Showing posts with label china. Show all posts
Showing posts with label china. Show all posts

2012-02-06

ZT: 蘋論:要旗幟鮮明反對「蝗蟲論」與歧視

Apple Daily still has a few sane minds, despite its fenqingization for the past few years.
  • 真正有效的辦法是堅守香港的特色與核心價值,包括包容及反歧視,讓香港在四方八面的衝擊下仍能保住自己的性格,自己的優勢。另一點該做的是更努力的走出去,更努力的國際化

 (还是深圳愤青比较大气)
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蘋論:要旗幟鮮明反對「蝗蟲論」與歧視

2012年02月06日

那些以「蝗蟲」、「蝗蟲論」歧視、批評內地人的網民、市民大概被怒火蒙蔽了眼睛與心靈,非但看不到「一竹篙打一船人」的荒謬,非但看不到自己的言論是在無理歧視內地民眾,非但看不到自己的「蝗蟲論」是在毒化兩地民眾的關係,反而痛罵指出問題的平機會,要求主席林煥光先生道歉;反而把反對「蝗蟲論」的人狠批為「賣港賊」。我們認為這些獨斷、非理性的指罵是無理又荒謬的,令人既痛心又憤怒。

訂定反歧視條例,成立平等機會委員會就是要消除社會上涉及歧視的惡習與風氣,讓香港在各個方面趨近一視同仁互相接納的情況,並打造共融社會。今次部份網民、市民在報上刊登全版廣告,以蝗蟲影射及批評內地居民,明顯跟共融社會的目標相違背,明顯跟消除各方面歧視的原則有違背。平機會表示反對網民的做法,提醒大家要尊重不同族群的人只是盡本身的責任,只是在履行自己的職務,只是在捍衞香港的核心價值,根本沒有需要或理由因此道歉。

假若平機會居然袖手旁觀,任由某些人以「蝗蟲論」之類的說法公然歧視醜化其他族群,它才是失職失責,它才應當道歉。 至於以「賣港賊」之類的帽子扣在一些反對「蝗蟲論」的人身上更是可鄙與令人齒冷。香港是個言論開放多元的城市,不同意見、不同觀點交鋒角力是常態,完全可以透過理性討論處理。即使最終說服不了對方,大家仍可以採取各自保留不同意見( agree to disagree)的做法,不需要作甚麼人身攻擊,更沒有理由像內地文革時那樣亂扣人家帽子,懷疑他人的企圖動機,甚至上綱上線至「賣港賊」之類的攻擊。香港的利益不是一個人、某個人說了算的,根本沒有人有資格指罵其他人是「賣港賊」!

而且,正如社民連立法會議員梁國雄先生所言,因為擔心社會資源分配問題而肆意攻擊社會上某個族群、某個階層的人是非常危險的。因為今天可以攻擊內地居民,下次可以攻擊歧視拿綜援市民,再下次可以反南亞裔居民,再下次可以狠批需要大量社會支援的病人、傷殘人士……。結果社會上的公平公正蕩然無存、包容互諒消失得無影無蹤,剩下的只會是越來越大的分化,越來越激烈的對抗,甚至被某些政客、團體利用,令香港變得面目全非。

在全球化及內地越來越開放的情況下,香港受外來人流、物流、資金流的影響將會越來越大,其他地區來香港工作、旅遊、學者的人將會越來越多。事實上不但香港要好好應對、處理這樣的衝擊,其他國家不管是台灣、美國、歐洲以至日本同樣要作出適應,同樣需要應付隨人流而來的新問題。但是,退縮、閉關自守絕不是可行的辦法,絕不是好的選擇;因為這樣做只會令香港市民錯過機遇,令香港社會跟國際發展脫軌。真正有效的辦法是堅守香港的特色與核心價值,包括包容及反歧視,讓香港在四方八面的衝擊下仍能保住自己的性格,自己的優勢。另一點該做的是更努力的走出去,更努力的國際化,爭取世界各地的人流、資金流來港,冲淡內地的影響。內地持續開放,內地人與錢湧入香港的確帶來各種意想不到的影響。重要的是要站穩陣腳,逐步、具體的解決問題包括雙非孕婦問題。以歧視性言論「一竹篙打一船人」,以扣帽子方式攻擊持不同意見的人不但沒有好處,只會帶來更多爭議、誤會與矛盾。 盧峯

2012-01-25

惡意擴大港陸矛盾不可取

1. 看了視頻和相關報導,的確孔慶東沒有一竹竿打死所有香港人。可惜香港媒體眾口一言把“部分”兩字“刻意省去,除了惡意激化港陸矛盾我實在想不到有什麼別的原因。

2.我不了解孔慶東其人,可能就一大憤青吧。然後,有人搬出在那火紅的歲月裡他曾經站在王丹旁邊的照片。我想起,當時溫爺爺初任總理時香港某媒體人(忘了是誰,好像是李怡?)說過,當時能和趙紫陽一起到廣場去的應該壞不到哪裡去。其實,即使是一大憤青五毛,昨天孔文就更說明他不是全無誠意的。

3. 假如我是早逝叔叔,我根本不會去評論一個屁民的言論。這世上憤青多著是。一個未來的領導人,雖然只是領導着700萬,只獲得1200人中多數的認同,與憤青論戰也不是你的職責。可惜,香港人卻很認可這一套,自己是不是狗還覺得需要一頭豬來說明?至於中聯辦和北大,那就更扯了,難道香港人希望大陸政府,甚至北大,管制每一個屁民憤青的言論?

ps 順帶講一講D&G事件。明明就是一跋扈來路品牌肆意佔據公眾地方加三流公關的事件。其中一個保安(甚至不一定是該公司僱員)說了句“他們就可以照”,各媚體就上綱上線把“他們”改為大陸顧客。也是一個惡意激化矛盾的例子。

2011-09-27

The War Nerd: China Joins the Yacht Club

 
 
