Showing posts with label economic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic. Show all posts

2011-06-12

How much food for a house in US? and how many barrels of crude oil? and pounds of whole chicken?

This chart shows how many tonnes of corn a median price new single family home in US can buy between May 1981 and May 2011.

(inspired by (and to compare with) Median Home Price by Ounce of Gold)


Source:
Average Median New Home Price: US Census
Maize (corn) price: Indexmundi

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This chart shows how many barrels of crude oil a median price new single family home in US can buy between May 1981 and May 2011.


Crude Oil price: Indexmundi

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This chart shows how many thousand pounds of whole chicken a median price new single family home in US can buy between May 1981 and May 2011.



Crude Oil price: Indexmundi

2010-10-01

A truer picture of China’s export machine - McKinsey

A truer picture of China’s export machine

China’s growth depends less on exports than conventional wisdom suggests.
SEPTEMBER 2010 • John Horn, Vivien Singer, and Jonathan Woetzel
Source: Strategy Practice

In This Article

Exhibit 1: Growth in exports contributed much less to China’s GDP growth than traditional export measures have indicated.

Exhibit 2: The contribution of exports, measured as DVAE, to overall growth has fluctuated significantly in recent years.

Is China’s economic growth largely dependent on exports, or is it becoming more domestically led? That’s a question economists are vigorously debating—and an important one for policy makers and executives alike. An increasingly consumption- and investment-focused Chinese economy could improve the chances of more balanced trading relationships with developed economies. At the same time, businesses operating in China or planning to enter it could find greater opportunities as the economy accelerated its transition from a manufacturing center to a key consumer market.

To shed light on this question, we developed a new way of measuring the role of export growth in China’s overall economic expansion. We found that exports have been a major driver, but not one as dominant as commonly believed. Indeed, there are clear signs that a shift toward domestically driven economic growth is well under way. The picture that emerges of the Chinese economy has implications for the growth and supply chain strategies of businesses in China and elsewhere.



A different way to measure exports

Arguments over the true nature of China’s economic reliance on exports have been rooted in the difficulty of appropriately measuring the export sector. The traditional measure governments and most analysts use is the growth of total exports as a share of GDP growth. This measure indicates that export growth has accounted, on average, for almost 40 percent of the total growth in real GDP since 1990—rising to almost 60 percent since 2000.

Yet these numbers, portraying a dominant and growing role of exports, are at odds with the fact that China was one of the few countries that escaped the great 2008–09 global downturn without a major economic slowdown—suggesting that internal growth played an important role. That’s one reason other economists have used a very different measure: growth in net exports (total exports minus total imports) as a share of GDP growth. By that metric, exports contributed only between 10 and 20 percent of China’s annual 10 percent GDP growth in recent years.

We contend that both measures are misleading. Using total exports neglects the fact that many of China’s export shipments include a fair number of imported goods that are reassembled, combined with domestic content, or otherwise modified before being exported. Failing to remove these imports from the total export figure overstates how much value exports contribute to GDP. On the other hand, a strict net export measure (exports minus imports) underestimates the contribution of exports to GDP, because many imports aren’t used in assembly and exported but rather sold to Chinese consumers and businesses.

We calculated a measure we call domestic value-added exports (DVAE) to assess more accurately the role of exports in GDP growth. DVAE is what you get after subtracting from total exports only those imports used in the production of goods and services that are subsequently exported. In automobiles, for example, finished imports are not subtracted from our measure of exports. But engine parts imported to manufacture motor bikes for export would be.



Governments usually don’t break out total imports into those used domestically (for production, investment, and consumption) and those used for exports, and China is no exception. So we estimated the country’s DVAE by using data from three different sources, each with its own strengths and limitations. The results were remarkably consistent—and collectively shed a powerful light on the evolution of supply chain strategies, Chinese consumption, and Chinese economic performance during the global downturn .

Supply chain shifts

On average, our analysis suggests that imported goods accounted for 40 to 55 percent of the value of total exports from 2002 to 2008. Put another way, roughly half of China’s exports represent domestic value added. Concurrently, DVAE’s share of exports generally has risen over time, suggesting that China has become less of a pure assembler of imported goods—a publicly stated government policy goal.
That has implications for many companies’ supply chains and business models. If your company is a manufacturer in China that is primarily processing intermediate components for reexport—a Taiwan-based original-design manufacturer (ODM) of household goods, for example—it’s probably time to consider alternative locations for the assembly work. With China moving up the value chain and beginning to export more skill-intensive goods and services, chances are that pure assembly will soon be less costly in other parts of Asia.

Exports, consumption, and strategy

We also applied our DVAE analysis to reassess the contribution of exports to GDP growth in the years for which we have overlapping data among our three metrics. We found that China’s export sector contributed 19 to 33 percent of total GDP growth between 2002 and 2008 (Exhibit 1). That’s only about half of the export contribution indicated by traditional total-exports measures.3

In other words, DVAE analysis suggests that exports have been an important driver of China’s growth, but not the dominant one, and that most common wisdom overestimates the role of exports while underestimating the role of domestic consumption for China’s growth. Any Chinese or multinational company that currently manufactures goods in China and primarily exports them to other countries should ask itself whether it needs to scale up its domestic strategy to get a bigger piece of the pie. This involves developing a more granular understanding of the Chinese market, making products that appeal to the Chinese consumer, and finding ways to market and distribute them effectively—all while contending with increasingly formidable Chinese competitors.4
China’s ‘downturn’ and the road ahead

A comparison between DVAE’s contribution to growth and that of other major macroeconomic components shows that DVAE topped private consumption, but was less important than investment, over the 2002–07 period (Exhibit 2). In the downturn years, 2008 and 2009,5 exports contributed much less to growth than other factors did, which explains why the Chinese economy could not fully match its GDP growth rates in the earlier part of the decade. However, the shift to a greater role for private consumption, investment, and finished imports explains how China could weather the downturn well and indicates movement toward a domestically focused economy, even though exports will probably continue to play an important role when the global economy picks up.

Of course, continued changes in the value of the renminbi in the coming years will also affect the evolution of Chinese trade. The more value-added-focused export sector suggested by our DVAE analysis implies that a greater share of exports will consist of higher-priced goods that compete more directly with those of developed nations. That, coupled with an appreciating Chinese currency, points to the creation of more balanced trading partnerships with the rest of the world—and an important shift in context when businesses consider future strategic moves in China.

About the Authors
John Horn is a consultant in McKinsey’s Washington, DC, office; Vivien Singer is a consultant with the McKinsey Global Institute; and Jonathan Woetzel is a director in the Shanghai office.

Notes
1 In this article, we address only national GDP, not employment or regional effects within China. Our interest is the overall health of the Chinese economy, and we leave aside the question of which groups or regions are better off because of any changes in the overall level of exports.
2 Calculated from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) China urbanization model.
3 Not surprising, exports measured by domestic value-added exports (DVAE) contributed more—almost two times more—to GDP growth than exports measured on a net basis. DVAE therefore represents a middle ground between total- and net-export measures.
4 See Jeff Galvin, Jimmy Hexter, and Martin Hirt, “Building a second home in China,” mckinseyquarterly.com, June 2010; and Yuval Atsmon et al., “2009 Annual Chinese Consumer Study, Part II: One Country, Many Markets—Targeting the Chinese Consumer with McKinsey ClusterMap,” McKinsey Insights China, September 2009.
5 The DVAE for 2009 is based on data from IHS Global Insight only.

2009-03-17

See wing-ching's view on China's investment in US treasury


See's view follows what Brad Sester said, the major risk in US investment is the exchange rate risk (i.e. potential USD depreciation in future). To mitigate such risk, China should lend money in RMB-denomiated bonds (to the US)

The implications are
  • the interest rate is determined by RMB rate
  • potential issue with China's forex control and also RMB market rate (increased demand by the time the RMB bonds are due -- but this could work in China's advantage, sort of, as it receives the appreciated notes, though the 'apparent downside' is the impact on export, but you can't have it both ways)
  • this may help release the political pressure from US on the rate of RMB appreciation (vs USD) in future, as by then RMB appreciation will mean that the US government would have to pay more (the US government can always hedge the risk through forward contracts with the i-banks but there is small cost associated with such hedging. In fact, China can also do such hedging if it keeps on buying US Treasury bonds)
  • if, by the time China's holding in RMB denomiated bonds reaches the size of USD (or EUR/etc) denominated bonds, the net impact of RMB appreciation (or depreciation for that matter) on China's reserve holding would be neutral. i.e. China does not need to hedge!

2009-03-15

Risk on China's foreign reserve

Brad Sester, "The main financial risk that China faces, after all, isn’t the risk that the US won’t honor its Treasuries, or even the risk that the US would walk away from the Agencies. It rather is the risk that the dollar and euro will eventually depreciate against the RMB, reducing the RMB value of China’s reserve portfolio."

2009-02-19

The wrong chart which misleads

(via Big Picture) WaPo has a chart showing how Japan has fallen behind in the past 2 decades. viz, it was #4 in GDP/cap (nominal) in 1992 and "now" only #20. Unfortunately there are two problems, (1) it used nominal currency which depends on the very volatile exchange rate figure; (2) it used 2007 figure.

