Bian about the lawyer issue here. You do not have to side with one camp and write good comments.
3. Some views from Taiwan discounted Apple Daily as tabloid. Despite all its faults, Apple Daily can be very good. (to Jimmy Lai, this is what we want to see from Apple Daily HK and Taiwan)
Related: Give Annette Lu a chance by Du Nianchung (cached below)
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無法切割的親情
有些人主張民進黨應和阿扁切割,阿扁應和趙建銘切割,綠營應和來自藍營的陳哲男和趙玉柱切割,有了切割,才可設停損點。可惜,弊案和醜聞有如土石流,泥土石塊不斷滑落,既無法停損,更無從切割。
第一家庭人人喊打,任何爆料都不必求證,寧可信其有,先定罪再說,談話性節目變成批扁大會,不分清晨或深夜一再重播,看多少遍都不厭倦,形成對阿扁的人民公審。
權力權威已分離
第一家庭聘請大律師顧立雄幫趙建銘打官司,受到不少批評,因為顧立雄是阿扁的御用律師,他的出馬證明政治力介入。但是,阿扁幫女兒找最好的律師,是親情的自然表現,如果他袖手旁觀,見死不救,也不可能切割關係,只會引起更多批評,即使殺人犯也有權利聘請最好的律師,何況趙建銘所涉及的刑責不重,案情也不太複雜,雖然國人皆喊打,但是法律和政治要分開,法律的攻防戰有助於法治社會的培養,政治和道德問題另當別論。
吳淑珍嚴詞否認見過陳由豪,如今沈富雄公開承認他陪陳由豪拿政治獻金到官邸,如果吳淑珍沒有出面澄清解釋,則無異於承認說謊,這不是法律問題,但它的嚴重性不輸於特權賄賂。
同理,阿扁曾說過,吳淑珍沒有收受SOGO禮券,否則他將下台,這種毒誓,政壇上司空見慣,但卻很少人說到做到,如果證明確有其事,不知將何以自處。
親情是無法切割的,但是權力和權威可以切割,權力來自地位,權威來自誠信,阿扁仍握有權力,卻已失去權威,沒有權威的權力,是何等蒼白無力!
江春男
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給呂秀蓮一個機會
李登輝說台灣之子不只一位,做不好就換,馬英九說如果阿扁有羞恥心和責任感,應該自動下台,面對來自四面八方的壓力,阿扁的處境日益艱難,他顯然已把個人毀譽置之度外了。
不過,政客對羞恥心和責任感的定義,與一般人不同,阿扁對於家門不幸,深致歉意,這是一種羞恥心,但他不想因此下台,因為他對黨國有很大的責任感,他認為如果下台,自己一走了之,國政亂成一灘,那才是真正缺乏責任感。
權力不是蘋果,熟了就會掉下來,馬英九身為最大反對黨,面對政治最大轉折點,卻不想領導群眾,也不想創造民意,只想等待阿扁自動請辭,就一位領導者而言,這種無所作為,何嘗不是缺乏責任感?
阿扁即使變成虛位元首,他仍然擁有一些發球權,除了權力下放,讓蘇貞昌成為實權閣揆之外,他還可以採取聯合內閣,聯合政府或任命多數黨組閣等多種策略,當這些步數都用盡,他才會下台。
國親兩黨可以發動罷免、彈劾和倒閣,也可以上街頭示威以升高衝突,迫使阿扁下台,但每一種策略都有優缺點,如果要把各黨派的利害,加上個人利害一齊計算,永遠也算不清楚,這種抗議示威活動,如果無法一鼓作氣,則再而衰,三而竭,除非弊案扯到阿扁本人,否則後勢必然消退,尤其是國親各有算盤,時間一拖,圖窮匕現,可能破局。
代理總統或能展現優點
雖然蘇貞昌獲得更大權力,但朝小野大的局面只會更加惡化,難有改善空間,萬一蘇揆做不好,呂秀蓮扶正的機會大增。民間傳說台灣將出現非民選女總統,民進黨必須做此心理準備。
呂秀蓮學經歷豐富,一旦她代理的機會出現,人們可能會發現她深藏不露的優點,不斷出現。
政治是一種可能的藝術,給呂秀蓮一個機會,不論會帶來多少驚奇或驚喜,至少是一個很好的政治試驗,也可為民進黨的進步性加分,在民進黨剩餘的有限光陰裏,即使作最壞打算,也壞不到那裏去吧!
