Warming?

1) A Berkeley professor dares to debunk the popular wisdom about the future of energy.

2) 开灯一小时

IMO the rationale for energy conservation should simply be, "we do not have unlimited source of energy (at least, before we can efficiently convert/store solar energy, to a level on par with what chlorophyll does)". Global warming mongering is like predicting China's GDP/cap will surpass that of US in 15 years -- simple straight line projection ignoring any non-linear effects/secondary corrections.

The Answer for Zhou Xiao Chuan

The answer for Zhou is already written here - as advocated by Prof Stephen NS Cheung and I recapped some 3.5 years ago. All issues Zhou raised are addressed in this system, which Zhou lamented for its being shelved some 70 years ago. China can go ahead with this solution alone while persuading G20/IMF/WB to follow suit. This is an area where China can and should lead, by doing it first, because China does not have the legacy of the developed nations. If China does so, it would surely be first joined by most nations which are now pegging their currencies to the USD or Basket (eg the gulf nations, ASEAN, some Eastern European non-Euro countries including Russia, may also follow suit)

Zhou's said, in an essay (in Chinese original here)

• 国际储备货币的币值首先应有一个稳定的基准和明确的发行规则以保证供给的有序；其次，其供给总量还可及时、灵活地根据需求的变化进行增减调节；第三，这种调节必须是超脱于任何一国的经济状况和利益
  
• an international reserve currency should first be anchored to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set of rules, therefore to ensure orderly supply; second, its supply should be flexible enough to allow timely adjustment according to the changing demand; third, such adjustments should be disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of any single country. The acceptance of credit-based national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The crisis again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability.
  
• 超主权储备货币的主张虽然由来以久，但至今没有实质性进展。上世纪四十年代凯恩斯就曾提出采用30种有代表性的商品作为定值基础建立国际货币单位“Bancor”的设想，遗憾的是未能实施
• Though the super-sovereign reserve currency has long since been proposed, yet no substantive progress has been achieved to date. Back in the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed to introduce an international currency unit named "Bancor", based on the value of 30 representative commodities. Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted.
• 超主权储备货币不仅克服了主权信用货币的内在风险，也为调节全球流动性提供了可能。由一个全球性机构管理的国际储备货币将使全球流动性的创造和调控成为可能，当一国主权货币不再做为全球贸易的尺度和参照基准时，该国汇率政策对失衡的调节效果会大大增强。这些能极大地降低未来危机发生的风险、增强危机处理的能力
• A super-sovereign reserve currency not only eliminates the inherent risks of credit-based sovereign currency, but also makes it possible to manage global liquidity. A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control the global liquidity. And when a country's currency is no longer used as the yardstick for global trade and as the benchmark for other currencies, the exchange rate policy of the country would be far more effective in adjusting economic imbalances. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability.
  
• 改革应从大处着眼，小处着手，循序渐进，寻求共赢
• he reform should be guided by a grand vision and begin with specific deliverables. It should be a gradual process that yields win-win results for all
  

(English recap from AP, and WSJ  seems to have missed some key points above)

• Zhou said the proposed new currency also should be used for trade, investment, pricing commodities and corporate bookkeeping.
• "A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control global liquidity," Zhou wrote. "This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability." Zhou also called for changing how SDRs are valued. Currently, they are based on the value of four currencies — the dollar, euro, yen and British pound. "The basket of currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation should be expanded to include currencies of all major economies," Zhou wrote. "The allocation of the SDR can be shifted from a purely calculation-based system to one backed by real assets, such as a reserve pool, to further boost market confidence in its value."

The Economists spelled out what China's objective really is (we all know it is neither practical or feasible to replace the USD in the medium term, as most media reported superficially, or the Chinese wishfully)

• Mr Zhou’s proposal is China’s way of making clear that it is worried that the Fed’s response to the crisis—printing loads of money—will hurt the dollar and hence the value of China’s huge foreign reserves, of which around two-thirds are in dollars.