I made a simple estimate, using the 2007 number given by WaPo (i.e. assuming the same GDP/cap growth in the past 14 months, which could vary by a few percentage points ), and applied the difference in exchange rate taken from charts in yahoo. Now Japan climbed back to #3 as a result of the recent exchange rate hike. (ignoring those behind #10 in 2007 ranking, which seems reasonable as no other country has seen such significant appreciation in exchange)



For developed countries it is always more "stable" to use PPP, for which Japan is still around #20 in 2008 (17 in World bank rank, which excludes non-sovereign entities such as HK, consistent with the charts WaPo has been using, which excluded HK). So I do not challenge WaPo's assertion, but its reasoning and choice of data is questionable.

p.s. I do not have the GDP/cap ranking for Japan in PPP in 1992, but I believe it is in the teens, so Japan's rank in GDP/cap(PPP), i.e. living standard, did not change that much. (it was 20520, vs 24700 of USA)

p.s.2 PPP is not as reliable when comparing the economy of developing countries, though in longer time span it is more stable -- which I had chosen when I studied China's growth a few years ago


2008-11-07

张五常 - 不值得花就不要花

张五常的想法很直观,很简单。该花的钱就花,不该花的钱千万不要因为要刺激经济就轻易花掉。我是非常同意的。面对金融危机,中国最需要的是学吴宇森那个诸葛孔明,冷静冷静再冷静。楼市要调整由他调整,不该花的钱不要为了所谓扩大内需而花。

举个例。假如有些基建(比如铁路、核电站)可以提前两三年建,反正迟早需要的。不过没必要的大白象,比如再来一个鸟巢,就可省了。有钱倒不如给官僚系统加薪,让他们不要觉得不贪污就显得寒酸,让那些为数不多的清官能堂堂正正的花钱,这些钱才会真正回到社会里。

所谓花钱扩大内需刺激经济就是把钱投入一个相对封闭的一个经济系统(在这里就是中国吧)。怎么投入其实区别不大,因为最终目的是整个系统增加了资金在流通。就如把一瓶水倒到一个缸里,不管你从哪里到,缸的水平线提高了。假如这是修一条铁路,资金会流到民工的工资,和制造路轨(还有车卡)的钢铁厂的产能使用上,使之失业民工的时间和工厂设备不至于空转。而这些民工和工程老板(还有承包商)把钱花在餐馆、住宅、食物衣服上。

问题是,我们需要以最有效率的方法来促进使用这笔资金。比如
  • 可以使得设备、工时免得空转的
  • 最终产品能产生长远经济效益的。公路、铁路海港是。为了消费而消费的,比如嘉年华,修长城,就不是。 (除非长城可以增加国家的总体旅游收入)
  • 尽可能把资金投到穷人身上。因为穷人比富人会更小心花钱,是的资金回流到社会的路途更有效。比如,承包商会话3万元吃一顿鲍鱼晚饭,或3万元买个包包送小三。资金最终流向LVHM等。民工则会缁珠计较,钱最终可能花在买廉价衣服和食物上。(当然,不能否定承包商的经济贡献。neccessary evil, 包括贪污,还是存在的。问题是,在刺激经济是要考虑到如何把低效率的资金分流途径最低化)


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北京不要拜凯恩斯学派为师

。。。但克鲁明建议的处理目前金融风暴的主要方案,我认为行不通。他认为美国政府要大手花钱,由政府推出消费,因为消费者有钱也不一定会花。这是纯度一百的凯恩斯学派了。

我认为这政策行不通,因为美国政府今天的财赤庞大得惊人,再大花一笔后患无穷也。事实上,目前的金融灾难,虽然不是起于美国政府花钱太多,但庞大的财赤肯定是加重了他们目前面对的困境。佛利民生时认为伊拉克之战是大错,但又认为财政上美国负担得起。真的吗?

我的观点简单得多。不管宏观或微观,我信奉的原则是花钱要有所值,不值得花就不要花。多花不值得花的钱,早晚会闯祸,那些政府究竟可以花多少、把财赤推向后代可以推多少的分析,我知道,但不同意。花钱的原则简单,不值得花就不要花。政府大手花钱可以挽救目前的灾难吗?如果有钱大花特花,当然有助,但值不值得是另一个远为重要的问题。国债这回事,不是推到后代那么简单。这次灾难过后,国债太高可能惹来债券下跌,利率上升,通胀急起,美元大跌──会是另一场灾难。这些不容易加起来的现象组合,地球出现过。

最近的观察,是北京当局知道问题严重:不一定是恐惧金融风暴,而是知道经济数字很不对头,工业兵败如山倒。迹象显示北京开始花钱了。值得吗?

我不担心像美国三十年代那样,中国会因为不景而搞出大政府,因为中国的政府已经够大了。问题是中国比美国幸运得多,可以修改现有的为祸不浅的政策而过关。我担心的是如果北京轻视这个选择,学美国的别无选择的花钱途径,为祸不浅的政策会永远地驱之不去! 。。。

2008-10-31

ZT: 保 內 地 經 濟 增 長 , 遠 遠 重 要 過 參 與 國 際 救 市

I am not a big fan of the Apple Daily editorial, not for the HK verion, or frankly not a fan at all. When one has to slip so much political agenda into every editorial it is hard to be fair and objective.

However, partisan as it is one as a reader should not lose his rationality, especially when it got things right despite all the prejudice. I agree 100% with today's column, only that, the politicised title is not helping it push its message to the intended ears, and I replaced its title with the conclusion: it is far more important to preserve domestic economic growth than participate in international rescue efforts. Because, (1) the ability to maintain economic growth inside China has a much larger impact to global economy than any money China can throw to IMF or the like, (2) It is uncertain how effective or efficient any of these US/Europe-led efforts are, we have seen the track record of IMF 10 years ago, and what it had done to Indonesia.

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金 融 海 嘯 不 是 機 遇   胡 溫 不 宜 貪 功

面 對 席 捲 全 球 的 金 融 海 嘯 , 中 國 人 民 銀 行 在 兩 個 月 內 三 度 減 息 , 儘 管 對 內 地 股 市 的 刺 激 作 用 有 限 , 但 表 明 了 中 國 領 導 人 胡 錦 濤 、 溫 家 寶 參 與 國 際 社 會 穩 定 市 場 、 穩 定 經 濟 合 作 的 意 向 。 不 過 , 對 於 美 國 總 統 喬 治 布 殊 呼 籲 中 國 增 購 美 債 、 英 國 首 相 白 高 敦 敦 促 中 國 注 資 國 際 貨 幣 基 金 組 織 ( IMF ) , 胡 、 溫 的 反 應 相 當 冷 淡 , 中 國 外 交 部 昨 日 僅 表 示 , 願 在 力 所 能 及 的 範 圍 內 , 積 極 考 慮 參 與 救 援 計 劃 。
對 於 今 次 百 年 一 遇 的 金 融 海 嘯 , 內 地 傳 媒 不 時 有 意 無 意 提 出 陰 謀 論 , 反 對 動 用 外匯儲 備 參 與 國 際 救 市 行 動 , 特 別 是 反 對 增 購 美 債 、 反 對 注 資 IMF 籌 設 的 一 萬 億 美 元 救 市 基 金 , 中 國 持 有 大 量 美 債 更 頻 遭 炮 轟 。 根 據 美 國 財 政 部 10 月 16 日 公 佈 的 數 據 , 中 國 至 今 年 8 月 持 有 美 國 國 債 5,410 億 美 元 , 居 第 二 位 , 僅 次 於 日 本 的 5,859 億 美 元 。
中 國 官 方 新 華 社 旗 下 《 瞭 望 東 方 周 刊 》 也 質 疑 「 金 融 危 機 是 一 次 合 謀 」 , 並 引 述 金 融 界 人 士 說 : 「 無 論 美 國 怎 麼 救 市 , 它 的 根 本 目 的 是 發 動 一 次 貨 幣 戰 爭 , 通 過 美 元 貶 值 、 國 債 估 值 下 降 , 到 時 候 由 日 本 、 中 國 這 些 與 它 金 融 聯 繫 比 較 多 的 國 家 買 單 。 」
這 種 以 貨 幣 戰 爭 看 待 金 融 海 嘯 的 陰 謀 論 , 顯 然 深 受 去 年 6 月 出 版 的 暢 銷 書 《 貨 幣 戰 爭 》 影 響 。 這 本 書 以 陰 謀 論 分 析 國 際 財 團 透 過 搶 奪 貨 幣 發 行 權 , 操 縱 國 際 金 融 、 經 濟 、 政 治 運 作 , 在 內 地 引 起 廣 泛 關 注 。 據 稱 , 主 管 金 融 工 作 的 副 總 理 王 岐 山 讀 後 還 批 示 , 要 求 所 有 財 金 官 員 研 讀 。
與 陰 謀 論 同 時 大 行 其 道 的 是 機 遇 論 。 一 些 學 者 、 官 員 認 為 , 金 融 海 嘯 是 中 國 參 與 重 整 國 際 金 融 秩 序 的 機 遇 , 對 胡 溫 裹 足 不 前 甚 為 不 滿 , 呼 籲 政 府 採 取 更 具 力 度 和 規 模 的 救 市 行 動 , 大 有 取 美 國 而 代 之 、 趁 其 病 (手羅) 其 命 的 氣 概 。 《 貨 幣 戰 爭 》 的 作 者 宋 鴻 兵 更 明 言 : 「 中 國 應 該 考 慮 如 何 在 即 將 到 來 的 國 際 金 融 戰 爭 中 贏 得 戰 略 主 動 權 , 最 終 實 現 在 一 個 國 際 『 後 美 元 體 系 』 中 的 貨 幣 霸 主 地 位 。 」
在 華 爾 街 五 大 投 資 銀 行 同 時 受 損 之 際 , 金 融 海 嘯 的 陰 謀 論 難 有 說 服 力 , 機 遇 論 則 未 免 太 過 自 大 。 陰 謀 論 、 機 遇 論 對 是 否 參 與 國 際 救 市 的 主 張 不 同 , 但 又 是 一 脈 相 承 , 都 是 基 於 中 國 龐 大 的 外 匯 儲 備 而 引 發 的 民 族 主 義 情 緒 , 都 是 要 求 胡 溫 向 美 國 說 不 。 截 至 今 年 9 月 底 , 中 國 外匯儲 備 達 1.9 萬 億 美 元 , 雄 居 世 界 首 位 , 在 金 融 海 嘯 襲 擊 環 球 之 際 顯 得 格 外 耀 眼 , 也 為 胡 錦 濤 、 溫 家 寶 在 任 期 屆 滿 前 建 功 立 業 創 造 了 條 件 。
但 是 , 以 中 國 現 行 一 黨 專 政 的 政 治 制 度 , 注 定 中 國 不 可 能 取 代 美 國 成 為 世 界 領 袖 。 何 況 , 論 經 濟 實 力 、 科 技 實 力 、 軍 事 實 力 , 中 國 現 時 都 不 足 以 充 當 世 界 領 袖 。 由 於 參 與 國 際 救 市 的 策 略 , 涉 及 中 國 外 交 戰 略 、 貨 幣 戰 略 的 調 整 , 貪 功 、 貪 快 , 並 不 足 取 , 保 內 地 經 濟 增 長 , 遠 遠 重 要 過 參 與 國 際 救 市 。
中 共 元 老 鄧 小 平 在 1989 年 六 四 事 件 後 提 出 24 字 外 交 戰 略 「 冷 靜 觀 察 , 穩 住 陣 腳 , 沉 著 應 付 , 韜 光 養 晦 , 善 於 守 拙 , 決 不 當 頭 」 , 放 諸 今 日 金 融 海 嘯 的 局 勢 , 顯 然 並 未 過 時 。