The War Nerd / September 18, 2011
When we lived in Long Beach, my dad used to say the same thing every time we saw the sign to the yacht club: “You know what a boat is?”
He’d ask the car that, then wait for somebody to answer him—he was a master of timing, except  nobody ever answered him no matter how long he waited, because my mom and sisters were always mad at him about something and I was too busy remembering that the Yacht Club was on some subdivision street that had the balls to call itself “Appian Way,” and I’d be furious in the back seat thinking no goddamn Roman legion ever marched down that stupid street, just those selfish Hot Wheels Merc sports models with seats for two people, selfish rich bastards. “Appian Way”! The nerve of those developers.
So while the car was enjoying a nice long sullen silence, he’d have to answer himself: “A boat is a hole in the water that you throw money in.”
It cracked him up every time, and probably made him feel better about the fact that we were as likely to be buying a boat anytime soon as we were to be running the Long Beach Marathon—I can just see us doing that, one of those funny “family run projects” where the whole fit bunch gets into a 20 ft caterpillar costume and trots along for 26 miles thinking they’re cute, the kind of local-news story that makes you wish you could see what an AK would do to a giant caterpillar.
Precious mem’ries, how they linger. I was remembering those drives down Highway 1 after reading the stories that China’s starting sea trials for its first aircraft carrier.
The weird thing about that story is that I grew up in California, so I have this prejudice that Chinese people are smart. And why would smart people build an aircraft carrier? I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again—I’ll say it as many times as my dad told that hole-in-the-water joke if I have to: Aircraft carriers are the worst weapons around, giant holes in the water that you throw hundreds of billions of dollars into.
Being the Chinese, they did it the smart way: Got the basic platform on the cheap, did some smart bargaining against their ex-rivals the Russians. When the Soviet paper tiger shredded, there were bargains galore, including all the military hardware any rising power could buy. The Soviet Black Sea fleet rusted at anchor in what was now the independent country of Ukraine. (They dropped the “The” along with the Soviet alliegance; it’s just “Ukraine” now, like those bands that get mad if you add “The” to their names.)
People were starving in Ukraine—the honest ones. The not-so-honest ones were getting rich selling off all the Soviet guns, tanks, missiles, ships and secrets they could to the highest bidder. Soviet ships were rusting in every harbor in the world. Not just military ones; every port in every country had one or two rusting Soviet fishing ships sinking a foot or two a year, sometimes with their crews stuck on board, drinking themselves to death and stabbing each other to relieve the boredom.
Most of the Black Sea fleet ended up as scrap steel. In fact there’s probably some of a Soviet missile cruiser in that Hyundai you drive to work. A certain Chinese scrap-metal company strolled over to have a look at one hulk in particular—a Soviet carrier started in the 1980s, the Varyag. Judging by the way Chinese housewives look for veggies, I’d imagine the scrap dealer did a lot of shaking his head and sniffing and grumbling in Mandarin about how spotty it looked, and wasn’t that a worm poking out of the hull, and it smelled funny (all of it probably true, too). In the end, this dealer said he had a buyer in Macau who wanted to turn the hulk of the Varyag into a floating casino. Whoever was selling the ship—some local politico’s son, I’d imagine—bought that story and sold it cheap. Sad to say—because I have a lot of respect for Russian forces, though not so much for the way they treat the poor bastards in the ranks—that story pretty much sums up relations between Communist Russia and China. The Chinese won that century hands down. (Imagine Russia without Stalin; no way it could’ve turned out worse. Now imagine China without Mao; no way it could’ve turned out this good.)
Well, it turned out there was no casino deal in Macau. Instead the scrap dealer was a patriotic associate of the PLA, and he towed the ship straight to Dalian harbor, where they started taking it apart and remaking it into China’s first carrier.
By the way, I’m not kidding when I say that double-dealing ship buyer was a real patriot. That’s the difference between the Chinese defense establishment and the DoD: They’re at the stage we were in about 1942, where sure, there was some profiteering from the contractors, but at least it wasn’t something to brag about, and when people got caught they had the decency to be ashamed. So maybe this ship  buyer made a profit on the deal, but I bet he got a good deal for his country. Compare that with the disgusting crap that US defense contractors do now and you’ll see why we are so totally screwed. A month ago the Secretary of the Navy admitted to “systemic failure” when he admitted there were “multimillion dollar” scams in a procurement contract.
The Chinese are still dead serious about building up their navy. You read the stories about their excitement over this new carrier and it’s like being back in 1942, when everybody believed in this stuff—before Navy heroes turned into turds like Duke Cunningham.
In the first place, everybody knows there ain’t nobody can online war-nerd it like the Chinese. Just imagine 100 million sunken-chested or baby-fat Chinese war nerds hyperventilating garlic breath onto their monitors at the thought of their resurgent homeland breaking into the Carrier-owners club, the ultimate frat for countries with any military snobbery at all.
Well, that’s what’s happening right now in China.
There’s been this huge online survey to see what the new carrier should be named. See, this is the difference between a good healthy war-nerd country and a bunch of degenerates like Europe. In Europe they have these contests to name the baby polar bear at the Berlin Zoo (and then the damn thing dies anyway—sums it all up); in China every guy who can’t make the varsity is whacking the keyboard to chime in on what to call the new carrier:
“Recently, the aircraft carrier has become one of the hottest topics on Internet forums [in China]. About 80 percent of netizens say they would like to donate money to build the first Chinese aircraft carrier.
According to a survey conducted by Chinese portal Sina, 45 percent of respondents are in favour of naming the aircraft carriers after historical Chinese figures such as Mao Zedong and Zheng He; only 12 percent think they should be named after major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. And 30 percent of respondents think the names of aircraft carriers should reflect the growing national strength of China.”
Read that, and hang yer heads in shame, fellow war nerds. Been a long time since “80 percent of netizens” in these parts cared about anything but how Chaz Bono’s gonna dance now that he’s got some weird ersatz dick tucked under his fat belly.
Four out of five of those poor 80-hour a week wage slaves in some filthy anthill city in China can’t wait to donate their own hard-earned money to build the carrier. We wouldn’t do that here, because we know goddamn well where the money would go: to buy Duke Cunningham another night on the yacht with some contractor-paid call girl. That’s right: Duke Cunningham lived on a yacht owned by his DoD contractor pimp buddy, Mitchell Wade. Wade named the boat the S.S. Duke Stir. And Duke wanted Wade to buy him girls and send them to the boat.
We’re supposed to think entrepreneurs outrank Alexander the Great now, supposed to consider the business dude just the crown of creation.  But from what I see looking at DoD contractors, they’re scumbags, modern sutlers trailing after the army for a quick nickel. Sutlers and pimps. Sherman quarantined them, one to a corps; Grant would’ve had them shot if he could’ve. Those were the days.
These Chinese war nerds don’t buy all this crap about the glorious businessman (even though they’re the best businessmen in the world); you can see that from the way they appreciate Mao. To them, he’s not some commie bogeyman, he’s George frickin’ Washington. Which he was, like it or not. Mao unified a seriously messed-up country all split into gang turfs, gave the most cynical people in the world a new sense of patriotism, turned Chinese who didn’t care about anyone who wasn’t a blood relative into suicide commandos who marched into North Korea in midwinter with nothing but quilted-cloth pants, a bag of rice and ammo, and jumped up out of the snow to give the US Army the biggest surprise of its life.
Zheng He: That’s one big eunuch–good name for a carrier
Zheng’s another interesting choice, a little weird for my tastes but good solid patriotic stuff anyway. He (the pronoun, not the guy’s name) was this 7 ft tall eunuch who led the 15th-c. Chinese fleet that sailed around the world. There was some book about it a couple years ago.
I don’t take too much stock in these books. When ten books come out all at once with titles like “How the Irish Saved the World” or “How Indian Civilization Turned Us from Apes into Geniuses” or “How the Chinese Actually Taught the Italians to Make Pasta” what it really seems to mean is: The ethnic group in the title is finally getting some cash. Once they move up the demographic rankings, they generate all these third-generation kiddie profs who start diving into the shelves to prove that granddaddy’s granddaddy actually was the first hominid to do this or that. Soon they’ll prove that whatever tribe comes into money in 2020 or so (the Persians—my guess) actually invented money while developing the wheel while performing brain surgery while discovering compassion and picnics, and looked good doing it too.
And that’s the point about this Chinese carrier: It’s about national pride, not military usefulness. The Chinese are after both those things, and it’s actually incredibly cool the way they’ve managed to get both. First, since they’re smart, they came up with a real weapon that totally neutralizes the US carrier fleet, a weapon that could sink all 11 of the US carriers in a few minutes, without even having to  bother with all the screening vessels and air cover and other useless “defenses” we’ve stacked around them. It’s not a glamorous weapon, it just works.