The key issue is how to make the transition "gradual" (大处着眼，小处着手，循序渐进) to minimize potential risk. And the only way to a first step is to (i) shift the RMB peg from USD to a basket of currencies then (ii) to a basket of commodities. China did the (i)  in 2005 but it needs to do (ii), perhaps but making a gradual shift, by, e.g. first with a 90% currency b. basket + 10% commodiy basket, then lowering the weight of currency basket smoothly

Related: The PBoC’s call for a new global currency, the SDR, the US and the IMF

再谈汇源案

续前文，有关商务部对汇源案的裁决的评论

“商务部依据《反垄断法》的相关规定，从市场份额及市场控制力、市场集中度、集中对市场进入和技术进步的影响、集中对消费者和其他有关经营者的影响及品牌对果汁饮料市场竞争产生的影响等几个方面对此项集中进行了审查。审查工作严格遵循相关法律法规的规定。审查过程中，充分听取了有关方面的意见。

商务部认定：此项集中将对竞争产生不利影响。集中完成后可口可乐公司可能利用其在碳酸软饮料市场的支配地位，搭售、捆绑销售果汁饮料，或者设定其他排他性的交易条件，集中限制果汁饮料市场竞争，导致消费者被迫接受更高价格、更少种类的产品；同时，由于既有品牌对市场进入的限制作用，潜在竞争难以消除该等限制竞争效果；此外，集中还挤压了国内中小型果汁企业生存空间，给中国果汁饮料市场竞争格局造成不良影响。 ”

1）关于“市场份额及市场控制力、市场集中度，进入壁垒”

a）“百分百果汁”及“中浓度果蔬汁”这两个细分领域，根据AC尼尔森报告，截至2007年底，汇源分别占据了42.6%和39.6%。其对手是，凭借2002年推出的“鲜橙多”迅速崛起的统一。

b）最新数据是汇源在“百分百果汁”的市场占有率已降到32.6%。而汇源的中国软饮市场总占有率则从10.3%降到了8.5%。

(另有资料显示：可乐+汇源的所有果汁类市场占有率为20%，总软饮市场则为12%--应该是市场定义的分歧。不过都支持下述结论。）

这证明了两点。一是场份额转变之快和进入壁垒之低，二是汇源市场价值相对于去年9月已有显著的下降。

2）关于"集中完成后可口可乐公司可能利用其在碳酸软饮料市场的支配地位，搭售、捆绑销售果汁饮料，或者设定其他排他性的交易条件，集中限制果汁饮料市场竞争，导致消费者被迫接受更高价格、更少种类的产品"

a)  茶饮料领域。。。统一、康师傅仍然占据龙头地位，连同麒麟、三得利、雀巢等品牌，控制了国内茶饮料市场的很大份额

b) 瓶装饮用水市场。。。娃哈哈居首、农夫山泉、怡宝分别位居第二、第三，乐百氏第四

事实是，各种软饮在国内市场由不同公司主导，显示的所谓捆绑销售并没有商务部或一些天真的MBA们认为的那么简单。当然，不同饮料在销售渠道、品牌宣传等都有一定的规模（和synergy），可是要谈到捆绑和垄断，趋势另一回事

3）有关“垄断”

a）可乐在美国市场（所有软饮）的市场占有率为44%，百事31%，cadbury schweppe（玉泉）15% (2002年数据，美国市场变化不大）。在美国这可算“垄断”或“寡头”。中国的市场占有率分别为达能 16.3%，可乐15.5%，可乐+汇源可能有23-24%左右。与美国（或其他市场）相比，并不算集中。

b）然而，在美国这么高度集中的市场，新的进入者仍然不断制造了成功的神话。POM Wonderful 在 2002-2008的6年间，作为一家独立的公司开辟了石榴汁的市场，销售达到1.65亿美元。EnergyBrand（itaminwater）则在８年间（１９９８年开始vitaminwater）达到3.5亿美元销售。

c) 中国市场无论是从结构上（销售渠道、品牌认同）等都比美国分散（fragmented)，因此进入壁垒只可能比美国低。

4）国内同业的反对

我是国内的同业竞争者的话，我也当然会反对这项并购。毕竟可乐是主要的竞争者。可是，商务部诸公应该知道所有潜在竞争者都是会反对这些并购行为的，因为竞争会趋于激烈。假如可乐并购汇源是（如一些网评所说）为了消灭这一品牌（如天府可乐）那竞争对手们应该是乐观其成才对。

