2008-11-30

Light reading: the failed US invasion in Beijing

I hope the more industrious bloggers can translate this into English. Anyway, most of the points made in the post are somewhat true, though some may be exaggerated.
(The related parody is a nicely made movie called PLA in Paris I blogged a while ago -- they can be found in the Sanlitun/Tongli DVD shop)


爆笑!!美军入侵北京作战行动总结

美军入侵北京作战行动总结

美军参谋长联席会议主席在美国国会所作的总结:这次失败不仅是战略上的失败,更是战术上的失败。  
一、我军大意地使用了北京市旅游局的北京旅游图和北京公交公司的北京交通图以及北京地质勘探中心的北京地形图。我们错误的以为中国人给自己用的东西虽然算不上好,但决不会欺骗自己人,然而我们错了。拿到这几张地图的第一天就注定了我们将要在一个错误的时间一个错误的地点和一个错误的国家打一场错误的战争。  
1.原本要降落在清华大学的101空降师506团3营被错误的空降到颐和园昆明湖中,会水的投降,不会水的淹死,533人无一逃脱。  
2.第十山地师在攻占云冈地区后,按原计划执行破坏中国航空集团第三研究院的命令,一团一营在云冈镇搜索了将近一天也未找到中航集团三院的确切位置,不得以增加部署整个一团加入搜索,使得部队未能完成作战预案。主力部队在度过永定河时,由于空降部队未能按时将舟桥部队运抵,不得以在渡河地点停留了7小时,在舟桥部队到达后才发现所谓的永定河根本没有水。而一团到撤退时才知道他们在航天三院的大院里整整转了四天!  
3.陆战三师的重型装甲集群在突破中国守军二十六军阵地后从八达岭高速突入北京市郊,在五环路和八达岭高速交界处遇到在美国前所未见的大堵车,在长达15小时的时间内未能前进一步,被中国人的增援部队击溃。  
4.降落在老屯的101师502团伞兵选择小区规划图上绿地、会所、游泳池、湖泊降落。结果当他们落地后发现:他们都落在楼顶上,因为开发商擅自更改规划,把原先承诺的绿地会所游泳池湖泊都起了楼以图多卖点钱。更悲惨的是这些该死的小区规划让倒霉的伞兵伞降着陆时死伤无数。幸存伞兵在楼顶与民兵隔着天窗枪战一宿,大部战死。  
5.唯一在四环内空降的101师501团降落在了朝阳公园,那是四环内唯一一片有空地的地方。空降后发现该地区地势崎岖完全称不上空地,空降的重装备无法运出公园,只得放弃原作战计划,固守公园等待救援。他们是本次战役中第一支被成建制俘虏的部队。  
6.打巷战时,我们使用的房地产商作为广告宣传的户型图严重失真,所有户型内部空间狭小到了令人恐惧的地步,重型武器均无法运入战前选为要塞的房间;且房屋强度严重不足,无法作为战斗用掩体。  
7.特别值得一提的是海豹突击队突袭安贞大厦时,特种部队的小伙子们沿消防通道突击,不想消防通道被物业公司封堵或改做他用,拧坏多把钳子后不得不宣告任务失败撤离。  
8.战地指挥官过度依赖中国官方的公路交通图,导致兵力部署失控,是不可推卸的责任。比如第四重装师从天津一路攻向北京,计划沿京通路,建国路,长安街杀奔中南海;然而路上无数缺失的井盖让我军车辆寸步难行,甚至有连绵不断的井盖群将轮式步兵战斗车和坦克卡住不能动弹的现象出现,仅存的坦克部队沿著名的京通快速路狂奔,到达四汇时已被颠散了架,被早已守候多时的收废旧家具的乘坐板车(一种近乎原始的中国农民用的运输工具)的疑似民兵的人群(经战后确认,虽然他们在当时表现出了惊人的战斗力,但他们并非民兵,只是收破烂的农民)一拥而上全部收去废旧站。  
9.负责突袭北京首都国际机场的八十二空降师在占领机场后沿机场高速公路进入市区,在通过四元桥时由于桥梁质量低劣,重型装备的驾驶员不敢通过,只得放弃车辆轻装前进。在三元桥面对让人晕头转向的36个红灯和数小时的堵车,被太阳晒得中了暑的士兵们纷纷四散找水喝,大批军人因口渴难耐不得不饮用北京被严重污染的地下水而口吐白沫四肢痉挛不能控制自己的拿起枪来乱射,并高喊:我的上帝,是哪个五角大楼的王八蛋要求进攻这里的?老子要宰了他!这里能住人吗?我们千里迢迢的打来这里,真是自寻死路啊!  
10.我军机械化部队进城简直是一场灾难,一路上有大大小小十几个收费站要交钱,而且按吨位交钱,同样是过车辆,该死的中国军队至少比我们少交一半的钱!而且,连查养路费的也到处设岗,进了城又被交警罚款,且收费人员素质低下,分不清美元和人民币,不论什么钱都要同样的数字!令我军视进城为畏途(早知道应该带日本人来)。  
11.三环大部分路面不能走重型卡车,所有路面不能过坦克,到达三环后所有突入部队的作战人员被迫下车步行作战,被以逸待劳的中国三十八军全歼。  
12.战前我们得到的准确情报称:天通园路地面开阔可以作为空降地点。凌晨一点我军实施突袭,没想到落地后就掉进挖开的下水道里。事后得知:北京市市政工程部门于十年前就开挖的改建天通园路下水道工程到现在都没峻工,同时,北京市区内到处开挖的工地让我们的机械化部队寸步难行。  
13.唯一一支杀到二环的是我们英勇无畏的陆军第一师(大名鼎鼎的大红一师),他们猛烈进攻前进到二环路,结果不小心上了西直门桥,就再也没能找到下来的路。各位在座的议员,如果你们有幸去中国的话,一定要去西直门桥看望我们那些可怜的战士,他们至今还在上面转呢。  
14.从塘沽沿京津塘高速进入的第七摩步旅在分钟桥寺下车后才感到噩梦刚刚开始,因为他们发现所有装备无法驶下分钟桥,而企图掉头另找下桥方法的部队发现所有路口都不够宽,或者有别的桥挡住去路。等到他们下了桥才发现他们已经走回塘沽了。  
15.安全空降在八宝山的三角洲部队沿石景山路,复兴路秘密潜入,结果在公主坟桥附近遭到顽强抵抗,被六门老式舰炮和满墙的机炮轰得一塌糊涂的野狼指挥官怒骂到:“是哪个脑子里装屎的家伙准备的地图?怎么连解放军海军总部和空军总部这种地方都没有标在地图上?”  
下面还有

二.北京市民和各职能单位的积极参战是我们遭到惨败的主要原因。  
17.我们的战略情报影响中心和心理战部队伪造了中央电视台晚上七点的新闻联播,试图让北京的市民相信他们已经战败,然而结果适得其反,他们作战的信心更加强了!!开始我们以为是我们的画面或者是播音员出了破绽,后来一个从大陆来美国的华裔告诉我,新闻联播也会有人看?那才叫见鬼!另一个华裔说:新闻联播的东西也能信?那才叫见鬼!  
18.北京满街都是的残疾助力摩托车民兵(姑且让我如此称呼他们)和电动自行车民兵师在中国人的防御和反攻战斗中起到了重要作用!这些人机动性极高,作战技巧十分熟练,能在任何路面,任何时机出现对我方人员造成杀伤!大批我军官兵被突然从角落里冲出又突然消失的车辆撞伤撞死撞傻撞飞撞得失去战斗力生活不能自理。你实在很难想象这些训练有素作战技巧丰富的人只是民兵,我更愿意相信他们是天生的战士。  
19.中央情报局的谍报人员以留学生身份在战前一星期就潜入北京海淀大运村,希望以那里作为临时据点将京A牌照的摩托化民兵师的兵力布置情况报告总部,谁知道使用天鸿房地产商,燕桥物业声称的XX 兆宽带进行网络通讯时,区区10张总共才5M大小的布防图照片发了4天还未发完!当战斗结束时,欢庆胜利的市民被告知:多亏了房产商和网络供应商的杰出贡献,城市才避免了更大的损失。  
情报人员告诉我们:假如不是北京慢如蜗牛的小区宽带网速,我们应该能在tian-an-door 过中秋节了。  
20.我们的战前评估认为中国的富裕人群比较怕死,可能不会参与反抗行动,后来发现我们大错特错。中国的富裕人群,尤其是宝马车主太厉害了,4天时间我们有4112人被宝马车撞死,而全北京的宝马车总计才1037辆,平均一人一天撞死一个!!!我们已通过外交部正式向德国宝马公司和他们的中国合资伙伴索赔。  
21.战役中我们的部队准备占领和平里居民小区时,被那里的物业公司误认为是刁民业主雇来的新物业公司,遂大打出手。我军的士兵完全低估了这些中国保安的可怕战斗力,在那种全无章法杀伤力极强的东方式格斗下全军覆没。  
第四师部队在进入王府井商业广场时也遇到同样问题。上至总经理、副总经理,下至保安,清洁工似乎都是当兵出身的,一句不合就动手打人,且格斗技巧很强!这种全民皆兵的战略让我们的士兵避之为恐不及。我们将明确地把中国城建的物业公司列为必须加以制裁的对象,严禁他们进行劳务输出,不然日后伊朗或者朝鲜的保安也会对美国军队产生严重的威胁。
22.我们的医疗后勤人员始终未能进入四环,因为当地有无数卖花的小姑娘会缠住离进行战地医疗的女兵最近的男兵让他买花,以至于部队前进寸步难行,并且延误了许多伤员  
23.我军先遣渗透部队刚刚进入北京,意图占领玉泉山制高点,结果由于迷彩化装失误,被巡园保安当作进城卖菜农民乱棍打出,伤亡惨重。  
24.巷战时,中国人从来不躲在屋子里,他们宁可以垃圾堆自行车为掩体和我们对射。开始我们以为他们缺乏基本军事素质,后来才发现躲在屋子里更危险,曾经有一发手枪子弹打穿半米厚的承重墙后又打死我们一名士兵!在战场上还出现了被一颗手榴弹炸塌17层居民楼的惨剧,部署在里面的整整一个连的士兵无一生还。现在中国的居民楼被我们称之为坟墓。
25.最惨烈的一仗莫过于在中国国家信访局门口的那场恶战。第八师一团奉命去里面清查档案,以找出中国官员的犯罪证据,来动摇人心,没想到当他们接近目标大门时,事先已化妆的他们被当成了前来维持治安的武警,立刻与前来上访的人群发生冲突。得到消息的上访人群源源不断地从北京南站等地赶来。事态不断扩大……  
26.中央情报局曾经在战前10天派100名高级谍报人员潜入大街小巷收集情报,结果无一生还。后据北京某街道办声称,有近50人在和本地侃爷们套情报的时候被他们滔滔不绝的时政分析所诱,走向了光明,近30人在和本地妇女套情报时受不了他们的嗓门精神失常丧失战斗力,其余20多人则是下落不明,据说是在天上人间调查时被高薪招安作了保镖。  
现在,各位议员们,我提议让我们为在这次战斗中阵亡的4691名,也就是八师一团的全部 战士默哀三分钟。


丫的我就不行美国佬看到后还敢再来!!!!

2008-11-28

The myth of the "Earthquake Line" in China

There is an article widely cross-posted around the internet about a 'mysterious earthquake line' running from the estuary of Tumen River to the SW of Yunnan bordering Myanmar. Alleged this line connects The 1975 Haicheng quake, 1976 Tangshan quake, 1966 Xintai quake, 1695 Linfen Quake and even this year's Yinxiu quake on May 12th. (Further claim by "readers" even includes those 1000 years: 1037 Kaifeng, 1303 Zhaocheng, 1555 Weizhou, 1654 Xian and others)

Here is the "earthquake line"

Pretty inpressive, it seems. I happen to have scanned a "full" (recorded) earthquake map for China back in May. and also an "earthquake belt map" in the same post. Amazed by this map, I dig it out and draw a line and this is what I get.


The red dots are quakes since 1900 (size represents strength) and green dots are major quakes recorded in history. I am not sure if I would call this a correlation line. Yes, a line passing half a dozen major quakes, ok, but there are many dozens of such quakes and I can draw a hundred of these lines from this map. 
  • Note some quakes, e.g. Haicheng is more than 100km away from "the line", the first map seems to have been distorted and the dot blurred
  • The line does not pass Henan at all, so I do not know how the 1037 quake was claimed to be on the line, even the 1654 Xian quakes are more than 200 km from "the line". The original poster appears to be a bit more rigorous than those "readers"
  • (A technical note: we are drawing line on a 'flatten' map while the earth is actually a sphere, so there are many ways to draw it. The geodesic (great circle line) is probably the most natural way to draw so the 'line' is only an approximation (though a reasonably good one).
Earthquakes do form patterns, as they are correlated with plate techtonics and fault lines, as indicated in, e.g., this chart, or this. If there really is a line, it would be the one running NS from Yinchuan to Kunming, which is, in fact 2 fault lines approxinately lined up by coincidence.

This charts show how one can create false correlation by selectively removing the data points. This is exactly what those earthquake predictors have done, selecting the a few data points from the hundreds such that they fit the "proposed" formula.

2008-11-26

A new country in the making



Greenland Takes a Step Towards Autonomy
  • the largest island in the world (Quiz: which are #2 and #3?)
  • the lowest population density in the world, at 0.027/sq km
  • a stray hydrogen by its coast somewhere (!?#)
  • One of the beneficairies of Global warming (others include Russia, Canada, Scandinavia, Iceland, etc)
  • The 13th country in size in the world, just after DR Congo which adds three 0's in terms of population (will displace Mexico into the 4th largest country in North America -- wouls it join NAFTA?)
  • If the Greenland ice sheet were to completely melt away, sea level would rise by more than 7 m (23 ft)[11] and Greenland would most likely become an archipelago
  • Contains the world's largest national park! 972,000 sq km!!! which is just smaller than the country of Eqypt (30th largest in the world), and largest than Nigeria or Pakistan which both host more than 100M people
  • About 81 percent of Greenland's surface is covered by the Greenland ice sheet. The weight of the ice has depressed the central land area into a basin shape, whose base lies more than 300 metres (984 ft) below the surrounding ocean. Elevations rise suddenly and steeply near the coast -- which will be lower than the surface of the Dead Sea (currently the lowest point on land, but I am being tricky here, as it will most likely become a lake and the lake surface will be higher than than)

ZT: how the places in Taiwan got their names 从台湾地名看其社会历史的变迁

I will leave the funs of locating the places discussed in this article to you. But if you need help, please post in the comment section and I will reply there. (the maps here, unfortunately, are not detailed enough to show all the locations)
  • Many streets in Taipei are named after Chinese provinces and cities, and roughly according the the geographic location in a China map! (I have noticed this years ago, I suppose they had Japanese names before 1945 and were renamed by the KMT who was not very rigorous on exact location)
  • There is a Santiago in Taiwan! Dutch and Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) also left their mark in place names
  • The Manchu's empire named Changhua and Chiayi. Changhua is similar to Dihua (see p.s.) and Chiayi means rewarding the loyalty (of the natives who supported the emperor)
  • Some names were transliteration from the natives to Hoklo into Chinese characters
  • Kaohsiung was actually transliterated via Japanese (Taka -> kanji Gao=Kao)
  • Just like the London in Canada and Paris in Texas, we also have many Tongan's (the old name for Xiamen) in Taiwan. Yongho in Taipei County corresponds to Yonghe in Jinjiang, Fujian
p.s. The Taipei city streets preserved some old city names in China. e.g. Dihua is Urumqi today, and Guisui is Hohhot. The PRC government was actually actually perhaps the first government to return the native names to these cities (much earlier than that for Mumbai, Ghana, Kalimantan, etc) in early 1950s, mainly because the old names bear derogatory connotation to the minorities which is not good for promoting unity. Dihua means "be civilized, tamed", and Guisui means "returned and pacified".




从台湾地名看其社会历史的变迁

  走进台北市街区,不然发现这里充满了“大中国”意识和当年台湾当局“反攻复国”的企图。台北市主要东西走向的干道,分别是“忠孝东、西路”、“仁爱路”、“信义路”、“和平东、西路”等四维八德的儒家教义,以及反映“故都”的“南京东、西路”“长安东、西路”;南北走向的干道分别是“中山南、北路”、“建国南、北路”、“复兴南、北路”、“光复南、北路”等含有复“国”的寄托。

  在台湾,无论大小城镇,最大的一条街,肯定叫“中山路”,其次叫“中正路”。以高雄市为例,它贯穿市中心的南北走向主干道分别是“中山一路”、“中山二路”、“中山三路”,东西走向主干道分别是“中正一路”、“中正二路”、“中正三路”、“中正四路”。

  有人会问,怎么台北市找不到“中正路”呢?其实,今天台北市的“八德路”就是过去的“中正路”,在上世纪六十年代,台北市区不断扩大,“中正路”也由第一段延伸到第七段,还要从火车站延伸到南港,眼看“中正路八段”即将出现。但那个“动员戡乱”的年代,谁敢将“中正”大卸八段,只好改成现在的街名了。

  台北市街道的布局非常有趣,除了“迪化街”放在东南方不够确切之外,其它街道名往往与它的地理位置相吻合。“伊通街”(吉林省伊通县)就在台北市的东北方,东边有“敦化路”(吉林省敦化市)再往北有辽宁街、通化街(吉林省通化市),再往东北方向走到基隆河前面就是“抚远街”(黑龙江省抚远县)。至于“广州街”、“潮州街”就在南边,“福州街”、“永春街”就在东南方、“西藏路”、“成都路”、“桂林路”就在西南方,以此类推。可见当年台湾当局的“大中华意识”有多么的强烈,台湾人熟悉了台北街市的布局,多多少少也加深了中国地理的概念。

  台北市有一些街道名是旧城市名,现代的大陆居民已相当陌生。诸如“迪化街”(乌鲁木齐旧名)、“归绥街”(呼和浩特旧名)、“凉州街”(甘肃省武威市旧名)“安东街”(辽宁省丹东市旧名),这些街道所蕴含的旧城市名,就是普通的台湾老百姓也耳熟能详。

  台湾原住民是台湾岛上最早的居民,他们在生产和生活当中留下了许多地名。

  当时,原住民分布全岛,每个部落(社)都有它的名字。例如台北市有一个叫“北投”的地方,就是以前“平埔族”凯达格兰族的北投社,这个地方温泉众多,终日烟雾弥漫,远望宛若女巫在此做法,原住民用凯达格兰语的“女巫”(发音batiao)给它命名。后来,汉族移民用闽南话音译为“北投”。宜兰县罗东镇的“罗东”,就是以前“平埔族”噶玛兰人对猕猴的称呼,当地猕猴群聚的景观转成地理名词,汉人拓垦到此,将其音译写成“老懂”一词,后来就改为“罗东”。

