2011-05-26

Economist on Kissinger -- full of ignorance, from the Economist

The Economist, usually a very good journal, unfortunately, occasional blunders, such as this pretentious one on Kissinger's new book, only demonstrated how Economist writer's knowledge of history and the world had fallen to the abyss over time.

A couple examples
  • "It is not clear when or why America abandoned its notion that China should commit itself to peaceful reunification as a precondition for a presidential visit. China has never renounced the threat of invasion." -- I have to laugh at this. The Economist writer is so naive as to think the the US will value defending a disappointing dictator (in 1970s) in an island of 15M people against the US's own national security strategy against its archenemy, USSR. How old were you in 1970? They want Dr Kissinger to admit this fact openly? so what?
  • 'Nor does Mr Kissinger explain the thinking behind the communiqué signed after Nixon’s first visit, in which America acknowledged “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." Large numbers of people in Taiwan have never maintained any such thing. But for China’s leaders, and, it seems Mr Kissinger himself, public opinion anywhere outside the United States is not really a factor when the geopolitical stakes are so high.'  Again, what the Economist alluded might be true for Taiwan today, but back in 1970s the government in Taiwan (THE ally of the US) clearly "maintained such thing", and so was the majority of people who lived on the island back then. In addition, there was NO such public opinion in the 1970s from the large numbers of people in Taiwan. If anything, the voice of the pro-KMT people living in US would have been the dominant voice, and probably still are over-represented in US (compared with back on the island)...And yes, it is true, geopolitical stakes trumps the hypothetical thesis, but the truth is such thesis did not even exist back in 1970s
  •  "China’s involvement in the Korean war, for example, led, in Mr Kissinger’s phrase, to “two years of war and 20 years of isolation”, hardly a goal for China—or a wei qi triumph."...This seems to be taken entirely out of context. China was drawn into the war, very reluctantly (or at least very passively), by the pressure of Stalin and also the unscrupulous action/declaration by General McArthur. You can only talk about goal if you initiated something.

The Economist is right in ONLY one single tidbit, though, regarding the mataphor of chess vs "Go". However, it has failed to explain why, and I wonder if the writers understands what is fundamentally wrong in his critique. But thanks to the internet, a commentator (bismack888) had put it very well in its webpage (something you don't read if you got the print or ipad edition)
  • The funny thing is most modern Chinese don't actually play alot of Go, Chinese chess is much more popular among Chinese people. This was particularly true of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. This is what Mao Zedong had to say about the Sino-Indian war.
  • Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess:
  • Their [India's] continually pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What should we do? We can also set out a few pawns, on our side of the river. If they don't then cross over, that’s great. If they do cross, we'll eat them up [chess metaphor meaning to take the opponent's pieces]. Of course, we cannot blindly eat them. Lack of forbearance in small matters upsets great plans. We must pay attention to the situation.
  • The concept of encirclement is relatively new in China, only in Modern day China does it become a concern.
However, while focusing on the discourse of chess vs go (which is really nothing "strategic" IMHO, except that go has something to do with two dimension geography and hence geopolitics). The Economist forgot that Kissinger spend a great deal of time discussing Romance of the Three Kingdom, which is the essence of Mao's strategic thinking.


---

America and ChinaNo go

The Western politician who understands China best tries to explain it—but doesn’t quite succeed
May 19th 2011 | from the print edition


On China. By Henry Kissinger. Penguin Press; 586 pages; $36. Allen Lane; £30. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk

CHINESE and American leaders have been sniping at each other in public again. This month Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, discussing political reform, told the Atlantic magazine that China’s leaders were “trying to stop history, which is a fool’s errand”. This may have been what provoked Wang Qishan, a Chinese deputy prime minister, to tell a television interviewer that Americans were “simple” (perhaps “innocent” conveys the Chinese word better), and have trouble understanding China, “because it is an ancient civilisation, and we are of the Oriental culture.”

Mr Wang will applaud Henry Kissinger’s latest work, a distillation of more than 40 years of involvement with China and its leaders, and an unabashedly Orientalist affirmation of the otherness of the country. The most riveting chapters deal with Mr Kissinger’s leading roles in the Nixon administration as it established links with Mao Zedong’s China. The well-known story bears retelling by a central protagonist who made his first, secret trip in July 1971, pleading illness to take a few days out of his official schedule while on a visit to Pakistan. President Richard Nixon’s own trip in 1972, which had been initiated by Mr Kissinger, was indeed a “week that changed the world”, as China and America ganged up to deter Soviet expansionism.