2008-10-16

China amid the global economic turmoil

Economist has an interesting review on China's situation regarding the recent financial turmoil.

It showed a chart demonstrating that the housing price relative to income in China had in fact fell in the past 8 year, probably based on government statistics. While I have no major disagreement with Economist's analysis or even preliminary conclusion, this chart deserves some discussion.

The government stats (if that is what the chart was based upon) should be the full market, i.e. including the rural area and villages, where I am not quite sure what land price means because even the ownership is not well defined yet. But to say that housing price/income fell by 30% in the past 8 years would mean that income increased 30% faster than housing in that period.

This is certainly debatable for large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai (which carries a lot of weight in the nation -- unless, of course, if the government used unweighted means so that the weight of a hut in the village is the same as that luxury villa in Pudong, which is not quite the right way to calculate)
  • The average wages had a bit more than doubled in the past 8 years, say grew by 150% (about 12% p.a.). 
  • But for Shanghai I heard the a high end apartment costed about 10k/sq m in 2000 and about 300k/sq m now. The price per square meter had risen by about 200% (probably lower for the market overall), and probably higher. Inflation had been mild until last year so adjusting to 'real' value shouldn't change the picture too much (maybe 30-50% cumulatively?). So for Shanghai (with policies encoruaging real estate purchase around 2000) the price/income ratio remained about the same (instead of declined by 30%)
  • Take Shenzhen for example, the price/sq m (for new apartments) is about 15k a year ago and probably the same now, and about 7k in 2005. I do not know the price in 2000 but i would venture something around 5-6k, which means a 150-200% growth over the period, nominal. The trend is similar to that of Shanghai
  • Caveat: of course we know that even the property price is not a fixed measure, as quality in general had increased significantly in China during this decade
  • The keyword in the Economist is probably "nationwide". There may be bubble in Beijing/Shanghai but it is not a nationwide one. So yes, the index would be higher for BJ/SH but at the national level we probably have to trust Economist's chart
  • Regarding the definition issue the chart shows the index (so the number in 2000 is also defined similarly), the only change is perhaps the relative weight between urban and rural but that would not be as large as to elevate it from -30% to a bubble
All said, property price had rose but it was not as big a bubble as that in the US, and more likely only a small bubble which would be absorbed by inflation in longer terms. If the chart was wrong then the index probably remain unchanged instead of having fallen for 30% as it showed. The conclusion remains that the price is not outrageous if one did not think so in 2000.

Going forward there should be adjustment/correction given the global economic environment but the Economist is right that it is probably only a "soft landing" in China. This correction is mainly a result of international finance and trade rather than an internal bubble.

If this is true then the recent turmoil in the world actually works to China's favour, provided it does not worsen from today's level. It provides a "soft landing" to the overheated economy, corrects the inflated commodity market, and eases the inflation pressure (though this one may not really be good) for China.

---

China's economy

Domino or dynamo?
China is pretty well placed to cushion a global downturn

CHINA has become the main engine of the world economy, accounting for one-third of global GDP growth in the first half of this year. Will it keep humming? Compared with many other emerging economies, notably Brazil and Russia, which have recently suffered big capital outflows, China has so far largely shrugged off the global credit crunch. But there are signs that China’s economy is sputtering. Export volumes have slowed markedly; the growth of industrial production dropped to a six-year low in the 12 months to August; car sales fell by 6% in the same period; and China’s property boom seems to be turning to bust.

Some of the recent slowdown reflects the temporary closure of factories around Beijing during the Olympic games, which cleared the air but made China’s statistics even hazier than usual. Yet the underlying economy has also weakened, especially in the housing market. Property sales in big cities have shrunk by around 50% over the past year. In Shenzhen prices of new luxury apartments have fallen by up to 40%. Average prices nationwide have started to slide, although they were still up by 5.3% in the year to August. Falling sales and a rising stock of new homes mean that prices are set to decline in more cities in 2009.

Predictions that average house prices could fall by up to 50% have recently grabbed the headlines. But they seem much too gloomy. After all, there has been no nationwide house-price bubble. Since 2000 average home prices have actually decreased relative to average incomes, in contrast to the surge in America until 2006 (see chart). As a result, average home prices are unlikely to fall for long.

China’s banks should also be able to withstand falling house prices better than their American counterparts. In America it was easy to get a mortgage for 100% or more of the value of a home, but Chinese buyers must put down a minimum deposit of 20-30%, depending on the home’s size, and as much as 40% on second homes. This provides banks with a large buffer as prices fall. Loans to property developers are riskier and banks’ profits will be hurt as developers go bust. But according to Wang Tao, an economist at UBS, these loans account for only 7% of total bank lending.

More generally, China’s banks should be better insulated from the global credit crunch than Western banks because the country’s system is funded through deposits rather than capital markets. Chinese banks’ loans amount to only 65% of their deposits, compared with far higher ratios in America and western Europe.

A fall in house prices will in any case hurt Chinese consumers much less than their American counterparts because Chinese households are not up to their necks in debt. Total household debt amounts to only 13% of GDP, against 100% in America. Chinese consumer spending actually strengthened this summer, with retail sales rising by 17% in real terms in the year to August. The main impact of the property downturn will be to depress construction.

The government also has room for manoeuvre. Inflation, which had been its main concern, fell to 4.9% in the year to August from 8.7% in February. This was largely thanks to lower food prices, but the growth in money supply has also slowed. Goldman Sachs forecasts that inflation will fall to 1.5% in 2009, which gives the central bank scope to ease monetary policy. Interest rates were cut for the second time in a month on October 8th, to 6.9%, and the government is expected soon to ease credit controls, especially for property.

China’s GDP growth slowed to an annual rate of a mere 10.1% in the second quarter of this year, from 12.6% a year earlier, and most economists expect it to drop to 8-9% in 2009. But this slowdown should partly be welcomed, because the economy had been exceeding its speed limit for several years. Better still, China’s growth next year will come entirely from domestic demand, as its trade surplus shrinks. If the global downturn forces China to switch the mix of growth from exports to consumption, it would also help to make its future growth more sustainable.

The government is expected to supply a fiscal stimulus to keep growth above 8%. The package will include tax cuts and extra infrastructure spending. Economists are also urging increased spending on social welfare to encourage consumers to save less and spend more. China has ample room for a stimulus because it boasts the healthiest fiscal position of any big economy. According to Stephen Green, an economist at Standard Chartered, it has a budget surplus of 2% of GDP, if measured in the same way as in rich economies, and public-sector debt is a mere 16% of GDP. China’s readiness to use fiscal lubrication is the best reason for hoping that its economic motor will not stall. 

2008-10-12

Crash Master - Shiller

By now many people have probably heard of Robert Shiller, of the Case-Shiller Index for housing price.

Time has an good story about him, and his pithy advice on how to treat (prevent) bubbles
  • What's the antidote to that kind of mass delusion? Shiller seems to have no interest in substituting his judgment, or the government's, for the market's. Instead, he sees information and innovation as the counter to group think. An active market in house-price futures and options--Shiller has recently helped launch such securities on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange--would let skeptical speculators prick housing bubbles, he argues. If banks wrote continuous-workout mortgages--in which the terms changed depending on house prices, unemployment and the like--homeowners might be less addicted to rising prices. If government subsidized financial advice for the nonrich, salespeople angling for commissions might be less influential.


2008-09-30

Random thoughts on sub-prime and the intervention


video via incoherent thoughts

Some thoughts:

1) In a closed system, matters are conserved.

If the total amount of monetary supply (the ultimate source of demand) and goods (in this case real estate and hence its derivatives, i.e. structured financal products) do not change, the "equilibrium" price should be a constant.
i.e. whether it is $700bn or $70tr, whatever term attached to this fund, is not going to change the "equilibirum" price. what it will do though, is to re-distributed wealth through intervention, in this case, from the pockets of good investors to those of bad investors.