  荷兰殖民者霸占台湾之后,也产生一些新的地名。“犁”,是耕种田地抽税的单位,汉人移民耕作时,一张犁可以开垦五甲地,由此类推,“三张犁”可以耕十五甲地,“六张犁”就可以耕三十甲地,这样耕地就成为地名。现在台北市虽然见不到农田,但三张犁、六张犁的地名依然存在。而台北市辖的三重市,也有三张、六张等地方(省去了“犁”字),这种地名都是荷兰殖民时期留下来的。荷兰人计算田地的方法,与中国人不同,以“甲”为单位,当时一甲土地大约十亩多一点,于是就有以“甲”作为地名的,今天台中县的大甲镇、台南县的学甲镇和六甲乡、台南市北郊的六甲顶等地名,都跟这段历史有关。

  西班牙境内有一个叫圣地亚哥—德孔波斯特拉古城,相传耶稣十二门徒之一的雅各安葬于此,这个古城就成为天主教朝圣胜地之一。后来,西班牙在每个殖民地上,都喜欢命名一个“圣地亚哥”(Sandiego)的地名,美国加利福尼亚州有圣地亚哥城,智利首都就是圣地亚哥,墨西哥、古巴都有圣地亚哥城,在中南美洲除了巴西因为曾经是葡萄牙殖民地外,几乎每个国家都有圣地亚哥,连亚洲的菲律宾因被西班牙殖民了三百年,也有圣地亚哥城。

  那么,台湾北部也曾经被西班牙统治过,台湾有没有“圣地亚哥”呢?有,就在台湾东北海岸。这个地方叫“三貂角”,它就是当初西班牙人统治时所命名的“圣地亚哥”,“圣地亚哥”用闽南话发音很像“三貂角”,于是台湾人把这一地名写成“三貂角”了。

  在台湾,特别是中南部许多地名与郑成功驻军和屯垦有关。

  郑成功收复台湾时,随军兵士就有数万人,后来郑经在漳泉一带与清兵作战失利,陆续撤军渡台,他们需要许多粮食来养活这么庞大的军队。

  为了解决这一问题,郑氏父子命令军队在驻扎地区屯垦,屯驻的地方就形成聚落。部队的称号也成了聚落的地名,如台南县的新营市、将军乡、下营乡、柳营乡、左镇乡以及中营、后营、林凤营、中协等地,也包括陈水扁的故里台南县官田乡。高雄市也有前镇区、左营区以及右冲、后劲等地名。

  此外,郑成功受过正统的儒学教育,他有浓厚的教化百姓的意念,表现在他更改了原住民的部落地名上。如将台南县的“湾里”改名“善化”,还有新化、仁德、归仁等地,也是由原先的平埔族部落改名而成。

  清朝统一台湾以后,又出现更多新的地名。例如中部巴布萨族的半线社,就改名为彰化,取“彰显皇化”之意。又如洪雅族的诸罗山社,在林爽文起义中曾帮助清兵,起义军被镇压后,乾隆皇帝褒扬“义行可嘉”,诸罗山社也因此改名嘉义。

  此外,北台湾的重要商港原名鸡笼,其名称渊源有两种说法,一说是它的地形很像圈鸡的笼子,另一说,指的是“鸡笼”的闽南话发音是当地凯达格兰(ketagalan)族名称的快简音转。不管哪一种说法正确,形诸于文字的都是“鸡笼”。直到光绪年间,清朝官员觉得这个地名太俗气,将它改为声音相近的基隆,并取“基地昌隆”之意。

  大批来自闽、粤两省的汉族移民渡海到台湾谋生,故土文化也播迁到台湾,他们将故乡地名移植到新的生活之处。据《台湾府志》记载,台湾地名沿用大陆地名的有91个,对开发台湾,命名台湾地名起了重要作用。例如台北县的泰山乡、永和市(福建省晋江县有永和镇)、苗栗县泰安乡、台中县的龙井乡、嘉义县东石乡(福建省晋江县有东石镇)、屏东县的潮州镇等等。也有的台湾地名反映移民移植了在大陆的民间信仰,例如桃园县观音乡(奉祀观音菩萨)和台南县关庙乡(奉祀关羽)等等。

  厦门原属福建同安,同安县也是许多台湾同胞的祖居地。在台湾,称同安、同安村、同安里、同安寮、同安厝、同安新村的地名有十二处,分布在台北、台中、台南、彰化、屏东、云林等县市,桃园县辖的桃园市还有一条同安街。台湾的这些命名“同安”的地名,除取其词义美好而外,更是由于同安人对台湾移民的缘故。

  1661年,同安人陈一贵最先来到台湾垦荒,康熙至雍正年间,又有陈永华、王世杰、林圯、李尚等人招募同安乡亲赴台开垦,仅同安颍川陈氏就有十余批宗亲入垦台湾。百数十人一起垦殖的场所,按闽南人习惯叫“寮”,冠以故里名称叫同安寮;有的建成住宅群,形成聚落,就改称同安厝;其中发展为行政村的称同安村。

  彰化县有一处同安寮,包括同安、中化两个行政村。据史料记载,雍正年间,同安人陈炳辉来此开垦,后有陈准、陈有德率人加入,经多年创业开发,生聚繁衍,遂成为同安人聚居地。而今社区已具现代规模,惟保存的庙宇如学甲慈济宫、中洲惠济宫、将军金兴宫等供奉的主神,香火多来自同安白礁慈济西宫,奉祀同安移民虔诚信仰的保生大帝。

  台湾移民把大陆地名搬到了台湾,凝聚了他们饮水思源,不忘故土的思想感情。

  甲午一战,清军惨败,清廷被迫割台。台湾在日据时代,地名改得最为彻底,全台几乎已没有“无名之处”。日本人改台湾的地名有两个原则,一是用日本本土的地名来取代台湾地名,例如将台北市的锡口改名松山,将高雄县的阿公店改名冈山,中部的林屺埔被改为竹山。另一种原则是以谐音来改地名,例如:原住民凯达格兰族人称呼独木舟Mangka,汉族移民音译成“艋舺”,既形声又会意,也成了地名,日本人将它改名为“万华”,因为“万华”的日语发音也是“Mangkaまあか”。

  还有南部的“打狗”,日语的“高雄”与“打狗”读音相同,这个地方被日本人改名为高雄(日语TAKA-Oたかぉ),也是取其闽南话的谐音。其它诸如打猫,改为民雄(TA-MIOたみお);三角涌改为三峡(SAN-KIOさんきょ);咸菜坪改为关西(KAN-SAIかあさん);茄苳脚改为花坛(KA-TANかたあ)。诸如此类,都取其谐音改名。

  很多大陆人觉得很奇怪,在台湾,同样一个地方,用闽南话和用普通话(台湾人叫国语)差那么多,原因就是出在日据时代改的名字比较文雅,而且当时台湾人识字率不高,所以还是沿用原来闽南话发音的地名。而外省人来台湾后,都用普通话去读日本人改过的地名。

  在台湾,从地名的不同读法,可以很快分辨对方是本省人或外省人。

  台湾本省人还分闽南(福佬)、客家两大族群,这从农村的地名中可以看出。如果在农村里,看到什么同安厝、晋江厝等有“厝”之类的地名,那就是闽南人的聚落。同样的,如果看到新屋、头屋,或中坜、内坜等有“屋”、“坜”的地名,那就是客家人的聚落。

  民进党政府有浓厚的大福佬主义意识和“台独”意识,他们取得政权后,千方百计地谋求更改地名,以“去中国化”。但是,除了陈水扁在1996年担任台北市长时,将“总统府”前面的“介寿路”(这条路是1946年纪念蒋介石寿辰而命名的)改名为“凯达格兰大道”获得民众认可之外,其它的台湾地名早已深入人心,民进党执政者也奈何不得。

  厦门 杨柳

《联合早报网》

2008-11-25

Light viewing: Chinese Calligrapgy, too.

We have seen the science magazine Max Planck Forschung taking Chinese calligraphy unscrupulously.
  • The texts say, "We have offered a lot of money to hire two managers -- KK and Jiamei  -- to lead the young girls during the day.  Our young girls are elegant northern beauties with attractive physiques.  We also have housewives who are coquettish and enchanting.  They are appearing here and now."


The Koreans did something similar as well, taking cool calligraphy more subtly. This is a screenshot from a Korean TV drama series, depicting the war between China and Koguryo in the 7th century. The picture shows the Chinese Emperor, Sui Yangdi, in front of a cool screen. The problem is that the writing on the screen is one of Mao's (perhaps most famous) poems,《沁园春•雪》 comparing himself to the great emperors of the past, among them the Tang Emperor who had later replaced the character in front of this screen.


2008-11-24

Wang Lixiong's Tibet Roadmap

Wang Lixiong, the Chinese writer who married a Tibetan artist, has written an essay about Tibet, (English translation in progress here) arguing that the recent event in Tibet has (1) pushed Tibet further away from PRC, (2) made the separation more likely in the long term future (if not inevitable).

IMHO there are many flaws in his argument. He has basically written this in the more traditional Chinese style of argumentative essay, so that the flow includes quite a number of leaps and bounds in logics, plus some contested facts mixed with some more agreeable facts, which leaves his conclusion as debatable as where he starts. Nevertheless, I tend to agree with person who introduced this essay in immediahk, that this is something worth our attention, no matter you agree with him or not.

I won't delve into the details of Wang's reasoning (the flaws and the rights). But I believe his observations of his personal interactions are faithful, which means the Tibet issues is fundamentally different from what it was a few years ago (or for the past 50 years), for 2 reasons Wang rightly pointed out
  • The efficient and speedy flow of information
  • The fundamental change in the mechanism how power is transferred, and in particular, the role of population and war (see related post: War of Babies)
For the PRC's perspective on this issue, other than what Wang has proposed in the past (i.e. the Hu Yaobang way) of easing control, etc. and in particular, forcing the Han officials to study Tibetan (which I this is of utmost importance), the "end-game" situation Wang anticipated that people's power will eventually prevail in Tibet and hence lead to inevitable independence may push the PRC government to more aggressively pursue the counter-moves (which it has so far reluctant to do so) of playing the democracy game (i.e. population game)
  1. Encourage ethnic Han people's permanent migration to Tibet AR, (i.e. give them Hukou), they only need to move 2.5M people to TAR and they will most likely be occupying the cities (and mostly during tourist seasons) withou attracting attention in the (99%) rural areas
  2. (Ironically, this is what the D-L has been proposing), re-drawing the adminstration boundaries to includes parts of the neighboring provinces into Tibet AR, such that the ethnic Tibetan people are diluted by other minorities (Qiang) and Han in these regions
Were these counter-moves be adopted, Wang's endgame will not be what Wang has thought, it would be really no different from that of the Americas. Mao knew these games too well even back in the 1950s. If you create a "vote scaled district map" for Qinghai (like this) you will know what I mean -- Xining area, with less than 5% of the lands in Qinghai in the NE corner, is predominantly Han, has about 75% of the population (hence votes) of the province. This is how Mao has zoned China's provinces, he understood how democracy worked, he just didn't want to practice it.

The population density map of Qinghai in 1990

China population density map (and legends for the QH map above)

p.s. Despite the observation above, I do not dispute that the "Hu Yaobang" approach could work (if well managed) and is much more preferrable, from the Han, the Tibetan, and the PRC perspectives.

---

For those inside the GFW I will replicate it below, first the Chinese then the English version. via ESWN there is also this article which listed some errors in Wang's essay, which I will let you judge yourself.

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王力雄:西藏Du立路線圖
週四, 2008-11-20 16:21 — 牧草與早稻

稻子註:
第一,我並不完全同意王先生作出的形勢分析,尤其是他對所謂國際社会的描述。
不過,即使論中存有好些錯漏,但這仍是一篇 我.們.不.可.以.不.看.的文章。

西藏Du-立路線圖

王力雄

目 錄

西藏Du-立路線圖... 1

一、 西藏事件是分水嶺

1. 官僚集團成為主導

2. 民族矛盾變成種族對立

3. 預期的自我實現

4. 中西民間的交惡

二、 帝國政體的困局

1. 當“反分裂”成為飯碗.

2. “官僚集團的民主性”

3. 西藏問題何以無解

三、 西藏如何走向Du-立.

1. 流血與Du-立

2. 西藏是西方的政治正確

3. 西方政府的考量

4. 中國難以避免陷入內亂

5. 決戰在西藏

一、 西藏事件是分水嶺

1. 官僚集團成為主導

這個路線圖從分水嶺出發。在2008年的西藏事件之前,我從未認真地對待過西藏Du-立。這個事件是一個分水嶺,讓我第一次正視西藏有了實現Du-立的可能。如果說此前西藏Du-立只是夢想的話,此後西藏Du-立卻浮出現實的水面,進入了目力所及的視野。之所以發生這種變化,主要推動者不是別人,正是中國權力體系中擔負“反分裂”職能的官僚集團。

十九世紀中到二十世紀中的中國,一直是身受帝國主義之害的形像。近代中國人牢牢記住了那段屈辱,卻很少有人去想中國也曾是一個帝國,在十七世紀到十八世紀進行過巨大的疆土擴張,雖有過被其他帝國打敗和瓜分的屈辱,但至今仍然繼承著相當一部分帝國遺產,包括西藏在內。

今天,西藏領土占帝國版圖的四分之一,西藏問題在帝國政治中有重要地位,中國的黨政權力體系中有諸多部門與西藏有關,其中省部級以上的部門有如下十三個:

1、 西藏自治區

2、 青海省

3、 甘肅省

4、 四川省

5、 雲南省

6、 中共中央西藏工作協調小組

7、 中共統戰部

8、 公安部

9、 國家安全部

10、 軍隊

11、 武裝警察部隊

12、 國務院新聞辦公室

13、 國務院宗教事務局

這些部門都設有專門處理西藏問題的機構,有一批長期甚至終生行使這種職能的官僚。除了這十三個部門,還有以下十一個雖不直接涉及西藏,同樣擔負“反分裂”職能、設有反分裂機構與人員的(省部級以上)部門:

1、 中央政法委

2、 中共中央新疆工作協調小組

3、 新疆自治區

4、 新疆生產建設兵團

5、 內蒙古自治區

6、 外交部

7、 國家民族事務委員會

8、 國務院台灣事務辦公室

9、 國務院港澳事務辦公室

10、 香港中聯辦

11、 澳門中聯辦

加在一起,中國的官僚體系中具有“反分裂”職能的部門共計有二十四個,乃是一個相當大的集團,擁有的權力、人力和資源非同小可。在處理這次西藏事件中,他們是一個聯盟,主導了整個處理過程。這一點與毛時代和鄧時代不同。當年無論是對西藏實行“統戰”或“平叛”,還是“撥亂反正”或“戒嚴”,都是權力高端決策,官僚集團執行。而這次西藏事件,權力高端基本無所作為,完全由官僚集團自行處理。

這不能簡單認為只是高端下放權力。實際上,拉薩事件發生的當月,中國總理溫家寶曾在老撾出席大湄公河次區域領導人會議時呼吁,希望達賴喇嘛能夠施加他的影響平息西藏事件。這種前所未見的說法引起了國際廣泛關注,被認為是中國領導人的新思路。然而此後不再有任何下文,“反分裂”官僚集團對事件的處理方式沒有任何變化。由此可以看出,今日中共政權處理西藏問題,不僅不需要權力高端進行決策,甚至即使高端進行了決策,若不符合官僚集團的意圖,也不會生效。這種局面很可能會成為今後的定規。至於為什麼發生這種變化,容後再述。

在權力高端能夠獨裁時,一方面會有專橫、粗暴乃至荒謬,另一方面也存在高瞻遠矚、撥亂反正、突破和變局的可能。二者只是一步之遙,有時就在於當權者的一轉念。而當官僚集團成為主導時,就不會再出現那種戲劇性,而是落進明確的規則框架。官僚集團是一種互相牽制、按部就班、墨守陳規的結構。更重要的是,官僚集團是一個利益主體,如果由它控制決策,所有決策都必須符合其自身利益。當其自身利益與社會利益發生矛盾時,官僚集團就成為破壞者,不僅破壞民眾利益,也會破壞它本當為之服務的統治目標。“反分裂”官僚集團正是這樣,在它按照自身利益去驅動“反分裂”的行動時,結果是把中國推向更危險的分裂。我們不妨從這個角度,看一下這次西藏事件的脈絡。

類似拉薩的“3.14”街頭抗議和暴力事件,其實在中國內地屢見不鮮。內地處理事件的方式已經很糟,但如果對“3.14” 事件采用與內地同樣的方式——新聞封鎖、大事化小、不激化矛盾、鎮壓加安撫、在下級官僚中抓替罪羊以平民憤等——很可能就不會發生隨後波及整個藏區的連鎖反應。然而對西藏問題,官僚們卻不會有這種平常心。因為首先西藏被世界關注,事件會引發國際輿論;其次西藏動亂會使當過西藏主管的中共領導人胡錦濤難堪,層層官吏都怕被怪罪;其三,既然官方多次宣布“西藏處於歷史最好時期”,出了這種自打耳光的事必須自圓其說。在中國官場,如果是由少數個人或單一部門承擔責任的事,可以通過找替罪羊的方式處理,官僚之間的競爭也容易導致落井下石。然而西藏事件不是西藏一地之責,在花了那麼多錢、用了那麼長時間、下了那麼大功夫之後,仍然出現如此規模的民眾抗議,僅憑常識也會知道是治藏路線的失敗。然而治藏路線是由眾多部門共同推動和執行的,承認路線失敗,十三個涉藏部門都脫不了干系,其他的“反分裂”部門也會受連帶影響。這種責任是整體性的,面臨的問責也無法靠官僚之間的推卸化解得了,諸多官員的仕途前景都會受影響。因此,“反分裂”官僚們必須團結起來,結成聯盟,共同行動,幫助西藏的官僚推掉責任,才能讓他們一塊得到解脫。

責任如何推卸得最徹底?可想莫過於推給“達賴集團”。因為不管什麼理由,只要是出自西藏本土,就免不了官僚自身的責任。只有把責任推到境外,才能讓自己完全無關。西藏自治區當局在拉薩事件發生當天就對新華社宣稱,“有足夠證據證明這是達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的”。這種宣稱立刻被所有涉藏部門和反分裂部門當作統一口徑。雖然他們至今也不能把“足夠證據”展示於世,可見只是推卸責任的謊言。然而官僚們並不在意能否拿出證據,他們的目的是在第一時間主導輿論。這一點的確是被成功地做到——他們的謊言立刻變為中國輿論的眾口一詞,成了一種不容置辯的話語模式,起到了誘導和迫使社會(包括權力高端)遵循同樣口徑的效果。

起點決定走向。起點失之毫釐,結果差之千裡。這種出於推卸責任的官僚口徑,決定了後續行動的框架,也決定了事態發展的走向。譬如3月14日拉薩發生鬧事的區域曾出現數小時放任狀態,外圍已經集合的軍警不進入,不行動,任憑暴力行為升級。很多人對這個奇怪現像困惑不解。在不同版本的解釋中,我比較傾向於這種做法是為鎮壓“培育”理由,以及為了拿到“宣傳攻勢”所需的電視畫面。一方面把攝制組部署進鬧事地點完成拍攝需要時間;一方面暴力不受抑制時會不斷升級,可以給鎮壓提供更充分的合法性,也容易拍到更有烈度的暴力畫面作為證據。如果從鬧事初起就動用警力控制,事件規模會小很多,有利全局,卻不利相關官僚。因為事件既已發生,在較低烈度時鎮壓會引起非議指責,包括北京也可能不滿,既不能讓官僚有效地轉移事件責任,還可能增加處置不當的罪名。因此他們寧可按兵不動,讓事態擴大,等待事件達到充分嚴重的程度,可以被認為是“有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的”之時,再進行鎮壓。那時外界無法指責,北京也難以怪罪。