Mr Kissinger’s encounters with the urbane, conciliatory prime minister, Zhou Enlai, and the elliptical, moody Mao—and indeed with every senior Chinese leader since—make gripping reading. Some of Mao’s allusively poetic dialogue, in particular, is beyond parody: “At the approach of the rain and the wind the swallows are busy.” The panoramic authority with which the Chinese leaders (and their interlocutor) dissect the world is breathtaking.

But Mr Kissinger is not telling all. He recounts how, in the years beforehand, more than 100 exploratory meetings in Warsaw had made no progress because of Taiwan, which America still recognised as “the Republic of China”. It is not clear when or why America abandoned its notion that China should commit itself to peaceful reunification as a precondition for a presidential visit. China has never renounced the threat of invasion.

Nor does Mr Kissinger explain the thinking behind the communiqué signed after Nixon’s first visit, in which America acknowledged “that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” Large numbers of people in Taiwan have never maintained any such thing. But for China’s leaders, and, it seems Mr Kissinger himself, public opinion anywhere outside the United States is not really a factor when the geopolitical stakes are so high.

Before Mr Kissinger himself enters the narrative, the reader is offered 200 pages of history of modern China and its foreign relations. Most of this is uncontentious and well told. But it is marred by three related flaws. The first is Mr Kissinger’s insight that Chinese strategists think like players of wei qi or Go, which means that, in the long term, they wish to avoid encirclement. Westerners are chess-players, tacticians aiming to get rid of their opponents’ pieces “in a series of head-on clashes”, he writes. “Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility.”

This conceit has been used by other authors. It appears every few pages here like a nervous tic. Even before Mr Kissinger joins the game, the metaphor is pulled into service to analyse, among other things, Chinese policy in the Korean war, the Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s (where, of course, “both sides were playing by wei qi rules”), the 1962 war with India (“wei qi in the Himalayas”). Later he describes events in Indochina as “a quadripartite game of wei qi”, just at the time when genocide was under way in Cambodia.

Second, the picture of Chinese foreign policy, as formulated by cool, calculating, master strategists playing wei qi, makes it appear more coherent, consistent and effective than it has been. China’s involvement in the Korean war, for example, led, in Mr Kissinger’s phrase, to “two years of war and 20 years of isolation”, hardly a goal for China—or a wei qi triumph.

Third, Mr Kissinger gives little weight to the fact that Mao, Zhou and the others were in fact communists. In power they soon replicated some of the forms of an imperial court, and China’s history always mattered more to them than “Das Kapital”. But one cannot ignore the influence of Mao’s adaptation of Marxist ideology on his foreign policy, let alone the importance to domestic politics of the Leninist structures imposed on the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920s, which still wears well.

In a rare admission of a blunder, Mr Kissinger recounts the only time he saw Zhou lose his serenity—at a banquet in Beijing in November 1973 when Mr Kissinger said that China had remained “essentially Confucian in its belief in a single, universal, generally applicable truth”. Communism, he suggested, had established Marxism as the content of that truth.

This was an extraordinary gaffe. Zhou was under indirect attack by Mao’s cronies through a campaign criticising Confucius. But his reaction also illustrates the prickliness of Chinese leaders when foreigners presume to pronounce on the eternal verities of Chinese culture.

If even the venerable Mr Kissinger can be caught out, what hope for American statesmen far less familiar with China? The problems that have beset relations since he left the stage are not surprising. His book describes the important role he played as an intermediary in trying to resolve the worst crisis—after the Beijing massacre of 1989. Shortly afterwards, the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the relationship of its “defining shared purpose”.

Since then, America’s relations with China have been marked by a startling increase in economic interdependence, but not by any onset of mutual trust. Mr Kissinger notes that in the post-1989 era, China’s foreign-policy posture has been “closer to Bismarck’s than Mao’s”. It has, you could say, taken up chess.

In his closing chapter Mr Kissinger finally turns to the big question: does China’s astonishingly rapid rise condemn it to inevitable conflict with America? He notes the similarities with the rise of Germany a century ago and the inevitable threat it posed to the British empire. America and China, too, could easily fall into a cycle of escalating tension that would be hard to break. Optimistically, Mr Kissinger insists that “were history confined to the mechanical repetition of the past, no transformation would ever have occurred.” But on how to avoid such repetition, he is disappointingly vague.