2) But the system is never really at its equilibirum point (it was above equilibirum for most of the past 3 years), though statistically it should spend most of the time around the equilibirum point. So the rationale for governemnt intervention is that it could fall way below the equilibrium price if no action is taken. The question follows, if that is the case, wouldn't some hedge fund start to buy in or are they all stupid?

3) Intervention: if the government should invene when the market is way below the equilibrium point, should it intervene when it is way above? -- i.e., to protect the average investors from buying at an overpriced point? why wasn't a similar amount given to the hedge funds who short the market 2 years ago?

4) HK 1998 vs USA 2008. 

The intervention in HK worked in 1998 (judging solely on results, ignoring issues such as market ethnic and proper governance) because IT WAS UNDERPRICED. Had the HK government intervened a few days early, it could have lost the gamble. Had it intervened a few days later, it could have profited more! It succeed not because it acted right, it succeed because it waited long enough and the price/timing was right.

The HK goverment was betting against a group of investors, who [might have] erred. We know how much it was paying for each piece of asset it acquired. We do not know whether the US government is betting against a group of speculator, or just the market ("gravity") -- see below.

For the $700bn plan, there is not a single indication of the price point the US government will enter. Since it is about structured financial products, the actual value of the goods could be zero. The only way this would work is, to restricted the fund to apply strictly to buying up properties, i.e. the underlying assets for these products, not the products themselves; real estates to be more specific if it has to, or something similar.

5) How do we know where the equilibrium point is? If we believe in statistics and the market force. the "equilibirum" (US) housing price should be around the average of the past 10 (or 15?) years, adjusted for inflation. 

Today, it is quite clear that it is out of the 'reasonable' bound. To be out of bound (and for a safe entry with taxpayers' money) the price should be about as far below the average as it had been once above that average (i.e. the around peak of the market)

e.g. (for those who believes in technical analysis there is a simple estimate -- though far from rigorous) Take the Case-Shiller Index (SPCSUSA), it moved between 85.71 and 185.45 for the past 10 years, the mid-point being around 135. The 2008 Q2 value was 155.32, today it is probably much closer to the mid-point of 135. To justify a value that is "way-below equilibirum" the index needs to fall signifcantly below 135, e.g., perhaps a bit more than 1 standard deviation.
(maybe adds inflation which had been low until very recently)
-- the same applies for those who want to invest his own money into real estate.

2008-06-23

World GDP per Labor capita

I have blogged about the comparison of economic potential of India and China before. One of the key issues I have raised is the underutilization of labor in India.

But I didn't have data to do real comparison 3 years ago. I made some very rough estimates that the relative labor utilization ('relative' because age profile was not counted, i.e., the factors of child labor and retirement age was ignored) that the relative labor utilization between China and India is 85:65=1.31.

Recently I came across the new CIA World Factbook (the major error in PPP was corrected after Zoellick went to World Bank, though many data still needs to be read with a grain of salt, e.g. the military spending ranking where China's number was manipulated to be above that of US, by (1) converting the hard currency paid for Russian import into PPP, hence inconsistency in numerator and denominator (2) used per capita so that US does not rank at the top, etc.) and I found it had a handy compilation of Labor force statistics.

The labor utilization rate (base on this CIA Factbook) for China is 60.4%, vs 45% for India. The relative ratio is 1.342. My estimate was actually VERY close !!!

Then, I did a very simple calculation to the CIA data: I calculated GDP/labor capita. (i.e. instead of the whole population, I divided GDP by the total workforce number) This ignored the fact that the non-working population may also contribute to the economy (eg by freeing up the time for the working person in the family, etc). But the results are still very interesting, despite its various faults (on top of the problem with PPP).



I have made a correction on CIA data for Niger (CIA's 70k labor is obviously wrong for the 13M strong Niger( the non-wage earning labor are also labors and they produce GDP). It basically ignored everyone who works in subsistence farming). There are other errors in CIA data that I did not bother to fix (all for small countries, e.g. Kiribati; and the mistake for Malta from IMF)

A few interesting facts

  • The gap between China and India narrows significantly if measured by GDP/labor (8775 vs 6002). With GDP/cap it is 5300 vs 2700.
  • China and Pakistan (which has even lower labor rate due to unemployment and the Islam restriction on women labor) comparison is even more striking. Pakistan's GDP/labor ranks just above that of China, at 8869. i.e. If Pakistan free up its women labor, and provided that they can find a job at similar pay as others today, Pakistan's GDP/cap will be the same as that of China (and higher than India's)! Mongolia is another surprise, just above Pakistan!
  • I speculated about Islam factor, which is demonstrated by the low labor rate for countries such as Indonesia (46.3%), Bengladesh (45.2%), Egypt (27%), Turkey (32.7%) and Pakistan (29.3%). But it would be wrong to simplify matters as such. Because one cannot then explain the fact that Pakistan/Eqwgypt have much lower rate than other Islamic countries. And Kazakhstan's 53.6% cannot be explained at all. (OTOH the gulf states rich in oil have higher labor rate merely because of the foreign labors)
  • DPRK (North Korea) has the highest labor rate. I know it is probably because its full employment due to socialism (and short life span so that there is no retiree?) but I am a bit skeptical of the numbers. Anyway, the productivity is very low because as many as 100k people would be practicing Mass Game for a few month in the years before this year (apparently they stopped the function this year! when I wanted to visit). Liechtenstein's high labor rate is probably a result of foreign workers (in its financial industry) as well. Same for Monaco.
  • Japan has higher (PPP_measured) GDP/cap than Taiwan only because more Japanese worked! This is another major surprise.
  • The gap between HK and Singapore has widened, with Singapore leading by almost 20% in GDP/cap. However, in terms of per labor they are next to each other again.
  • Bostwana, the star of Africa, ranked number 6 in the world, just behind financial/tax havens Luxembourg/Bermuda, and oil states Qatar/Brunei -- But I am not sure if the CIA labor rate of 15.7% is right. However, even if not, Bostwana's GDP performance is still very impressive.

2008-04-18

It is time to claim victory and call off the boycott... and why boycott is often a bad idea

The Carrefour boycott seems to be sending a signal to its German counterpart. Meanwhile, the LVMH "kow-towed".

Size does matter. An a limited scale boycott demonstrated the China consumer power. The Chinese citizens seems to have won a small battle in the game of boycotting buff with the West. But it is hard to see who will win the war in the longer term.

Simple economic: free market economy values choice. The more choices you have, the more opportunity you will find a better deal.

As a result, any boycott in trade, whether it hurts your target or not, hurts yourself first.

That is why I always think boycott, any kind of boycott, be it Chinese product, Olympic, Carrefour, are stupid ideas. Threatening of a boycott is also in general a bad idea, though there is occasional exception -- i.e., if you achieve your objective before you begin to hurt your own interest. The American have palyed this game on "Made in China" for quite a while, only in very isolated cases it worked.

So it is time for the Chinese citizens (and netizens) to claim victory and retreat. Carrefour is (1) innocent and (2) surrendered. There is really no point fighting again. Continue the boycott will not only hurt both side, but worst of all, it will convince Carrefour that it does not really matter what it does (see earlier post of why you should tell the truth if you really want to help the Tibetans)

If they still find themselves energetic, then bluff at Mercedes-Benz/BMW, or Walmart. But the games of bluffing are dangerous, they could backfire. Because anyone who is calling for a boycott of any kind, remember there are a few conditions that need to be met
  1. A specific result (which is achievable). e.g. a clarification announcement from Carrefour's major sharehold Arnault is one, something which violates WTO rules is not
  2. You need to be able to materialize your bluff. It seems Arnault yielded before we could see how large the impact on Carrefour could be. Apparently the capitalists does not want to risk even a single cent of revenue
  3. There is cost in any kind of boycott. So the calculate your cost before carrying it out. Usually your cost is higher than the cost of your target (anyone venture a proof?)
  4. If your bluff is called and couldn't be fulfilled. Then you can never bluff again. (e.g., the Schumer-Graham Bill)

---
p.s. The fact that I do not buy Luis Vuitton because I think it is over priced is not an act of boycott, but an act of expressing my personal choice.

p.s.2. Why boycott is a bad idea

While I agree with Jin Jing on not boycotting, I do not agree with her reasoning (I also disagree with those who disagree just for the sake of disagreeing with the angry netizens, they have become angry netizens themselves by saying so)

  • Jin Jing said boycotting Careefour will hurt its employee's, this is not quite true
  • (1) A limited boycott will only hurt short term profit, not the employees, assuming Carrefour started as a financially sound company
  • (2) Boycotting Carrefour mean purchasing somewhere else (the demand is still there), so whoever laid off by Carrefour could still find job in, e.g. Walmart, as revenue is shifted there and so is the job opening
  • This works in parallel to Americans(or French) boycotting Made in China goods, the factory may shift to Vietnam but the demand change is usually small (unlesss price is changed significant)
  • In the end, the consumer (whoever limited himself with less choice) is the one who suffer (most), as he is seeking a less than optimal deal

Having said that, there are other reasons not to boycott Carrefour. Carrefour's operating in China, assuming it is reasonably successful, means it has contributed to China by bringing in competition and hence skills. As a result, the Lian Hua/etc needs to play catch up (and it could poach managers Carrefour trained). In the longer run, perhaps this would stimulate a strong retail enterprise from China (maybe Lian Hua or Jingkelong/etc).