這就是專制制度的特點——權力體系中每個角色都把自身利益置於核心位置,以個人得失決定行動。官僚為了個人算盤,寧可把事情推向惡性發展的方向,不管會造成什麼惡果。回顧此次西藏事件的脈絡,從拉薩僧侶的和平請願,一步步發展成遍及藏區的動蕩與鎮壓,以及擴大到全球的抗議和反抗議,很多環節都有這個因素在起作用。

2. 民族矛盾變成種族對立

3.14事件發生後,官僚們首先要向政權高端、國內民眾和國際社會證明鎮壓的必要與合法。他們采取的方式是先發制人,利用一切輿論手段進行頻繁的信息轟炸;同時封鎖現場,阻斷信息,不讓對手掌握不利自己的證據,由此達到壟斷輿論的目的。與中國其他地方發生類似事件時媒體幾乎不報道,更少見諸電視畫面相比,這次對拉薩出現的暴力卻一反常態,十幾個小時之後就通過電視新聞把畫面送到全國乃至全世界,密集播放藏人對漢人的施暴,不談事件起因,單一地表現成藏人攻擊漢人(盡管存在這種攻擊),歸咎於境外操縱的分裂,由此煽動漢人針對藏人的民族主義情緒。

民族對立是一個國家發生分裂的根本原因,本是首先應該避免的分裂,然而擔負“反分裂”職能的官僚集團卻在此次西藏事件中一手制造這種分裂。他們不是不知道後果,而是十分明白地就是要利用這種對立,需要的就是這種後果。只要煽動起中國主體族群——漢人的民族情緒,形成同仇敵愾的社會氛圍,就可以讓他們躲在後面,不但可以避免來自民意的質詢和追究,還能借助洶湧的民意把權力高端納入他們的軌道。任何對陰謀論的懷疑,對己方的檢視,力圖溫和的處理方式,緩和矛盾的用意,都會在激憤的民意威懾下無法伸張,只剩“反分裂”官僚的謊言成為不容懷疑的定論,不斷放大,裹挾所有聲音和行動。

這種宣傳不會平息事件,反而是火上澆油。一九八零年代的藏人抗議局限在拉薩,這次卻遍及整個藏區,其中電視是重要原因。當年少有的電視現在普及到各個角落。雖然藏人攻擊漢人的畫面可以讓漢人認同對藏人的鎮壓,但是對藏人的效果卻相反。各地藏人在日常生活中積澱的不滿,很容易被直觀的電視畫面引發出來。可以說,電視在相當程度上成了引發藏區抗議的動員令。作為藏人,不但理解和同情拉薩街頭發生的行為,有些人還會被電視內容誤導,認為應該用同樣行為表達不滿。藏區個別地方發生針對異族的暴力事件,正是在看到拉薩街頭的電視畫面後。當局把藏區各地同時發生抗議作為是“有組織、有預謀、精心策劃”的證明。其實哪裡需要組織、預謀和策劃,讓各地藏人同時看到拉薩人已經起來的活生生畫面,就足以讓他們同時走上街頭了。而這個動員令,正是當局自己發出的。

另一方面,單方面取舍材料、不探討理由只渲染現像的輿論煽動,把事件片面表現為藏人對漢人的無端仇殺,造成的結果是漢人與藏人的種族切割。近年漢人對藏文化表現出的向往和親近,發生一百八十度轉彎,變成了對藏人整體的畏懼和仇視,把藏人視為恩將仇報的民族。互聯網上充斥中國憤青對藏人的狂熱辱罵。對藏人的排斥成為中國社會彌漫的風氣。到處發生對藏人的歧視與不公。機場、旅館、各種檢查站,只要見到藏人,即使是位居高官者也免不了侮辱性對待。甚至藏族兒童在學校也受漢族同學欺侮。這種出自漢人的整體敵對,把藏人整體推到了漢人的對立面。出於對官方宣傳的反感,藏人對官方言辭一概抵制,同時也對漢人的仇藏還以相反的仇漢。可以說,從這次事件後,漢藏之間已經形成了以血緣劃分的種族對立。最典型的例子是在隨後舉行的北京奧運會期間,本無民族區分的藏族孩子從以往為中國加油變成每見中國失掉金牌就歡呼。孩子的變化,正是預示西藏問題的長遠走向。

在這次西藏事件前,西藏Du-立的其他條件一直相當充分—— 單一民族、單一宗教和文化,地域界限分明,歷史地位清楚,國際社會高度認可,有眾望所歸的領袖和運轉多年的政府……然而不具備的是最重要的條件,即作為藏人主體的境內藏人缺乏追求Du-立的足夠動力。雖然西藏問題長期存在,但是集中於政治、歷史或文化層面。雙方被卷進糾葛的主要是官方、民族上層、知識界或國際社會。即使是一九五零年代的藏人武裝反抗和達賴喇嘛出走,也被毛澤東化解為階級鬥爭,並未變成種族對立。一九八零年代的拉薩抗議因為沒有擴散到其他藏地,也未影響到整體的藏漢關系。兩個民族的普通民眾之間,可以說此前關系一直比較和睦,甚至比較親近,在境內藏人多數不追求Du-立時,有利於西藏Du-立的其他條件再多,也不會發生作用。我過去之所以沒有正視西藏Du-立前景,原因正是在這裡。

但是這次西藏事件卻在藏漢民族之間整體地切開了鴻溝。民族關系變成了種族對立,情況就發生了本質變化。上層和精英之間的民族矛盾相對容易化解,政策變化、體制改革、翻案平反等都可能成為出路,然而以血緣劃分的種族矛盾涉及每個人,遍布在兩個民族日常交往的所有細節。雙方任何成員、任何接觸都可能成為衝突之源。而所有衝突都會起到繼續動員的作用,使得種族之間仇恨增長,冤冤相報,衝突升級,兩個民族只能越走越遠,從此踏上不歸路。這時受到壓迫與歧視弱勢民族一方,產生要求Du-立的訴求幾乎是順理成章的。一旦境內藏人普遍把西藏Du-立當作願景,西藏原本具備的Du-立條件就立刻變得有效。正是這個重大變化,使得西藏Du-立進入了現實層面。雖然最終能否實現Du-立還要取決於歷史時機和外部環境,但至少從藏人自身而言,條件已經齊備。這是此次西藏事件完成的轉折。如果“ 藏獨” 方面要論功行賞的話,頭功理所應當該授予的就是把藏漢民族變成了對立種族的中國“反分裂”官僚集團。

3. 預期的自我實現

既然從一開始就把事件定性為“達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的分裂活動”,對於把統一奉為最高原則的政權,處理方式就只能是堅決鎮壓,沒有緩和余地。這是藏區各地政府和官員不敢有違的立場,也是軍警執行鎮壓的指導思想。拉薩事件發生後,藏區各地政府及軍警的過度反應與草木皆兵——大規模逮捕、暴力鎮壓、刑訊逼供、封鎖寺廟、迫害僧人,人人過關等,引起藏人廣泛不滿,促使更多普通百姓卷入其中,致使反抗擴散到整個藏民族,應該是這次西藏事件規模如此擴大的另一主要原因。

在官方宣傳灌輸下,從外地調進藏區執行鎮壓的漢人士兵把藏人一概視為分裂國家的敵人,因此以仇恨心態對藏人施暴,引發了很多本來不該發生的衝突。比如漢人士兵見到藏人家裡供奉“分裂集團頭目達賴”的照片,會粗暴地進行損毀,甚至逼迫藏人自己動手損毀。這對把達賴喇嘛視為至尊的藏人是不可接受的。如果藏族老人為保護達賴喇嘛像而遭士兵毆打,老人的子女當然憤怒,親屬和鄉親也會不平,於是卷進更多的人。衝突就這樣發生和擴大,演變成事件,甚至導致軍警開槍,造成傷亡,再被歸於“有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的分裂活動”進行鎮壓。類似之事這次各地多有發生,其實往往並無政治內涵,完全屬於“激起民變”。

1989年六四事件後,中共總結的“要把一切不穩定因素消滅在萌芽狀態”,至今已化為官僚集團的基本思維,是所有官僚奉行的准則。按照他們的權力崇拜心態,只要有權力,一切都可以恣意妄為。他們在民族地區實行的政策是“主動出擊、露頭就打、先發制敵”,後來發揮成“不露頭也要打,要追著打”。這種窮凶極惡在這次西藏事件得到充分體現。本來許多和政治無關的活動,如過節、賽馬、宗教法會等,只是傳統風俗,自古已有,但是在把“非我族類”視為“其心必異 ”的官僚眼中,尤其是外地調來、全然不了解民俗的軍警來看,只要聚眾就可能出事。既然要“先發制敵”,“不露頭也要打”,最穩妥的就是禁止任何形式的聚眾,封殺所有民間活動。或者即使沒有禁止,也要重兵防範,軍警包圍,架設武器威懾等。可想藏人對此的反應——“憑什麼你們能開奧運會,我們不能開賽馬會?!”血氣方剛的藏人面對如臨大敵且態度蠻橫的軍人,一言不合就可能引發衝突,釀成事件。對當局來講,那正好驗證了聚眾就會出事的判斷,於是更加禁止民眾活動。孰不知之所以出事,恰恰就在於他們的這種判斷。

其實,即使從統治者角度,把全部矛盾“消滅在萌芽”也非好方法,因為“萌芽”不能真實地顯露事物性質。有些“萌芽”本來並非“不穩定因素”,讓其生長只能有利於穩定,而粗暴的“消滅”卻將其推到了敵對,等於制造了新的敵人。即使這種鎮壓一時造成穩定的表面,但是從長久看,不穩定的因素不會被消滅,只是壓抑和積累,等待時機形成更大的爆發。

僧侶在藏地本是理性與和平的群體。當他們以和平請願的方式表達不滿,如果當局能夠虛心聆聽,正面互動,對藏地的長遠穩定肯定只有好處。然而當局內心深處把僧侶視為不勞而獲的寄生蟲、達賴扎根西藏的基礎、西藏Du-立的土壤、鬧事者和煽動者,總之都是負面的,因此一遇到僧侶挑戰,就會條件反射式地做出粗暴舉動。3.14拉薩街頭出現的暴力事件,與此前連續幾天軍警毆打和平抗議的僧侶有直接關系。那幾乎是一模一樣重復1987年拉薩事件發生的起因,讓人驚訝當局不汲取教訓的顢頇。對藏人稍有了解就會知道,與官僚對僧侶的蔑視與厭惡相反,僧侶在藏人心目中地位極高,既是藏傳佛教的三寶之一,又是藏文化的傳統知識分子,作為藏人精神世界的引導者和護佑者,受到藏人極大尊崇。因此藏人最不能容忍僧侶遭受虐待和羞辱。軍警對僧侶的暴力行為會引發藏人騷亂幾乎是必然的,只有被權力傲慢遮蔽了雙眼的帝國官員才會看不到這種後果。

而當局並未反思,反而變本加厲。各地僧侶被當成主要打擊對像;眾多具有崇高地位的寺廟遭到軍警侮辱性搜查;除了參與抗議的僧侶大批被抓,還有很多僧侶被限制行動自由;一些寺廟長期被關閉;外地戶口的僧侶被驅趕;強令所有寺廟開展所謂“愛國主義教育”,逼迫僧侶們公開譴責達賴喇嘛。很多僧侶為了躲避這種人人過關離寺出走,有些寺廟竟走得幾乎無人。如果說在這次西藏事件發生前,僧侶中還有不少是不問政治、一心修行的,不滿只停留在政策層面,並未導致整體否定中國的統治,這次事件卻使西藏僧侶集體地轉向對西藏前途的政治思考,贊成西藏Du-立的比例大幅度增加。

中國當局把西藏僧侶整體地推到敵對位置,等於是給自己制造了最難擺平的對手。西藏傳統民歌這樣形容僧侶:“立起是一支香,倒下還是一支香,抓我的腦袋只有頭發,摸我的屁股只有破布。”說的就是僧侶無家庭牽累,無後顧之憂,因此無所畏懼,敢於反抗和挑戰。之所以西藏歷次事件總是僧侶打頭,這是重要原因。同時,以僧侶在西藏民眾心目中的地位,以僧侶在西藏民間的廣泛滲透,他們對中國統治的不滿和西藏Du-立的訴求絕不會僅限於自身,而是一定會對藏人百姓產生廣泛影響。

官僚集團的另一種行為——急於拿出事件是“達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃”的證據,為此大量抓捕藏人,使用刑訊逼供,制造冤假錯案等,在這次西藏事件中也波及眾多藏人及其家屬,造成廣泛的離心離德。在實施了眾多迫害後,最終也沒有拿出自圓其說的證據。媒體對達賴喇嘛的指控在藏人聽來全是謊言,即使對未發生抗議的藏區,也使民眾心生反感,造成擴大矛盾和制造仇恨的效果,反而會讓更多的藏人考慮 “分裂”是不是更好。當局進行的“反分裂”宣傳等於在給分裂意識提供素材。藏語中的“西藏Du-立”——“博讓贊”原本是多數藏族百姓不知道的詞彙,也沒有這個概念,但是經過長期的“反分裂教育”,這個詞現在變得家喻戶曉,婦孺皆知。在這次西藏事件中,“博讓贊”成了從僧侶到普通市民到農牧民甚至小學生都要喊的口號。

這就是所謂“預期的自我實現” ——把藏人當成敵人,藏人最終會真成為敵人,處處防範藏人“分裂”,藏人最後就會真要分裂。對這次波及整個藏地的抗議運動的性質,觀察者有不同解讀。其中主要分歧在於,這究竟是要求西藏Du-立的政治運動,還是僅僅在表達對經濟地位或官方政策的不滿。讓我來看,這次事件的過程不見得有明確的西藏Du-立訴求,而是諸多因素綜合所致,包括發展造成的落差,經濟層面的不滿,移民問題,境外影響和“羊群效應”等,官方宣傳的反向動員和鎮壓反彈更是起了推波助瀾之效。然而這次事件的結果,卻是讓藏人普遍有了西藏Du-立的意識,形成廣泛認同。因此,等到下一次再發生類似事件,西藏Du-立將會成為眾多藏人的共同訴求,成為自覺的運動,並會在發展過程中作為主要的驅動力和思想指導。

4. 中西民間的交惡

中國民間與西方民間過去沒有多少矛盾,中國人對西方人好感居多,對西方媒體也相對信任,即使在民族主義情緒高漲時,也只是針對西方政府。而西方人對中國人也無惡感,雖然西方社會與媒體經常批評中國政府,卻是把中國民眾當作專制政權的受害者。然而在這次西藏事件中,雙方民間卻直接交鋒並且對立起來。中國民眾對西方媒體大加討伐,對西方民眾也惡言相向。這種態度轉變,是中國官僚集團輿論戰的成功。不過輿論戰所依賴的條件——官方壟斷信息,對於成功煽動中國人是必要條件,同時卻是必然受到國際社會質疑的原因。

為了封鎖信息,當局於3.14事件發生當天就在拉薩限制外國人行動自由,隨之將所有外國人驅離西藏。此後各地藏區長期不許外國人進入,到處設卡檢查。圖像被視為最敏感資料,執行命令的軍警大量侵犯人權,除了防止境外人得到圖像,有的藏人僅因為用手機拍攝了照片就遭酷刑和長期關押;即使是漢人被發現在藏區拍攝了“敏感”圖像也會受審問、沒收設備或刪除圖像。嚴密的信息封鎖使得西方媒體幾乎拿不到第一手材料,只能利用間接消息進行報道。而間接消息容易出錯,授人以柄,使得西方媒體在中國人心目中被普遍抹黑。中共宣傳部門與西方媒體的多年鬥爭中第一次占據這種上風,十分得意。

然而這並不能讓西方媒體服氣。中國民眾一面倒的謾罵、恫嚇,加上中國政府對西方媒體的制裁與施壓,只能把被稱作“第四權力”的西方媒體整體地推到與中國長遠為敵的位置。雖然中國人的敵意會使西方媒體報道時更加仔細,更多考證和平衡,然而也會使他們對中國的厭惡增加,不僅厭惡專制政權,也厭惡中國人表現出的狂熱和暴戾。可以相信,今後只要有機會,類似這次西方媒體對中國的聯合圍剿還會發生。而西方民眾的態度很大程度上被媒體主導。得罪了西方媒體,將其推到對立面的結果,最終勢必轉化成西方民眾眼中的中國更加妖魔化。

事實上,正因為中國的新聞封鎖,西方公眾即使無法從本國媒體得到第一手消息,也決不相信中國媒體,並且質疑中國官方在西藏問題上的所有言詞。因為這對他們是簡單常識——只有謊言才需要封鎖信息。即使封鎖能做到讓人不知道謊言的具體內容,但是徹底的方法就是對封鎖信息者所說的一切全部當作謊言。之所以西方民眾對北京奧運火炬進行激烈抵制,也是因為缺乏其他渠道進行有效表達,借此發泄對中國當局封鎖真相的憤怒。

中國官僚集團並不在意西方民間的看法。他們需要中國民眾與西方社會的對立來證明自己得到民意支持,此後又利用奧運火炬在西方的遭遇進一步刺激中國民眾對西方的敵意。群眾運動和運動群眾是極權主義的擅長。在面對宏大問題時,民眾沒有足夠信息與知識進行Du-立思考,容易被煽動與操縱。中國民眾雖然在多數問題上對政府並不認同,卻接受了把國家統一當作基本價值觀。對遠離自身日常生活的西藏,多數中國人只能以簡單的“分裂” 與否進行判斷。當官方媒體以一個聲音指責西方敵視中國、偏袒“藏獨”時,激發起中國人的敵意不難做到。此次西藏事件除了把漢藏關系變成種族對立,同時又把中國民間與西方民間推向形成兩個對立陣營的發展軌道。

的確,中國民眾這次對政府的支持前所未有。在互聯網上,或是在國外街頭,中國愛國者和西方人短兵相接。然而中國人不被允許看CNN,卻狂熱地反 CNN;在自己國家沒有示威自由,卻在其他國家聚集起來再現文革場面(這些行動不乏中國官方支持和大使館幕後組織),一方面會讓西方人更強烈地在價值觀上否定中國,另一方面也會刺激西方民眾把中國視為具有強烈敵意、終有一天會威脅自己的整體,而不是像過去那樣把中國人和中國政府分開,區別對待。

陣營敵對最無理性存身之地,雙方都會采取簡化的認同,如足球流氓那樣聚在一起羞辱對方,不問理由,沒有是非。一旦當西方民眾和媒體認定中國人對西藏普遍存有殖民主義心態時,會使他們認定西藏必須從中國統治下解放,而不管中國政權性質將來發生什麼變化。中國民主人士堅稱中國民主後西藏就會自由的許諾不會得到信任,因為制度變化不等於民眾心態會變化。這將大大增加未來中國處理西藏問題的難度。