2011-05-22

Shift in phone markets

Via Big Picture



There are other charts in Washington Post.

Khan Academy explaining how the Chinese Yuan is pegged

Salman Khan: The Messiah of Math

The Khan Academy has a series on finance as well, and in particular, on the Chinese Yuan pegging mechanism. In really, it is "a basket" not just the USD since mid-2005. Well, at least that is what they said.





Lee Kuan Yew: Charlie Roas interview on Mar 18, 2011

Lee Kuan Yew: Charlie Roas interview on Mar 18, 2011, and here.

The great old man seems to have lost most of his (physical) teeth, but he is just as sharp as he used to be.







2011-03-18

Fukushima is not Chernobyl

 Update: 2 very well written Chinese articels

核电站事故FAQ非常浅显版
为什么要发展核电?


The analogy is like iodized salt vs iodine tablet.
  1. Chernobyl exploded to the sky/air, and wind carried the nuclear waste away. There is no chance Fukushima will explode, even in the worse case of a melt-down. The difference between the recommended circle of evacuation we heard, from US vs Japanese guidelines, are 80km vs 20km. an 80km circle is about the size of Hong Kong. So people in Tokyo will be safe, very safe.
  2. The inner steel-concrete is intact. Yes, there is a theoretical possibility that there might be a leak, and risk if temperature will rise. The truth is once such risk arises, cement can be poured in to seal the reactors permanently. Worse case: the 50km radius or so will be no man zone, mainly a a result of radiation level risk -- but a paradise for wildlife.
  3.  (As the New Scientists put it) What is different about the Fukushima Daiichi accident?
    The Chernobyl reactor was actually running – albeit at low power – at the time of the accident there. By contrast the Fukushima Daiichi reactors automatically shut down as soon as they felt the earthquake, by inserting control rods so the nuclear reactions in their cores began slowing within seconds. This means that, from the outset, the amount of heat being produced was much smaller than at Chernobyl. (I should add that Reactor #4, which has been damaged, actually has no fuel rod inside)