DF-21 Incoming
It’s a long-range ballistic missile specifically designed to kill carriers and other oversized surface targets. This missile, the DF-21, has a 900 mile range and drops down on the carrier from directly above.
“Equally intriguing has been the depiction of this capability in the Chinese media. A lengthy November 2009 program about anti-ship ballistic missiles broadcast on China Central Television Channel 7 (China’s official military channel) featured an unexplained — and rather badly animated — cartoon sequence. This curious ‘toon features a sailor who falsely assumes that his carrier’s Aegis defense systems can destroy a incoming ASBM as effectively as a cruise missile, with disastrous results.”
Read that and weep all over again. That’s our big consolation prize, the fact that the Chinese weapons video is “rather badly animated”—as in, “Ha ha, well at least they still can’t make good cartoons!”?
Never mind the animation, what about the plot? Cuz if you don’t see that that sailor who goes skipping along thinking that that phony-ass Aegis system is going to stop a warhead coming directly down at meteor speed is based on solid reality, you’re crazy. We have nothing, NO-thing, that will stop those missiles. Here’s a nice little quote on the reentry speed of an ICBM warhead. I’m not a physicist but I’d guess a warhead with a 900-mile range goes up enough to come down at roughly the same speed as this:
“The reentry speed of an ICBM is so great that the reentry vehicle can be filled with concrete for a fixed target, or metal rods for an area target; the kinetic energy of the warhead is so great that a conventional explosive filling would add no appreciable energy.”
We’re talking about man-made asteroids here. Remember the dinosaurs? You can add Carrier-o-saurus ex-Rex to your kid’s dino list. So if you’re into military maps, you can now put a red zone for 900 miles out from the coast of China and mark it off “US Carrier No-Go Zone.”
DF-21 (land-based) range: Carrier-free zone
I haven’t been able to see if this DF-21 can be fired from subs yet—I don’t think it can be at the moment—but nearly every missile can be adapted to sub use. If you can fire a Trident from a sub, this can go underwater too, sooner or later.
And when it does, well…that carrier that used to rule the waves will be exactly what those RMS This-or-That battleships were in WW II: Expensive statuary sitting in the harbor. The battleship got a fake “new lease on life” in the later stages of the Pacific War, thanks to total US air superiority, but if you want to see what happens to a WW II-era battleship in real combat, check out what happened to the pride of the British fleet, the battleship Prince of Wales and its teammate in Task Force Z (“Z”–good name, maybe they saw what was coming) Repulse. They ran into primitive Japanese dive bombers, stone-age tech with human pilots, flying low at a few hundred miles an hour, and yet they still hit the bottom in a few minutes.
Last above-water seconds of the P of W
Strange how not many naval warfare nerds want to talk much about that disaster. Might be because the Brits put on such a lousy performance in the Pacific War in general, so lousy they hushed the whole thing up and insisted on hanging a lot of Japanese naval officers in revenge, maybe just so they wouldn’t publish any memoirs with titles like “What was up with you losers skedaddling out of Singapore without even putting up a fight?”
Kinda sad: Brit diver flags P of W
They tagged along with what turned out to be the winning team and turned a lousy military record into a whole lotta braggin’. And in the meantime, nobody noticed that the rest of the battleships, theirs and everybody else’s battleships stayed in harbor until the admirals were absolutely certain of total, absolute air superiority—like, until the last coffee-grinder noise of an Me-109’s machine guns went all quiet on the Western Front.
And that’s where the carriers will spend their time if there’s anything like an all-out conventional war in the near future: In port.
Which brings us back to the big question: Why would smart military planners like the PLA spend so much money on a useless weapon like a carrier?
There are two possible reasons and I think we’ve got both, working together:
1. Decoy. This is a classic, and it lets the Chinese military tease the USN into wasting huge, unbelievably huge, money on a useless fleet of almost a dozen carriers and the incredibly expensive, over-engineered planes that fly from them. The US carrier fleet is a boondoggle at best, and one that costs a thousand times more than all the welfare cheats that your Congress-idiot loves to rant about put together. Even the USN, dumbest and sleaziest of all the services, knows that, but Congress just plain will not stop funding for carriers.
It’s easy and fun, if you’re Chinese—to tap into stupidity like that, especially when it’s mixed up with paranoid crap from the right and entrepreneurial sleaze from the sutlers. “China got carrier! Duh, we need more carrier!” Yeah, more cowbell, that’s the solution. You can’t fix stupid, but if you’re a potential enemy, why would you want to?
Aegis cruiser firing: Pure potlatch
The Chinese are polite most of the time, but they can’t help gloating about how they can use their undervalued Yuan to buy the makings of a carrier cheap off the dying Western economies:
“With a view to both marine security and economic factors, now is the right time for China to built [sic] its first aircraft carrier,” said Song Xiaojun, a military expert. “Current low prices of raw materials at home and abroad will offer the prospect of economies in procurement.”
Look at the cost comparisons to see how it works for China: They buy a platform for next to nothing from the dying Soviet empire; they refit it into a 300 meter carrier purposely designed to imitate US carrier design; they leak the info to the sleazoids who report on “Pentagon affairs” for the tame news services and committees; those committees pour another hundred billion dollars into a fleet arm that basically consists of floating monuments to the Battle of Midway. Cost comparison: For every yuan the Chinese spend, we spend thousands of dollars building gold-plated carriers from scratch, with huge profits sucked out by parasites at every stage. And when the war comes, neither side actually fields a surface navy because they know it’d be suicide.
2. Pride. Does anybody buy a yacht because they expect to make money on the resale? Or to put it in strictly naval-warfare terms, Why did the Germans and the Soviets invest in a surface navy when the USN had already overbuilt and overcommitted to dominating the surface? Maybe the Soviets did it as a decoy (see #1 above); there was a lot of speculation that way back in the 1970s. But probably not. Probably out of stupidity, or local sleaze, or pride–simple national pride. “We can build battleships as good as yours, you Brits”—that’s what the Nazis said in the 1930s. And in the 1970s, the Russians did the same with their ski-ramp carriers. Those never made sense, militarily; they were the same as buying a boat to sit in Long Beach Marina: A hole in the water that they threw money into—and then sold off cheap to the Chinese when it was their turn to play the nationalist pride game.
China can afford to build a carrier or two as display items, even aside from their decoy value. China is sitting pretty, on top of the world economy, right now—with a national currency undervalued by 40% against the poor old dollar.
China is also sitting on a huge chunk of the US national debt, which means that we’re actually funding that Chinese carrier, thanks to the miracle called compound interest.
Yuan vs. Euro (red); Yuan vs USD (blue, bluer, blown)
When you hit the point that your national biz is coasting like that, you start visiting boatyards, looking around for a 32-foot Bayliner with a parasail roll bar for some conspicuous consumption. Put that in the driveway and listen to the neighbor’s wife give him Hell: Sweet, sweet music to a nationalist’s ears.
And it’s good military strategy as well as a Gold Card Reward. I read the Injuns in Oregon and Washington used to have this custom they called “Potlatch,” which was about pure conspicuous consumption without even pretending it was for usefulness. They’d buy the most expensive things around, like copper plates with beads on them (don’t ask me, I ain’t Chief’s cuz) and throw them into a bonfire in front of their neighbors, just to show they could afford to.
Well, look, the Chinese are doing their carrier potlatch with a used chassis they got cheap off a Ukraine pawnbroker, and they’re only building one of them. If they can scare us into pouring more money into the carrier hole-inna-wadda with that one Quaker Gun of a carrier, they realize something like 100:1 force multiplier, to use DoD blabber. Not bad for conspicuous consumption.
It’s not hard to come up with quotes from the Chinese showing how much this carrier has to do with national pride instead of military usefulness:
“Building aircraft carriers is a symbol of an important nation. It is very necessary,” the China Daily paper quoted Admiral Hu Yanlin as saying earlier this month. “China has the capability to build aircraft carriers and should do so,” he said.
If you’re used to reading through DoD propaganda, no matter what country it’s coming from, you see what the admiral is saying here. Here’s my loose translation of what Admiral Hu is getting at: “We don’t actually need a carrier, but it’s part of being one of the big boys so we have to do it, like paying for your kid’s wedding. So we’ll turn out a few of them, but we’re only going to do it when it’s cheap and doesn’t interfere with production of real weapons like the DF-21.”
I’m telling you, they’re playing with us. Polite as they’re trying to be, the contempt seeps out from time to time—and I can’t blame them. With enemies like us, they literally cannot lose.
Would you like to know more? Read “This Is How Carriers Will Die”.
Gary Brecher is the author of the War Nerd. Send your comments to gary dot brecher at gmail dot com. Read Gary Brecher’s first ever War Nerd column by clicking here.