今日中共不再是意識形態至上的革命黨,而成了善於投機的實用主義利益集團。照理說從自身利益出發,它也應該避免與西方形成陣營對立。然而事情朝什麼方向發展,往往取決於內在邏輯。專制體制的特點正是即使每個局部都以自我理性行動,全局結果卻可能遠離理性,而且也不符合全局的整體利益。這種局部理性合成全局非理性的“納什均衡”,對事物走向往往更有決定性。下面我們會看到,正是“反分裂”官僚集團對自身而言的理性算計與趨利避害,合成了中國官方在此次西藏事件中的整體謬錯。

二、 帝國政體的困局

1. 當“反分裂”成為飯碗

帝國政權最重要的職能是保持帝國疆土的完整,所設立的“反分裂”部門因此地位顯赫。曾擔任過中共高官的西藏共產黨創建人平措汪傑先生對這些部門與人員的描述是“吃反分裂飯、升反分裂官、發反分裂財”。這是因為,所謂的“分裂”越嚴重,帝國賦予這些部門和人員的權力就會越大,輸送的資源也會越多。這決定了他們從本能上會希望“分裂”問題始終存在。為了部門利益和個人利益,不但不要民族問題最終解決,反而會有意強化衝突,渲染“分裂”危險,無限上綱,沒事找事,小事搞成大事;或是為了顯示政績,強化對事態的處置,促使衝突擴大;或是為推托責任,拒不承認錯誤,用更大的錯誤掩蓋較小的錯誤。對官方在這次事件中表現的不智,有人歸於行事官員愚蠢。其實那不對,官員們都很聰明。他們不是不知道自己的行為對整體不利,照做不誤的原因在於他們的目的不是為了辦好事情本身,而是為了自己從中得益。例如組織海外華人和留學生搞“紅海洋”的駐外官員,很多都在西方受教育,長期生活在國外,不會不了解那種場面一定讓所在國民眾和媒體反感,破壞中國的形像。但是他們的官運不取決於所在國的好惡,而是取決於中國領導人和主管部門的滿意。中國領導人在電視上看到西方國家布滿中國國旗和愛國華人,感到臉上有光、心頭解氣時,那些駐外官員就有了增加升遷的可能。這才是他們的出發點。至於對國家造成的危害,那不會落到他們個人頭上,也不由他們承擔責任,因此無需他們操心。

前面說了涉藏官僚集團把事件起因推給“達賴集團”能讓他們把責任推得最干淨,然而至少對其中的公安、國安、武警等部門卻不是這樣,他們的職責本來就是防止 “敵對勢力”和“境外勢力”破壞,竟然讓“達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃”如此得逞,責任本該最大,為什麼會默認這種不利於本部門的說法呢?除了為利益共同體所進行的必要擔待,由此還顯示官僚集團高超的另一面。單純推卸責任只是官僚的初級本能,更高手腕則是把危機變成撈好處的機會。那些情治和鎮壓部門不會由自己擔待責任,而是會歸咎於資源不夠、經費欠缺、權力所受限制過多,政策過於溫和等“外因”;當他們用強力把藏人的抗議血腥鎮壓下去,搖身變為“對敵鬥爭”的英雄,不但無過,反而有功,同時再次證明了只有強硬鎮壓才是有效法寶;這時再反過來總結以往資源不夠,權力所受限制多,政策過於溫和的“教訓 ”,要求權力高端給予更多資源和權力,實行加強他們地位的強硬政策。一般來講,這種手腕一定得逞,因為只要利用信息不對稱去渲染事件的暴烈、“分裂”的危險,可以輕易嚇住帝國的權力高端。而對帝國當權者來說,為了保持帝國疆土完整是從來不計代價的。

可以預期,這次西藏事件在很大程度上會打斷中國政權走向開明化的進程,那些力圖使中國擺脫警察國家的改革也可能夭折,尤其是在民族地區,原本已經實行的緩和措施正在取消,軟化的權力重新堅硬,並且再度集中。在“反分裂”和“反恐”名義下,中國民族地區的未來政局難免趨向法西斯化。這在很大程度上,正是官僚集團吃“反分裂飯”的結果。

官僚無論在什麼制度下都會追求自身利益,這並不奇怪。但是好的制度會把官僚追求自身利益合成好的機制,壞制度卻會把官僚追求自身利益合成壞的結果。讓聰明的官僚聰明地去做對政權和國家愚蠢的事,正是專制制度的弊端,也是專制終會垮於內部的原因。

2. “官僚集團的民主性”

不過,人們免不了奇怪,專制政權的特點是上級決定下級,雖然官僚追求自身利益或部門利益,但是高端當權者對下屬部門不顧全局的行為,為何會聽之任之,不進行干預和統籌領導呢?

這裡不設想專制者昏聵的情況,雖然在專制歷史上,被虛假信息包圍的專制者落入昏聵遠高於其保持明智的可能性。然而更能反映中國權力體系本質的,卻是專制者即使明智,也無法扭轉下屬部門共謀形成的局面。這是因為,在專制體制中,專制者的決策只有通過官僚體系進行具體操作才能貫徹。正是這一點決定了,專制權力對外雖可以絕對專制,對內卻存在專制失效的可能。只有在不損害官僚集團利益的前提下,專制者才有對官僚集團一言九鼎、說一不二的專制性,而只要損害官僚集團利益,官僚群體就會共謀合作,利用拖延、扭曲、不了了之等手段,在具體操作過程中把專制者的決策架空,使之無法推動和落實,這時,專制權力的專制性就大打折扣。我把這種狀況稱為“官僚集團的民主性”。

無論是在古代王朝還是近代的專制政體,“官僚集團的民主性”都廣泛存在,它不會體現於制度和程序,只是以官場潛規則的方式發揮作用,是一種物競天擇演化形成的機制。官僚之間在具體問題上有競爭,總體卻是相互聯合的共同體。他們對自身利益的得失極其敏感,精於謀利,容易形成共識,而且無需串聯和組織,利用現成的官僚體系就能默契地共謀,達成相互庇護,成本低,風險小。因此,專制者要想讓自己權力得到貫徹,便需要順應這種“官僚集團的民主性”,滿足(或至少是不觸犯)官僚集團的利益,才能使官僚集團成為得心應手的工具,而不是陽奉陰違的對抗者。

當然,歷史上也出現過力圖對官僚集團說一不二的專制者。那除了需要具有特殊權威,還必須使用極端手段——如啟用野心勃勃的新人充當酷吏,對官僚集團進行清洗,以肉體消滅的恐怖進行懾服。然而那種手段只是見效一時,飛揚跋扈的酷吏幾乎都無好下場。暴君終歸要死,或是清醒過來就會明白,以利益收買而不是恐怖威懾更能換取官僚集團的效力。對於多數只求利益和權力的專制者,達成與官僚集團的分肥,自己清閑地坐車,讓官僚們奮力地自覺拉車,豈不比與官僚集團南轅北轍地較勁要省心和實惠得多嗎?

即使以毛澤東對中共官僚體系的權威,在他要開展觸及官僚集團的運動時,甚至無法在他居住的北京發表一篇文章,可見官僚集團的能量有多大。毛最終采取的方式是越過官僚集團,直接號召底層民眾造反,摧垮阻礙他意志實現的官僚集團。那種被命名為“文化大革命”的方式是史無前例和登峰造極的,最終卻歸於失敗,原因就在於毛也離不開官僚集團。文化大革命可以摧毀舊的官僚集團,但仍然需要建立新的官僚集團來為他貫徹權力。而不管什麼官僚集團,最終都會演化成利益集團, “官僚集團的民主性”也就會起作用。毛澤東最終只能無奈地退到以“七八年再來一次”的恫嚇,把他的文化大革命降低到酷吏來使用。

在文革中吃了大虧的官僚集團就此留下刻骨銘心的記憶,他們決心不允許再出現專制領袖可以摧毀官僚集團的情況。毛後幾十年中共推行“黨的建設”、“發揚黨內民主” 等,說穿了就是在加強“官僚集團的民主性”,保護官僚集團不再受領袖傷害。而中國改革的主要內容——權力下放,本質也是讓官僚集團分掌更多權力。至今,中共內部已經形成了完整的制約機制,官僚集團也有了相當充分的能力,既不允許再出現酷吏式的黨內清洗,也不允許再有文化大革命那類群眾運動,甚至不再允許黨內出現可能導致分裂的路線鬥爭。今天,中共黨內的高層權鬥比歷史任何時期都弱,權力交接也有了一定程序化,其深層原因,就是這種“官僚集團的民主性”在起作用。

這是一種本質性的轉變。在意識形態至上的時代以訴諸路線鬥爭進行的高層爭權中,官僚們只能處於被動狀態,選擇跟隨不同路線的代表人物,然後隨代表人物的沉浮而沉浮。而當維護執政和獲得利益成為中共的主要目標時,執政的具體操作者和利益的主要承載者——官僚集團就變成了黨的主體。失去了意識形態背景的黨內鬥爭變得名不正言不順,從而不再有合法舞台。隨著“官僚集團的民主性”進一步加強,不利於集團整體的黨內鬥爭將在相當程度上被聯合起來的官僚所遏制。這時的中共將變得比以往更少分裂,更為務實。高端當權者不再是以往那種凌駕於官僚集團的獨裁者,而是變成了官僚集團利益的協調人與代言人。這時的高端當權者只有通過為官僚集團爭取利益最大化,才能交換官僚集團的支持,坐穩自己位置。

官僚集團熟悉政權機器,善於經營,一旦建立了制約高端當權者的機制,便一定會將其盡運用到極致。他們可以在無形中決定高端權位的起伏、人事更替、政策導向等。而只要他們具有了這種能力,就不會僅限於避免發生黨內清洗或文革,而是擴展到避免對自身的任何不利,以及盡可能地用於為自身謀取更多利益。因此,把所謂的“黨內民主”看做是中國民主的步驟,完全是看走了眼。“黨內民主”只是古已有之的“官僚集團民主性”的別稱,同中國民主與人民民主毫無關系。

3. 西藏問題何以無解

明白了“官僚集團的民主性”及其在中共黨內的作用,就可以看出中國現行的西藏政策為何不會改觀。它牽扯十三個省部級以上的涉藏部門,或者說二十四個省部級以上的“反分裂”部門。了解中國情況的人都知道,采取“瞞上欺下”、“上有政策下有對策”、“一個拖字定乾坤”等手段,哪怕只有一個省部級單位不執行中央決策,中央無可奈何的情況都不鮮見,何況二十四個部門結成聯盟。

相對於毛澤東和鄧小平,今日中共領導人的權威性無法相比,既缺少資歷和功績,也沒有卡裡斯瑪人格(依靠特殊魅力和超凡品質吸引追隨者的能力)。他們皆為官僚出身,在官僚體系浸淫多年,熟知官場規則,從逆向淘汰的官僚階梯循序爬到高位,何嘗不知道官僚集團的手段厲害?他們是否想走不同路線且不論,即使想,很可能也得知難而退。他們本質上不是領袖,只是到達了頂峰的官僚,幾乎不會有超越性,全部目標就是掌權,不越雷池一步。因此,在毛、鄧那類獨裁者身上可能發生的決斷與自我轉變,對他們難以指望。這次西藏事件發生後很長時間看不到中共高端的動作,全憑“反分裂”部門自行處理,成為此次事件的特殊之處。二十四個 “反分裂”部門涵蓋權力的各個方面,印把子、槍杆子、筆杆子一應俱全,相互構成決策、執行和協作的完整鏈條,即使沒有高端領導人主持,也能自我協調,自行運轉。

除此之外,今日中共還落進了一個自設的陷阱。從革命黨蛻變成權力集團,作為權力核心的主權以及維護主權的民族主義成為唯一具有實質性的意識形態,舉國體制進行的灌輸與不厭其煩的改寫歷史,使中國人普遍確信當年中國以帝國方式占領的領土“自古屬於中國”。這種狀況使得“反分裂”官僚們占據了“政治正確”的位置,擁有民意支持,形成尾大不掉之勢。“反分裂”既可以被他們當作盾牌,又可以被他們當作武器——無人敢對他們表示異議,他們卻隨時可以發動進攻。二十四個“反分裂”部門的聯盟,加上占據了唯一具有實質性的意識形態高地,使他們能量十分巨大,甚至有能力啟動“黨內民主程序”進行政變,以捍衛國家主權不力的名義罷免跟他們不一致的高端領導人,而且很容易贏得黨內黨外的民意支持。因此,把權力視為一切的中共領導人在這種威脅面前,為了不被政敵抓住把柄,避免民眾輿論的攻擊,總是會寧左勿右,而不會采納可能使自己地位受威脅的新思維。即使他們心裡清楚如此下去會有更大危機,能做的也只是把危機發生時間盡可能後推。中共領導人從終生制改為輪流坐莊制,表面是一種進步,實際卻導致在台上者寧願“擊鼓傳花”,只保自己任內平安無事。至於把危機推到後任爆發,那就與己無關了。

因此,國際社會敦促中國領導人與達賴喇嘛會面,達賴喇嘛希望繞過中間層次直接與中共領袖交流,藏人精英給中共高層寫信懇勸,在我看都是沒有認清真正的決定因素。西藏問題如何解決,並非中共高端可以獨斷。雖然在特殊情況下,中共高端可能對西藏問題進行某些特殊處置,但那只會停留在策略層面,不會觸動實質。知道了“反分裂”勢力在中國權力結構中占有多麼重要和廣泛的位置,就可以清楚,指望靠中共領袖個人(即使是再開明的領袖)解決西藏問題,是不切實際的幻想。

三、 西藏如何走向Du-立

1. 流血與Du-立

“反分裂”官僚集團堵塞了在中國內部解決西藏問題的出路,持續產生的矛盾只能不斷積累和發酵,最終把西藏推到爭取Du-立的方向。不過,很多人會認為西藏與中國實力相差太過懸殊,即使西藏全民族都為Du-立而戰,也不可能達到目標。如果孤立地看西藏和中國,並且靜止在目前的力量對比上,的確是這樣。然而在全球化時代,西藏和中國都要很大程度受國際影響,中國的強大也非永遠不變。近年Du-立的東帝汶和科索沃在力量對比上都處於相當弱勢,卻都實現了Du-立目標。與他們相比,西藏Du-立的可能性不會更小。

東帝汶和科索沃之所以能夠實現Du-立,決定因素是國際社會——尤其是西方國家——的支持。之所以兩地Du-立得到這種支持,很大原因在於兩地人民遭受的人道災難(至少桌面上的理由如此)。在人權高於主權成為國際社會共識時,種族矛盾導致的仇殺會成為民族Du-立被認可的主要根據。西方社會早就認為西藏發生過大規模人道災難——藏人非正常死亡人數被認為接近百萬,西藏寺廟曾遭盡數摧毀……在這種基礎上,未來西藏發生的人道災難即使沒有東帝汶、科索沃那樣慘烈,也足夠讓西方支持西藏Du-立。

西藏未來會不會再發生人道災難?可能性是很大的。這次西藏事件被鎮壓下去,卻不等於就此了結,反而成為下一次更大爆發的起因。如同這次事件比一九八零年代的拉薩事件規模更大,下次爆發會比這次規模還大。這並非是無根據的猜測,我甚至能預言下次爆發:把其他可能的爆發撇開,至少在達賴喇嘛去世時,如果西藏問題仍未進展,達賴喇嘛也沒能回到西藏,大爆發是一定躲不過去的,境內藏人會全面起事。中國鎮壓機器根本無法防範,因為信息時代已無法封鎖達賴喇嘛去世的消息,而藏人起事也無需其他串聯,消息本身就足以讓各地藏人不約而同揭竿而起。

領袖去世引發大規模民眾抗議,中國有過一九七六年周恩來去世導致的四五運動,有過一九八九年胡耀邦去世導致的六四事件,其震蕩都導致中國歷史發生改變。設想達賴喇嘛去世引發西藏大動蕩決不是危言聳聽。稍微了解西藏就會知道,達賴喇嘛的命運是每個藏人心頭的傷口。作為西藏宗教至高無上的領袖,活在現實的菩薩,達賴喇嘛放棄了西藏Du-立,只求以高度自治保存西藏文化和宗教,如此謙卑換得的卻是羞辱,至死不能回到家鄉,不能和終生等待他的人民與信徒見面,就此永別,這種痛是無可比擬的。達賴喇嘛在世時,不論有什麼挫折,藏人總還有希望,一旦他去世,希望變成絕望,仇恨壓過恐懼,爆發一定非常激烈,“西藏Du-立 ”也將從目前的口號成為切實的運動。

當然,僅靠示威不能實現西藏Du-立,畢竟中國軍警總數接近藏人的總人口,而且是以毀滅性武器對付赤手空拳。但是悲憤的藏人絕非輕易可以鎮壓。所謂“一人拼命,十人難敵;萬人必死,橫行天下”,何況藏人有六百萬。那時中國當局將不得不再次乞靈於種族主義(信仰崩潰的中國再無其他意識形態),煽動以漢人為主的中國軍警大開殺戒,同時鼓惑中國民眾支持“反分裂”的屠殺。

很多藏人會在那個過程失去生命,但是民族Du-立之路往往正是鮮血衝刷出來的。鎮壓不一定會使藏人退縮,他們甚至可能主動迎接暴力。一方面西藏傳統宗教的苦行觀念會提供這種動力,一方面非暴力抗爭也有這種內涵。流亡藏人居住的印度是非暴力抗爭的發源地。被譽為聖賢的甘地正是號召他的追隨者要“學習死亡的藝術”。按照一些分析者的解讀,甘地主張的並非是對施加於己的暴力不反抗的“消極非暴力”,而是要去主動挑起對方的暴力施加於己,才能“通過自己承受苦難達到改革的目的”(甘地)。對持有這種理念的西藏Du-立者而言,中國對藏人的屠殺正是能夠獲得國際社會支持西藏Du-立的歷史機會,因此不是要力圖避免,反而應該有意加以運用,甚至會期望中國的屠殺夠得上種族清洗的規模,才會調動起國際社會最大的同情與支持。從西藏Du-立者角度,這並非是無視藏人的生命,而是在實踐甘地所述的非暴力抗爭之核心 ——“把生命奉獻給自己認為是正當的事情”。藏人的血流得越多,國際社會對西藏Du-立的支持就會越強。由此來看,中國的武力鎮壓不但將是失效的,而且起到的是完全相反的作用——是在幫助西藏實現Du-立。

發生種族流血衝突和出現種族清洗的災難,是種族間無法共存的證明,是促使國際社會出面對受迫害民族進行庇護,繼而支持受迫害民族建立Du-立國家的主要理由。而按照中國“反分裂”官僚集團推動的邏輯發展下去,未來西藏難以避免發生這種災難。那時,西藏實現Du-立所差的就只剩最後兩項條件,一是西方國家出面推動西藏Du-立,並且承認西藏的國家地位;二是中國自身陷入動蕩,不再有對抗西方和鎮壓西藏的能力。

2. 西藏是西方的政治正確

至今,西方政府對中國繼承帝國遺產並未表達異議,也沒有公開支持西藏Du-立。在西藏問題上與中國對立的,主要是西方民眾與媒體。西方社會是多元的,幾乎在每個問題上都存在爭議,然而在西藏問題上卻是空前一致。對中國人來講,這可以算一種奇觀——很多西方媒體完全不了解西藏,卻總是黑白分明地下結論;更多的西方人完全沒見過西藏,卻要充當西藏的代言人和捍衛者。中國人的質問是:即使中國繼承了帝國遺產,曾經欺侮過中國的西方列國繼承的帝國遺產更多,甚至今日世界很多國家都是當年西方殖民者的後裔所建,西方人有什麼資格在西藏問題上裝成正義化身指責中國呢?