Why Fukushima Daiichi won't be another Chernobyl
Six days after the earthquake that rocked Japan and left thousands dead, the nation is now struggling to avert disaster at its Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Events have moved fast and risks are hard to assess.
The worst nuclear accident in history was the Chernobyl explosion of 1986 in what is now Ukraine. Nuclear experts have repeatedly stated that the Japanese situation cannot get as bad as Chernobyl. New Scientist explains why.
What has happened so far in Japan?
Following Friday's magnitude-9 earthquake off the coast of Japan, the nuclear reactors at Fukushima Daiichi automatically shut down – as they were meant to. However the cooling systems have repeatedly failed, leading the cores of some of the reactors to overheat.
This has led indirectly to explosions damaging both the outer buildings and parts of the containment systems intended to prevent radioactive material from escaping. Because of these breaches, some of that material has got into the atmosphere.
Additionally, ponds containing used fuel rods have been overheating, and could potentially lead to more contamination.
We published a detailed rundown of events so far on 15 March, and you can follow the latest developments on our Short Sharp Science blog.
What happened at Chernobyl?
Staff at the plant were running tests to find out how well they could cope with a temporary shutdown of the reactor's cooling system. The test went wrong and there was a power surge. The staff tried to shut the reactor down, but instead the nuclear reaction accelerated rapidly.
"For a few seconds it was generating thousands of times the normal power output," says Michael Bluck of Imperial College London. The extreme heat from the nuclear reaction triggered an explosion, which blew the roof off both the reactor vessel and the building containing it – exposing the reactor core to the outside world – and sending radioactive material hurtling into the atmosphere.
Fires then started. Most were put out within hours, but the one in the damaged reactor burned for many days, spreading radioactive material still further.
How bad was Chernobyl?
Chernobyl is the only event ever to be given the maximum rating of 7 on theInternational Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, which measures the severity of nuclear accidents. This means it released a major amount of radioactive material that covered a wide area.
It's too early to say how the Fukushima Daiichi incident will compare. The Japanese authorities provisionally put the event at level 4, a "local accident". Earlier this week, however, the French nuclear agency rated the disaster as at least a level 5 or 6.
What is different about the Fukushima Daiichi accident?
The Chernobyl reactor was actually running – albeit at low power – at the time of the accident there. By contrast the Fukushima Daiichi reactors automatically shut down as soon as they felt the earthquake, by inserting control rods so the nuclear reactions in their cores began slowing within seconds. This means that, from the outset, the amount of heat being produced was much smaller than at Chernobyl.
So why couldn't a runaway reaction happen at Fukushima Daiichi?
The Chernobyl reactor had a fundamentally different design to those at Fukushima Daiichi. Chernobyl ran on unenriched uranium, which is a fairly weak nuclear fuel. In order to use it, the reactor was designed in a way that made it easier for the nuclear reaction to accelerate. This allowed it to generate useful amounts of power, but it also left it vulnerable to running out of control.
Fukushima Daiichi runs on more powerful fuels than Chernobyl did, mostly enriched uranium. In contrast to the Ukrainian reactor, its design minimises the nuclear reaction unless its human operators boost it. "You have to actually try to make it go," Bluck says.
Ordinarily the reactor cores are surrounded by water. Heat from the nuclear reaction boils the water, creating steam that drives turbines which generate electricity. In doing so, the water also helps to cool the reactor.
But crucially, the water is also a "moderator": it helps keep the uranium fission reaction going by slowing down neutrons produced by the reaction as they hurtle out of the fuel rods. Slow neutrons sustain the reaction, by liberating still more neutrons and heat from uranium atoms in the rods; fast-moving neutrons just pass straight through the other fuel rods without colliding with other uranium atoms. If the water heats up too much, however, bubbles form within it and these allow the neutrons to escape, slowing down the nuclear reaction.
Effectively, if the coolant overheats, it starts shutting down the reaction without any human intervention. "It's a brilliant solution," Bluck says.
Nuclear engineers call this a "negative void coefficient", because having voids – bubbles – in the coolant slows down the reaction. By contrast Chernobyl had a positive void coefficient, so the reaction was more likely to accelerate.
Could Fukushima Daiichi catch fire like Chernobyl did?
There have been some small fires on the site, all of which were put out rapidly. In one case the Japanese authorities initially said that one of the spent fuel ponds was itself on fire, but this was later retracted and it remains unclear what actually happened. In another case, the fire has been attributed to diesel engines pumping water into the reactors. All of the fires seem to have been outside the pressure vessels that contain the core of radioactive fuel rods.
At Chernobyl the pressure vessel was breached and the reactor had no containment. There, the core itself burned fiercely, largely because it was made of graphite – which was used as the moderator. This did not make the accident more likely, explains Bluck, but once the reactor exploded the graphite made the situation worse, because it burned so readily. The fires carried radioactive material from the reactor core high into the atmosphere, where it spread far and wide. This could not happen at Fukushima Daiichi, as it does not use graphite as the moderator.
What is the worst-case scenario for Fukushima Daiichi?
It's difficult to be definitive, because information is limited and often confused, and the outcome will depend on the decisions the plant's operators take.
But at the moment the reactors themselves seem to be largely under control and are cooling rapidly. The control rods, which absorb neutrons and dampen down the nuclear reactions, have been in since Friday, and the reactors have been suffused with seawater laced with boric acid – another neutron absorber. Because of the reactors' negative void coefficients, the nuclear reactions cannot now restart unless those actions are reversed. "There is no scope for there to be criticality," Bluck says.
Meltdown would only become possible if, for some inexplicable reason, the operators were to undo all they have done to date to control the reaction.
There have been some leaks of radioactive material and will probably be more, partly because containment systems have been breached, and partly because radioactive steam must be regularly vented to allow more water in.
The biggest threat now seems to be the spent fuel ponds, where the water level has fallen and temperatures have risen. That could lead to the fuel rods breaking open, releasing their radioactive contents.
Bluck is surprised that the ponds are proving so problematic, because unlike the reactor cores they contain no high-pressure steam making it hard to pump in cooling water. The ponds are a standard feature of nuclear facilities, and are typically designed to ensure that nuclear reactions cannot restart in the fuel rods: among other things, the rods should be widely spaced in the pond.
However, the company operating Fukushima Daiichi has now said that, for the fuel pond at reactor 4, "the risk of recriticality is not zero", meaning a nuclear chain reaction could restart in the rods. Quite how this has come about is unclear. But adding boric acid to absorb the neutrons should stop the reaction before it starts.