-- this is, in addition to Carrefour helping the Chinese consumer to get better service and price from the retailing industry.

So, think thrice before you boycott.

2008-02-12

Roach's Canaries in Beijing

Subprime: Canary in a Coal Mine?
January 31, 2008

Stephen Roach

"Morgan Stanley's Stephen Roach and Mary Meeker both recently presented at the Caijing Magazine Annual Conference in Beijing.

The conference - a leading forum on the Chinese economy - addressed the major challenges and opportunities for China in 2008.

Roach kicked off his remarks by providing a comparision between the dotcom bubble burst of 1999 and the recent subprime mortgage crisis; he then focused on trends in global consumerism and the myth of Asia decoupling. He explored the challenges facing a growing China, as well as the increase in protectionism and currency risks that are playing out with Asia economic expansion."


right click to download - a very insightful set of charts.

2008-01-22

Professor Cheung on China's New Labor Law

Professor has been a big fan of China's reform policy, because it is pragmatic and cautious; more importantly, it is the freeest of all free economy, and more 'capitalistic' than the US.

So it is worth our attention when he rings the bell.
  • 很不幸,因为新劳动法的推出,我不能不在该文补加一个脚注。九十七岁的高斯不会高兴:他坚持该文要以中国大凯旋的姿态收笔。
  • Very unfortunately, because of the launch of this New Labour Law, I had no choice but to add a footnote/caveat to my essay. Professor Coarse, at the age of 97, will not be happy about this caveat, he wanted me to end my essay with the full success of China's economic progress.
Cheung suggested a face-saving remedy for Beijing
  • 前思后想,我认为如下的治方值得北京考虑。那是新法不改,但容许工商业机构选择(甲)、采用新劳动法,或(乙)、劳工合约完全自由。劳动市场于是有甲、乙两种机构或公司的选择存在。如果员工认为新法对他们有利,可选执行新法的机构,否则会选合约自由的。倒过来,如果老板采用自由合约的公司,不同意的员工可以另谋高就。这样分两种合约性质不同的机构或公司处理,员工的自由选择可以说清楚很多有争议性的问题。适者生存,不适者淘汰,哪种公司胜出是市场竞争的结果。如果两种公司一起存在,我敢赌身家,自由合约公司的员工的收入一定比选择新法的上升得快!
  • I think Beijing needs to consider the following option. i.e., keep the New Law [to save face], while allowing the companies [in fact the employee] two options: the New Law and a "free contract"....... I am willing to place my bet, when there are two types of companies, the worker will choose to work for the second type.
IMO, to go one step further, Beijing can even let different provinces choose different laws (and perhaps force a few provinces to choose the new law), after a couple years, it will know which provinces win. This is fully consistent with the great helmsman Deng's Feeling the Stone to Cross the River doctrine.

Links below. Please use babelfish/google translator for a rough translation.

(2007.12.11)新劳动法的困扰

(2008.01.08)再谈新劳动法

(2008.01.15)灾难的先兆——三论新劳动法

(2008.01.22)新劳动法的启示

2007-12-05

Stephen Cheung on RMB (iii)

This is actually the 4th and 5th part of his speech -- I combined 2nd and 3rd as (ii) in my previous post, where hemade it very clear that he is supportive of letting Chinese investors go abroad and also very strongly against restricting their choice to the HK equity market only (the logic flows directly for free market believers), lest we forget
  • 把人民币放出去 与此前决定(而最近剎掣)的天津「直通车」到香港买股票很不相同。「直通车」是 内资外流,但人民币外放有引进外汇的效果,国家是有钱赚的。这里要说清楚:从经济学的角度看,我不反对内资外流,但指明是购买股票却是劣着。股票之价,原 则上,是反映着上市公司的回报率,市场应早有定论。无端端因为「直通车」而使港股上升了百分之四十,反映着股民一般无知,早晚会损手烂脚!买股票不是移民 潮买楼,不是自由行购物,而是市场投资,要看上市公司的投资回报。
  • 炎黄子孙有钱出外投资,那很好,但要让他们自由选择投资的项目与回报的预期。说实话,当今之世,不容易找到一个地方投资比神州大地更可取,但如果炎黄子孙要分散一点,那到外间下点注,过瘾一下,也无不可,但不要强迫他们通过港股市场。
Please enjoy the rest of the speech below.

In 4th he pointed out the the effort of using a currency to achieve multiple target will be an effort in vain. I can paraphrase it in business term, that de-focusing will dilute one's impact; or in mathematical terms, that adjusting one independent variable can only optimize for one independent variable at most.

In 4th he recapped and illustrated the Basket Commodity theory. This alone is a Nobel worthy result. The pity is that the Chinese government is so risk averse that it will not try anything not tired in other country before. Therefore, I suggest Professor Cheung to sell this to another country, e.g., Malaysia, Brazil, or Korea, Russia.

---

人民币的困境(之四)

不久前在报章上读到周小川先生在十七大的言论,有云:「中国当前货币政策仍要坚持多目标,并强调促进经济发展……。他大称,中央银行首先要注重通货膨胀的防治,保持币值稳定,其次在宏观调控和制定货币政策时要考虑促进就业……。」

上述的观点无疑是西方某传统的货币政策观。可以办 得到吗?地球历史没有成功过。今天欧元币值稳定,主要是因为他们放弃了「多目标」。可不是吗?欧元成立以还,德国与法国的失业率毫无改进,其它的欧盟国家 有失业率低很多的。欧盟之邦有不同的经济困境,是佛利民当年认为欧元行不通的原因,而今天欧元成功,是因为主事者只求币值稳定,不管其它。货币政策的「多 目标」,在实践上没有成功过。原则上行得通吗?理论说很困难,困难重重也:一石多鸟要碰巧。国家大事,岂同儿戏哉?

虽然不是我的研究专业,但自六十年代初期起我跟进货币,有名师指导,同学了得,而后来认识佛利民、夏理·庄 逊、蒙代尔等货币大师,要不跟进也艰难。记忆所及,佛老当年认为没有一个联邦储备局的主席是及格的。后来到了格林斯潘,佛老认为最好。格老的政绩如何呢? 处事临危不乱,国会应对一流。然而,他在任的二十年间,美国的利息率轮上轮落凡八次之多。我早就说过,利息率辘来辘去,辘上辘落,早晚会有投资者或借贷者 被辘瓜。言犹在耳,次按风暴就出现了。

费沙的利息理论说得清楚:投资的回报率应该与市场 的利息率相等。很显然,投资的回报率不可能像格老任内的利息率那样辘上辘落。换言之,格老的货币政策基本上是违反了经济原则。佛利民当年是反对以利息率调 控经济的,但以币量调控,困难重重,格老转用利率也就无话可说。可惜佛老去年谢世,否则见到今天的次按风暴,足以仰天大笑矣!中国的央行最近加息五次,也 是以利率调控,拜格老为师,放弃了比格老高明的朱镕基传统。不敢说朱老比格老聪明,而是美国的「无锚」(fiat money)货币制度有不容易解决的困难。佩服蒙代尔,他四十年前就这样说。

西方的币量理论(quantity theory of money)起于史密斯之前,其后参与的天才辈出,实证研究的大好文章数之不尽,可谓精英尽出矣。然而,理论归理论,实践归实践。实践上,该理论有一个无可救药的要点:我们不知道方程式内的货币量究竟是些什么!是M1?是M2?是M3?还有其它吗?

我肯定币量理论有严重的失误,始于一九九五。该年我的一位师兄A. Meltzer访港,我带他到雅谷进午餐。在货币研究上,这位师兄非同小可。他是K. Brunner的学生,与老师拍档研究货币得享大名。单以调控银根(base money)来调控币量的主张,是这位师兄一九六三首先提出的。这个「银根」法门后来被西方的国家普遍采用,是以利率调控之前的事了。可以说,从货币理论实证研究的角度衡量,这位师兄的成就不在佛利民之下。

在那次雅谷午餐中,师兄向我提出一个困扰着他的问 题:美元的币量急速上升了好几年,但美国见不到有通胀复苏!他说想不通,唯一的解释是当时美元在国际上强劲。分手后我再想,得到的解释是:一九九一波斯湾 之战后,苏联解体,国际上要持美元者急升,而外间多持美元是不会导致美国本土的通胀上升的。三年前,佛利民直言他对自己多年来的币量观有怀疑,那是大师的 风范了!