時間是一種解釋。殖民時代已經過去,西方當年的錯誤不能作為中國今天的理由。的確,時間需要成為一個因素,否則任何根據都會在無限追溯中無從立身。中國和西方幾乎在每一步上都有時間錯位:中華帝國腐朽的年代,正是西方列強最為凶悍之時;西方殖民行為獲得合法性,主要靠有效統治,中華帝國時間雖長,卻只求萬方來朝的心理滿足,放任“諸藩”自成一體;當與西方的相遇使中國明白“朝貢體系”只是虛榮,必須實現有效統治才能符合主權體系,保住疆土,一連串的國難和戰爭又阻礙了這種進程;而當世界進入非殖民化時代,民族Du-立建國成為主流,西方國家紛紛從殖民地撤出時,中國卻以前所未有的強勢進軍西藏,導致達賴喇嘛帶領數萬藏民流亡他國;隨後當民主、信仰自由和文化多元在西方成為文明進步的原則時,中國卻在西藏開展了砸毀寺廟、禁絕宗教的文化革命;今天,當人權高於主權在西方世界成為普世價值觀,中國仍然以主權為至高無上,為此肆無忌憚地侵害人權。

不難理解,首先是這種時間錯位,使得每一步都與潮流相逆的中國在西藏問題上飽受西方指責。不過中國人仍然可以反問,憑什麼由西方確定時間標准?憑什麼要把西方當作原點判斷中國的錯位?即使從中共執政算起,至今中國已有效統治西藏半個多世紀。而今天西方的法國、英國、加拿大、西班牙等都存在民族問題,為什麼只有中國的西藏問題被指責?

這就涉及到西方與中國的另一個不同——西方國家是用民主方式賦予了保留帝國遺產的合法性。如科西嘉島百分之八十居民表決留在法國,比法國本土居民希望保留科西嘉島的比例還高百分之二十(不少法國人認為科西嘉島是負擔,不如讓它Du-立);而英國當年允許北愛爾蘭自主決定去留,結果是多數北愛爾蘭人選擇留在英國。西班牙的巴斯克、加拿大的魁北克都是經過民眾公決否定了Du-立。因此,那裡的民族問題只是少數人進行Du-立活動。然而對西藏卻不能這樣說,因為至少中國從未給過西藏人民選擇的機會。

今日,在摒棄了殖民主義的西方社會,自由、人權、反殖民成為社會共識,而民主制度則使西方民眾對中國擁有居高臨下的優越感。普通的西方人不像政客或商人受到中國的利益或政治制約,他們判斷遠離日常生活的西藏問題,主要是用價值標准。西藏在他們眼中一直是被中國占領的Du-立國家,而西藏問題幾乎能綜合所有西方與中國的價值分歧,因此順理成章地成為炮轟中國的最好靶子。不管中國人對此如何不解與憤怒,這已經成為中國未來必須面對的一種現實。

對此,西方媒體起的作用也很大。一方面,市場化的媒體必須跟隨大眾感情在西藏問題上追隨大眾一面倒毫不奇怪。另一方面,當大眾與媒體高度一致地相互作用時,會產生一種趨於極端的性質,我稱為“廣場效應”。如同希腊城邦在廣場上進行的民主,競爭者把煽起群眾狂熱視為成功,群眾則以鼓掌或喝倒彩方式表達支持或反對那樣,今天的公眾被媒體和當代通訊技術聯系在一起,等於制造了一個可以無限放大的廣場。媒體與大眾的相互激勵,彙聚出比古代廣場大得多的群眾效果,且導致情緒在整個社會快速地傳染。

大規模人群彼此無法充分溝通,也無法進行深入思考,只能用簡單概念獲取共識,以明確結論斷定是非。西藏Du-立在西方本來就有很強的民意支持,這次西藏事件中形成的中西陣營對立,中國民眾的反西方姿態和對西方媒體的圍攻,進一步加強了西方社會在西藏問題上的“廣場效應 ”。市場競爭促使西方媒體緊盯大眾關注熱點,因此今後會始終把西藏當作對像,不懈地捕捉任何蛛絲馬跡,特別是藏人的抗爭和中國的鎮壓,並且把所有的迫害和流血都以放大方式展示給西方民眾。那種效果反過來又會給“廣場效應”不斷加碼,促使西方民意更加支持西藏爭取Du-立。在當今世界所有民族問題中,最能得到西方社會支持的就是西藏。可以說,西藏自由已經成為西方社會的一種政治正確,同時也成為各種勢力爭搶和利用的制高點。

3. 西方政府的考量

如果與中國對立的僅是西方民眾與媒體,只在乎權勢的中國當局盡可以當作“雜音”不予理會。然而中國當局所在乎的西方當權者,卻是要靠民眾的選票才能上台。他們只要追求選票,首先就得追隨民意,因此最終一定會被民間的“廣場效應”裹挾。這是西方民主制度的基本狀態,本質上是不可更改的。面對西方,中國政府無法要求西方公眾改變態度,也無法要求西方媒體轉移立場,那只能得到反感和反彈,自取其辱。中國政府能做的,頂多是用貿易大單引誘或威脅西方政府,迫使西方政客們接受中國的立場。但是即使西方政客一時順從中國,卻不能像中國政府那樣管束本國民眾與媒體。相反,他們歸根結底要被本國民眾和媒體所決定,一俟時機成熟,就會爭相站到支持西藏Du-立一邊。

雖然今天沒有哪個政府承認西藏Du-立,然而政府態度從來是可以變化的。民間“廣場效應”的推動只是因素之一,西方政府對西藏Du-立還會有另一面考量。六四時西方國家雖有過對中國的聯合制裁,但那時針對的只是中國政府,對中國民眾的民主追求卻抱有希望。隨後的蘇東變化給了西方信心和耐心。鄧小平推動中國經濟走上資本主義之路,更使西方相信中國會隨著經濟變化出現政治變化。然而這次西藏事件證實了這種希望的虛幻。中國沒有隨資本主義進程融入西方陣營,反而隨經濟崛起有了更多威脅性;中國當局這次放棄了鄧小平的“韜光養晦”方針,極力顯示強大、強硬、以及操控民眾的一面;中國民眾(至少是西方眼中看到的)並沒有成為民主力量,反而是和專制政府結成了同盟,對內欺壓弱小民族,對外敵視民主社會。這樣的中國完全是一個新法西斯帝國的形態,令西方政治家感到驚恐,未來若任憑中國崛起下去,會不會有一天威脅世界和平?

在民主、自由、和平等表面文章之下,西方對中國的不滿還與切身利益有關。譬如中國以低人權和破壞環境為代價吸引國際資本,制造出大量廉價產品衝擊國際市場,損害了西方國家上百年才得以形成的勞資關系、福利制度和市場秩序;中國經濟對資源的巨大飢渴給全球生態危機雪上加霜;中國日益活躍地參與爭搶資源的行列,在全球與西方進行角逐,加劇了資源緊缺,導致價格飛漲;此外,更深層還有不會擺上桌面卻絕非不重要的擔憂——假如中國達到與西方相近的消費水平,瀕於生態極限的世界會不會因此崩潰?西方政治制度決定了無法以降低本國消費解決生態極限的危機,只能去抑制其他國家——尤其是中國這種人口大國——的消費提升。這其中當然存在顯而易見的霸權主義和不平等人權,卻不是沒有可能成為西方政府制定中國政策的潛在依據。

為了上述桌面上和桌面下的考量,削弱中國、抑制中國繼續發展也許有一天會成為西方國家的共同願景。而達到這個目的,肢解中國,讓中國陷於肢解後的內部衝突和相互牽制不能自拔,也讓中國喪失支撐崛起的資源與空間,是釜底抽薪的方式。只要找得到名正言順的口實,也許就會成為西方國家樂於接受的集體安排。而什麼口實會比以反帝反殖民名義促成西藏Du-立更為名正言順呢?西藏Du-立會連鎖地帶動新疆甚至更多中國民族地區Du-立。要知道,僅西藏和新疆兩地,就將使中國失去百分之四十領土,也會把中國更遠地隔離在歐亞大陸一隅。這種對中國的肢解不但不會遭受譴責,還會戴上解放者的桂冠。因此,目前看似小心翼翼不忤逆中國的西方各國政府,只要歷史發展提供最後一個條件——中國陷入內亂,就可能在很短時間轉移到支持西藏Du-立的軌道上。

4. 中國難以避免陷入內亂

那麼,今日看似日益強大、不斷崛起的中國,會不會有陷入內亂的一天呢?一種對目前中國狀況的評價是:從來沒有過這麼好,也從來沒有過這麼糟。不過多數人看到的中國僅是從未有過的好,沒有看到從未有過的糟。而被看到的好和看不到的糟之間,其實只有一線之隔。很可能在人們毫無意識之時,從未有過的糟就會突然浮出水面,在措手不及中釀成大禍。此次西藏事件的爆發,原因之一正是在於以往只看到了“好”。

其實,今日中國的好,說穿了只是經濟發展速度快。且不說這種發展速度快的代價須在明日加倍償還,僅以常識也可知世上沒有任何經濟能夠永遠高速發展。中國經濟已埋伏種種隱患,面對重重困境,危機遲早會不期而至。那時,原本被經濟高速發展掩蓋的社會危機和政治危機必將隨之而來。三重危機疊加,政權垮台、管治真空和社會動亂等一系列後果都可能出現。

眼下,因為看不到挑戰中共政權的力量,人們往往以為中共就會一直統治下去。然而大變化不是一定非得出自大力量或者大事件,細微的積累同樣可以導致崩潰結果。有一種研究讓沙子一粒粒落下,形成逐漸增高的沙堆,同時精確地計算每落一粒沙會連帶多少沙粒移動。初始階段,落下的沙粒對沙堆整體影響很小。但是當沙堆增高到一定程度,達到“臨界”後,沙堆就具有了“一體性”。那時每粒新落下的沙都會產生一種“力波”,盡管微細,卻能通過沙堆的“一體性”貫穿沙堆整體,將新落沙粒的碰撞傳給所有沙粒。沙堆結構將隨每粒沙的落下逐漸變得脆弱。說不定哪一粒落下的沙(注意:只是一粒沙),就會導致沙堆整體發生坍塌,也就是所說的崩潰。

有一個西方諺語,說的是斷了一個馬蹄釘,絆倒了馬,摔傷了將軍,輸掉了戰爭,亡了國家。那國家當然不是因為馬蹄釘亡的。用沙堆理論解釋,就是那國家的內部危機已經超過臨界狀態,馬蹄釘斷只是引起坍塌的最後一粒沙而已。中國也如同一個沙堆,各種變化和衝擊不斷落在上面,積累的結果遲早會使沙堆超過臨界狀態。而到了連馬蹄釘都成為“不穩定因素”時,專制政權控制再嚴密也是無法防止垮台的,因為它不可能給每個馬蹄釘都派上看守的兵。

按照中共目前這種拒絕政治改革,不斷積累各種矛盾的道路走下去,中國遲早會爆發全面危機。專制政權的特點之一就是無法預測,既無規律,也缺乏資訊,因此其變化總是“突變”。試問有幾個人事先看到龐然大物的蘇聯帝國會垮台呢?它卻一夜之間就分崩離析。鎮壓可以把崩潰往後拖,如同不斷拍打沙堆周邊可以使沙堆繼續增高一樣。但是那種增高不會無限,最終還是要垮,而且堆得越高,垮得越烈。經驗告訴我們,大系統雖有很強的自我維護能力,卻總是一垮就兵敗如山倒。

真正穩定的社會需要具有多重整合機制。除了政權,還有道德倫理、法治,完善的市場,國家化軍隊,以及宗教組織、民間社會、多個政黨等。這種多元並存的機制對保持社會長期穩定不可缺少。就像多黨制中執政黨下台,反對黨馬上可以頂替那樣防止出現權力真空造成的社會失序。然而步入多事之秋的今日中國恰恰只剩依靠行政體系和警察手段的一黨政權進行整合,其他整合因素都被政權吞食,不是變成政權的依附,就是被視為異己力量而“消滅於萌芽”,或是在重重壓制下無法生長,因此都無力擔負整體的整合。這樣的社會一方面似乎沒有挑戰,異常穩定,一方面卻存在巨大的風險——一旦有一天政權垮了,整個中國就會出現整合真空,由此陷入內亂,長期無法恢復秩序。

可想而之,當那一天到來,目前靠武力壓制的民族矛盾會立刻爆發,民族Du-立運動也將風起雲湧。而專制中國的鎮壓能力卻會隨內亂瓦解,或是消耗於內鬥。那些堅持大一統的中國民主人士所說的,未來中國的民主政府照樣不會允許西藏Du-立,只會是一句空話。因為陷入了內亂的中國哪裡會有民主政府?民主政府如何能從被中共消滅了其他整合機制的空白中產生?那時就可以看出中共把中國綁為人質(要亡一起亡)的後果——當中共失去了控制中國從而也失去控制西藏的能力時,中國也將不會有任何其他力量可以控制西藏。

5. 決戰在西藏

達賴喇嘛的放棄Du-立,誰都知道是一種面對現實的犧牲。未來如果有一天西藏可以實現Du-立,他真會拒絕嗎?中共執政者不抓住時機把他的放棄Du-立盡快變成法律事實,而是置之不理,何其不智。對中共的政客謀士而言,中共垮台的前景是思維大忌,因此會閉眼不看,也不會去想達賴喇嘛作為西藏問題的鑰匙,可以開門,也可以鎖門的可能——如果有一天中國陷入內亂,西藏問題仍無進展,達賴喇嘛就有充分理由號召西藏重新爭取Du-立,並呼吁國際社會給予支持。既然他允諾的放棄Du-立不被中國理睬,也就沒人能指責這種轉變是食言。那時,以達賴喇嘛對藏人的號召力和對西方的影響力,將對西藏Du-立發揮無可比擬的作用。他一人威力抵得上百萬之師。

中國和西方兩種本質不容的政治制度,交叉在全球化時代,從根本上只能漸行漸遠。價值觀和利益的雙重衝突致使雙方不可避免要進行最後決戰。而在浩蕩的世界民主大潮中,失敗一方只能是專制中國。西藏將成為全球最後一個專制大國的克星。人權高於主權的觀念,已經給西方鑄就了切入中國的刀劍,而西藏正好提供了發起決戰的戰場。現在誰也無法預見具體進程,那會受很多歷史因素的影響。但是所謂決戰很可能沒有兩軍對壘,在經濟和外交領域就見分曉。中國國門已經洞開幾十年,實用主義的經濟發展對外來資金、技術和市場的無度追求,把中國的生存命脈很大程度上交到了西方手中。這使得中國在面臨存亡危機時,除了接受西方安排,很少有其他選擇。

這裡只作為舉例進行設想:比如中國內亂與經濟危機同步,既然中國經濟已和世界融為一體,要度過難關就得靠掌管世界經濟的西方國家援手。而西方國家若是要求以承認西藏Du-立作為交換,急於從崩潰邊緣和更大災難中被挽救的中國政府(如果那時還有政府)即使再不情願,可能也不得不答應。另一種可能是,那時的中國陷入類似民國初年的分裂,一方面根本無暇西顧,無力鎮壓西藏的Du-立運動,一方面力圖成為中國主人的各方勢力爭相得到西方國家承認—— 那樣才能在國際上合法地代表中國,並得到西方輸入的資源。西方則可以合縱連橫,進行交換——哪一方願意在承認西藏Du-立的文本上簽字,就會承認和援助哪一方。當年蒙古Du-立只得到蘇聯的支持,無論是國民黨政府還是共產黨政府都無法抗拒,只能接受。將來的中國面對的將是西方列強聯盟,何以抵擋?平時高喊統一的各方勢力為了成為中國主人,很可能會以各種動聽理由(如拯救億萬百姓生命等)搶著在同意西藏Du-立的文本上簽字。類似情景在民國初年曾多次上演。中共也一直對列寧以“給新生政權爭得喘息機會”為由簽訂的不列斯特和約給予很高贊譽。而那和約讓蘇俄向德國割讓了上百萬平方公裡領土,賠款60億馬克,絲毫不亞於中國失掉西藏。這種實用主義精神某種程度上正是中共的本質。

中國的百姓則會更務實。這次西藏事件中與西方抗衡的只是一批居住城市,善於使用互聯網,與媒體接近,在中國現狀中得利的人。他們的聲音被放大,占人口的比例卻很小。對中國的普通民眾(底層百姓,工人、農民、農民工、上訪人等)而言,切身的公正、人權、自由和民主遠比西藏歸屬更重要。只是他們沒有發聲管道,不被媒體關注,在專制高壓下也最缺乏抵抗能力。不過,在中國首先發出“不要奧運要人權”呼喊的,正是黑龍江的失地農民。雖然立刻就被鎮壓,卻足以提醒那才是觀察中國的真實角度。一旦整個中國落入危機,人人生存受到威脅,起哄的民族主義立刻會煙消雲散。如同當年的河南飢民歡迎帶來了糧食的日本侵略軍那樣,遙遠西藏的去留不是問題,重要的是盡快擺脫切身困境。因此只要未來中國的危機足夠嚴重,同意西藏Du-立便不會受到太大反對。

一旦被國際社會認可的中國政府簽署了同意西藏Du-立的協議,就具有了國際法保證的效力,以後即便政府更換,再想重新占領西藏,除非那時中國有了與整個國際秩序和西方陣營對抗的實力,否則便沒有希望。當代世界在各地反復演練過的國際監管形式——聯合國介入、維和部隊進駐、劃分隔離區、進行國際援助等—— 將穩妥地保證Du-立西藏的安全。而只要西藏作為一個國家堅持數年,就會成為不可更改的既成事實,長存永續。

路線圖到此結束時,在終點回首展望,可以清楚地看到,如果有一天中國失去西藏,原因不是民主,恰是專制。中國那些把專制政權視為中國統一保證的“愛國者”們,號稱寧要專制不要分裂,而這個路線圖所展現的,卻是截然相反的結論——正是專制,導致分裂。

2008年 北京

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Roadmap of Tibetan Independence: Wang Lixiong
By Email[Tuesday, November 18, 2008 14:41]
By Lixiong, Wang

Translated by Lingxi Kong


Chapter One

March Incident in Tibet is the Watershed

1. Bureaucratic Institutions Became the Driving Force

This roadmap derives from the watershed. I had not taken the possibility of Tibetan independence into serious consideration before the incident in Tibet in 2008. It serves as the watershed that compels me to realize that Tibetan independence, for a long time being a fantasy, has turned into an emerging issue and reached the eyesight of the public. This change is brought by none other than the “anti-secession” institutions in China’s bureaucratic system.

The Party ideology sees China, during the mid 19th to mid 20th Century, as a victim of Western imperialism. The Chinese consequently have remembered the humiliations, but have rarely considered China itself as an imperial power. The vast territorial expansion from 17th to 18th Century, though beaten and humiliated by other world powers, rendered itself to modern China as a territorial heritage that includes Tibet.