2011-06-04

Afraid of missing a bogeyman -- 請讀史。看石頭。

Are the "democrats" in HK afraid of losing a bogeyman if the Chinese government turns nice? or are they just irrationally opposing everything? Writer Lu Li was too nice to the them in this article.

北京破冰,未必「可恥」 - 陸離

不能同意李卓人說,近月北京公安數次接觸一位「天安門母親」,談賠償問題,是「北京做法可恥」。 —我寧願選擇「天安門母親」公開信中一句正面的肯定:「今年終於打破沉默,是值得歡迎的一次。」—難得「對方」終於破冰,無論是多麼微小的一個起點,那麼「天安門母親」和她的支援者,即使只是作為繼續作戰的一種孫子式策略,譬如面對一個「長久有問題的病人」,都好應該首先「讚」他一下,然後再堅持自己必須堅持的其他方面吧?

「天安門母親」,明顯比李卓人成熟有分寸。

我相信李卓人是「忠」的,但是亦甚難忘記22年前,差不多今天這個時候,我們香港剛剛5月21日「反李鵬戒嚴」百萬人大遊行,隨即5月27日「民主歌聲獻中華」約30萬人齊集跑馬地馬會籌得一千二百多萬,次日5月28日香港再次百萬人上街響應「全球華人大遊行」……然後,李卓人就攜帶巨款,飛上北京,支援「保衞」天安門廣場!(當時柴玲是「保衞天安門廣場」總指揮!)

當然,李卓人被扣留了。柴玲等最終決定「有條件、不限期」撤退。「六四」血腥鎮壓之後,不知過了幾多天,李卓人無恙釋放,回港下機,問:「我現在是在香港嗎?」

之前,李卓人和大部份香港人似乎都忘記了:中共中央建國頭三十年,曾經患過「極其嚴重的精神病」,有「暴力」傾向,曾多次「大」發作。鄧小平決定嘗試「摸着石頭過河」改革開放之後,「精神病」有望可能好轉,可惜……

李卓人,請讀史。看石頭。

2011-05-26

Economist on Kissinger -- full of ignorance, from the Economist

The Economist, usually a very good journal, unfortunately, occasional blunders, such as this pretentious one on Kissinger's new book, only demonstrated how Economist writer's knowledge of history and the world had fallen to the abyss over time.

A couple examples
  • "It is not clear when or why America abandoned its notion that China should commit itself to peaceful reunification as a precondition for a presidential visit. China has never renounced the threat of invasion." -- I have to laugh at this. The Economist writer is so naive as to think the the US will value defending a disappointing dictator (in 1970s) in an island of 15M people against the US's own national security strategy against its archenemy, USSR. How old were you in 1970? They want Dr Kissinger to admit this fact openly? so what?
  • 'Nor does Mr Kissinger explain the thinking behind the communiqué signed after Nixon’s first visit, in which America acknowledged “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." Large numbers of people in Taiwan have never maintained any such thing. But for China’s leaders, and, it seems Mr Kissinger himself, public opinion anywhere outside the United States is not really a factor when the geopolitical stakes are so high.'  Again, what the Economist alluded might be true for Taiwan today, but back in 1970s the government in Taiwan (THE ally of the US) clearly "maintained such thing", and so was the majority of people who lived on the island back then. In addition, there was NO such public opinion in the 1970s from the large numbers of people in Taiwan. If anything, the voice of the pro-KMT people living in US would have been the dominant voice, and probably still are over-represented in US (compared with back on the island)...And yes, it is true, geopolitical stakes trumps the hypothetical thesis, but the truth is such thesis did not even exist back in 1970s
  •  "China’s involvement in the Korean war, for example, led, in Mr Kissinger’s phrase, to “two years of war and 20 years of isolation”, hardly a goal for China—or a wei qi triumph."...This seems to be taken entirely out of context. China was drawn into the war, very reluctantly (or at least very passively), by the pressure of Stalin and also the unscrupulous action/declaration by General McArthur. You can only talk about goal if you initiated something.

The Economist is right in ONLY one single tidbit, though, regarding the mataphor of chess vs "Go". However, it has failed to explain why, and I wonder if the writers understands what is fundamentally wrong in his critique. But thanks to the internet, a commentator (bismack888) had put it very well in its webpage (something you don't read if you got the print or ipad edition)
  • The funny thing is most modern Chinese don't actually play alot of Go, Chinese chess is much more popular among Chinese people. This was particularly true of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. This is what Mao Zedong had to say about the Sino-Indian war.
  • Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess:
  • Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that’s great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.
  • The concept of encirclement is relatively new in China, only in Modern day China does it become a concern.
However, while focusing on the discourse of chess vs go (which is really nothing "strategic" IMHO, except that go has something to do with two dimension geography and hence geopolitics). The Economist forgot that Kissinger spend a great deal of time discussing Romance of the Three Kingdom, which is the essence of Mao's strategic thinking.


---

America and ChinaNo go

The Western politician who understands China best tries to explain it—but doesn’t quite succeed
May 19th 2011 | from the print edition


On China. By Henry Kissinger. Penguin Press; 586 pages; $36. Allen Lane; £30. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk

CHINESE and American leaders have been sniping at each other in public again. This month Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, discussing political reform, told the Atlantic magazine that China’s leaders were “trying to stop history, which is a fool’s errand”. This may have been what provoked Wang Qishan, a Chinese deputy prime minister, to tell a television interviewer that Americans were “simple” (perhaps “innocent” conveys the Chinese word better), and have trouble understanding China, “because it is an ancient civilisation, and we are of the Oriental culture.”

Mr Wang will applaud Henry Kissinger’s latest work, a distillation of more than 40 years of involvement with China and its leaders, and an unabashedly Orientalist affirmation of the otherness of the country. The most riveting chapters deal with Mr Kissinger’s leading roles in the Nixon administration as it established links with Mao Zedong’s China. The well-known story bears retelling by a central protagonist who made his first, secret trip in July 1971, pleading illness to take a few days out of his official schedule while on a visit to Pakistan. President Richard Nixon’s own trip in 1972, which had been initiated by Mr Kissinger, was indeed a “week that changed the world”, as China and America ganged up to deter Soviet expansionism.

Mr Kissinger’s encounters with the urbane, conciliatory prime minister, Zhou Enlai, and the elliptical, moody Mao—and indeed with every senior Chinese leader since—make gripping reading. Some of Mao’s allusively poetic dialogue, in particular, is beyond parody: “At the approach of the rain and the wind the swallows are busy.” The panoramic authority with which the Chinese leaders (and their interlocutor) dissect the world is breathtaking.

But Mr Kissinger is not telling all. He recounts how, in the years beforehand, more than 100 exploratory meetings in Warsaw had made no progress because of Taiwan, which America still recognised as “the Republic of China”. It is not clear when or why America abandoned its notion that China should commit itself to peaceful reunification as a precondition for a presidential visit. China has never renounced the threat of invasion.