5) 保护主义（？）

汇源是“民主企业”吗？

汇源股东包括（1）朱+管理层42%，（2）法资达能（danone） 23%，（3）美资华平基金（warburg pincus）7%，（4）其他香港市场股东（包括外资基金）35%

市场资料来源：

中国饮料业版图巨变：“沦陷”还是“重构”

Beijing Thwarts Coke's Takeover Bid

Coke and China

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p.s. 如前文（及众多网友）疑，可乐可能“做了商务部工作”。最可圈可点的是商务部猪公之一姚坚似乎露了馅“可口可乐继续并购的意愿还是有的”，什么叫“还是有的”？就是“只有一点”吧？

明明知道可乐的意愿已经不大，还要去否决，不是摆明在帮可乐吗？看来商务部诸公其实不笨，只是比较容易被做工作而已。

汇源内部人士称可口可乐操纵收购案结果

• 汇源集团内部人士给《中国经营报》记者发来短信：“我上次不是给你说过：结果会以商务部按《反垄断法》不批。”他坚定地指称，“这是可口可乐操作的结果。可口可乐一早就不打算买了，汇源早就做好了准备。”
  
• 在上海的会面上，朱新礼捺着性子追问可口可乐公司总裁及首席执行官穆泰康，可口可乐大举投资，是否意味着在并购问题上产生了动摇？而穆泰康则回应，希望汇源能够同意降低收购价格。记者未能了解当时情况，或许是因为可口可乐方面压价太多，朱新礼并未让步。
• “（并购案被否）是可口可乐操作的结果。一颗红心、两手准备，（并购案被否）我们早都有准备的。”汇源集团内部人士直言不讳。“可口可乐早已不打算买了，可口可乐董事会反对的声音越来越多，这是事实。商务部裁决中说‘商务部与可口可乐公司就附加限制性条件进行了商谈，要求申报方提出可行的解决方案’，那只是程序问题，可口可乐有意提出更为严苛的方案以让审批无法获批。”
• 商务部新闻发言人姚坚则强调，“据我所知，可口可乐继续并购的意愿还是有的，不存在可口可乐公关商务部的情况。”
  
• 汇源集团内部人士指称：商务部禁止收购的理由，经不起考问。关于集中之后对市场进入的限制问题。目前果汁行业不存在进入限制，果汁行业的准入门槛很低，只要企业有资金、设备，就可以做。目前国内果汁消费量人均不足1公斤，与欧美发达国家年人均50-70公斤的消费量相差很远，市场空间非常大。另外，可口可乐与汇源远达不到行业垄断，汇源的强项是高浓度果汁与中浓度果汁，这两者总和远不及低浓度果汁的销量。
• “以《反垄断法》为依据，没有理由否决这起并购案，担心什么呢？”一直以来，商务部研究院外资研究部主任马宇研究员通过写博文的方式支持并购，为此还遭受了网民的攻击与漫骂。“并购案为什么被否决？因为品牌问题？反垄断审查只涉及竞争，不涉及品牌。担心可能造成垄断？果汁是一个完全竞争的行业，果汁不是那种不可替代的生活必需品，消费者拥有自主的选择权，即使可口可乐并购汇源之后在果汁领域也不构成事实上的垄断。”