    2011-02-06

    US position on Egypt?

    The Chinese are probably wondering, what if, or why didn't

    'the US supported Jiang ZM in 1989...'

    2011-02-02

    都是“有勇氣”滴人啊

    離去很容易決定,留低卻需要好大的勇氣...

    2010-12-29

    reading list Nov 2010

    C觀點 - 施永青
    誰最不想韓國統一

    (2010年12月24日)

    近年南韓的經濟發展得非常迅速,一些電子產品已行銷全球,攻佔了原先屬日本產品主導的市場。相反,北韓的經濟卻長期停滯不前,且經常發生饑荒,人民不斷外逃。因此,即使北韓有核武器,但若以綜合國力計,南韓絕對比北韓強。

    這種發展,已令朝鮮半島的勢力失去平衡。上次朝鮮戰爭,之所以會在三八線停火,是因為勢均力敵。但現在蘇聯已不復存在,而中國與北朝鮮的關係又不如毛澤東與金日成時代友好。這本是南韓統一朝鮮半島的大好機會,但南韓在天安艦與延坪島事件上都沒有乘機發難,原因是南韓受制於美韓安全條約,韓國軍隊已交由美國統一指揮;美國如果不想打,南韓單獨是打不起來的。

    上次韓戰停火後,中國的志願軍已撤出北韓;但美軍卻一直留在南韓。不難設想,如果南北韓統一,美軍再沒有藉口留在韓國。以韓國人的民族情緒,他們是不會在沒有需要的情況下,繼續讓外國軍隊長期駐在自己的國土上的。這種發展,並不符合美國在全球的戰略部署。為了維護美國在全球的一哥地位,美國是不會輕易放棄在外國的軍事基地的。

    然而,韓國的民情與台灣的民情有別。台灣有相當一部分人想獨立苟安,但韓國人卻一面倒的傾向統一。「維基解密」說,有中國官員私下向南韓透露,中國樂於看到,統一後的韓國由南韓執政。這極有可能是真的,因為中國極需要向南韓表示,中國不會是韓國統一的阻力。這將刺激韓國人好好地想一想,誰才是韓國統一的真正阻力。

    其實,國與國之間的外交關係,無可避免以本國的利益為主導。當年中國派志願軍去北韓參戰,亦是認定了美國會乘機顛覆中國。現時,中國極需要多三十年和平發展的機會,因此不可能會鼓勵北韓向南韓挑釁,製造紛爭。把朝鮮半島的形勢弄得這麼緊張,只會讓美軍有藉口留在亞洲圍堵中國。

    很明顯,北韓絕不是中國可靠的盟友。過去,中蘇有爭拗的時候,北韓倒向蘇聯,而不是中國。現在,北韓表面上與中國友好,但目的主要是拿中國的經濟援助。有人認為,中國想借北韓來牽制美國。但北韓根本不會聽中國的話,他只會為中國製造麻煩,而不會配合中國的國策。

    自從中國與南韓建立邦交之後,不難發覺,南韓可以替中國帶來很多互利的雙邊關係;而北韓卻只會拿中國的好處,並不斷為中國帶來麻煩。因此,中國樂於看到統一後的朝鮮由南韓來管治是很正常的。

    北韓雖然說信奉社會主義,但金日成家族的政權,父傳子,子又傳孫,已與封建王朝無異。這種與人類歷史背道而馳的發展,根本為天理所不容。相反,南韓若能統一朝鮮半島,不但可以減少亞洲的紛爭,而且可使北韓的剩餘勞力找到出路,令南韓的經濟發展有更多的空間,對兩邊的人民都有利。統一後的韓國,不但會與中國有更多的經濟交往,而且會減少對美國的依賴,其外交政策將更加獨立。獨立後的韓國,不一定肯做美國圍堵中國的棋子。

    Revisit: China vs USA, total GDP growth

    I wrote in 2005:
    total GDP of China (in PPP) could be comparable to that of US in 15-20 years, in an optimistic scenario.


    Now the Economist projected it to be around 2019, one year ahead of my optimistic scenario. I still think the Economist is a bit to optimistic.

    2010-12-09

    Chart manipulation: how to make 99 appears 6 time larger than 663

    The Economist is very good in manipulating charts. In the past, it would make 120 appears twice as large as 110 by plotting the y-intercept at 100.

    Here is another innovation to mislead our readers.