Nor does Mr Kissinger explain the thinking behind the communiqué signed after Nixon’s first visit, in which America acknowledged “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” Large numbers of people in Taiwan have never maintained any such thing. But for China’s leaders, and, it seems Mr Kissinger himself, public opinion anywhere outside the United States is not really a factor when the geopolitical stakes are so high.

Before Mr Kissinger himself enters the narrative, the reader is offered 200 pages of history of modern China and its foreign relations. Most of this is uncontentious and well told. But it is marred by three related flaws. The first is Mr Kissinger’s insight that Chinese strategists think like players of wei qi or Go, which means that, in the long term, they wish to avoid encirclement. Westerners are chess-players, tacticians aiming to get rid of their opponents’ pieces “in a series of head-on clashes”, he writes. “Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.”

This conceit has been used by other authors. It appears every few pages here like a nervous tic. Even before Mr Kissinger joins the game, the metaphor is pulled into service to analyse, among other things, Chinese policy in the Korean war, the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s (where, of course, “both sides were playing by wei qi rules”), the 1962 war with India (“wei qi in the Himalayas”). Later he describes events in Indochina as “a quadripartite game of wei qi”, just at the time when genocide was under way in Cambodia.

Second, the picture of Chinese foreign policy, as formulated by cool, calculating, master strategists playing wei qi, makes it appear more coherent, consistent and effective than it has been. China’s involvement in the Korean war, for example, led, in Mr Kissinger’s phrase, to “two years of war and 20 years of isolation”, hardly a goal for China—or a wei qi triumph.

Third, Mr Kissinger gives little weight to the fact that Mao, Zhou and the others were in fact communists. In power they soon replicated some of the forms of an imperial court, and China’s history always mattered more to them than “Das Kapital”. But one cannot ignore the influence of Mao’s adaptation of Marxist ideology on his foreign policy, let alone the importance to domestic politics of the Leninist structures imposed on the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920s, which still wears well.

In a rare admission of a blunder, Mr Kissinger recounts the only time he saw Zhou lose his serenity—at a banquet in Beijing in November 1973 when Mr Kissinger said that China had remained “essentially Confucian in its belief in a single, universal, generally applicable truth”. Communism, he suggested, had established Marxism as the content of that truth.

This was an extraordinary gaffe. Zhou was under indirect attack by Mao’s cronies through a campaign criticising Confucius. But his reaction also illustrates the prickliness of Chinese leaders when foreigners presume to pronounce on the eternal verities of Chinese culture.

If even the venerable Mr Kissinger can be caught out, what hope for American statesmen far less familiar with China? The problems that have beset relations since he left the stage are not surprising. His book describes the important role he played as an intermediary in trying to resolve the worst crisis—after the Beijing massacre of 1989. Shortly afterwards, the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the relationship of its “defining shared purpose”.

Since then, America’s relations with China have been marked by a startling increase in economic interdependence, but not by any onset of mutual trust. Mr Kissinger notes that in the post-1989 era, China’s foreign-policy posture has been “closer to Bismarck’s than Mao’s”. It has, you could say, taken up chess.

In his closing chapter Mr Kissinger finally turns to the big question: does China’s astonishingly rapid rise condemn it to inevitable conflict with America? He notes the similarities with the rise of Germany a century ago and the inevitable threat it posed to the British empire. America and China, too, could easily fall into a cycle of escalating tension that would be hard to break. Optimistically, Mr Kissinger insists that “were history confined to the mechanical repetition of the past, no transformation would ever have occurred.” But on how to avoid such repetition, he is disappointingly vague.

2011-05-22

Lee Kuan Yew: Charlie Roas interview on Mar 18, 2011

Lee Kuan Yew: Charlie Roas interview on Mar 18, 2011, and here.

The great old man seems to have lost most of his (physical) teeth, but he is just as sharp as he used to be.







2010-12-29

Revisit: China vs USA, total GDP growth

I wrote in 2005:
total GDP of China (in PPP) could be comparable to that of US in 15-20 years, in an optimistic scenario.


Now the Economist projected it to be around 2019, one year ahead of my optimistic scenario. I still think the Economist is a bit to optimistic.

2010-11-28

寻畔滋事量刑表

北京地区法院量刑图

2010-11-08

What was Zhan Qixiong plan when he was intercepted by Yonakuni?

This is the video taken by Yonakuni on the collision when it tried to intecept Minjinyu 5179.


First, let's note a few facts (see previous post for background and screenshots)
  1. Yonakuni has taken a long circle to come in front of Minjinyu, starting from about 8 O'clock direction (of Minjinyu 5179) to reach 2 O'clock in the begining of the video, and was at around 11:30 O'clock when its end collided with Minjinyu 5179
  2. At around 8'30", you can see another JCG ship, probably Hateruma (Let call it H), behind Yonakuni and to the right of Minjinyu 5179. Since we did not see it before earlier while Yonakuni was circling in front of Minjinyu 5179, we can conclude that  H was probably either at 7-8 O'clock direction for Minjinyu 5179, or some distance from the 3 O'clock direction
  3. The track thickened a lot right behind Yonakuni at the moment of the collision, most likely indicating it has slowed down and parked (confirmed by the relative motion of Yonakuni with the sea wave track in the video)
  4. You can see an island right behind Minjinyu 5179 (wiki said it is Huangwei Yu, also called Kubashima by Japan), indicating that Minjinyu was trying to sail away from the island and halted when being cut in front by Yonakuni
The situation is illustrated in this diagram below (click to enlarge)


What would you do if you wre captain Zhan at this moment?
  • Your boat is much slower than Yonakuni (10 knots vs 30-40 knots), so it is useless to go anywhere in front of it. 12-9 O'clock directions are ruled out. It takes some time for Yonakuni to make a u-turn so your best chance is go behind it.
  • You cannot go backward. You probably arrived at this position and were planning to move forward. But you had to stop your engine because Yonakuni is cutting in front of you. Going backward will bring you closer to Huangwei Yu and bring you more trouble. You want to be as far away from Huangwei Yu as you can now.
  • You should also see JCG H coming from behind and trying to round you up on the other side, so you should try to get as far away from Huangwei Yu as possible. You hope if you can get out of the 24 nm radius you would be free and avoid being caught and result in financial losses
  • You options are anywhere from 3-12 O'Oclock. 12 O'clock (proceeding directly ahead) offer you the best chance to escape, because JCG H is behind you and may intercept you from behind on your right hand side Another reason to avoid your right hand side is that H probably is already at your 3 O'clock now.
  • You see Yonakuni is moving, there are some 100-200m between you and Yonakuni, so by the time you reached its current position (Y0), it should have moved to Y1 already.
So you took the short path, charging directly ahead to break the trap. M0 to M1.

Yonakuni knew that and saw that. It braked/backpedaled and stayed at Y2 instead. You tried to avoid it but you still got to its tail.

Should you have taken 1 O'clock or 2 O'clock instead to be safe (even if H is at 3 O'clcok coming to you)? You probably should, and you probably had done all those earlier that morning. This is one of the many interceptions since early morning and the ordeal would take at least another 2-6 hours that day. Maybe they have videos for you trying hard to avoid collision as well. They are not going to show the public if all the other videos. If not for that over-zealous and over-confident sengoku38 san, no one in the public will be able to even see this video.

Maybe you should have made your own recording. But you cannot afford such gadgets, and were not prepared to bring a video-camera to this trip, After all, you are a poor fisherman trying to make some bugs. You are not coming here for eco-tour.