Today, Tibet geographically accounts for one fourth of imperial China’s territory, and assumes a high level of importance in the politics of the empire. A considerable number of institutions in the power structure deals with Tibet, among which there are thirteen provincial/ministerial level institutions listed as following:


1. Tibet Autonomous Region

2. Qinghai Province

3. Gansu Province

4. Sichuan Province

5. Yunnan Province

6. CPC Tibet Work Co-ordination Group

7. The United Front Work Department

8. Ministry of Public Safety

9. Ministry of State Security

10. The Army

11. The Armed Police Force

12. The State Council Information Office

13. The State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau

Each of these institutions has a division that deals with Tibet, and fosters a large number of bureaucrats who have based their entire career on such issue. Besides, the following eleven institutions, not directly dealing with Tibet but assuming “anti-secession” responsibilities, have “anti-secession” divisions and personnel (listing only provincial or ministerial level or above):


1. The Central Commission of Politics and Law

2. CPC Xinjiang Work Co-ordination Group

3. Xinjiang Autonomous Region

4. Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

5. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

7. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission

8. The State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office

9. Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office

10. The Liaison Office in Hong Kong

11. The Liaison Office in Macao

Adding together, there are twenty four provincial/ministerial level institutions that assume “anti-secession” roles in China’s bureaucratic system, which is a huge group with considerable amount of power, personnel and resources. These institutions acting like a league led the decision-making process in the March incident. This is unlike what would happen in Mao and Deng’s reign, during which the highest level of authority made decisions, to be executed by the bureaucracy, regardless of what the task is: to “unite the front”, to “suppress insurgence” or to “enforce the martial laws”. Yet in the Tibet incident, the highest authority took no actions; all executed alone by the ever growing bureaucracy.

This pattern of decision-making should not be simply regarded as devolution of power from the above. In fact, in the same month when the incident happened, Premier Wen Jiabao, attending the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit Meeting in Laos, called that the Dalai Lama should use his influence to calm down the Tibet incident. This was unheard of and aroused international attention seeing it as the highest authorities’ new pattern of thinking. However, nothing followed, and no change on the handling was made by the “anti-secession” institutions. From there, we may see that the decision-making process on the issue of Tibet requires no role played by the highest authority. Even if the highest authorities made any decision, it would not come into effect if it was not in accordance with the purpose or intent of the bureaucracy. This pattern would probably have constituted an inexplicit rule for future decision-making process. The causes that contributed to this situation will be elaborated later.

Decision-making at the highest level produce brutality and absurdity on the one hand, on the other hand, possibility remains that it may produce decisions with prudence and vision for change and breakthroughs. The two extremes are not too far away, often residing in the transient thinking of the ruler’s mind. However, when highly bureaucratic institutions dominate decision-making process, it is far less likely to see dramatic breakthrough in a given situation. Bureaucracy is inherently rigid, inflexible and hard-lined. Most importantly, it is expanding and interest-driven in that all decisions produced have to be in accordance with its self-interests. When its self-interests are in conflict with public interests, bureaucracy invariably becomes destructive. It is not only deserting the public interests, but also deserting the highest authorities it should be faithfully serving. Bureaucratic “anti-secession” institutions are acting in such a way that when they generate “anti-secession” actions, the outcomes are invariably pushing China towards the abyss of split. In light of this perspective, let’s analyze the veins of the March incident in Tibet.

Street protests with violence similar to the “3.14” Incident repeatedly occur in Mainland China. The tactics used to handle these incidents have already been very obtusely unskillful. But if the same tactics—news blockade, passively cooling down, not stimulating further conflicts, cracking down the hardcore while providing comfort to others, and finding scapegoats in lower level bureaucracy to calm down the anger—were used to deal with the March incident, the chain reactions throughout the Tibetan area that we had seen would not have been forthcoming.

However, the bureaucrats dealing with Tibet do not wish to have such impassive perspectives. First of all, the international community pays good intention on Tibet, and any incidents not well-handled would raise heavy discussions and criticism. Second, turmoil in Tibet would embarrass President Hu Jintao who had been in charge of Tibet, and each level of bureaucracy fears to bear this kind of culpability. Third, since the authority has announced in various occasions that “Tibet nowadays enjoys the best time in history”, any incident, therefore, would make the government unable to explain itself.

The dynamics of Chinese politics determine that if a few individual or one department hold responsibility for any serious incident, it is acceptable to find scapegoats to calm down the event; therefore tensions among different bureaucratic institutions would not be escalated and forthcoming. However, no single administration can take responsibility for the turmoil in Tibet, since after decades of huge spending and efforts, large-scale protests had openly announced China’s policy failure in Tibet. Yet China’s Tibet policy was co-designed and executed by various institutions and agencies, and admitting its failure is tantamount to announcing failure of the collective efforts of all the aforementioned institutions and “anti-secession” agencies: No one can be excused, and career prospects of many bureaucrats would be affected. Therefore, “anti-secession” bureaucrats must organize themselves as an interest group, to act together and help the bureaucrats in Tibet to shake off responsibility of policy failure.

The most convenient way to get excused is to translate the burden of failure as a result of the “sedition and secession” efforts organized and carefully planned by the “Dalai clique”. Because no matter what excuse is readily available, if it came from within, the bureaucrats have to bear responsibility for the failure; only by throwing the burden off the country can the bureaucrats be totally excused. The administration in Tibet Autonomous Region announced to Xinhua News on the very day of incident that “sufficient evidence demonstrates that [the incident] was ‘organized, premeditated, and carefully planned’ by the Dalai clique”. This announcement immediately became the official statement by all institutions and “anti-secession” agencies dealing with Tibet. They are unable to present “sufficient evidence” up till now, and they do not care if they could. Their goal is to guide the public opinion at the very beginning, which was successfully achieved: The lying statement became a model of language, with unquestionable certainty that guided and forced the society (including the highest authorities) to follow suit.

The starting point determines the course. This official statement, throwing the burden off the bureaucrats, modeled the framework of ensuing actions, as well as the course of the event. For example, on March 14th, there was a four-hour period when the armed force, occupying the peripheries, took no action in the commotion area, allowing the degree of violence to escalate. Many people were confused by this strange phenomenon. Among the various interpretations, I tend to believe that this non-interference was made deliberately for “breeding” purposes. On the one hand, it took time to set up video equipments in the commotion area; on the other hand, violence without necessary control would naturally grow, thereby contributing to the validity of the forthcoming crackdown and allowing journalists to record more poignant scenes of the violence. If the armed force had taken over the situation at the beginning, the scale of event would have been much limited. It would be better off for the general situation but unfavorable to the bureaucrats: suppressing violence, though at a small scale, would invite waves of international criticism, which might not please their bosses in Beijing. It would not allow the bureaucrats to wash off the smears and may irritate Beijing to charge them for improper handling. Therefore, they would rather take no action, allowing violence to increase until such a degree that it could be properly labeled as “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned”, so that when they actually began to suppress the turmoil, the outside world as well as Beijing would have nothing to hold against them.

This is the characteristics of autocracy—every agency in the system tends to place maximization of its personal benefit at the core of decision-making. Bureaucrats take no heed to the actual cause and would rather actively allow things to shift towards the extreme, in order to guard their own interests, no matter how serious the outcome could possibly be.


2. Ethnic Conflict Turned into Racial Opposition

After the 3.14 Incident, the bureaucrats had to prove its necessity and validity of the crackdown to the highest authorities in Beijing, to the people at home and to the international community. On the one hand, they took immediate actions, using all forms of media to repeat the official statement, and on the other hand, they blocked the commotion area, cutting off all forms of communication, so that no counter evidence could be obtained and public opinion could be well under control. When similar events took place in the Mainland, there was little or no media coverage, not to mention showing video recordings on TV. It was remarkably unusual that after several hours TV news reporting was sent through the whole country and even to the whole world, repeatedly showing Tibetan violence against the Chinese. It did not mention or analyze the causes, only showing the attacks launched by the Tibetans and attributing it to the efforts organized by outside separatists, thereby directing nationalistic hatred at the Tibetans.

Ethnic opposition/confrontation is the root cause that may ultimately lead to separation, and should be avoided by all means. Unfortunately, the “anti-secession” bureaucratic institutions are creating the split. They knew how serious the outcome could be, but knowingly utilized ethic opposition for their political gain: As long as nationalistic feelings of the Han Chinese are stirred up, forming bitter hatred towards the enemy, not only could they hide behind the curtain to avoid inquiries and investigation, but they could also use the nationalistic sentiments surging through the country to incorporate the highest authorities into their political trajectory. Any suspicions of the handling or suggestions to double check or soften the tension would receive no resonance under surging waves of extreme nationalism. The only thing exists is the absolutely unquestionable statement. It magnifies, amplifies, and wraps up all voices and actions in accordance with the lie of the “anti-secession” bureaucrats.

Pouring oil to the flames, propaganda efforts made in this way would not calm down the event. The protests in the 1980s were only limited in Lhasa, but now extended over the whole Tibetan area. TV is an important factor, a rare commodity in the 1980s, now available everywhere. Though showing the violent scenes may receive endorsement from the Han Chinese for the crackdown, it did just the opposite to the Tibetans. Graphic scenes on TV, acting as an order for mobilization, triggered the explosion of accumulated discontent all over Tibetan areas. Tibetans not only shared empathy towards what was happening in Lhasa, some would be misled by the scenes, thinking they should be acting in the same way to express discontent. In some Tibetan areas, violent actions that Tibetans made to other ethnic groups took place after they saw the violence scenes in Lhasa showing on TV. The bureaucrats deemed the protests as an evidence for being “organized, premeditated and carefully planned”. In fact, there was no need for organization, premeditation and careful planning: Allowing Tibetans to see the vivid actions that people in Lhasa were taking was tantamount to asking themselves going to the streets. This order of mobilization, marvelously, was sent out by the bureaucrats themselves.

On the other hand, due to prejudiced choice of materials and propaganda efforts that stirred up extreme sentiments, the incident was pictured as an event in which Tibetans slaughtered Han Chinese without a reason. It cut out a racial chasm between Han Chinese and Tibetans. The longing and intimate feelings towards Tibetan culture that Han Chinese people displayed in recent years were changed into fear and hatred towards Tibetans in general, seeing Tibetans as an ungrateful people. The Internet was inundated by extreme nationalists’ feverish and abusive words. Everywhere Tibetans experienced discrimination and unfairness, no matter it was in the airport, hotel or checkpoint. Tibetan children were also bullied by Han Chinese classmates. Out from sheer aversion to the official propaganda, Tibetans resist all forms of official language, and returned hatred to Han Chinese. It could be said that after March Incident, racial opposition was formed between Han Chinese and Tibetans, divided by blood. The most typical example is: During the Olympic Games in Beijing, Tibetan children, once cheering the Chinese term, cheered whenever China lost a gold medal. This change among children indicates the long-term trend of the Tibet issue.

Before the incident in Tibet, there were conditions sufficient for independence—single ethnicity, religion and culture, clarity of national boundaries and history, high recognition from the international community—except one condition carrying the greatest importance: the lack of driving force among Tibetans domestically to seek for independence. Although the issue of Tibet has existed for decades, it is concentrated on political, historical or cultural spheres. The people involved were mostly from the government, the upper-class, the intelligentsia and the international community. Even 1959 Uprising and the escape of the Dalai Lama were regarded by Mao as merely a result of class struggle, not at all ethnic opposition. Protests in the 1980s did not make a huge impact on Sino-Tibetan relationship in general, since the protests were exclusively in Lhasa, not reaching into other Tibetan areas. Common people of both ethnicities were more or less harmonious or even intimate. If there was no driving force among Tibetans to actively seek for independence, no matter how many outside conditions could be met, they would make little difference. Precisely because of this, I had not realized the prospect of Tibetan Independence.

But the March incident in Tibet has created a great chasm between Han Chinese and Tibetans. When ethnic relationship becomes racial opposition, the nature of the issue has changed. The conflict between upper-class and the elites were easy to resolve, as policy modification, institutional change or reversal of individual cases could all serve the purpose well. But ethnic conflicts treating people differently by blood and race made everyone involved, and made impact on every single detail of daily interaction between the two peoples. Any individuals in any form of interactions could become the cause of conflicts, and all conflicts would serve as a force propelling further conflicts, thereby accumulating racial hatred between the two peoples, eye for eye, teeth for teeth, making the two peoples going further and further apart, without a returning path. In that scenario, the weaker side, the suppressed and discriminated, would naturally yearn for independence. Once Tibetans in the Tibetan areas generally envision independence as their ultimate goal, all the conditions for independence that Tibet enjoys immediately become effective. Precisely because of this important change, Tibetan Independence becomes an emerging issue in reality. Though its actualization would depend on historical timing and external environment, at least for Tibetans themselves, the conditions are now all met. This is the turning point in the course of the Tibet issue. If people for a free Tibet would want to give out reward, the most deserved party is the “anti-secession” bureaucratic group that successfully turned Sino-Tibetan relationship into racial opposition.


3. Self-fulfilling Expectations

Since at the very beginning the nature of incident had been defined as “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned by the Dalai clique”, and since the authorities regard national unity as the paramount principle, the method of handling was to crackdown, determined and unconditional. This is the principle that government and bureaucrats would not violate, and is also the guiding ideology of the armed force executing crackdown operations. After the incident, all levels of authorities in Tibetan areas as well as the armed force had been over-reactive, with large-scale arrests, violent suppressions, cruel interrogations, temple blockades, persecutions on monks, which provoked widespread discontent, and got more common people involved, making the whole Tibetan people to become resistant. This is another major cause making the incident escalated to such a degree.

Under inculcation of Party ideology and propaganda, all Han Chinese soldiers brought to Tibet to execute crackdown operations regarded Tibetans as separatist enemies, with hatred and violence unleashed to Tibetans, further provoking unnecessary conflicts. For example, when Han Chinese soldiers saw the Dalai Lama’s pictures, the head of the separatist clique, they would destroy them violently, or would even force Tibetans to destroy. This is not acceptable by Tibetans who see the Dalai Lama as the supreme leader. If old Tibetans were beaten in order to protect the Dalai Lama’s pictures, their offspring was course very angry, and relatives and villagers were also very angry. So more and more people were involved, and the conflicts occurred, escalated, and become serious incidents, possibly leading to gun shooting and casualties. Thereafter, it would be ascribed to efforts being “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned”, and suppression followed. Similar events happened all over Tibetan areas, though often without any political content. They were but “resistance provoked by the government.”

After June 4th Student Movement in 1989, the Party concluded that “Destabilizing factors must be resolved at the grassroots and nipped in the bud", which become the basic thinking pattern of the bureaucracy, and is the highest guiding principle of the bureaucrats. According to their power-worship mentality, they believe, with power and might, anything can be done wantonly. The policy they were carrying out in areas with ethnic groups is to “take the initiative to attack, to hit the raised heads, and to take pre-emptive actions”. Later, the policy becomes “to attack and chase even if [the enemies] haven’t raised their heads”. This atrocity was well displayed in the March Incident. Many activities that have nothing to do with politics, such as holidays, horse-racing, religious ceremonies, etc, which are but traditional customs having existed since ancient times. However, for the bureaucrats, especially for the soldiers brought from outside, they know nothing of the culture and traditions, and believe that “all non-Han people must be rebellious”. They believe whatever gatherings might possibly lead to serious accidents. Since they need “to take pre-emptive actions” and “to attack even the heads yet to raise up”, the most reliable way is to forbid all forms of gatherings, and stop all non-governmental activities. Even if not to forbid entirely, they need to deploy a large number of troops, to surround and threat them by setting up heavy weapons. The reactions would be easy to imagine: “How come you can hold the Olympic Games but we cannot even hold horse-racing?!” Impatient Tibetans, facing insolent and atrocious soldiers who see them as potential enemies, might cause conflicts beginning at verbal engagement. To the authorities, it precisely validated their prediction that gatherings lead to incidents, thus putting more efforts limiting these activities but not knowing that their self-fulfilling expectations are exactly the cause of incidents.

In fact, even from the rulers’ perspectives, to “resolve everything by nipping in the bud” is by no means a good way, because the “bud” cannot display the nature of affairs. Some “buds” are not “destabilizing factors”, and their growth will help stability. To “resolve” atrociously would throw the bud to the opposite side, which is tantamount to having created new enemies. Even if the nipping created a situation that looked stable, destabilizing factors are becoming and accumulating. They are not finished, merely waiting for the next chance to explode in a larger scale.

The monks in Tibet are rational and peaceful. When they were using peaceful ways to express discontent, if the authorities could have listened carefully and interacted positively with an open-mind, it would in the long run contribute to the stability of Tibetan area. But the authorities see the monks as parasites, reaping without sowing, as the basis of the Dalai’s roots in Tibet, as the nursing soil of Tibetan independence, as the troublemaker and instigator—all very negative, so whenever being challenged by the monks, the authorities, as if pre-programmed, would act with atrocity. The violence in 3.14 Incident is directly resulted from the fact that soldiers had beaten the peaceful monks continuously for days. It was exactly the same with the cause that led to the Lhasa Incident in 1987. How surprising that the authorities learned no lessons from the past. A little knowledge about Tibetan culture would tell that, contrary to the disgust and contempt feelings that bureaucrats had towards the monks, they enjoy very high social status and respect among Tibetans: They are one of the Three Treasures of Tibetan Buddhism, traditional intellectuals of Tibetan culture, and are guiders and protectors in the spiritual world of Tibetans, being greatly respected by Tibetans. Therefore, the least thing that Tibetans could tolerate is to see monks being abused and humiliated. It was guaranteed that the abuse and violence that armed soldiers gave to the monks would lead to a commotion. Only the imperial bureaucrats being blinded by power could not foresee the outcome.

The authorities never reflected on what happened, but acted to worsen the situation. The monks in all areas became the main targets; many great temples were insultingly searched by the armed force. Besides those who participated in the protests were arrested, many were confined and lost freedom; some temples were being closed indefinitely; monks without registered residence were deported; all temples were ordered to engage in “patriotic education”, forcing the monks to openly denounce the Dalai Lama. Many monks fled from the temples in order to avoid such denunciations – it was required to be made by each individual. Some temples even became empty. Before the incident in Tibet, many monks were apathetic towards political issues, devoting themselves to spiritual practice. They did not object to China’s rule, with discontent only about policy issues. The incident, however, made the monks at large to think about Tibet’s political future, and the number of monks agreeing with Tibetan independence rapidly increased.

China’s authorities forced the monks to go to the opposite side, which is tantamount to having created the most difficult opponent to deal with. Traditional folk songs described the monks in this way: “Put him up, he is a piece of straight incense; put him down, he is still a piece of straight incense. Seize the head, you get only hairs; touch the butt you get only rags”. This explains the fact that monks have no family to worry about, and thus they are resolute, single-minded and uncompromising, not being afraid to challenge the authorities. This is the reason that the monks were always in the front during the past incidents. Meanwhile, given the highly respectable status that monks enjoy in Tibetan society and the far-reaching influence that monks exert, their discontent and appeals for independence would not be limited to themselves alone; it would have a broad impact on all the Tibetan people.