2006-06-01
Gapminder

downloaded versions at gapminder.org
Looking at the chart above (where the circle series shows data from year 1975-2004), we see the fetrtility rate in most countries are dropping, except for USA and Russia. Russian income and fertility rate both took a turn around 1996-7, very likely a result of the economic/political transition after USSR collapsed. A few hypothesis regarding Malthus
- There is a clear trend of fertility rate decline over time since 1970s. Is this a result of income growth? or "pressure" (population density/career pressure)
- A noted example is HK, with fertility rate below 1. It is an extremely densely populated urban environment, where there is very little living space (per capita living area is probably lower than 100 sq ft/10 sq m!), working hour is extremely long (many work from 9am to 8pm, for 5/25 days/week). The result may be both psychological and physiological
- This seems to be very strong evidence for Sean Meade's assertion of "Malthus not happening". But I think it is simpler (or more complex) than that. This only shows the self-correcting course of nature. There is a limit for the total number of people our earth can support, given the techonology human being can command at the particular era. When such limit is approached, self-correcting mechanism is "switched on". Such mechanism include famine, war, and gradual correction by natural decrease in fertility, or forced decrease in fertility (China). The only difference between what Malthus predicts and what we have observed. Malthus is still correct. China is able to avoid the Malthus calamity precisely because it took preventative action after warned by Malthus, and got an early lesson in 1959-1961 when policy mistake brought about the calamity earlier than it would have occurred naturally. Had it not been the long period of peace aftger WWII (all wars were local and in relatively small scale. The only areas of major decrease in population due to war is perhaps Indo-China and Korea. So the psychologically/physiologically induced self-correction kicked in because war did not.
- US is a special case, it probably has to do with lower population density (higher space/capita), pro-child environment/culture, secondary effect of the 1950-60 baby-boom cycle, or perhaps hispanic immigration?
What is wrong with Bus Uncle profiteering?
The quality of Ming Pao has gone downhil since the thug Yu Pinghai took control. Though it had since recovered when Yu left, it was never able to reclaim the ground lost to Apple Daily. I thought commentator Qin Sheng has been really good. But I am really disappointed by today's editorial on Bus Uncle
- [ 明報 ]若借醜聞發達 應停發綜援
「巴士阿叔」罵人事件續有餘波。繼被罵青年Elvis和用手機偷拍罵人經過的Jon相繼向傳媒現身,罵人的阿叔也公開亮相,原來他是曾經報名參選特首的綜援受助人陳乙東。他接受了《壹週刊》的專訪,聲淚俱下地訴說自己和女友吵架致心情低落,罵人前正致電撒瑪利亞防止自殺會求助。本報記者跟進這宗新聞時,陳乙東要求記者先付錢表示誠意,並說另一家媒體給了他10萬元,如果此說屬實,是自1998年《蘋果日報》的「陳健康事件」後,另一宗媒體付錢予醜聞主角炮製真假難辨「新聞」的個案。《壹週刊》應公開說明今期的陳乙東專訪是否用錢換來,而社會福利署亦應主動調查陳乙東的財政狀,若發現他有大筆金錢而不作申報,應馬上停止發放綜援金及考慮提出檢控。
媒體如果用錢買新聞,對象若非公職人員,一般而言並不違法,但卻會引起新聞道德操守的質疑,因為受訪者為了令付款機構覺得物有所值,很易會刻意誇大、弄虛作假,甚至自導自演炮製新聞,而花錢買新聞的機構,若不認真查證,並向讀者如實交代採訪經過,可能會像當年付錢給剛喪妻的陳健康北上尋歡的《蘋果日報》那樣,從醜聞的揭發者搖身一變為醜聞的主角。
試想像,如果媒體付錢給陳乙東,安排他和被罵青年見面,上演一幕巴士罵人事件續集,然後大書特書,試問這是客觀的新聞報道,還是為求銷量而刻意編導的一齣煽情戲劇﹖
陳乙東欲借醜聞發達,公眾雖感到惡心,卻也無法阻止,只能罷買罷看他的半瘋癲狂人表演,但社署有責任確保公帑不被亂花,綜援受助人若有巨額收入而不申報,社署須依法懲處
2. Ming Pao went on to compare this to the "Chen Kin Hong scandal" of Apple Daily and questioned if AD did this again. AD might have succumbed to Bus Uncle's ransom, but paying someone to buy a story that has already happened and probing about his perspectives is very different from paying someone to create a story.
3. MP is apparently worried about the interviewee would exaggerate if the interview is paid for. They worried too much. a) People would exaggerate whether there is economic incentive or not. b) As long as the reporters are faithful and use 'quotes', we should leave the readers to judge for themselves, not the editor. Next did a decent job in using 'quotes' and leaving subjective judgment aside.
4. Lastly, (this is what I really want to talk about), if Bus Uncle (or anyone) is able to earn a living for himself and release himself from the safety net of social welfare, shouldn't this be encouraged? Why Bus Uncle cannot take opportunity of his 3 week fame to make a few bucks? If the media can profit from an event, why the person in question is not allowed to? Why, is the selling of (fabricated) Lady Di's secret love story more acceptable than (hypothetically) if Lady Di sells her own interview? Why is it okay for Clinton or Greenspan to charge US$200k per appearance/lecture, but no okay for Chen Yuet-tung to charge HK$100k for an interview?
p.s. IMHO Bus Uncle is full of sh1t (why? see this) and he does not deserve my sympathy. But my precise point is that such personal view should not alter our answers to the questions above.