2010-11-07

Which ship has made a change in direction before the collision of Mizuki and Minjinyu 5179 (UPDATED)

Update (Nov 17): upon a few more viewing, I have come to the conclusion that Minjinyu also made a turn of about 20-30 degree and at some point was not exactly facing left. I have updated my graph accordingly. Note also that I am not trying to prove that Minjinyu bears no responsibility at the collision. I believe both sides need to share the responsibility, since Mizuki also made a significant turn of some 240-270 degrees, and made its direction very unpredictable -- might have caused the seemingly erratic turn of Minjinyu. (But we really do not have solid evidence to say either way)

But before you go on I want you to first judge this picture, that if the boat has turned


Then you can find out the answer in this picture below (where the picture above is cropped from), taken from the end credit of the movie Suspect X (a great movie btw). I do not claim the situations are the same, but this just shows us how a partial picture is far from being a conclusive evidence. That is why I hope Japan would release all the 10 hours of videos it has taken.



===

In my previous post an anomymous commentator suggested that Minjinyu 5179 made a change of direction and hence ram into Mizuki. What he saw was the video taken from on board Mizuki, all it shows is the relative velocity. Fortunately, we are able to see another video taken by Hateruma during the exact same moment from a different angle. Here it is.


This is a screenshot taken by Japanprobe, from the video taken by Hateruma, observing the collision between Mizuki and 5178. You can see the trace behind Mizuki, when it just completed a 300 degree turn right in front of 5179. It is quite clear that it is Mizuki which had made a large angle turn just before the collision, towards the area blocking the path of 5179

A path with time scale based on the video, and the speed indicated by the intervals between the 10 second gaps is shown approximately here. Looking at the time scale you can also see that Mizuki has more or less parked (stationary speed) for the 30 seconds before the collision, while Minjinyu had actually slowed down a bit. You can view the video again to verify my chart.

1A) Mizuki speeding towards 5179 (0:47)
1B) Mizuki turned 90 degrees (1:10). Note that Minjinyu 5179 has already made its turn of 20-30 degree by then. So Minjinyu's turn was made most likely while Mizuki formed a T in front of it. Perhaps it was expecting Mizuki to continue sailing towards its right, so that turning left would avoid the much faster Mizuki.
 1C) Mizuki completed the turn (1:08)
Since Mizuki is almost stationary while making the turn, we can estimate the speed of Minjinyu during the moments to be around its own length during 10 seconds. which is approximately 40m/10s or 4m/s=15km/hr.

If you compare the location of Mizuki between 0:26 and 0:29,  in less than 3 seconds it traveled the length of its own of 46 meters (type びざん型巡視船 (2代))(marked by the white wave). So its speed is about 50m/3s = 60km/hr, 4 times the speed of fishing boat 5170. So even adjusting for it slower speed right after the turn, it must be able to avoid the crash it wanted to.

If this is still not conclusive, in the Mizuki video we can see two other JCG staff were taking videos, they should release those videos as well as additional data points.

---
 Now back to the video taken from Mizuki.

A second JCG ship can be seen on the right of 5170, trying to encircle it from left behind
 In 15 seconds, the 2nd JCG ship has moved to the left side of 5179, leaving a long white trace behind it, this shows the significant difference in relative speed of JCG boats and Minjinyu 5179

The encircling tactic is not uncommon from JCG. This is an aerial photo from another act by JCG, probably taken in 1998 in the same area. This may be the plan of the JCG ships.

See also a different view in this NBR thread, there are some problem with the poster's observation though, e.g. he claimed there were 2 JCG ships, in fact there were at least 3, the Yonakuni, the Mizuki, and the Kateruma.

2010-11-05

The Diaoyu Collision Videos

Update 3:
More analysis of the collisions
1) Which ship has made a change in direction before the collision of Mizuki and Minjinyu 5179
2) What was Zhan Qixiong plan when he was intercepted by Yonakuni?

Update 2:
Some discussion in the comment. I would recap here.

How the collision happened, and the routing of the JCG ships and the Chinese boat are pretty clear after viewing these videos.

This is actually quite similar to the case of the Hainan flight collision between a Chinese fighter and American spy plane in April 2001.

Now the issues (and comparison) really are:
1) From Japan's perspective, the JCG is 'enforcing' its law in its water. The question is comparable to whether a police boat should block the course of a civilian when it disobeyed order. And whether the enforcement should be as aggressive in certain disputed area with a foreign boat.

2) From Chinese perspective, Japan simply has no right to enforce its law in this area.

3) From a third party's view. The issues are
a) shall enforcement be this aggressive, assuming even if this area belong to Japan (as many Japanese would say, the Russian were much more aggressive, and opened fire in South Kuriles)?
b) shall the fishing boat change course (or is it possible for it to do so technically, given it is much slowed to control the speed and direction of a boat than a car)?
c) has the captain been avoiding such collision for the whole 4-5 hours of hide and chase game, and eventually lose either concentration or patience and gave up on steering control?
d) the area seems to be within 12 nm of the island (as you can see the islands in the background in Yonakuni video). so this is not the high sea. but again, it is disputed area and enforcement should be more scrupulous.

Related links
1) ESWN: Hong Kong Media Reaction To Diaoyuatai Collision Video
2)  日艦故意讓「閩晉漁」撞上 操弄錄影片段枉費心機
3) 釣島撞船片外洩 中日矛盾惡化
4) 故意不播周旋過程
5)  專家:日艦違慣例強攔漁船

---


Update 1:
1) 282 DVDs discovered in JR Station, with leaflet of "This shows the truth about DPJ. Please help yourself for free"
2) Asahi's speculation of the rationale for the leak.

---

The two collision videos are finally viewable -- just as I suspected before, Kan government clearly has every reason to keep the videos to themselves, But LDP will not let go of this opportunity to discredit its political rival. I suspect the leak is from DPJ's political enemies. (The leak's youtube ID is Sengoku38. While Sankei tried to explain the connotation of 38 as gossip women in Chinese. 38 are also good fortune number is South China. So it might as well be Chinese hacker who leaked the video)

1) This is taken by crew on Yonakuni. You can see Yonakuni started from the right flank of Minjinyu 5179, cut in front of it (and obviously doing this very slowly or even 'parked' in order to intercept the fishing boat). Minjinyu's direction did not change much throughout the video and its velocity was not fast and didn't change much. When the boats collide you can see the white wave track left behind by Yonakuni, showing that it had just crossed in front of Minjinyu. From the track you can see Yonakuni's speed was much faster than Minjinyu. It makes one wonders why it slowed down (instead of sped up) while parked in front of Minjinyu.


See the white track behind Minjinyu. Yonakuni had came from behind Minjinyu and circled it from its left aft, right aft, right flank, then cross in front of it. See all that Minjinyu left no visible track, showing that its speed was much much slower than Yonakuni. The fact that Minjinyu did not crossed the white track behind also indicated that the amount of time Yonakuni has to circle Minjinyu was less than the amount of time Minjinyu has taken to go across the circle (for a perfect circle, the speed ratio will be at least pi/2=1.57 times)

1A) White track behind Minjinyu

 1B)White track to the right of Minjinyu
1C) Right before collision, white track behind Yonakuni. Yonakuni has just made an almost 90 degree turn in front of Minjinyu.
 1D) After collision, no more white track as Minjinyu broke out of the "white circle".

Compare this with earlier CGI released by Japan you will understand why CGI is preferred over the real thing for Japan.

2) This one was taken by another JCG ship, Hateruma. In the first second of the video, it shows that Mizuki has just sped past Minjinyu and turned around in front of Minjinyu (see the semi-circle white wave track). Mizuki then sailed toward the Chinese fishing boat, then did a quick turn around right in front of Minjinyu, slowed down and parked and got hit by the Chinese boat which apparently could not brake nor turn (or reluctant/slow to turn).(for English subtitle version see here)



2A) Mizuki Turn around in front of Minjinyu to intercept
 2B) Mizuki speed toward Minjinyu after first turn
2C) Mizuki, reach in front of Minjinyu, turned again to block Minjinyu from its front, the next video starts here, filming the left side of Minjinyu. You can see that Minjinyu did not change direction, while Mizuki turned into its way. It is not clear whether Minjinyu would have enough time to change course, or if it did, Mizuki would not move again to block it.