Another method that the bureaucrats often use— hurriedly hunting for evidence to demonstrate that incidents were “organized, premeditated and carefully planned by the Dalai clique”, created a large number of arrests, tortured confessions and wrong cases. These efforts also affected a large number of Tibetans and their relatives, creating a wide-spread discontent and disillusionment. After many persecutions, the bureaucrats still couldn’t justify themselves with convincing evidence. The charges that the media brought against the Dalai Lama, to Tibetans, were all lying. Even in those Tibetan areas without protest, these propaganda efforts provoked disgust and aversion, creating hatred and bringing further conflicts. This made more Tibetans to think if separation is better off. “Anti-secession” propaganda efforts are providing materials breeding consciousness for separation. “Tibetan Independence” in Tibetan --“博让赞” was a word and concept not very well known among Tibetans, but after long-term “anti-secession” educations, everyone, old and young, knows this word. In this Incident, “博让赞” became the slogan being cried out by monks, city dwellers, herdsmen and primary school students alike.

This is the so-called “self-fulfilling expectation”—treating Tibetans as enemies, they would eventually so become; everywhere preventing Tibetans from “secession”, Tibetans would eventually want to secede. Analysts have different views on the nature of protests in all Tibetan areas. The main disagreement is whether it was a political movement seeking independence, or just protests expressing discontent towards policy or economic disadvantage. To me, the course of this incident may not contain specific appeals for independence; many contributing factors exist, including the discrepancy of living standards, influence from the international community, “the effect of sheep flock”, discontent regarding economic issues, migration issues, etc, and official propaganda efforts and suppression had all been adding fuel to the flame. However, the outcome of the incident is that Tibetans in general widely planted in mind the consciousness of seeking independence. Therefore, when similar incidents happen, it will become a spontaneous movement, and Tibetan Independence will become the universal appeal of many Tibetans, serving as the driving force and guiding principle during the course.


4. Sore Conflicts between Chinese Society and Western Society

Chinese and Western societies in general in the past had little conflicts. Chinese people shared good feelings towards the Westerners, and relatively trusted Western media. Even during the time with most inflated nationalistic sentiments, the anger was directed at Western governments. Westerners also had little negative feelings towards the Chinese, criticizing the Chinese government but thinking the people are victims living under totalitarian regime. However, in regard to the Tibet Incident, common Chinese people launched a jihad against Western media, and treated Western people invectively. This change of attitude derives from the bureaucrats’ successful campaign over the media. Yet the condition on which successful opinion control was depended is the necessary condition to instigate Chinese people, but is the cause that will definitely raise suspicion and criticism from the international community.

In order to achieve information blockade, the authorities on March 14, the very day of Incident, restricted freedom of movement of foreigners, and soon after, drove out all foreigners out of Tibet. For a long time, foreigners were not allowed to visit Tibetan areas, and checkpoints were set up on the road. Graphical materials were treated as the most sensitive, and the armed force largely violated human rights. Besides preventing foreigners from getting pictures, some Tibetans who used cell phone cameras to take pictures were arrested and treated with cruel persecution. Even Han Chinese, if they were caught having taken sensitive pictures, were interrogated, equipments confiscated or pictures deleted. Western media could hardly get any first-hand material due to strict enforcement on information censorship, and could only use indirect sources for reporting purposes. Indirect sources were easily mixed with errors, which invited heavy criticism and damaged Western media’s image in Chinese people’s eyes. It was the first time China’s propaganda machine came out the bout fighting Western media victoriously; the bureaucrats were extremely pleased.

But this couldn’t convince Western media. Chinese people’s one-sided abuse and intimidation, along with Chinese government’s pressure and violation, could only push Western media, referred to as the Fourth Power, to the opposite side of long-term enemies. Although Chinese people’s enmity would make Western media to report with greater care, research and balance, it will also increase the media’s aversion, not only towards Chinese totalitarian regime, but also towards Chinese people’s fanaticism and violence. One can believe if any opportunity arises in the future, similar joint campaign against China will duly occur. Western people’s attitudes are by and large guided by the media. Once the media is insulted, pushing it to the opposite side, it is bounded that people in the West will think about China with more and more negative images.

In fact, it was due to China’s news control efforts that the people in the West could not get first-hand information from the media, and, without any trust in Chinese media, they began to hold suspicions towards every single word or statement that China provided in regard to the incident in Tibet, because it is commonsensical to the Westerners that only the act of lying needs information control and censorship. Even if such efforts of control could be so successful that people could not know the details of lying, a feasible way to thoroughly resist these efforts is to treat everything as lying. Many Westerners wanted and actually tried to boycott the Olympic Torch Relay. The reason behind it was due to the fact that they lacked other means to express their discontent towards China’s handling of Tibet and took it as an opportunity to direct their anger at China’s efforts to hide the truth.

The bureaucratic institutions do not really care about Westerners opinions. They need to use Chinese people’s hostility displayed towards the Western society in order to show the government’s popularity and support, and thereafter when individual Westerners tried to boycott the Olympic Torch Relay, the bureaucrats showed those scenes repeatedly, further stimulating Chinese people’s hostility towards the Western society. Mass movement and mobilizing the masses are a craft that totalitarian regimes are very adept in. When big issues occur, Chinese people lack sufficient information and knowledge to think critically and independently, and are easy to manipulate. Although people do not consent to the government on many issues, the majority, having accepted as a fundamental principle that national unity is inviolable, used “seeking secession or not” as a simple assessment in regard to Tibet, a place far away from their daily life. When all the media, controlled by the government, circulating the single voice and reprimanding Western society’s hostility towards China and its feverish support towards “Tibetan Independence”, it was not difficult to stimulate Chinese people’s enmity. The handling of the Incident not only turned the ethnic relationship between Han Chinese and Tibetans into ethnic opposition, but also pushed Chinese and Western societies into the course to become two opposing camps.

Indeed, it was unprecedented how much support that Chinese people gave to the government. On the internet, or on foreign streets, Chinese patriots and Westerners had close combat. Chinese people are not allowed to watch CNN, but can frenetically oppose CNN; back home there is no freedom to protest on streets, but abroad patriots gathered together to repeat the scenes as if back to the Cultural Revolution (though some of these performances were encouraged and organized by Chinese government and consulates abroad). One the one hand, it will make Westerners depreciate China in terms of cultural values; on the other hand, it will invite Westerns see China, a country with enmity towards the West, as a threat to the free world. They would not treat Chinese people and the government separately, as they did before.

No rationality can exist between two opposing camps. Both sides will use simple criteria for identification, as if soccer hooliganism humiliating the opposing side, without valid reasons and without right or wrong. Once Western people and media deemed that Chinese people in general possess colonizers’ mentality, they will believe that Tibet must be freed from Chinese rule, regardless of knowing what changes China’s political system will experience. The promise made by China’s dissidents holding that Tibet would be free once China becomes democratic will not be trustworthy, because institutional change is not the same with the change of people’s mentality. This will greatly increase the difficulties when future China handles the issue of Tibet.

Today, the CCP is no longer a revolutionary party that strictly sticks to founding ideologies; rather, it becomes a pragmatic and opportunistic interest group. Theoretically, out from preserving self-interests, it should avoid direct confrontation with the West. However, the course of development is always depended on its inner logic. One of the characteristics of autocracy is that, even if each part acts rationally, the general outcome could be far away from rationality, and would not serve the general interest of the group. The trend wherein rationality of parts evolves into irrationality of the whole, like Nash equilibrium, exerts vital importance in determining the course of affairs. In the following analysis, it will be evident that, it was due to the rational calculation of the “anti-secession” bureaucratic institutions that formed China’s whole logical fallacy in dealing with the Tibet Incident.

(To be continued…)

Chapter Two: Dilemma of the Imperial Regime

Chapter Three: Road to Tibetan Independence


2008-11-21

Picture maps: Ireland, France and Italy, and Corea







Koreans made this map, allegedly in response to some Japanese derision that they are rabbits.


This is a propaganda map by a Japanese around the time prior to the 1905 Russo-Japanese War (but the language used was Chinese and English), In the English text on the top left corner Ohara depicted Russia as the "Black Octopus"
Note the antenna of the Octopus going through Manchuria into Lushun (near Dalian today).



小朋友!你能把各省的名稱指出來麼
Being Humourous Outlines of Various Countries
Satirical Maps of the First World War

2008-11-19

ZT: 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考 Wei - the Prussia of China 2500 years ago

One of the biggest puzzles in reading the Chinese history before the Qin dynasty is the geographic locations. In early Spring-Autumn period, the maps are relatively easy to construct, as most states are single-city states, surrounded by the farm land in the neighborhood. As the "merger and acquisition" game played out, territories are formed. still there was no clear boundary and at times exclaves and enclaves are formed.

By the time of the Warring States, the states are relatively consolidated. But one big confusion remains, i.e. the map for the state of Wei.

Wei started as 2 geographically disjoint "-claves": The West portion (today's SW Shanxi, From Yuncheng to Fenglingdu where the Yellow River makes a sharp 90 degreee turn from southward to eastward, and where the brick kilns a couple years ago was), and the East portion (today's Kaifeng and surrounding). For a few years at its pinnacles it even got another exclave by "borrowing road" via Zhao, to qonquer and annex Zhongshan (today's Shijiazhuang area).

Historians (and historic geographers) are still not quite sure how Wei (esp its army, as the cities are mostly self-sustainable and messengers are easy to get through in the wild) moved between its two disjoint territories. You can see the overall Warring State maps below. Some has postulated that there is a corridor (see the second map) connecting them but this theory has been disputed. Though it was possible that while Han was friendly to Wei (for most of the time it was, except the brief period when they were at war) they share the paths between their cities.

The origin of Wei's weird territory needs to be traced back to how the 3 states were formed upon the division of Jin. There were actually much more than 3 families towards the end of Jin, at least 8 (赵 魏 韩 知 范 中行(=荀) 栾 郤 in reverse order of when they were annihilated), most of them were descendents of the families who followed Zhong Er's (Jin Wen Gong) exiles a couple hundred years earlier in the Spring Autumn Period. In short, near the end there were 5 families left and each of these 3 got 2 big chunks, one of which was there traditional holding plus whatever they got up to that point, the second chunk was what they got by killing the other 3 families.
  • Zhao was the most lucky one, who had Jinyang (Taiyuan today)  area to start with, and acquired south Hebei (around Handan) from Fan/Zhonghang, Zhao was twice lucky because they were furthest away fromt he formidable Qin state, who later unified China. Wei and Han were weakened throughout the Period because of its promixity (and hence war) with Qin
  • Han's 2 chunks are one in South (mid-Henan) and one in North (the area which separates the 2 Wei territories)
  • Wei got where it started (Anyi, the capital before it was driven to Daliang (today's Kaifeng)) plus Zhi (the home of the Zhi family) which is SW of Anyi. Looking at this map one could understand why Zhao Xiangzi had been able to convince Wei into switching side and fought Zhi -- Zhi located in the SW corner of Jin and if anyone Zhi wanted to wipe out next it must be Wei who is just outside its front door. The graphically location of the West portion of Wei meant that Wei would have to be in war with Qin for the next 150 years until it more or less lost all its western territory, by that time the nightmare for Han really began as it was exposed to Qin fully then.

The Warring States Period had some striking similarity with Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. Wei, geographically disjoint as East and West Prussia, was surrounded in the middle facing enemies from all directions, which also made them great warriors and actually the first to reform (before Qin did). Chu was in a position similar to that of Russia, with wide open territories without advanced population on the other sides. Qin was similar to that of Britain, geographically well defended and eventually became the strongest of all.

---
Map of early Warring States Period, circa 400-300BC


The cities of Han and Wei (you can see Zhi is located to the west of Anyi, just north of Yongji, on the east side of Yellow River around where it is about to turn east)





战国时期魏国疆域变迁考  

作者:李晓杰 出处:历史地理

一、 问题的提出及已有的相关研究成果

政治地理学的研究在西方至今已有一百余年的发展,并取得了不少成绩。然而在我国,政治地理学长期以来未得到充分的发展,尤其是作为其分支的历史政治地理的研究,几乎是鲜有人涉猎。近年来,情况有所改观。在理论方面,周振鹤先生率先著文,对历史政治地理学的理论与学科建设提出了自己的设想 。不过对具体的中国历史政治地理的断代研究,则尚未出现。

战国时期,诸侯国之间征战频仍,其各自之间疆域变动之剧烈,在中国历史的其它时期,很少有能与其匹敌者。这段历史时期所发生的政治、军事、外交等诸多方面的变化,无疑给我们探讨历史政治地理提供了一个极好的案例。而欲进行战国时期政治地理的研究,理清其时各诸侯国的疆域变动的轨迹,应是首要进行的基础性工作。

关于战国时期诸侯国的疆域,迄今为止仅有钟凤年 、顾颉刚与史念海 、杨宽 、雁侠 、陈伟 、徐少华 等不多的几位学者做了一定的研究。在上述这些研究中,除去陈伟、徐少华先生对战国时期楚国北疆的变迁考证较为详实之外,其余的研究都是比较初步的,因此有必要对此进行重新审视。本文拟在此即对战国时期三晋之一的魏国疆域变迁做一全面的考证 ,以期对这一方面的研究有所推动。

现存先秦时期的文献中可作为疆域研究的资料极其有限,且已被以往的学者几乎利用殆尽,因此想要对前人的研究有所突破,其中一个很重要的条件就是依靠地下新的出土资料。前些年出土的一些先秦时期文字资料,其中主要有秦简《编年记》、曾侯乙墓中的简册、《包山楚简》及大量的秦封泥等,恰好都为考订这一时期的诸侯国疆域变化提供了宝贵的材料。

在进行战国诸侯国疆域变动的考证中,首先遇到的最大问题即是战国史料的编年的问题,它直接影响到整个考证的结论,因为依据不同的年代,就会复原出不同的历史面貌。以往从事这段历史研究的学者,在运用这些材料时都会感到一个很大的不便,即很多事件发生的年代,由于文献记载的矛盾,很难判断确切的时间。仅有的可作为年代参考依据的《史记·六国年表》,又包含有大量无法理顺的问题。现在这一问题终于有了一个较为圆满的解答。日本学者平势隆郎经过潜心的研究考证,在前人研究的基础之上,编纂了一部《新编史记东周年表--中国古代纪年の硏究序章》 ,该书将纷繁矛盾的先秦史料做了梳理,可谓目前最为完善的一部先秦历史纪年表。这一年表不仅将战国时期的事件做了统一的排序,而且也相应地澄清了一些史实 。不过,在此需要指出的是,该书的编纂是将《史记》所载之事完全做为信史而进行的,而对《史记》所记之事的真伪并未做进一步的考订,这是此书略显不足之处。
在此书出版之后,又有一位日本学者藤田胜久刊布了其研究成果--《史记戦国史料の研究》 。此书主要对《史记》的《本纪》及主要《世家》中所涉及的战国史料的编年问题做了深入的研究,其大部分结论与《新编史记东周年表》相同。因此本文在下面所从事的具体疆域考证的系年,基本上即以《新编史记东周年表》(后文简称平势《表》)为准。
另外,缪文远又有《战国史系年辑证》 问世,但因此书仍主要是以《史记·六国年表》及《资治通鉴》的《周纪》与《秦纪》为线索,并未跳出传统的战国纪年的窠臼,故本文不采缪氏之说。
魏,本为西周封国,公元前661年为晋国所灭,封大夫毕万于此地。《左传·闵公元年》载:"晋侯作二军,公将上军,大子申生将下军。赵夙御戎,毕万为右,以灭耿、灭霍、灭魏。还,为大子城曲沃,赐赵夙耿,赐毕万魏,以为大夫。"《魏世家》所载略同:"献公之十六年(前661),赵夙为御,毕万为右,以伐霍、耿、魏,灭之。以耿封赵夙,以魏封毕万,为大夫。"魏城在今山西芮城县北。后来毕万的势力越来越大,于是从其国名而称为魏氏。战国时期的魏国即是在此基础之上发展而来的。


晋文公即位,令毕万子魏武子袭魏氏之后封,列为大夫,治于魏。据《魏世家》,魏武子之子悼子时,又徙治霍(今山西霍州西南)。晋悼公之十二年(前562),魏绛又由霍徙治安邑(今山西夏县西北)。
公元前451年,魏桓子与韩康子、赵襄子伐灭知伯,分其地。随后,魏又与韩、赵两国三分晋国 ,正式确定了魏国的领土范围。由于战国前中期韩国北疆与赵国南境接壤,这种形势便将魏国河东与河内地区隔断,使魏国疆域分为东、西两个地理区域,因此本文拟分别考证这两个区域四至的变动情况。


二、魏国西部区域边界的变化

战国时期,魏国西部区域主要指魏河西、河东地区。在这一区域魏主要与秦国、赵、韩三国接壤。下面我们就具体来讨论一下魏这一部分疆域的变化情况。

(一) 西境

魏西境的变化是魏、秦两国相互争夺土地的结果。魏、秦之间的领土争夺先从西河地区展开。
魏文侯执政后,任用李悝,实行了一系列的变法改革措施,使魏国的实力大为增强。二十一年(前422),魏为防范秦国的侵袭,在少梁(今陕西韩城市西南)筑城 。少梁在西河以西,加之《秦本纪》说在魏筑少梁后,"秦击之",所以可推知该地其时与秦地相接,为魏西境上地。魏国此时西境已有西河的部分土地。
二十二年,魏国再次向位于自己领土西境外的秦国发动进攻,一直打到渭水南岸的郑(今陕西华县)地才收兵,并在雒(洛)阴(今陕西大荔县西南洛河南岸)、合阳(今陕西合阳县东南)筑城 。
二十三年,魏复城少梁 。此年复城少梁,当是此地邻秦,地理位置极其重要之故。
二十八年,魏派太子击围攻秦之庞(今陕西韩城市东南),"出其民",将庞地占为己有 。
三十一年,魏将吴起率军伐秦,夺取了秦临晋(今陕西大荔县东)与元里(今陕西澄城南)等地,并在该二地筑城 。临晋、元里亦在西河地区,加上前此魏所据有的少梁、洛阴、合阳、庞等地,魏将河西地区大部分土地控制在自己手中。春秋时期,河西之地本为晋地,公元前645年,晋将河西地献给了秦国 。现在魏又占领了该地。于是魏置西河郡,以吴起为郡守,以抵御秦、韩等国的进攻 。
四十六年,秦又侵位于渭水之南的魏之阴晋(今陕西华阴市东) 。魏、秦两国在渭南地区展开了激烈的争夺。
四十八年,秦伐魏,再败魏于渭南的武下(今陕西华县东),并俘虏了守将识 。魏国渭水以南领土缩减了不少。
惠成王五年(前366),魏为了巩固其在渭南的疆土,于是在武堵(都)(今陕西华县东) 筑城,但仍被秦国所败。因此时秦为献公执政,通过一些改革,秦国力已由弱转强。同年,秦又败韩、魏联军于洛阴,该地也当为秦所得 。自此,秦开始了逐步重新夺取魏河西之地的行动。
八年,秦又向北攻打魏河西的少梁,赵再次出兵相救 ,才得以抵挡秦军的攻势。
九年,魏继续与秦在少梁作战,结果被秦庶长国所率的军队击败,魏将公孙痤等被俘,位于少梁东北的庞为秦所取。庞原本属秦,故此次秦当是收回之 。
十七年,魏与秦战于元里,秦攻占了魏的少梁 。
十九年,魏在河西筑长城,南起于渭水南岸的阴晋,向北越过渭水、洛水,经大荔、澄城、合阳诸县,最后止于少梁 。
三十年,魏在西境与卫鞅所率的秦军交战,结果魏军败北 。
至迟三十三年,合阳属秦 。三十三年,秦攻魏,败魏于岸门(今山西河津县南),俘虏了守将魏错 。
惠成王更元三年(前332),魏将阴晋(今陕西华阴市东)献给了秦国,以求和好。秦得该地后,更名为宁秦 。
更元五年,秦在雕阴(今陕西甘泉南)大败魏将龙贾所率之军,斩首四万五千。与此同时,迫于秦的压力,魏将河西之地献给了秦国 。这样,魏与秦当以黄河为界。
更元六年,秦攻取了魏的汾阴(今山西万荣西南)、皮氏(今山西河津东)、焦 。
至迟于哀王十二年(前307),皮氏复由秦归魏 。
十三年,魏又在皮氏筑城 。
昭王六年(前290),魏又将河东四百里之地送给了秦国 。同年,皮氏又为秦攻取 。