于今回顾,我历来敬仰而又拜服的佛利民,币量之说 外,其货币观还有两处失误。其一是他对美国三十年代经济大萧条的解释,是货币的顶级研究,详尽得前无古人,但轻视了当时的美国工会林立,福利大行其道,最 低工资半点也不低。这些加起来约束了劳工合约的选择,而重要的件工合约当时在美国是被判为非法的。我绝不怀疑佛老说的,当年美国的联邦储备局做错了,失误 频频,币量应加不加,或应加反减,也不怀疑在合约选择自由不足的情况下,大幅增加货币量,搞起一点通胀,对当时的大萧条有助。然而,朱镕基的中国经验却令 人大开眼界。神州大地一九九三的通胀率越百分之二十,一九九七下降至零,跟着有负三强的通缩,如果算进当时的产品与服务的质量急速提升,通缩率达两位数字 应无疑问。楼房之价是下降了三分之二的。就是在这样的极为「不景」的时期,中国的经济增长保八,而失业率徘徊于百分之四左右。长三角的经济就是在那时颷 升,只八年超越了起步早十年的珠三角。是重要的经验,明显地否决了佛老的单以货币理论解释大萧条的分析。

佛老的另一项失误,是他认为金本位制度放弃了之 后,一个大国不容易甚至不可以用实物为货币之锚。昔日以金或银为锚的本位制,导致西方太平盛世很长的时日,今天还有不少经济学者向往。可惜此制也,金或银 本身的价格波动会导致其它物价的波动,而这本位制的瓦解,起于经济增长或行军打仗,金或银的供应量不足。

没有谁不同意有实物为本位的货币制度最可取,只是找不到可取的实物。是朱镕基在九十年代处理货币的方法使我霍然而悟,站了起来:以实物为货币之锚,市场要有实物存在,但政府不需要提供实物,而市民是不需要储存有关的实物的。解释是后话。

这里要向周小川先生澄清一下。多目标的货币制度虽然老生常谈,但历史的经验没有成功过。货币的基本用途是作为计算单位(unit of account), 亦即是协助市场交易的单位了。凯恩斯是这样看的。作为计算单位,货币的主要目标是稳定物价,而如果只针对这单一目标处理,成功不难。这应该是中央银行要集 中的唯一职责。经济的其它方面应该是央行之外的责任。不要羡慕美国联邦储备的主事者基本上是管到经济的各方面去。看似大权在手,其实手忙脚乱!是那个无锚 的fiat money制度使然。货币无锚,以币量调控物价难于登天,顾此失彼,于是不能不管到多方面的目标去。

君不见,西方常说的商业周期(business cycle),开放改革后的中国从来没有出现过。不是说经济没有波动,而是没有周期性。货币制度不同,市场合约选择的自由度不同,所以有别。个人认为:朱老搞出来的中国货币制度是好的。非常好,要不然中国不会有今天。我同意蒙代尔为此而提出的格言:还没有破坏,不要修理它。

(之四)

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人民币的困境(之五)

有数之不尽的理 由一个国家的货币要下一个固定的锚,然后让所有汇率自由浮动。人民币目前的主要困境,是一方面要解除外汇管制,让人民币外放来纾缓币值上升的压力;另一方 面,这汇管的解除有很大的机会带来不可以接受的高通胀。在这样的情况下,我几次建议的把人民币与一篮子物品挂钩,即是说以一篮子的物品价格指数为人民币之 锚,就更加重要了。

解释过几次,明 白的朋友拍手称善,但好些读者不明白,可能他们想得太深了。不是我的发明。我只是把古老的本位制与朱镕基的货币政策结合起来,知道可行。与一篮子物品挂钩 的想法二十多年前向佛利民提出过,但要等到十年前,得到朱老的政策启示,我才知道提供货币的政府机构是不需要有篮子内的物品在手的。当年大家都想错了。

让我从金本位说 起吧。黄金的本身值钱,以金币作货币,金的所值就是币值。金有重量,携带不便,提供货币的机构可以发行钞票,是纸钞,面额说明可以换取多少重量的金,发钞 的机构是有黄金储备的。这个古老的本位制有两大缺点。其一是金价的波动会导致其它物价的波动,其二是发钞的机构可能遇上黄金储备不足的困难。后者其实是误 解,是错觉,起于发钞的政府或机构营私舞弊,或言而无信,或上下其手。中国清代的一些钱庄与后来国民党的关金、银圆券、金圆券等,说明有金或银作本位,都 是骗人的玩意。我们有理由相信今天中国的央行再不会那样做,而如果他们那样做,没有谁有理由去关心中国的经济改革。

今天,我们要把 问题倒转过来看。央行发钞,大可说明一百元(或某面值)可以在市场买到某重量的金。短暂的波动当然存在,但可以容许。央行本身不提供金,只是见市场金价上 升,央行把部分钞票收回;见金价下跌,则多发钞票出去,那钞票面值的金量可以稳守。目的只一个:稳守金价,其它货币政策不管。这样稳守就是以黄金作为货币 之锚,也是本位制,是另一种,增加了不需要储备黄金的弹性。容许短暂的金价波动,稳守币值的金价不困难。困难是其它两方面。一、市场的黄金需求或供应可以 大上大落,稳守币值的金量,其它的物价会跟着大幅波动,对经济有不良影响,可以是很坏的。二、市场中的大富君子可以跟政府赌一手,炒金图利。这是说,以市 场的黄金为货币之锚,金量的多少不是问题,其它物价的可能大幅变动才是。

这就带来以一篮 子物品作为货币之锚的建议了。曾经建议用三十种物品,认为不够安全用六十种吧。要选对衣、食、住、行有代表性的,物品的质量要有明确的鉴定准则,要从没有 讨价还价的期货市场及批发市场选择。不难选出约六十种,但再多不容易。篮子内的物品各有各的不同价,比重也不同,而这篮子中的相对物价是自由浮动的。固定 的是一千元人民币(或某面值)可以在市场购得那篮子内指定的物品的质与量,及物品之间的固定比重。最简单是用一个指数处理。说一千元可以购得一个固定的篮 子物品,称指数为一百,央行如果调高指数为一零一,是说要有百分之一的通胀,调低为九十九,是说有百分之一的通缩了。容许每年有上、下限百分之三左右的变 动吧。篮子内的相对物价自由浮动,人民币的对外汇率也自由浮动。篮子内的物品是些什么要公布,每种选哪个市场不一定要公布,而物品的不同比重也不一定要公 布。

这就是了。西方考虑过以物价指数为货币之锚。这不成,因为这指数不能直接在市场成交。物价指数只能作为币值的目标,牵涉到不少困难。以「目标」为货币之「锚」不可能固定,算不上是真的锚,是今天西方的fiat money制。 这里提出的以一篮子物品为锚,是可以在市场直接成交的,任何人都可以。央行在明,每天甚至每个小时的篮子内的物价变动清楚,整个篮子的物价指数是随时明确 的。短暂的篮子物价指数波动容许,如果这指数上升过高,央行把部分人民币收回来;如果下跌过多,多放人民币出去。从中国目前的货币运作看,集中于钞票的收 回与放出应该是立竿见影的。最简单是由央行以外币在国际市场处理人民币的交易,而如果外币在国内自由流通(目前差不多),在国内买卖货币对通胀的调控会快 一点。外汇储备那么多,有需要时用很小的一部分足够,何况把人民币外放,有一段时期外汇储备还要急升。

民无信不立。经 过那么多年的风风雨雨,今天我们要假设央行不会营私舞弊。这假设容易接受,因为我们没有其它选择!以一篮子物品为货币之锚无疑会增加人民对央行的信心,而 外间给人民币升值的压力会消散:汇率自由浮动,你们要对人民币贬值或升值自便吧。主要是与中国竞争的廉价劳力之区,尤其是亚洲一带的发展中国家彼此之间的 汇率。大家揾食,懂得做他们的货币会以人民币为锚。另一方面,国内的通胀预期会因为人民币以一篮子物品为锚而烟消云散。

在地球一体化正 在演变的今天,举世的经济形势很不妥。金融(包括股市与国际币值)的大幅波动,半个世纪以来没有见过那么严重。石油之价达百美元一桶,而如果伊朗事发,不 知会升到哪里去。不对头,因为这几年大油田屡被发现。中国呢?屋漏更兼连夜雨,最近深圳推出的约束人民币提款,与明年初举国推出的「新劳动法」,皆令识者 心惊胆战。读者相信吗?不久前两家欧洲机构,说明年起中国会领导世界经济。不知是欣赏还是中伤,树大招风肯定是大忌。

在制度上,中国 还要清理的沙石数之不尽。非清理不可:还有太多太多的同胞的生活水平不可以接受。未富先骄,花巧的经济政策是来得太多太早了。要先稳守然后清理。这几年我 最担心的是人民币的问题,因为只要在货币政策上一子错,其它沙石怎样清理也帮不到多少忙。要一次过地稳定币值,不要管花巧的理论或政策,要把改革的精力集 中在教育、医疗、宗教、言论、法治、知识产权等事项去,大家都知道是沙石很多的。最好用自己想出来的方法,不要管外间的专家怎样说。

是不容易明白的 现象。西方的经济专家云集,但没有政府听他们说的。中国的经济专家数不出几个,但今天却喜欢引进西方的不成气候的非专家经济思维。希望北京的朋友明白,中 国的经济改革是历史奇迹,方法主要是中国人自己想出来的。高斯最近读了我那篇关于中国制度的英语文章,非常欣赏我提到的邓小平说过的一句话:「试一试,看 一看。」这是中国改革走了近三十年的路,继续这样走下去看来最上算。

(之五·

2007-11-26

Stephen Cheung on RMB, Rural China (ii)

When I first started as a management consultant a dozen years ago, the MNCs focus on "big 3" -- Beijing Shanghai and Guangzhou. They complained that there is no scale in such a huge market. I laughed, and created a tiered city approach using the China City Statistical Yearbooks. Without going for the 200+ cities China does not have the scale to support these capitalist fat pigs. The role model of the time, Xian Janssen, already went to that depth while everybody was insisting only the big 3 can afford his product and they will never compromise by "lowering" their price.

The Excel database and classification I established is still in use today by the firm, quite widely, AFAIK.

Today, our focus should shift to rural China. Only those with the vision to reach rural China, and the ability to understand rural China will succeed in the coming decade.