This is taken on Mizuki. It very clearly shows the JCG ship Mizuki sped up to intercept the Chinese Fishing Boat. In the beginning of the video, the two boats almost sailed side by side. Note also that a lot of black smoke came out from Mizuki a few seconds BEFORE the collision, similar to what you see when one pushes the pedal suddenly on a truck uphill.



This is taken a second before the collision, Note the thick black smoke from Mizuki.

The JCG boats seem determined to intercept the Chinese fishing boat. The Chinese fishing boat (Minjinyu 5179) seems determined to get out of the encirclement. The JCG boats are 3 times in length (translates into 27 times in size/volume/tonnage - Yonakuni is 89 meter long, 1300 ton displacement, vs Minjinyu 5179's 30 meter length and about 40 tons in displacement) and much faster than the fishing boat. As I had earlier speculated, it is extremely unlikely that any sane skipper will want to run into ships 27 times its size with much stronger steel body, nor that a much slower fishing boat would be fast enough to chase up the JCG ship. This looks like a replay of the 2008 Lien Ho Incident.

Relative size of A JCG ship and Minjinyu
  • Hateruma: 89m, 1300 ton (speed about 60km/hr or 30-40 knots)
  • Yonakuni: 89m, 1300 ton (speed about 60km/hr or 30-40 knots)
  • Mizuki: 46m, 197 ton (speed about 45-45 knots)
  • Minjinyu5179: 30m, 40 ton (speed about 15km/hr or 10-15knots)

In short, these videos do not help with JCG's case against skipper Zhan. It explain why Japan had to release the captain.

The Chinese MoFA spokesman Cui Tian Kai is now very adamant, "[Regarding what actually happened], The facts are very clear..."

2010-10-24

So what did Ma Ying-Jeou say?

Background see e.g., "Despite his clarification and similar statements by other officials, some commentators insisted that the AP report showed Ma's intention to start political negotiations with Beijing if he wins re-election." - Focus Taiwan

The full excerpt is now published (or here). This is what Ma actually said,
  • AP: So, do I understand you correctly that, if economic issues are
    resolved during your second term, during that term, you might move on
    to political questions?
    [00:32:17]
    President Ma: As I said, it depends on how fast we move, whether these
    issues are satisfactorily resolved, and of course all the policies regarding
    the mainland are very sensitive, and we certainly will also make decisions
    on generally whether the decision receives popular support. So usually
    when we lay out our general policy, we will say that: first of all, it has to
    be something needed by the country; secondly, it has to be supported by
    the people; and thirdly, that it will be supervised by the national
    parliament to make sure that this is a policy basically meeting the needs
    of the people
    .
This is what AP reported
  • In between the poles of union and separation, Ma said his government is prepared to discuss political agreements, including security issues, as soon as the priority economic issues are dealt with. He suggested that those political talks could start as early as a second four-year term if he wins re-election in 2012.
  • "We are not intentionally delaying the talks on political issues. Certainly the economic ones are more important to people here. People also support the idea (of) economy first, politics later," said Ma. Asked if he would move to political talks in a second term once economic issues are dealt with, Ma said "it depends on how fast we move." Political issues, he said, "will come after all the major economic issues are resolved."
Regarding the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, The AP reporter Hutzler has such a loaded question
  • [45:20]
    AP: Now, since you touched on the natural resources, the U.S. has voiced
    some concerns that, you know, there’s the Diaoyutai and then there’s the
    larger issue of the free passage of shipping through the South and East
    China seas and access to natural gas deposits or whatever might be down
    there on the ocean floor. And the U.S. has voiced concerns that the
    mainland is really trying to cut off access to foreign trade in that area,
    which would have, obviously, a poor effect on Taiwan, which really owes
    its existence to free access to those shipping lanes
    . So, do you share the
    concerns of the United States?
    [45:53]
    President Ma: Certainly. I think most of the waters in the South China
    Sea should be open waters, the so-called high seas according to the Law
    of the Sea.
    And they’re open to international traffic for sure. Actually, as I
    said, countries started to occupy and garrison those islands a long time
    ago. So this is not a very new issue. We sent our troops, our Marine Corps,
    to station on those islands as early as 1956. Just 10 years ago, we changed
    that with Coast Guard instead of the Marines. I served in our Navy more
    than 30 years ago, and my unit had the responsibility to supply all these
    islands. So I understand this issue well.
    AP: So is China trying to interfere with the open water policy?
    [46:52]
    President Ma: No. So far no. And I don’t think mainland China would do
    that.
    You know, when they are becoming a power in the region, they also
    become more careful about those issues. Certainly, it wants to maintain
    its sphere of influence but I don’t believe that will reach the level of
    interfering with international traffic
    .
    16
    [47:15]
    AP: They often raise objections to the passage of U.S. military ships
    through the South China Sea and they have, at times, taken measures to
    block those ships from passing through
    . The argument that some people
    in the mainland make is that free passage does not extend to military
    vessels
    , that that can be considered to be preparing the battlefield for the
    future. Does your government believe that these types of military
    surveillance activities are normal and should be allowed?
    President Ma: Well, certainly all the activities on the oceans, particularly
    in international waters, are regulated by the United Nations Convention
    on the Law of the Sea of 1982, which came into effect in 1994. It’s very
    important to note that there are rules of conduct. For instance, a warship
    is not supposed to sail through the territorial waters of other countries, but
    if the waters are too narrow in an international strait, then they certainly
    have to do certain things to make sure that it’s an innocent passage. There
    are rules. I think that each country should follow the rules.
No, Mr Hutzler , China did not object to free passage of international ships in the seas in question, not even US gunboats. China objects to US spy ships snooping some 20 miles by its mainland and main islands only, so far. This is what China's MoFA said regarding the "spy ship harassment" incident
  • "China has lodged a solemn representation to the United States as the USNS Impeccable conducted activities in China's special economic zone in the South China Sea without China's permission," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu told a regular news briefing. 
  • "We demand that the United States put an immediate stop to related activities and take effective measures to prevent similar acts from happening," Ma said.
Passage is not, and has never been, China's complaint. Especially, if it is passing in the open sea far away from its naval bases.China complained about the "activities", not the "passage".

Mr Hutzler, you need to do your homework before an interview, and you need to go back to school to study how to write a report.

2010-10-08

2010-10-02

Clarifying Western Media Accounts of “China Rare Earth Metal Ban” - Lisa Reisman, Metalminer

(Update) One note: many local papers falsely claimed that "China mines all 17 types of rare earths", or even "China is the only country that mines all 17 types". This is WRONG. To start with, there are only 16 elements to be mined, the Promethium is radioactive and decays quickly (the most stable isotope of Promethium lose half of its atoms every 17.7 years). So, nobody, including China, mines Promethium.



Watch Lisa Reisman on the alleged RRE "ban".

In fact, even from the mother of all rumours, this NYT report, this was not really a ban,
  • Industry officials said that mainland China’s customs agency had notified companies that they were not allowed to ship to Japan any rare earth oxides, rare earth salts or pure rare earth metals, although the shipments are still allowed to go to Hong Kong, Singapore and other destinations. But no ban has been imposed on the export to Japan of semi-processed alloys that combine rare earths with other materials, the officials said. China has been trying to expand its alloy industry to create higher-paying jobs in mining areas, instead of exporting raw materials for initial processing.
So if anything, China was just trying to extract more value-added. Since semi-processed alloys were exported with no disruption even from the NYT source. The alleged "ban" was merely second-handed distortion of the original report. And Reisman was correct that it may well be a general slow down in anything send to Japan (till the end of September).