中国商务部的一班白痴

商务部就可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司案反垄断审查做出裁决。

我基本上同意量子博客在“出乎意料的判決”文的观点。

商务部的裁决完全没有理由，而且不符合国家利益。因为

1. 软饮的进入壁垒很低，汇源管理层卖了盘后过了“不竞争期后”要重新建立一个新品牌并不难。
2. 垄断只在市场集中度高的产品有作用。国内外的软饮市场集中（垄断）度并不高。国内已有品牌包括娃哈哈、康师傅和旺旺等都有足够能力可以与之抗衡。在美国，包装果汁的市场领导者是tropicana（占橙汁市场60-65%），属于百事集团，不是可口可乐集团。
3. 捆绑销售在果汁和碳酸饮料之间作用比不明显。基本上没有人知道tropicana和pepsi间的关系。比如说，美国的麦当劳卖可口可乐（不卖百事，因为以前麦当劳的对手是burger king属于百事集团），可是麦当劳的果汁是tropicana，而不是可乐集团的minute maid。
4. 可口可乐拥有minute maid品牌，真的要进入中国果汁市场也不一定需要汇源。

商务部的裁决其实正中可乐公司下怀，因为这交易是金融海啸前达成。也就是说可乐花了比目前市场价格高2倍多的代价，正愁着没有借口把交易取消。现在商务部帮了外国公司省钱，损害了汇源股东了利益，还落了人家口实。(外间甚至有人认为可乐公司对商务部进行了游说！至少可乐公司应该是故意不去解决商务部提出的问题的 - 商务部否决并购的其中一个理由是可乐公司没有对其关于垄断问题给出令人满意的解决方法，假如我本来就对这项交易后悔了，为什么还要去尽心回答你的问题？）

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可乐公司并购价格：US$2.4bn=HK$18.6bn

汇源市值：HK$12.2bn （股价 HK$8.3)

商务部宣布后汇源股价掉了23%停牌 （昨天股价HK$10.3）

-- 估计还会再下。交易宣布前（2008年9月）股价为HK$4. 市值约HK$6bn ！我们可以用国内其他饮料公司去年9月和今天的股价做benchmark。例如，青岛啤酒（0168.hk) 掉了15% （从 HK$17.8 到 HK$15）汇源股价（假如没有可乐的交易）大概会在HK$4和3.4  之间。

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related：

1) Coke, Keep Your Cash - JPM

2) 狗拿耗子 : "商務部有一位研究員出來講話，說這次審批是從法規操作層面的角度來考慮。真的有這麽白癡嗎？彙源的股東首先就不見了25億美元，這些可是中國人好不容易從美國人手上騙來的錢。那中國在海外的收購怎麽辦？現在是中國在海外大肆收購的最好時機，商務部那幫蠢才，把什麽都搞亂了"

See wing-ching's view on China's investment in US treasury

See's view follows what Brad Sester said, the major risk in US investment is the exchange rate risk (i.e. potential USD depreciation in future). To mitigate such risk, China should lend money in RMB-denomiated bonds (to the US)

The implications are

• the interest rate is determined by RMB rate
• potential issue with China's forex control and also RMB market rate (increased demand by the time the RMB bonds are due -- but this could work in China's advantage, sort of, as it receives the appreciated notes, though the 'apparent downside' is the impact on export, but you can't have it both ways)
• this may help release the political pressure from US on the rate of RMB appreciation (vs USD) in future, as by then RMB appreciation will mean that the US government would have to pay more (the US government can always hedge the risk through forward contracts with the i-banks but there is small cost associated with such hedging. In fact, China can also do such hedging if it keeps on buying US Treasury bonds)
• if, by the time China's holding in RMB denomiated bonds reaches the size of USD (or EUR/etc) denominated bonds, the net impact of RMB appreciation (or depreciation for that matter) on China's reserve holding would be neutral. i.e. China does not need to hedge!

Risk on China's foreign reserve

Brad Sester, "The main financial risk that China faces, after all, isn’t the risk that the US won’t honor its Treasuries, or even the risk that the US would walk away from the Agencies. It rather is the risk that the dollar and euro will eventually depreciate against the RMB, reducing the RMB value of China’s reserve portfolio."