This is why I am thrilled by Professor Cheung's speech below (ii), and (iii)

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说过多次,反对人民币升值是为了中国的农民。也说过多次,中国农民的生活搞不起,经济增长怎样了不起也没有用。说要改善农民的生活说了几千年,得个「讲」字,但今天是看到曙光了。

近来反对人民币 升值有点火气,情难自禁也。可不是因为农民的生活没有改进,或改进得太慢。正相反,大约二○○○年起,中国农民的生活改进得快,上升速度超过我的期望。形 势好,是关键时刻,泼冷水愚不可及。左盘算右盘算,我认为这几年农民生活改进的速度,如果再持续十年——从历史看是很短的时日——中国的农民会达到小康。 还要鼓励城市的工商业发展。农民生活的改进,是要靠工商业的继续励进带动的。不容易看到农民的生活与城市的人均收入打平,因为后者有大富人家。但农民的人 均收入,要达到城市的中等人家水平不苛求。那是小康,大约还需要十年吧。这是以目前农村的发展速度算,也把二○○三年起农产品价格上升的速度算进去。

说实话,要一下 子大幅提升农民的生活,易过借火。那是拜当年的日本为师,禁止农产品进口。但这样做,中国整体的经济发展会变得溃不成军,无从再进矣。我反对禁止农产品进 口,或抽进口税;我也反对最低工资,反对补贴农业,反对福利经济——因为这些会扼杀农民自力更生的机会。我赞成大事推广农村子弟的知识教育,认为最好鼓励 私营的慈善机构办学,赞成在农村推广适用于中国的农业科技,也赞成大学取录学生时,农村子弟的高考成绩不妨让个折头。

我也认为两年前取消农业税是对的。这「取消」协助了在农民大量转到工商业去的情况下,农产品的总量还继续上升:弃置了的农地再被耕耘,雇用全职农工开始盛行,而农作的机械与建设投资,虽然还简陋,是明显地急速上升了。

不要相信农民的 生活愈来愈苦,或贫富两极继续分化。就是北京也难以估计流动人口,以户籍人口算农民的人均收入不对,而外国机构的什么分化指数统计,根本不知道中国发生着 些什么事。在收入的差距上,城市与农村之间可能还在加阔,但相对的百分比升幅,这几年农民比市民升得快是没有疑问的。这发展继续,农民的收入早晚会追上城 市的居民。

北京目前的统 计,是全国农民人口下降至总人口的百分之五十六。是以户籍人口算吧。我调查了几个农村(包括河南、江苏、浙江、广东、贵州),图案竟然一样:可工作的农村 劳力,十个走了七个。近城市的走得较少,因为容易半农半工。大略地算一下,从总人口看,今天农村的实际人口只有总人口的百分之三十五左右,而从劳动人口 看,操作农业的大约是百分之二十(一位作过比较深入调查的专家朋友,说只剩百分之十五左右)。六年前在广州讲话,我说中国操农作的要下降至总劳动人口百分 之二十左右才算及格。这言论给人痛骂,说永远不可能。曾几何时,今天应该是达到了,比我六年前想象的快。今天看,农作劳动人口再下降五个百分点就差不多 了。

无可置疑,近两 年建筑工人的收入上升得很可观,反映着从农转工的速度缓慢了下来。雇用的农工兴起,而他们的全职收入,目前是略高于工厂的低薪工人。这里要指出一个考虑重 点。以低工资从工商业学起,只要勤奋,知识与日俱增,假以时日,其收入的上限有机会高到天上去。换言之,工商业的知识有很大的争取空间,机会有很大的变 化,因而收入增长的弹性高。农业可没有这样的际遇。中国的农作知识了不起,但主要是数千年的智慧积累,农村的孩子从小耳闻目染,长大后一般都学满了师。不 是说先进的农业科技对中国毫无用处,但地少人多,好些外来的科技没有多大用场。技术上,这些年中国的农业有长进,而以胶布建造温室这几年盛行了。那天我见 到农民投资五千,用胶布建一间房子,可养鸡千只,有无限感慨。是新法饲养,而令我心跳加速的是一户农家拿得出三个五千元。

无论怎样说,一 个地少人多的国家,加上农业的本质,农民收入的上升弹性远不及工商业。所以我认为一个年轻力壮的农工收入,只略高于工业的低薪是不够的。这几年农产品的价 格比工业产品的价格上升得快,是好现象。假设工业产品之价不变,农产品之价再升一倍至一倍半,加上设备投资与新技术,农民一般可达小康。这样盘算,我的估 计是再要大约十年。

漫长的黑洞,中 国的农民终于走到尽头,见到光亮了。为什么不让他们走出洞口呢?发神经!说过无数次,农转工,中国的农民起步时是转到我称为接单工厂去。这些工厂的产品没 有自己的商标,也没有任何专利,只是有单接单,有版照造,他们的竞争对手不是什么先进之邦,而是越南、印度等工资比中国还要低的地方。人民币升值,大家用 美元结算,订单会容易地跑到这些后起的地区去。今天的中国可没有日本当年那样着数,可以让日圆上升一两倍还有竞争力。一九九一年,在瑞典,我跟佛利民说得 清楚:世界大变,不久的将来地球会增加十至二十亿的廉价劳力在国际上竞争。没有看错,这竞争出现了,是地球之幸。我为印度、越南等的兴起感到高兴,而对中 国来说,落后之邦有点钱是大吉大利,因为与之贸易可以多赚一点。但让人民币升值是让赛,是轻敌,是未富先骄。

是的,就是农转 工到了一个饱和点,北京还不能让人民币升值。原因是要提升农民的收入,我们要让工商业的收入上升。这上升会自然地迫使工业改进产品的质量与引进科技,而这 几年中国的研究投资的上升率是世界之冠。人民币不升,中国的接单工业总会有抬头的一天。是的,中国早晚要放弃低下的接单工业,让改革较慢起步的接单去吧。 绝对不是看人家不起,而是中国的劳苦大众吃了那么多年苦,今天的形势是他们的血汗换回来的。

五年前说过,人民币强劲,主要是因为中国的人民大众吃得苦。人民币升值,对富有的炎黄子孙无疑有利。但劳苦大众呢?难道他们会旅游巴黎喝拉图红酒吗?

(之二)

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上文提到人民币面对两项困境。其一是兑美元上升, 外贸以美元结算,弹性系数不协助,中国的外贸顺差不跌反升。这会带来外间再强迫人民币升值,有可能一重一重地逼上去,使中国走上日本当年的不幸的路。其 二,中国的劳苦大众的工资,高于跟他们竞争的印度及越南等地,人民币再上升,这几年发展得很有看头的农民生活,会遇到严重的打击。

这里转谈第三项困境。那是这几个月中国的通胀是明 显地上升了,到了近于不可以接受的水平。这里我们要冷静下来,思量一下。首先,近来的通胀加剧主要是农产品的价格上升得快。这是好现象。农转工的人数那么 多,农产品的价格上升是自然的现象,而如果农产品的价格不升,农民的生活不容易有抬头的一天。然而,普通常识说,农转工的人数多,非农业的物价理应下降才 对。但没有,只是上升得少。原则上,中国的物价指数,农产品占三分之一,其价上升一个百分点,其它物价下降半个百分点可以抵销,使通胀率为零。但没有。在 目前中国的发展中,通胀年率低于五可以接受,目前是在六至七之间,不好,也不大坏。

大坏而又头痛的,是人民币兑美元上升了百分之十, 按照经济常规,币值上升是会带来通缩的,但没有。以香港为例,近两年港人到大陆消费,物价是上升了百分之二十强。不是说国内的人也遇到同样的通胀,分析复 杂,但可以肯定地说,因为人民币值在国际上升了,国内的通胀率其实不止目前公布的六至七之间。

这就带来一个有趣的经济学问题。币值上升,应该有通缩—读者不妨想象人民币值大幅上升,通缩必至—但为什么上升了百分之十还会有通胀加剧的现象呢?

我的解释有两方面。其一,贸易顺差急升,外资继续 涌进,外汇储备激增,这些进帐或迟或早是要用人民币兑换代替的。这会导致人民币的国内流通量增加。不是说外汇进帐要下降至零才没有通胀,但因为这进帐的激 增使人民币量上升,央行加息约束的主要是国内市民的消费与投资,不是明智之举。其二,央行以压制人民币需求的方法来纾缓其上升压力,例如禁止在国内自由地 以外币兑换人民币,有适得其反的效果。压制需求会促使市场预期人民币会继续上升,争持人民币会使币量被迫提升。

这就带来我曾经说过的一个重点:要纾缓人民币上升的压力,约束需求(目前做的)是劣着—正着是增加人民币的供应。后者,为避免国内的通胀加剧,央行要把人民币大量地放出国外—这是要解除目前的外汇管制了。

解除汇管,把人民币大量放出去,要人民币变得毫无 上升压力很容易,而放出去够多人民币值是会下降的。要注意:把人民币放出去与此前决定(而最近剎掣)的天津「直通车」到香港买股票很不相同。「直通车」是 内资外流,但人民币外放有引进外汇的效果,国家是有钱赚的。这里要说清楚:从经济学的角度看,我不反对内资外流,但指明是购买股票却是劣着。股票之价,原 则上,是反映着上市公司的回报率,市场应早有定论。无端端因为「直通车」而使港股上升了百分之四十,反映着股民一般无知,早晚会损手烂脚!买股票不是移民 潮买楼,不是自由行购物,而是市场投资,要看上市公司的投资回报。

炎黄子孙有钱出外投资,那很好,但要让他们自由选择投资的项目与回报的预期。说实话,当今之世,不容易找到一个地方投资比神州大地更可取,但如果炎黄子孙要分散一点,那到外间下点注,过瘾一下,也无不可,但不要强迫他们通过港股市场。