Having reviewed this, it makes one wonders, if not for the rare earths, what made Japan released the captain in such an abrupt change of stance? IMO, as I wrote in Chinese a couple days earlier, there are two plausible explanations. (1) that the local prosecutor did reached this decision on his own, based on the circumstantial evidence; (2) that what Kan perceived was the determination of the PRC government in even risking a lose-lose fight in this issue, as it directly challenged its legitimacy domestically.

登月之旅的目标

via Danwei

(参阅:大国崛起

2010-10-01

A truer picture of China’s export machine - McKinsey

A truer picture of China’s export machine

China’s growth depends less on exports than conventional wisdom suggests.
SEPTEMBER 2010 • John Horn, Vivien Singer, and Jonathan Woetzel
Source: Strategy Practice

In This Article

Exhibit 1: Growth in exports contributed much less to China’s GDP growth than traditional export measures have indicated.

Exhibit 2: The contribution of exports, measured as DVAE, to overall growth has fluctuated significantly in recent years.

Is China’s economic growth largely dependent on exports, or is it becoming more domestically led? That’s a question economists are vigorously debating—and an important one for policy makers and executives alike. An increasingly consumption- and investment-focused Chinese economy could improve the chances of more balanced trading relationships with developed economies. At the same time, businesses operating in China or planning to enter it could find greater opportunities as the economy accelerated its transition from a manufacturing center to a key consumer market.

To shed light on this question, we developed a new way of measuring the role of export growth in China’s overall economic expansion. We found that exports have been a major driver, but not one as dominant as commonly believed. Indeed, there are clear signs that a shift toward domestically driven economic growth is well under way. The picture that emerges of the Chinese economy has implications for the growth and supply chain strategies of businesses in China and elsewhere.



A different way to measure exports

Arguments over the true nature of China’s economic reliance on exports have been rooted in the difficulty of appropriately measuring the export sector. The traditional measure governments and most analysts use is the growth of total exports as a share of GDP growth. This measure indicates that export growth has accounted, on average, for almost 40 percent of the total growth in real GDP since 1990—rising to almost 60 percent since 2000.

Yet these numbers, portraying a dominant and growing role of exports, are at odds with the fact that China was one of the few countries that escaped the great 2008–09 global downturn without a major economic slowdown—suggesting that internal growth played an important role. That’s one reason other economists have used a very different measure: growth in net exports (total exports minus total imports) as a share of GDP growth. By that metric, exports contributed only between 10 and 20 percent of China’s annual 10 percent GDP growth in recent years.

We contend that both measures are misleading. Using total exports neglects the fact that many of China’s export shipments include a fair number of imported goods that are reassembled, combined with domestic content, or otherwise modified before being exported. Failing to remove these imports from the total export figure overstates how much value exports contribute to GDP. On the other hand, a strict net export measure (exports minus imports) underestimates the contribution of exports to GDP, because many imports aren’t used in assembly and exported but rather sold to Chinese consumers and businesses.

We calculated a measure we call domestic value-added exports (DVAE) to assess more accurately the role of exports in GDP growth. DVAE is what you get after subtracting from total exports only those imports used in the production of goods and services that are subsequently exported. In automobiles, for example, finished imports are not subtracted from our measure of exports. But engine parts imported to manufacture motor bikes for export would be.



Governments usually don’t break out total imports into those used domestically (for production, investment, and consumption) and those used for exports, and China is no exception. So we estimated the country’s DVAE by using data from three different sources, each with its own strengths and limitations. The results were remarkably consistent—and collectively shed a powerful light on the evolution of supply chain strategies, Chinese consumption, and Chinese economic performance during the global downturn .

Supply chain shifts

On average, our analysis suggests that imported goods accounted for 40 to 55 percent of the value of total exports from 2002 to 2008. Put another way, roughly half of China’s exports represent domestic value added. Concurrently, DVAE’s share of exports generally has risen over time, suggesting that China has become less of a pure assembler of imported goods—a publicly stated government policy goal.
That has implications for many companies’ supply chains and business models. If your company is a manufacturer in China that is primarily processing intermediate components for reexport—a Taiwan-based original-design manufacturer (ODM) of household goods, for example—it’s probably time to consider alternative locations for the assembly work. With China moving up the value chain and beginning to export more skill-intensive goods and services, chances are that pure assembly will soon be less costly in other parts of Asia.

Exports, consumption, and strategy

We also applied our DVAE analysis to reassess the contribution of exports to GDP growth in the years for which we have overlapping data among our three metrics. We found that China’s export sector contributed 19 to 33 percent of total GDP growth between 2002 and 2008 (Exhibit 1). That’s only about half of the export contribution indicated by traditional total-exports measures.3

In other words, DVAE analysis suggests that exports have been an important driver of China’s growth, but not the dominant one, and that most common wisdom overestimates the role of exports while underestimating the role of domestic consumption for China’s growth. Any Chinese or multinational company that currently manufactures goods in China and primarily exports them to other countries should ask itself whether it needs to scale up its domestic strategy to get a bigger piece of the pie. This involves developing a more granular understanding of the Chinese market, making products that appeal to the Chinese consumer, and finding ways to market and distribute them effectively—all while contending with increasingly formidable Chinese competitors.4
China’s ‘downturn’ and the road ahead

A comparison between DVAE’s contribution to growth and that of other major macroeconomic components shows that DVAE topped private consumption, but was less important than investment, over the 2002–07 period (Exhibit 2). In the downturn years, 2008 and 2009,5 exports contributed much less to growth than other factors did, which explains why the Chinese economy could not fully match its GDP growth rates in the earlier part of the decade. However, the shift to a greater role for private consumption, investment, and finished imports explains how China could weather the downturn well and indicates movement toward a domestically focused economy, even though exports will probably continue to play an important role when the global economy picks up.

Of course, continued changes in the value of the renminbi in the coming years will also affect the evolution of Chinese trade. The more value-added-focused export sector suggested by our DVAE analysis implies that a greater share of exports will consist of higher-priced goods that compete more directly with those of developed nations. That, coupled with an appreciating Chinese currency, points to the creation of more balanced trading partnerships with the rest of the world—and an important shift in context when businesses consider future strategic moves in China.

About the Authors
John Horn is a consultant in McKinsey’s Washington, DC, office; Vivien Singer is a consultant with the McKinsey Global Institute; and Jonathan Woetzel is a director in the Shanghai office.

Notes
1 In this article, we address only national GDP, not employment or regional effects within China. Our interest is the overall health of the Chinese economy, and we leave aside the question of which groups or regions are better off because of any changes in the overall level of exports.
2 Calculated from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) China urbanization model.
3 Not surprising, exports measured by domestic value-added exports (DVAE) contributed more—almost two times more—to GDP growth than exports measured on a net basis. DVAE therefore represents a middle ground between total- and net-export measures.
4 See Jeff Galvin, Jimmy Hexter, and Martin Hirt, “Building a second home in China,” mckinseyquarterly.com, June 2010; and Yuval Atsmon et al., “2009 Annual Chinese Consumer Study, Part II: One Country, Many Markets—Targeting the Chinese Consumer with McKinsey ClusterMap,” McKinsey Insights China, September 2009.
5 The DVAE for 2009 is based on data from IHS Global Insight only.