3 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考

(二) 北境
武侯九年(前387),翟败魏于浍水 。
二十五年,魏败赵于蔺(今山西离石县西) 。
惠成王十年(前361),赵与魏又易地。魏将榆次(今山西榆次)、阳邑(今山西太谷东北)二地给了赵国 。
惠成王更元七年(前328),秦夺得魏蒲阳(今山西隰县),同时魏将上郡全境十五县之地献给了秦国 。魏至迟在魏文侯卒位的公元前395年已置有上郡。上郡之领域,杨宽以为有今陕西省洛河以东,黄梁河以北,东北到子长、延安一带 。在魏上郡属秦之时,原为魏十五县的肤施、漆垣、广衍等地亦当同时属秦 。
更元十三年,秦攻取了魏的平周(今山西介休县西) 。

(三)东境
武侯十四年(前382),魏城王垣(今山西省垣曲县东南) 。
惠成王九年(前362),魏与韩、赵发生利害冲突,魏相公孙痤大败韩、赵联军于浍水。擒赵将乐祚,伐取了赵的皮牢(今山西翼城东北) 。
惠成王更元十三年(前322),秦攻取了魏的曲沃(山西闻喜县东北) 。
昭王四年(前292),秦大良造白起率军攻魏,夺取了魏之垣邑,旋秦又将该地归还给魏国 。
六年,垣又为秦攻取 。
至迟九年,魏绛(今山西省侯马市西)地属秦。绛本春秋晋国之都,战国时期,绛入于魏 。

(四)南境
文侯三十九年时,秦对魏发动攻击,一直打到魏国的阳狐(今山西垣曲县东南古城),此时两国当以此地为界 。
武侯十四年(前382),魏城安邑(今山西省夏县西北) 。
惠成王二年(前369),魏与韩、赵联军战于浊泽。结果,魏军大败 。其地应在今山西运城市解州西。
七年,秦向东进军,越过黄河,攻打魏的河东之地。在石门(今山西运城西南),秦军大败魏军,斩首六万。赵派兵急救魏,方解秦之围 。
十九年,秦大良造卫鞅率军围攻魏旧都安邑,迫使安邑降秦 。后安邑又还属魏(见下文)。
更元五年(前330),围魏在黄河南岸的焦(今河南三门峡以西)、曲沃(今河南三门峡西南)二地 。
更元八年,秦复将焦、曲沃归还魏国 。
哀王五年(前314),秦将樗里子攻取魏的曲沃、岸门(今山西河津县南)、焦 。
十六年,秦攻取魏蒲阪(反)(今山西永济西)、阳晋(山西永济县虞乡西)、封陵(今山西芮城县西南)三地 。此三地都位于魏河东地区。
十七年,魏秦又将蒲阪(反)归还魏国 。
二十三年,魏、韩、齐三国联合攻秦,攻入函谷关,迫使秦求和。秦复将河外之地与封陵还给魏国,以示和好 。
昭王六年(前290),蒲阪又为秦攻取 。
九年,秦将司马错攻打魏之河内,魏将安邑献给属秦 。
安釐王二十三年(前254),秦取魏之吴城(今山西平陆县北) 。至此,魏在河东之地尽失于秦。


三、魏国东部区域疆界的变动

魏国疆域的东部区域是指魏河内及黄河以南的地区。

(一) 西境
魏国河内及中原地区西侧为韩国疆土,魏这一段疆界的变化,涉及到战国前期的魏与韩和后期的魏与秦之间的领土变化与争夺。
魏文侯四十二年(前401),魏在酸枣(今河南省延津县西南)筑城 。
惠成王十三年(前358),魏将龙贾率军在魏大梁西侧修筑了一条长城 。这条长城北起黄河南岸的卷(今河南原阳西),东南经阳武(今河南原阳东南),再折向西南,最后至密(今河南密县东北) 。魏筑此长城主要为了防备秦国越过崤关向东的侵袭 。
十四年,魏又从韩国手中取得了穿越太行山的要道轵道,并将鹿(今河南浚县东南)给了韩国 。
昭王七年,秦攻取魏河内六十一城 。
九年(前287),秦取得魏新垣、曲阳(河南济源市西)二城 。
十三年(前283),秦得魏安城(今河南原阳县西南,一说在今河南汝南县东南) 。
安釐王元年(前276),秦将白起伐魏,又攻取魏二城 。依据当时的形势推断,此二城应在魏大梁附近。
二年,秦再攻取魏二城,并兵临魏都大梁城下,韩派暴鸢率兵前来救魏,结果被秦击败,暴鸢退走启封(今河南开封西南),秦军追至该地 。魏最终将温(今河南温县西南)割给了秦国,才求得议和局面 。


4 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考
三年,秦客卿胡阳攻魏,又得魏卷、蔡(阳)(今河南上蔡西南)、长社(今河南长葛东北)及中阳(今河南郑州东)四城 。
四年,秦将白起攻华阳(今河南新郑县北),败三晋军,斩首十五万,魏将芒卯被迫逃走,魏献南阳以求和 。
九年,秦夺取了魏的怀地(今河南武陟县西南) 。
至迟十一年,韩邢丘(今河南温县东平皋东北隅)属魏,十一年该地又属秦 。
二十九年,秦拔魏高都(今山西晋城市)及汲(今河南汲县西南)。《秦本纪》:"(庄襄王)二年(据平势《表》,当三年 (前248)),蒙骜攻魏高都、汲,拔之。"
三十二年,秦麃公将军攻卷,斩首三万,复取魏卷 。卷本在安釐王三年已属秦,此年秦又攻之,当是得而复失,故再次攻取之。
景湣王十二年(前231),魏献地于秦 。从当时的形势来推测,魏所献之地当在魏都大梁附近。
王假三年(前225),秦将王贲率军攻魏,将魏都大梁包围,引河水及大沟水灌大梁,结果大梁城坏,魏王假被俘,于是魏亡于秦 。

(二)北境
魏文侯三十五年(前408),魏越赵界伐中山,至三十七年(前406)而拔中山 。因魏与中山之间有赵国相隔,所以魏对中山当是遥领之。魏文侯为守中山,将太子击封于中山,乐羊封于灵寿(《乐毅列传》),并任命李克为中山相 。
四十年(前403),魏文侯令西门豹守邺(今河北省临漳县西南),至迟此时魏已有邺地 。以该地所处位置来看,当在魏、赵两国交界处。
武侯六年 (前390),赵进攻魏的河北地区,攻取魏的棘蒲(今河北魏县南) 。
二年之后(八年),赵复取魏黄城(河南内黄县西北) 。
至迟十年,因魏不能越过赵国而对中山实行强有力的管辖,因此中山趁机复国,魏不再控有中山 。
惠成王元年(前370),魏在怀(今河南武陟县西南)大败赵军,怀当属魏 。
九年,魏伐赵,攻取了赵列人(今河北肥乡县东北)与肥(今河北肥乡西)二地 。列人、肥两邑地近赵都邯郸,魏占据之后,对赵十分不利。
十年,魏攻取了赵的泫氏(今山西省高平市) 。亦在此年,赵与魏又易地。赵将其旧都中牟县送给了魏国。而此时魏亦将繁阳(今河南内黄西北)、浮水一带给了赵国 。两国易地,使魏北界与赵南界发生了变化,因此《水经·渠水注》曰:"自魏徙大梁,赵以中牟易魏,故赵之南界,极于浮水,匪直专漳也。"
十八年,魏伐赵,攻占了赵国都城邯郸 。赵于是向齐求救,齐便派田忌、孙膑率兵求赵。齐军大败魏军于桂陵(今河南长垣西北)(《赵世家》、《魏世家》、《田敬仲完世家》、《孙膑列传》)。《孙膑兵法》中所记载的智擒庞涓的"围魏救赵"著名战例,即指的此次战役。


5 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考
二年之后(二十年),魏又将邯郸归还赵国 。
三十年,魏与赵在魏之北境交战 。
至迟惠王更元元年(前334年),黄城复由赵属魏 。
昭王八年(前288),魏河阳之地为赵所得 。此河阳,即河雍,在今河南孟县西 。
十四年,乐毅率领赵国的军队攻取魏伯阳(今河南安阳县西北) 。
十六年,赵与魏伯阳 。
安釐王元年(前276),赵国大将廉颇又领兵攻取了魏国东北境的几(今河北大名东南) 。
二年,赵攻取魏的防陵、安阳 。防陵与安阳都在今河南安阳西南。
二十年,魏宁新中(今河南安阳市西)属秦 。
景湣王元年(前242),秦拔魏酸枣(今河南延津西南)、燕(今河南延津东北)、虚(今河南延津东)、长平(今河南西华东北)、雍丘(今河南杞县)、山阳(今河南焦作东南)等二十城,随后即建立了东郡 。
景湣王二年(前241),魏朝歌(今河南淇县)为秦所取 。
三年,魏汲被秦国所攻取 。安釐王二十九年(前248),秦已从魏国手中夺取了汲,此时又复取,当是汲在公元前248年后又复属魏之故。
四年,魏将邺给了赵国 。
五年,秦将杨端和攻魏,夺取了魏的三城:垣(今河南省长垣县东北)、蒲阳(今河南长垣西)、衍(今河南郑州北)。随后,秦军又先后攻占据了魏的仁(当近平丘)、平丘(今河南长垣西南)、小黄(今河南开封东北)、济阳(今河南兰考东北)、甄城(今山东甄城北)等地 。

(三)东境
魏文侯四十五年(前398),襄陵(今河南睢县)为齐所攻取 。襄陵地处魏东南境上,其时当与齐为邻。而由《汉志》陈留郡襄邑下颜师古注引圈称所云"襄邑,宋地,本承匡襄陵乡也。宋襄公所葬,故曰襄陵。秦始皇以承匡卑湿,故徙县于襄陵,谓之襄邑,县西三十里有承匡城"之文又知襄陵为承匡之襄陵乡,是至迟此时魏已有宋之承匡地。承匡,亦作承筐,本春秋宋邑,其地在今河南省睢县西南匡城。战国初期承匡属魏,《齐策二》载"犀首以梁为齐战于承匡而不胜"可证。
武侯九年(前387),魏又使吴起伐齐,至灵丘(今山东高唐县南,一说在今山东滕州市东) 。
十四年,魏再次伐齐,至齐桑丘(今山东平原县西) 。
惠成王三年(前367),齐败魏于观(今河南清丰县南) ,观当属齐。观位于河水东岸,于此说明其时魏与齐在此处以河水为界。
十四年,韩派使者许息至魏,将韩伸入到魏国境内的平丘(今河南封丘东)、户牖(今河南兰考北)、首垣(今河南长垣东北)等地送给魏国 。
至迟十九年,襄陵由齐还属魏国,该年诸侯围魏襄陵 。
二十九年,魏攻韩,韩求救于齐。齐派田忌、田朌为将,孙膑为军师,出兵救韩。结果在马陵(今山东范县西南),齐军设下埋伏,大败魏军。魏太子申被俘,魏将庞涓自杀。
三十年,齐国大将田朌与宋人一起联合攻魏东境,围魏平阳(今河南滑县南) 。
三十一年,魏在济阳(今河南省兰考县东北)筑城 。
更元十二年(前323),楚伐魏,魏襄陵属楚 。
哀王二年(前316),魏与齐战,齐败魏于观津(今河北武邑县东南) 。
八年,魏攻卫,得卫二城 。
安釐王十二年(前265),魏据单父(今山东省单县) 。
至迟三十四年,秦陶郡之地为魏所取 。陶春秋时期为宋国属地,战国时期齐灭宋后,为齐所据。后来燕等五国联合破齐,秦又占有该地,秦昭襄王三十三年(前274),又益封穰侯魏冄于此。魏冄死后,方又设郡。陶郡乃因陶邑而得名,陶邑即定陶,该郡当有今山东省宁阳至定陶县一带 。三十四年,秦将蒙骜率兵夺取魏畼、有诡二地 。

(四)南境
魏文侯四十二年(前401),魏向南进攻郑国 。
武侯二十年(前376),魏伐楚,得楚之鲁阳(今河南省鲁山县) 。魏得鲁阳后,使魏在黄河以南有了较为广阔的领土。
惠成王元年(前370),魏在马陵(今河南新郑东南)大败韩军,马陵当属魏 。
六年,魏伐宋,取仪台(今河南虞城县西南) 。
十年,魏为了使地处河东的国都安邑免遭秦国的侵扰,决定将都城由安邑徙都中原地带的大梁(今河南省开封市) 。魏国的政治中心也因此由西部转到了东部。


6 战国时期魏国疆域变迁考


十六年,魏侵宋黄池(今河南封丘县西南),不久,宋复取之 。
至迟在惠成王更元六年(前329),楚上蔡属魏 。
哀王二十三年(前296),魏趁楚怀王新立,政权不稳,出兵伐楚,攻取了楚陉山 。
昭王元年(前295),秦取魏南部的襄城(今河南省襄城县) 。


四、小结

以上我们对战国时期魏国的疆域变动情况,按地理方位分别进行了考察。为了使魏国疆域的整体变化更易了解,下面再按时间顺序选取一些主要时段做一综述。

在安釐王二十三年(前254)之前,魏国的疆域主要分为以安邑为中心的西部区域及以大梁为中心的东部区域。前一区域主要包括魏河西与河东地区。后一区域主要是魏河内及黄河南岸的中原地区。在这两大区域之间是韩国的疆土。

文侯三十七年(前406)时,魏国疆域的大致范围是:1)西部区域:西境在渭水以南有武都、武下、阴晋,渭水北岸洛水及黄河以西有洛阴、临晋、元里、合阳、少梁、庞、皮氏、雕阴、肤施、漆垣、广衍等地与秦为界,北境有榆次、阳邑、平周、蒲阳与赵相接。东境有绛、曲沃、垣等地与韩接壤。南境大体以黄河为界,有黄河北岸的阳晋、封陵、焦、阳狐等地。2)东部区域:西境有曲阳、温、怀、卷、酸枣、衍、密、华阳等地与韩为界。北境有棘浦、黄城、宁新中、朝歌、汲、山阳等地与赵为邻。另外,魏向越过赵界还控制有中山国领土。东境有观津、观、平阳、济阳等地。东南境有襄城等地。

武侯二十年(前376):1)西部区域:西境无武下。2)东部区域:北境无棘浦、黄城,但增加了邺,且中山国地亦不再控制。东境又增灵丘、桑丘二地,但东南已有襄陵。南境拓展至鲁阳。

warring state period evolution map (source)


惠成王十四年(前357):1)西部区域:西境无武都、洛阴、庞。北境无榆次、阳邑。东境增皮牢、安邑。2)东部区域:西境增轵道,无鹿。北境无繁阳,增列人、肥、泫氏、中牟。东境无观、增平丘、户牖、首垣。南境增马陵、仪台。且此时魏都已由河东的安邑迁到黄河以南的大梁。




哀王二十三年(前296):1)西部区域:西境无少梁、合阳、阴晋、雕阴、肤施、漆垣、广衍等河西及上郡之地,亦无汾阴。魏、秦接壤处已从河西东移至河东。北境无蒲阳、平周。东境无曲沃(山西闻喜县东北),南境无曲沃(今河南三门峡西南)、岸门、焦。2)东部区域:东境无观津,得卫二城。南境增陉山,北境增黄城,无河阳。

昭王十三年(前283):1)西部区域:无垣、蒲阪、皮氏、绛、安邑。2)东部区域:西境失河内六十一城、新垣、曲阳、安城。南境无襄城,北境无几、防陵、安阳。



安釐王二十三年(前254),魏西部区域尽为秦所得,魏疆与其时的东部区域重合。西境无温、怀、高都、汲、卷、蔡阳、长社、中阳、华阳,北境无宁新中,东境增单父。

景湣王五年(前238),北境无酸枣、燕、虚、长平、雍丘、山阳、朝歌、邺、垣、蒲阳、衍、仁、平丘、小黄、济阳、甄,东境增陶。

王假三年(前225),秦破魏都大梁,魏亡。


战国时期魏国疆域的沿革主要情况,已如上述。不过,需要指出的是战国时期的疆域还不具备后世那样的封闭性,在没有修筑长城的地方,往往会有城邑交错。在有象太行山险的地方,韩、魏二国城邑的错综复杂更是可以想见。本文在此所勾画的魏国疆域只是一个理想的疆界,与当时的实际情况可能会有一定的出入。
另外,在此尚有一个问题需要提出,即魏国东、西两大区域是通过哪条路线保持彼此之间的联系的?对此问题已有学者做过一定的探讨。钟凤年推测其时魏可能是通过借道于韩来保持两区域间的往来的 。史念海先生则指出:"在魏国更为重要的却是新旧两都间的道路,也就是由河东经过河内通向河外的道路。尤其是河东和河内间的道路在较早的时期就更为重要。梁惠王就曾经说过:'河内凶,则移其民于河东,移其粟于河内;河东凶亦然'。这条河东河内间的道路当是由安邑,经过晋国旧都绛,再东南行达到河内。由河内东南行,前往大梁,是要渡过黄河的。渡河之处当在卷。" 其论可备一说。另外,在《淮南子·说林篇》所载"秦通崤塞而魏筑城也"及高诱所注"魏徙都大梁,闻秦通治崤关,知欲来东兼之,故筑城设守备也"之文中,似亦可窥出一些消息。这段文字虽然是讲述魏所筑的中原长城之事,然从中可推知,秦从崤关攻魏当是沿黄河进兵的。如此,则不知是否魏还可通过黄河沿岸的道路来沟通魏河内与河东地区?

This map postulated that there is a corridor up north between Han and Zhao connecting the 2 parts of Wei.

至于《中国历史地图集》及杨宽先生所认为的魏通过上党山区一线来联系河东与河内的结论 ,则是不可靠的。这不仅因为魏当时绕行赵、韩上党地区于理不合,更因为这一区域在战国时期始终为赵、韩的领地,魏从未有过据有赵、韩上党之地的记载 。总之,在魏国的东西两大区域之间一定存有沟通的道路,只是由于史料的不足,目前尚很难做出明确的判断。要准确复原这种情形,还有赖于新的相关文献的发现及对太行通道以及南阳诸邑归属的详尽检讨。