要纾缓人民币的上升压力,大量把人民币推出国际是 最上选的了。这里还有一个很少人注意到的重点。这两年人民币上升,主要是兑美元上升,而我说的接单工厂今天叫救命,主要是他们一律以美元结算!是个尴尬的 问题,炎黄子孙很有点面目无光:既为泱泱大国,经济搞了起来,震撼世界,但外国人购买中国货,为什么不能用人民币结算呢?这是因为中国还有汇管,人民币不 自由外放。

北京的朋友要为国家的尊严设想一下吧。但在目前的 形势下,解除汇管让人民币自由外放,有不小的机会带来相当头痛的麻烦:国内的通胀因而急速上升的机会存在。这里我们有两方面的考虑。一方面,有两点对通胀 是有利的。第一点,如果北京依照我的建议,取消进口税,贸易顺差大跌,有纾缓通胀的效果。第二点,以提升人民币的对外供应来减少该币的上升压力,市场再不 争持。另一方面,人民币自由外放,对通胀不利也有两点。第一点,人民币的强势下降的本身,会增加通胀的压力。第二点,如果外放了的人民币回流,国内的人民 币量增加也会导致通胀。人民币留在外地则不会,但外放了的总会有某部分回流,尤其是投资中国这些年成为风气了。我们无从估计外放了的人民币的回流比率会是 多少。

两点会纾缓通胀,两点会增加通胀压力,一起合并, 国内的物价会向哪个方向走呢?很难说。如果一定要我猜一下,我认为在目前的物价明显地趋升的形势下,解除汇管,外放人民币到没有上升压力的那点,国内通胀 加速的机会较高,有可能引起急速通胀。因此,我不能不旧话重提,建议人民币与一篮子物品挂钩。这后者我分析过多次,但好些读者还是不明白。应该是传统的货 币观误导了他们。我要从另一个角度再说一次。

这里要补充一下的,是人民币大量外放,中国的外汇储备会相应上升。与贸易顺差及外资涌进的储备上升不同:除非人民币大量回流,其外放带来的储备上升是不会增加通胀的。

(之三)

2007-11-10

The fundamental things apply

From the World Economic Forum’s annual Gender Gap report (via the rather conservative blog Cominganarchy), there are two interesting charts. They both provide evidence for my earlier comparison of the fundamental issues regarding the economic potential of India and China.

GDP/cap vs Gender Gap


Competitiveness vs Gender Gap


China is placed a bit lower than I had expected on this chart. I think it has to do with the scoring system. e.g., women literacy vs male were ranked and scored. Even though Chinese women's relative literacy is 0.91, it is only ranked #81. This means in certain measure a small difference (in terms of economic and social impact) has been magnified in this scoring.

But the more seirous problem with the China data here (and in general for all statistics) is that the urban-rural difference has been averaged. If we are to look at the urban data alone, I am sure the relative literacy (and most other measures) will greatly improve. I would not be surprise if urban China is ranked in top 25, or even 15. However, much of what the report reflects about China, esp the rural area, is true. When you listen to a restaurant waitress that she quitted school at 13 and now sending money back to pay for her younger brother's school fee, you know how much we still have to do in this country. When you are picking up your shirts and dresses from Banana Republic or A&F, with a "Made in China" sign, you would appreciate who really created the economic miracle in China. It is the hundreds of millions of country girls who work 70 hours a day in these sweat shops.

The fundamental things are that in China, 2 people works to support 3 people; in India only one person works to support 3, they do apply, as time goes by... this is what contributed to China's successful economic transformation, and what India needs to consider very seriously.

2007-09-10

Inflation in China is a very good thing, provided that ...

I was going to write a post about this. But I was glad that Professor Cheung already did this.

若要马儿好,让马儿吃草——从通胀说一篮子物品


Related links:
Commodity Peg
Cheung's interview with Phoenix TV
All essay on the basket peg
Series 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (or here)

IMHO, The arrogant professor may really be hitting the Nobel jackpot this time.

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最近北京公布通胀上升加速,是大新闻了。与去年七月相比,物价指数上升了百分之五点六,其中农产品之价上升尤甚,是百分之 十五点四。媒体纷纷求教,只覆一处,说:「我一则以喜,一则以忧,你要先听哪一则?」是女孩子访问的,聪明兼漂亮,难道老人家动了凡心乎?女孩子说要先听 「以喜」的那一则。
  
  一时间我有无限感慨:神州大地满是伪君子!又要马儿好,又要马儿不吃草!大家不是抢着说要改善农民的生活吗? 人均的农地面积那么小,而这些年数之不尽的农作青年随着流动人口流到工业那边去,加上炎黄子孙的袋里多了一点钱,要吃得好一点,农产品之价岂有不升之理? 我反对福利经济,反对补贴农民,但同意取消农业税,而更喜欢见到的是农产品之价上升了。这是我期待了很久的事,不出现中国农民的生活不会有大好转。三年前 农产品之价明显地上升了,我高兴,这次升得急,大吉大利也。朋友,要协助农民的生活吗?长贫难顾,补贴不是好办法。多花一块几毫购买他们的蔬菜,才是通过 市场来协助农民的妙方。
  
  在北京的物价指数内,农产品约占三分之一。算起来,农产品之价升百分之十五点四,非农产品之价的升幅只百 分之零点九,近于零。如果要物价指数整体的升幅是零,即是说毫无通胀,那么非农产品的物价指数要下降百分之七点七。农产品相对非农产品的物价一定要上升, 中国的农民才有希望的。最近的指数,显示这相对物价上升了百分之十七点一,是大好形势,可喜可贺也。
  
  转谈「以忧」的一则吧。中国 的物价指数何止上升了百分之五点六?一年来,人民币兑美元上升了百分之七强。一字都冇咁浅的经济逻辑说,币值上升,物价指数理应下降才对。这次币值上升而 物价指数又上升,物价的真实升幅应该是百分之十以上。跟与美元挂勾的港元相比,一年来人民币兑港元上升了百分之七强,国内物价指数上升了百分之五点六,从 香港游客的角度看,以港元兑换人民币到国内消费,国内的物价升幅约百分之十三。不是说百分之十三才是去年中国物价的真正升幅——对香港游客来说当然是—— 但因为国内的对外贸易一般以美元结算,通过外贸与外资的进入,这百分之十三的物价升幅早晚会大约地传达到中国人民的消费那边去。
  
   农产品之价上升了百分之十五点四是佳音,而非农产品之价只升百分之零点九也不是坏消息,然而,因为人民币的币值上升了不少,国内的人从旅游或物品进出口的 物价变动衡量,国内的物价是大幅地上升了。这可能引起国内的人对通胀形成了恶性预期,而这预期一旦形成了,不容易改过来,就算央行能成功地大事收缩人民币 的币量供应,改变通胀预期所需的时日不短。
  
  不要误会,我不是说通胀预期已经在中国形成了,也不是说因为最近公布的物价指数与人民币值的上升,这预期早晚会出现。我不知道,也无从知道,只是说,如果有通胀预期这回事,近今的数据变动逻辑上是通胀预期的成因。
  
   老实说,预期这回事或什么理性预期的,只有上苍才知道,我们凡夫俗子无从考究。人的预期是脑中的抽象物,既看不到,也摸不着。「预期」之所以在经济学存 在,是因为在推理时,逻辑上,不用上「预期」好些现象我们无从解释。另一方面,凡是难明的现象,推出「预期」可解,但一般性的解释力,以左预期右预期之法 作解释,不容易避免前后矛盾,低能也。再另一方面,不管预期何物,现象的观察是,预期一旦形成了,要改过来很困难。
  
  近今世界大 乱,什么恐怖活动,什么次按风波,而各地股市无不大上大落,到处汇率、利率皆如冇尾飞铊。中国呢?还是尽可能避开外来的波动为上。这不是说中国要独善其 身,只管自扫门前雪,不管他人瓦上霜。地球一体化,可以帮助他家中国要考虑,但如果中国因为外间的影响而自己波动起来,说什么协助他家是不自量力了。
  
   我因此不能不旧话重提,建议北京把一篮子物品的物价指数作为人民币之锚。只要这篮子的物品选得适当,人民币之锚稳守,通胀可以一次过地解决,而通胀预期 必去如黄鹤矣!这个以一篮子为锚的货币制度我解释过多次,这里不重述。以近今公布的物价指数为例,升幅百分之五点六,其中农产品升百分之十五点四,非农产 品升百分之零点九。如果人民币以一篮子物品的物价指数为锚,而该篮子有北京统计物价指数所选的物品有同样的代表性,那么坚守这篮子的指数不变,如果农产品 的物价上升了百分之十五点四,非农产品的物价一定会下降百分之七点七——通胀率是零。为锚的一篮子物价指数既可调高,也可调低。我认为每年调高百分之二, 即让物价上升至百分之二,是可取的。
  
  有了一篮子物品的依凭,要纾缓人民币上升的压力,北京大可解除外汇管制,把人民币推出国外。 人民币外放国家有钱可赚,而有了以一篮子物品为锚的维护,通胀无技可施。央行把人民币外放,要放到人民币的上升压力毫不存在为止。每放一元,国家赚一元。 如果人民币的币值因为外放太多而偏高,回头走,国内会有通胀的压力。如果每年的物价调高百分之二不够,或守不住,央行大可把人民币收回来。外汇储备那么 多,兵来将挡,水来土淹,何难之有哉?何况,把人民币大量外放,在强势下外汇进帐如猪笼入水,储备之高天下奇闻矣。
  
  有钱可以做很多有意义的事,不单为炎黄子孙,懂得怎样花对地球会有重要的贡献。